amusement, or public conveyance on land or water, restaurants, barber shops, eating houses, or other places of public resort, refreshment, accommodation, or entertainment, or denies or aids or incites another to deny to any other person because of race, creed, or color, or previous condition of servitude, the full and equal enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any hotel, inn, tavern, restaurant, eating house, soda-water fountain, ice-cream parlor, public conveyance on land or water, theater, barber shop or other place of public refreshment, amusement, instruction, accommodation, or entertainment," it was declared, as hereinbefore set out, that the power of the legislature to enact the Civil Rights Statute "as to all kinds of business, of a public or quasi public character, conducted for the accommodation, refreshment, amusement, or instruction of the public, which the state has the right to regulate under its police power, so that all classes of citizens may enjoy the benefit thereof without unjust discrimination, is no longer open to discussion." This case involved the construction of the statute, the specific question being whether or not saloons or places where intoxicating liquors were sold came within the meaning of the statute, it being contended that they did under the general words "or other places of public refreshment." The court, while holding that saloons did not come within the meaning of the statute, under the rule of ejusdem generis, declared that there could be no doubt of the power of the legislature to bring within the operation of such a statute "places where spirituous, vinous, and malt liquors are sold to the public, which exist wholly under the authority of state laws." In Darius v. Apostolos (1919) 68 Colo. 323, 10 A.L.R. 986, 190 Pac. 510, a statute providing that "all persons" shall be entitled to the equal enjoyment "of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and all other places of public accommodation and amusement," and making violation of a statute a misdemeanor, was held not unconstitutional, as applied to the business of operating a boot-blacking stand (which the court held to come within the meaning of the term "other places of public accommodation"). In this case, it was said: If "such construction makes the act unconstitutional as applied to the business of defendant in error, it is, for the same reason, unconstitutional as to barber shops. The contrary has been held, and we think correctly,"-citing the case of Messenger v. State (Neb.) infra. In Messenger v. State (1889) 25 Neb. 674, 41 N. W. 638, a statute providing, in effect, that "all persons within this state shall be entitled to the full enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, barber shops, theaters, and other places of amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to every person," and making a violation of the statute a misdemeanor, was declared to be within the power of the legislature to enact, in a case involv ing a matter of practice (the specific question being whether or not it was necessary to allege in the information that person excluded from barber shop was a citizen of the state). Said the court in this case: "There is no doubt of the authority of the state to prevent discrimination against certain individuals or races because of their color or previous condition. The authority of the state to prohibit discriminations on account of color in places of public resort-as a barber shop-is undoubted." In Fruchey v. Eagleson (1895) 15 Ind. App. 88, 43 N. E. 146, a statute in language substantially identical with that involved in the Colorado case of Darius v. Apostolos (Colo.) supra (the same being an exact copy of the Act of Congress of 1875, generally known as Civil Rights Act), and making violation of the act a misdemeanor, as well as subjecting violator to forfeiture of sum to person aggrieved, was declared not subject to the constitutional objection applicable to an act of Congress on the subject, in a case involving the construction of that statute (the ground of complaint being that plaintiff had been refused accommodations at an inn because of his color). In Decuir v. Benson (1875) 27 La. Ann. 1, reversed on other grounds in (1878) 95 U. S. 487, 24 L. ed. 547, infra, a statute forbidding common carriers of passengers to make discriminations on account of race or color, and giving to party aggrieved the right to recover damages, was held not violative of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as depriving one of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. See also Joseph v. Bidwell (1876) 28 La. Ann. 382, 26 Am. Rep. 102, where statute prohibiting act complained of, namely, exclusion of plaintiff from theater on account of his being a colored man, was authorized by express provision of the state Constitution prohibiting distinction or discrimination on account of race or color upon any conveyance of a public character, or in any place of business or public resort, or in any place requiring a license, the court declaring that that article of the state Constitution rights. 