lifetime," is not affected by the provision: "At the death of my wife, I desire that the residue, if any, be converted into cash and divided as follows." Nichols v. Alexander (1926) Ind. App., 152 N. E. 863. No trust in favor of testator's children is created by a devise to his wife of his farm and the residue of his property during her lifetime and widowhood, accompanied by the words, "which I desire she shall manage and control for the benefit of herself and mine and her children; and, at her death or the termination of her widowhood, it is my desire that said property may be equally divided among my children." Major v. Herndon (1879) 78 Ky. 123. No trust is created by a will in which the testator expressed his "greatest desire" to be that his executor would see that his two brothers were well taken care of as long as they might live, "that they may lack for nothing that will render them comfortable and happy in this life," but without making any other provision. for them, and devised to his executor a saddle horse and saddle and his private papers, and to his relatives the remainder of his estate, the property to which the trust must attach being indefinite and uncertain, and the prior disposition of it showing that the testator intended the devisees to take it free of any burden. Hazelwood v. Webster (1885) 7 Ky. L. Rep. 164. No trust, but simply a desire or request addressed to the conscience of the devisee, is created by the following provision: "I give and bequeath to my wife the further sum of $10,000, which I desire her to use for the benefit for her brothers and sisters according to her best judgment and discretion, which is to be paid after the discharge of the debts; and provided, further, the same shall not exceed the full amount coming to the heirs and children aforesaid of" another legatee. Jacob v. Macon (1868) 20 La. Ann. 162. Under a provision in a will that at the death of testator's wife, to whom he had given all his property, "I desire ... the balance of what she that will leave on the day of her decease shall be divided equally between my natural heirs and her own," no charge is imposed upon the wife to preserve anything. Dufour v. Deresheid (1903) 110 La. 344, 34 So. 469. A trust, notwithstanding the indefiniteness of the object, was held to be created by the following provision: "I give and bequeath and devise unto the Reverend H. G. Bowers . . . all the rest and residue of my estate, and desire him to use and appropriate the same for such religious and charitable purposes and objects, and in such sums and in such manner as will in his judgment best promote the cause of Christ." Maught v. Getzendanner (1886) 65 Md. 527, 57 Am. Rep. 352, 5 Atl. 471. A trust was held, in view of the fact that testator used the word "desire" in other parts of the will in a mandatory sense, to be created by a will in which testator devised a share of his residuary estate to his son and the other half to his wife for life, with remainder to his son, adding: "And it is my desire that all the property received from me by my son either directly or otherwise through my said wife, shall pass to my grandson if living at the time of the death of my son . . . and should my said grandson not be living at the time of the death of my son and should be survived by his stepmother then I desire that she shall have the life interest in such portion, and upon her death said property shall vest absolutely in the heirs, personal representatives, and assigns of" the grandson. Grieves v. Grieves (1918) 132 Md. 300, 103 Atl. 572. A trust in the profits of the estate for the support and education of the testator's children is created by a will by which testator provided, that, during his wife's widowhood, she "is to have the entire use, profits, and control of my estate, and to her discretion do I intrust the education and maintenance of my children during that time; but, in case of her death or marriage before the time appointed for a division as aforesaid, then it is my desire that my children be all supported, and that the girls under sixteen and the boys under eighteen be as well educated out of the annual profits of my estate as they will allow up to the time of division." Lucas V. Lockhart (1848) 10 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 466, 48 Am. Dec. 766. A clause, after a bequest to a woman absolutely, "I desire that said Maria Rachel Mason and her daughter Edith Hyder Mason have the exclusive benefit of the above-bequeathed estate, free from any control of Robert B. Mason," —was held not to have been intended to give the daughter any interest in the land. Balliett v. Veal (1897) 140 Mo. 187, 41 S. W. 736. The word "desire," in the clause, "I desire that at such time as may be agreeable and mutually consented to by my wife and my son Charles, the homestead be sold and one purchased in lieu thereof by them," was held not to be used in a precatory sense, where it was not used in such sense in other parts of the will. Stewart v. Stewart (1900) 61 N. J. Eq. 25, 47 Atl. 633. Where the donee of property is "desired" or "requested" by the testator to dispose of that property in favor of others, those words are imperative, and their use will create a trust. Riker v. Leo (1889) 115 N. Y. 93, 21 N. E. 719. An intention to make a gift, rather than to request the testatrix's son to do so, is manifested by a will in which testatrix gave all of her estate to her son, adding: "But out of this inheritance he is desired by his mother to pay as soon after as possible that it comes into his ownership five hundred dollars ($500) to her grandniece, . recognizing in this form the kindness bestowed upon your mother in her youth by her brother, the grandfather of said" grandniece. Re Copeland (1902) 38 Misc. 402, 77 N. Y. Supp. 931. No trust in favor of testator's children is created by a will in which he gave to his wife, "for her industry and good management of our domestic affairs," all his property, adding: "And I desire that my said wife at my decease shall take my place and shall have the right to sell and dispose of all or any of my real or personal estate as she may deem proper