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as a matter of fact under the master's control.

III. Rule applied.

a. Caddy leaving golf course. In Indian Hill Club v. Industrial Commission (1923) 309 III. 271, 140 N. E. 871, an injury sustained by a boy twelve years old, who was a caddy at a golf course, while he was about to leave the grounds of the club, was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. The court said: "It is also contended that the injury did not occur in the course of the employment, and did not arise out of it. The defendant in error, having waited until he saw there was no prospect of his services being needed, was leaving the grounds of the club, and while doing so, but still on the grounds and about 30 feet from the clubhouse, was injured. It is not essential to the right to receive compensation that the employee should have been working at the particular time when the injury was received. The employment is not limited to the exact moment when he begins work and when he quits work. . . . An injury accidentally received on the premises of the employer by an employee while going to or from his place of employment by a customary or permitted route within a reasonable time before or after work is received in the course of and arises out of the employment."

b. Persons employed on construction

work.

It will be observed that, in the cases discussed herein, the accidents did not occur on the premises of the employer, but at places where the employee, because of the nature of the work, was required to be. The general rule stated supra, II., however, has been applied to these cases, with the result of protecting the employee while entering or leaving such place.

Thus, in H. W. Nelson R. Constr. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1919) 286 III. 632, 122 N. E. 113, the deceased, who was employed in con

struction work on or near a railroad bridge, was injured while attempting to get to the other side of the bridge for the purpose of eating his lunch, having left his dinner pail or that side of the river, and it was held that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.

And in Stephens Engineering Co. v. Industrial Commission (1919) 290 Ill. 88, 124 N. E. 869, it was held that injury sustained by a carpenter employed to make repairs and remode a grain elevator, while attempting to leave the grain elevator, at the end of the day's work, by way of a fire escape extending from the ground to the bin floor of the building along the side of the building, and consisting of a ladder structure, arose out of and in the course of the em ployment. The court said: "There is testimony in the record tending to establish that the employees of the plaintiff in error were in the habit of using the fire escape on the elevator as a means of descent from the bin room, and that such use was known to the plaintiff in error. There is also in the record evidence tending to show that the fire escape was a safe means of descent. It appears that the day's work of the deceased and other employees was not completed until they had descended from the bin room, and turned in their names and numbers to the timekeeper. There is, therefore, evidence in the record tending to establish that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased. and the industrial commission was justified in so finding."

In Jobst v. Industrial Commission (1922) 303 III. 599, 136 N. E. 493, an inexperienced employee who was working on a scaffold, removing forms from completed concrete work, was injured while attempting, at the close of the working period, to descend to the ground by sliding down a rope which hung from the end of the scaffold; and it was held that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The court said: "The question in this case is, What was Waible (the employee) doing at

the time he was injured?-not, How was he doing it? It must be conceded that he was acting within the scope of his employment when he was getting off the scaffold at the end of the day's work. Theretofore the scaffold had been raised or lowered, as the case might be, so that he could climb through window and descend by a stairway. This would have been the safer method to have adopted, and it is not likely that he would have been injured if he had left the scaffold in the customary way. He said that, after Headley left him on the scaffold, he became frightened, and that he did not know any other way to descend than to follow Headley down the rope. He had seen Headley land safely, and it cannot be said that his attempt to descend by the same method amounted to a wilful intention to injure himself."

See also Hoffman v. Knisely Bros. 1916) 199 Ill. App. 530, where an employee who was injured at the end of the day while descending the stairway of the building on which he was working, was held to be within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, on the ground that the injury was one arising out of and in the course of the employment.

and conse

And in De Mann v. Hydraulic Engineering Co. (1916) 192 Mich. 594, 159 N. W. 380, an injury resulting in death, received by a laborer by striking his head against a crossbeam while climbing stairs, and quently falling down the stairs, was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, on the ground that the employment is not limited by the exact time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, nor when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. In the instant case, the deceased had completed his day's work and was about to go for his coat and dinner pail.

And where an employee of a contractor, excused, upon reporting for

work on a certain day, by the superintendent in charge, because the latter thought the employee was drunk, was injured by falling while leaving the place of employment, it was held that the employee was entitled to the protection of the act. Kiernan v. Friestedt Underpinning Co. (1916) 171 App. Div. 539, 157 N. Y. Supp. 900.

But see Sheriff v. Wilson, 3 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 661, holding that an injury sustained by a workman who was engaged in making repairs on a church, by falling from a railing in attempting to enter the church by the window, due to his inability to open the door, did not arise out of and in the course of the employment, on the ground that the employment had not yet commenced.

c. Factory employees.

1. Injuries received before beginning day's work.

on

Co.