66 guarantees substantial The following statute has been stated to be only declaratory of the common law as it then existed in that state, in a case involving its construction (the specific question being whether or not, under the statute, restaurant keeper could restrict colored patrons to particular part of restaurant): . . all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, eatinghouses, barber shops, public conveyances on land and water, theaters, and all other places of public accommodation and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens," and making violation of the statute a misdemeanor. Ferguson v. Gies (1890) 82 Mich. 358, 9 L.R.A. 589, 21 Am. St. Rep. 576, 46 N. W. 718. See also substantially to the same effect, West Chester & P. R. Co. v. Miles (1867) 55 Pa. 215, 93 Am. Dec. 744, a case involving discrimination by carrier against colored person, And see Civil Rights Act (1875) 1 Hughes, 541, Fed. Cas. No. 18,258, in which it was said that under the common law and statutes of North Carolina at that time the Civil Rights Bill (Act of Congress, March 1, 1875) was unnecessary in that state, so far as the full and equal enjoyment of the advantages, accommodations, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, etc., was concerned. A statute making it unlawful to refuse admission to "any opera house, theater, melodeon, museum, circus, caravan, race course, fair, or other place of public amusement or entertainment to any person over the age of twenty-one years who presents a ticket of admission acquired by purchase, and who demands admission to such place" (subject to the right to exclude persons of objectionable character or conduct), and providing for recovery of damages and penalty by person aggrieved for violation of the act, has been held to be a valid regulation imposed by the state in the exercise of the police power, in cases involving the right to refuse admission to race track. Greenberg v. Western Turf Asso. (1903) 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050; Greenberg v. Western Turf Asso. (1905) 148 Cal. 126, 113 Am. St. Rep. 216, 82 Pac. 684, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 72 (a similar case between the same parties), affirmed in (1907) 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384. Such statute is not in contravention of civil rights guaranteed by Const. Cal. § 1. Greenberg v. Western Turf Asso. (1905) 148 Cal. 126, 113 Am. St. Rep. 216, 82 Pac. 684, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 72, supra. (In this case it is stated that the statute was passed under the unquestionable right of the state to regulate places of public amusement, and that it is in the exercise of this power, and not at all as having to do with civil rights, that the act in question was upheld in the earlier case, and its constitutionality again affirmed.) Such statute is not unconstitutional as denying to lessee in possession of race course the equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, since the statute is applicable alike to all persons, corporations, or associations conducting places of public amusement or entertainment. Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg (U. S.) supra, affirming Greenberg v. Western Turf Asso. (1905) 148 Cal. 126, 113 Am. St. Rep. 216, 82 Pac. 684, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 72, supra. Said lessee being a corporation, it cannot claim that the statute abridges or impairs the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United States, guaranteed by that amendment. Ibid. For the same reason, it cannot claim that the statute deprives it of liberty without due process of law, guaranteed by that amendment. Ibid. Such statute does not deprive said lessee of any property right without due process of law, within the meaning of that amendment. Ibid. Continuing, the United States Supreme Court entered into the following general discussion respecting the constitutionality of the statute: "Decisions of this court, familiar to all, and which need not be cited, recognize the possession, by each state, of powers never surrendered to the general government; which powers the state, except as restrained by its own Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may exert not only for the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, but for the general or common good, for the well-being, comfort, and good order of the people. The enactments of a state, when exerting its power for such purposes, must be respected by this court, if they do not violate rights granted or secured by the supreme law of the land. In view of these settled principles, the defendant is not justified in invoking the Constitution of the United States. The statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admis sion, and who is not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. In short, as applied to the plaintiff in error, it is only a regulation compelling it to perform its own contract as evidenced by tickets of admission issued and sold to parties wishing to attend its race course. Such a regulation in itself just, is likewise promotive of peace and good order among those who attend places of public entertainment or amusement. It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right secured by the Constitution of the United States. The race course in question, being held out as a place of public entertainment and amusement, is, by the act of the defendant, so far affected with a public interest that the state may, in the interest of good order and fair dealing, require defendant to perform its engagement to the public, and recognize its own tickets of admission in the hands of persons entitled to claim the benefits of the statute. That such a regulation violates any right of property secured by the Constitution of the United States cannot, for a moment, be admitted. The case requires nothing further to be said." Upon the ground that the regulation of interstate commerce is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of Congress, it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that a statute forbidding common carriers of passengers to make discriminations on account of race or color, and construed by the state supreme court to apply to those engaged in the transportation of passengers among the states, so long as passenger was within the state, is unconsti tutional and void to the extent that it does apply to those engaged in the transportation of passengers among the states. Hall v. Decuir (1878) 95 U. S. 487, 24 L. ed. 547, reversing (1875) 27 La. Ann. 1, supra, on this point. The court was careful to say that its decision was confined to the statute in its effect upon foreign and interstate commerce, expressing no opinion as to the validity of the statute in any other respect. As has been pointed out in several of the above cases, these statutes make no attempt to confer equality of social rights and privileges. See, for example, Brown v. J. H. Bell Co. (1909) 146 Iowa, 89, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 407, 123 N. W. 231, 124 N. W. 901, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 852; People v. King (1888) 110 N. Y. 418, 1 L.R.A. 293, 6 Am. St. Rep. 389, 18 N. E. 245, affirming (1886) 42 Hun, 186. And it has been stated that any law "which would impose upon the white race the imperative obligation of mingling with the colored race on terms of social equality would be repulsive to natural feeling and long-established prejudices, and would be justly odious." Civil Rights Bill (1875) 1 Hughes, 541, Fed. Cas. No. 18,258. And it has been stated that it is doubtful, to say the least, if so-called Civil Rights Statute could be made to apply to purely private business. Brown v. J. H. Bell Co. (Iowa) supra. L. S. E. Landlord and tenant, § 239 — provision for re-entry — construction. 1. Where landlord is entitled to possession unlawfully withheld by tenant, lease contract providing that landlord may re-enter without legal proceedings is binding to extent that landlord may re-enter, provided he does so without breaking doors, windows, or other passages of ingress, and neither uses nor threatens personal violence towards tenant or those holding for him. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 517.] APPEAL by defendants from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Clay County (Sturdivant, J.) in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recov er damages for alleged unlawful ousting of it from leased premises and for conversion to defendants' own use of certain personal property on the premises. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. McIntyre & Roberds, for appellants: Provisions in leases for a term of years for forfeiture or right to reenter for nonpayment of rent, though not favored by the courts, are universally held to be valid and enforceable at law. 16 R. C. L. ¶ 647, p. 1126; 35 C. J、 TT 232, 234, 239, pp. 1064, 1068; Whitcomb v. Indianapolis Tract & Terminal Co. 64 Ind. App. 605, 116 N. E. 444; Blue Ridge Coal Co. v. Hurst, 196 Ky. 432, 244 S. W. 892; New Orleans v. Rigney, 24 La. Ann. 235; Starr v. Starr Methodist Protestant Church, 112 Md. 171, 76 Atl. 595; Miller v. Havens, 51 Mich. 482, 16 N. W. 865; Patton v. Bond, 50 Iowa, 508; Gulf Compress Co. v. Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. 265 Fed. 199, certiorari denied in 254 U. S. 635, 65 L. ed. 449, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8; Hallbrooks v. Rosser, 143 Ark. 559, 221 S. W. 483; Sells v. Brewer, 125 Ark. 108, 187 S. W. 907; Smith v. Caldwell, 78 Ark. 333, 95 S. W. 467; Buckner v. Warren, 41 Ark. 532; Malone v. Wade, 148 Ark. 548, 230 S. W. 579; Allenspach v. Wagner, 9 Colo. 127, 10 Pac. 802; Reynolds v. Fuller, 64 Ill. App. 134; Cremer v. Anderson, 88 Kan. 316, 128 Pac. 208; Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville Property Co. 137 Ky. 339, 125 S. W. 732; Perret v. Dupre, 19 La. 341; Fox v. McKee, 31 La. Ann. 67; Kron v. Watson, 14 La. Ann. 435; Hennen v. Hayden, 5 La. Ann. 713; Cooke v. Brice, 20 Md. 397; Gould v. Bugbee, 6 Gray, 371; Lowenthal v. Newlon, 138 Minn. 248, 164 N. W. 905; La Salle Invest. Co. v. Wells, Mo. -, 181 S. W. 1136; Jackson ex dem. Van Schaick v. Vincent, 4 Wend. 633; Backus v. West, 104 Or. 129, 205 Pac. 533; Reams v. Fye, 24 Pa. Co. Ct, 671; Follin v. Coogan, 46 S. C. L. (12 Rich.) 44; 36 C. J. p. 598, ¶¶ 1757, 1758; Princess Amusement Co. v. Smith, 174 Ala. 342, 56 So. 979; Wetzel v. Meranger, 85 Ill. App. 457; Delph v. Finnell, 2 Ky. Ops. 91; Podren v. Macquarrie, 233 Mass. 127, 123 N. E. 335; Chetteville v. Grant, 212 Mass. 17, 98 N. E. 616; Cohen v. Carpenter, 128 App. Div. 862, 113 N. Y. Supp. 168; Kavan - augh v. Cohoes Power & Light Corp. 114 Misc. 590, 187 N. Y. Supp. 216; Scott v. Wasson, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 460; Henderson v. Beggs, - Tex. Civ. App., 207 S. W. 565; Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68, 75 Am. Dec. 278; Main v. Green, 32 Barb. 454; New Orleans v. Camp, 105 La. 288, 29 So. 340; Jackson ex dem. Livingston v. Kipp, 3 Wend. 230; Conner v. Jones, 28 Cal. 59; Taylor, Land. & T. §§ 290, 291; Pendill v. Union Min. Co. 64 Mich. 172, 31 N. W. 100; Winston v. Franklin Academy, 28 Miss. 121, 61 Am. Dec. 540. Not only has the landlord the right to re-enter, but he is entitled to make the re-entry by force, using no more force for that purpose than is reasonably necessary, without incurring any civil liability to the lessee. 16 R. C. L. p. 1143, ¶ 663; 2 Taylor. Land. & T. 8th ed. §§ 531, 532; 36 C. J. p. 600, ¶ 1761; Howe v. Frith, 43 Colo. 75, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 672, 127 Am. St. Rep. 79, 95 Pac. 603, 15 Ann. Cas. 1069; Tribble v. Frame, 7 J. J. Marsh. 599, 23 Am. Dec. 439; Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568, 8 Am. Rep. 442; Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 309, 23 Am. Rep. 272; Smith v. Detroit Loan & Bldg. Asso. 115 Mich. 340, 39 L.R.A. 410, 69 Am. St. Rep. 575, 73 N. W. 395; Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116, 69 Am. Dec. 484, 6 Mor. Min. Rep. 216; Hyatt v. Wood, 4 Johns. 150, 4 Am. Dec. 258; Allen v. Keily, 17 R. I. 731, 16 L.R.A. 798, 24 Atl. 776; Rush v. Aiken Mfg. Co. 58 S. C. 145, 79 Am. St. Rep. 836, 36 S. E. 497; Mugford v. Richardson, 6 Allen, 76, 83 Am. Dec. 617; Eames v. Prentice, 8 Cush. 337; Sterling v. War den, 51 N. H. 217, 12 Am. Rep. 80; Livingston v. Tanner, 14 N. Y. 61; Jackson ex dem. Seelye v. Morse, 16 Johns. 197, 8 Am. Dec. 306; Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 Watts & S. 90, 37 Am. Dec. 440; Simmons v. Thompson, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 268; Esty v. Baker, 50 Me. 325, 79 Am. Dec. 616; Wilde V. Cantillon, 1 Johns. Cas. 123; Cox v. Eckstrom, 142 Ill. App. 426; Moring Ables, 62 Miss. 263, 52 Am. Rep. 186. Where the landlord has lawfully re entered, he may remove the goods of the tenant from the premises, provided |