In Jeffries v. Pitman-Moore (1925) 83 Ind. App. 159, 147 N. E. 919, it was held that an injury received by a factory superintendent by being struck by an interurban street car fifteen minutes before the time to begin work, while driving his automobile the private roadway maintained by the employer, which was the only and customary means of ingress and egress from the building, arose out of and in the course of the employment. The court said: "The instant case is not that of an employee being injured on his way to work over a way and at a time of his own choosing. Jeffries was going to work over a roadway through the premises of his employer, a way prepared and maintained by his employer for the use of himself and his coemployees in going to their place of work. It was the way that his employer intended that he should go. He was going, too, at the usual time for him to go. He was superintendent of a department. Under his contract of employment, it was his duty to be in the factory building to commence work at 7 o'clock in the morning. If he was to be in his place of work ready for the

men in his department to begin work at 7 o'clock, it was necessary for him to be on his way before that time. If he was a faithful and competent superintendent, he would see to it that he was at his place of work sufficiently early in the morning that he would have time to park his automobile and change his clothes, if necessary, and see to it that all was in readiness in his department before the time fixed for work to commence. At any rate, he was going to work at the usual and customary time for him and other employees in the factory to go. It would be a harsh rule to deny compensation to an employee for an accidental injury which occurred but a few minutes before the time fixed for his work to begin, and at a place which faithful service on his part required him to be at that time, preparatory to commencement of the day's work. We do not mean to hold that under any and all circumstances compensation is to be allowed an employee who is injured on the premises of his employer on his way to work. What we do hold is that where a factory employee, while going to work at the usual and customary time and manner of going, and over a roadway constructed and maintained by the employer for the use of the employees in going to and from the factory, is accidentally killed on such roadway, near his place of work, on the premises of the employer, his death is the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the employment."

Where an electrician, upon arrival at the shop to begin his day's work, was injured by the explosion of a dynamite cap while striking a match to light a cigarette, such injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, notwithstanding the fact that the use of the dynamite cap was confined to parts of the premises remote from the building in which the accident occurred. Rish v. Iowa Portland Cement Co. (1919) 186 Iowa, 443, 170 N. W. 532.

2. Injuries received preparatory to leaving premises; washing or cleaning up. In Re Ayers (1918) 66 Ind. App.

458, 118 N. E. 386, it appeared that the employees were, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the employer, in the habit of providing warm water with which to wash up at the close of the day's work, by heating an iron bar in the furnace and placing it in a bucket of water. On the occasion in question, when the furnace fire was extinguished, the claimant, mistaking boiling acid in a vat for hot water, dropped a bucket of water into it, causing an explosion, and consequently the injuries complained of; and it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.

And in Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach (1918) 181 Ky. 262, 13 A.L.R. 524, 204 S. W. 152, 16 N. C. C. A. 879, it was held that one who was employed in bottling liquors for a wholesale liquor concern, and who had finished his work for the day, and was washing himself preparatory to leaving the master's premises for the night, wher he came in contact with an electric wire at the washbasin and was killed. was in the course of his employment, and his dependents were entitled to compensation under the act. The court said: "Undoubtedly, one who is washing, dressing, and preparing himself on the master's premises, at the close of the day's work, to leave the premises, is, in the meaning of the act, in the course of his employment, because all of these things are reasonably incident to the day's work."

And it has been held that a girl employee combing particles of wool from her hair at the close of the day's work. preparatory to going out, and who was injured by her hair catching in moving machinery, was entitled to compensation, and that the injury arose Terlecki v. out of the employment. Strauss (1914) 85 N. J. L. 454, 89 Atl. 1023, 4 N. C. C. A. 584, affirmed without opinion in (1914) 86 N. J. L. 708, 92 Atl. 1087. The court said: "It would be entirely too narrow a construction to limit the benefit of the statute to the time the workman is a tually employed at his machine. He must have time to reach his machine and to get away from his employer's

premises. In fact, it is a necessary implication of the contract of employment that the workman shall come to his work and shall leave with reasonable speed when the work is over. The preparation reasonably necessary for beginning work after the employer's premises are reached, and for leaving when the work is over, is a part of the employment. A workman is none the less in the course of employment because he is engaged in changing his street clothes for his working clothes, or in changing his working clothes for his street clothes. In the present case, it was reasonably necessary that the petitioner should comb her hair and remove the particles of wool before leaving the factory."

See also Brink v. J. W. Wells Lumber Co. (1924) 229 Mich. 35, 201 N. W. 222, holding that an employee who, after his day's work, and after punching the time clock, as he was required to do, fell and injured himself while following a usual route of departure, intending to leave the premises of his employer by a certain gate, was within the protection of the act.

3. Injury received while running to punch time clock.

And so it has been held that, where an employee was injured as a result of colliding with a fellow employee while running to punch the time clock, preparatory to going home to lunch, the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co. (1914) 180 Mich. 168, L.R.A.1916A, 22, 146 N. W. 665, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 386, 4 N. C. C. A. 851.

4. Revisiting place of employment after quitting time.

In Urban v. Topping Bros. (1918) 184 App. Div. 633, 172 N. Y. Supp. 432, an accident resulting in death to an employee was held not to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where it appeared that the employee, who five minutes after quitting time, and after he had washed up, put on his coat and hat, and gone to the door to go out, returned to the work room to look for his companions with whom he usually went home, and, not finding them there, was, while call

ing to them down an open elevator shaft, killed by a descending elevator. The basis of the above decision was that at the time the employee met his death he was not engaged in the business of his employment, for his act in turning back and looking about the room for his companions, and putting his head into the elevator shaft, was his own voluntary act, and he had thereby deviated from his direct and ordinary route or passage for purposes of his own.

See infra, III. e, 5, for cases involving injuries to miner revisiting mine after quitting time.

5. Injury received while descending staircase after termination of day's work.

And where an employee in a comb factory sustained an injury while leaving the building in which he was working, at the termination of his day's work, by means of an outside covered staircase leading from the second floor of the building to the ground, it was held that the injury thus received arose out of and in the course of the employment, on the ground that there is a reasonable probability that some employee in the course of his employment will fall and receive an injury while descending a staircase of an employer, constructed and used as the staircase was in the case at bar. O'Brien's Case (1917) 228 Mass. 380, 117 N. E. 619.

6. Injuries received while using ele

vator.

In Lienau v. Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. (1922) 151 Minn. 258, 186 N. W. 945, it was held that where an employee of a telephone company, whose employment was on an upper floor of a building owned by the company and used exclusively by it, was injured while descending in an elevator in the building upon leaving work, the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment within the meaning of the Compensation Act.

And where an employee, arriving at the building in which he was employed twenty minutes before the time work usually began, was injured while riding on a freight elevator which was

not guarded as provided by statute, it was held that the injury nevertheless arose out of and in the course of the employment. Novack v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1924) 158 Minn. 495, 198 N. W. 290. The court said: "Appellant suggests that, because the employee was at the place where she received her injury at 7:40 A. M. and she was not to begin work until 8 o'clock A. M., she had not yet assumed her duties, and that the relation of master and servant had not begun, and that 'the hours of service' had not arrived. We cannot so hold. This employee reached the premises twenty minutes ahead of time to begin work. This was in the wintertime. We do not know how far she had to travel, and contend with winter traffic, and her promptness is more to her credit than being one minute late. We hold that, upon reaching the premises of the employer twenty minutes before 8 o'clock, she was there within a reasonable time in that season of the year, and that, upon her arrival upon the premises, within such reasonable time, she immediately became subject to and was entitled to the benefits of the Compensation Act, and that she was in the elevator at the time of her injury 'during the hours of service.'"

And in Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald (1920) 143 Tenn. 505, 226 S. W. 215, it appeared that an employee left the building in which she was employed, and went across the street to procure some lunch, and, as she was returning to the first floor of the building in which she was employed, to eat her lunch, in an elevator which was operated by someone on the outside thereof, and which did not stop at the first floor, but ran past the same, and the employee, becoming excited, attempted to get off, but fell into the elevator shaft and was killed, and it was held that the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment.

7. Employee directed to come to factory for wages.

In Crane Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922) 306 III. 56, 137 N. E. 437,

evidence that an employee was directed by his foreman to come to the factory to receive his pay, and that the employee, after leaving the factory with his pay, fell and injured himself while on the premises of the employer, on his way home, was held sufficient to sustain a finding that the injury was sustained in the course of the employment.

And in Riley v. William Holland & Sons [1911] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 1029 — C. A., an employee who was discharged on a Wednesday, who came on the following Friday to get her wages, and was injured by slipping on the stairs of the mill, on her way to get the wages due, was held entitled to compensation. Cozens-Hardy, M. R., said: "I think it is a fallacy to assume that the 'employment' ceases necessarily when the actual work ceases. It included going from the place of work and going to and from the pay office. In the words of Lord Cranworth in Brydon v. Stewart (1855) 2 Macq. H. L. Cas. (Scot.) 30, we ought to 'take a great latitude in the construction of the phrase "being engaged in his employ." The contractual obligations of the employers were not terminated or satisfied until the wages due on Wednesday were paid on Friday. Mrs. Riley had not only permission to go to the mill on Friday to receive her wages, but it was her duty towards her employers to go to the mill and not to require them to search her out and pay her elsewhere. Though her employment was at an end on Wednesday night, in the sense that she had ceased to work under the contract, yet the employment continued because of the obligation of the employer to her arising out of the course of the employment and continuing until Friday afternoon."

See also infra, III. i, 2, for injury received by store employee while us ing elevator, and also IV. b, 2, for injury sustained by employee while us ing elevator in building occupied by several different employers.

For injury to hotel employee while using elevator to leave premises, see infra, III. d.

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