and for the best interest of our children; and, lastly, if anything is left, it is my desire that she shall divide the same between our children as she in her good judgment may consider just and fair." Bennett v. McLaughlin (1908) 57 Misc. 507, 103 N. Y. Supp. 256, affirmed in (1908) 125 App. Div. 172, 109 N. Y. Supp. 63. Nothing less than an absolute interest is given to the testator's wife by a will in which he gave her the residue of his estate, "with the express wish and desire that she use and enjoy only the income thereof, and that she do not dispose by will of any portion of the principal thereof to anyone except my said daughter, it being my desire that the unexpended balance of the principal of the above devise and bequest shall become the property of my daughter upon the death of my said wife." Re Crawford (1917) 99 Misc. 416, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1107. No trust is created by a will by which testator gave his residuary estate to two persons and the survivor of them, adding: "I desire them to distribute my said residuary estate among such religious, charitable, and educational corporations as they may designate." Sands v. Waldo (1917) 100 Misc. 288, 165 N. Y. Supp. 654. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his residuary estate to his wife, "to use and dispose of as she may see fit," adding: “And it is my desire that, if any of my property should remain undisposed of by said wife at the time of her death, I direct that the same be disposed of as follows," among the relatives of his wife and himself. Re Russ (1923) 121 Misc. 498, 201 N. Y. Supp. 542. No trust is created by a will by which testatrix gave all her property to her son, adding: "I desire that my son shall observe the following requests: To remember Frank P. Wolfe for his kindness to us with a small sum, and when wanting advice to go to him; that he remember [certain persons named]; that if my son dies without children, then I desire that the property which came to me on the Griswold side, if any is left, be given to [a person named], and that the property which came to me on the Durand side to be given to [a person named]. I desire my son to do as he wishes with the property in his lifetime, and to follow these requests in the disposition of the remainder of those properties." Re Barney (1923) 207 App. Div. 25, 201 N. Y. Supp. 647, affirmed on opinion below in (1924) 239 N. Y. 584, 147 N. E. 206. Nothing more than the expression of a wish is contained in a will by which testator devised to his children a certain tract of land, "with the distinct understanding that the parts or parcels hereinafter allotted to each is not to be sold to anyone by him or them except the right to sell to one of those above named, it being my desire that the said land shall descend to my grandchildren." Brooks V. Griffin (1919) 177 N. C. 7, 97 S. E. 730. A trust is created by a will which showed that the equal division of the property of his wife and himself among his four children was the matter of chief concern to the testator, along with the ample power given to his wife to enjoy and control the property during her life, such will, after giving his wife all testator's property, "with power to sell and convey or pay debts or use in any way as she may choose," containing the following clause: "I request of her that our children .. shall in all respects share equally in our mutual estate after all their expenses for education shall have been paid. . . . Should my wife die at or near the same time as myself, then and in that case I desire that her estate and mine be combined and divided equally among our several children . . . after each is charged with whatever he or she may have received. In case my wife survives me, I desire that she have entire control of my estate, and divide and pay to our children only when and as she may desire." Ide v. Clark (1891) 5 Ohio C. C. 239, 3 Ohio C. D. 120. The word "desire" was held to have been used by the testator in a mandatory sense in a provision by which he devised to his son a farm and other property "for his support, and, if he should be spared to have family, I desire the above estate to go to use of his children." Oyster v. Knull (1890) 137 Pa. 448, 21 Am. St. Rep. 890, 20 Atl. 624. In Presbyterian Bd. of Foreign Missions v. Culp (1892) 151 Pa. 467, 25 Atl. 117, testatrix gave her mother her real and personal property, "to be used by her for her own personal benefit," and further provided: "After the decease of my mother, Mary Elder, I desire that my interest in the said above-mentioned farm, together with all interest accruing therefrom, shall be appropriated to foreign missionary work." It was held that it was the intention of the testatrix to give her mother only a life estate, and therefore that the expression of desire as to the disposition of the remainder was of mandatory force. The husband takes nothing more than a life estate, with power to consume, under a will by which testatrix devised her residuary estate to her husband, his heirs, and assigns, adding: "And should my husband not expend the whole of my estate, then it is my desire at his death to give so much of it as remains to my sister . . and my two brothers." Dickinson's Estate (1904) 209 Pa. 59, 58 Atl. 120. No trust in favor of testator's adopted children was created by the following provisions: "All the residue of my estate, real and personal, of which I shall die seised and possessed I bequeath absolutely to my beloved wife, desiring that she shall use such portion of my estate as may seem best to her in the education and support of my beloved son [name] and of my beloved daughter [name], and in case of her remarriage pay ten thousand ($10,000) dollars to each of them then living." Miller v. Stubbs (1914) 244 Pa. 482, 90 Atl. 1132. A trust in favor of the daughter of testatrix is created by a will in which testatrix devised her real estate to her husband, adding: "I also desire, should my husband, Jacob R. Croft, wish to dispose of all the remainder of the real estate in my name, he may do so, with the provision that my daughter Alice Croft receive two thirds of the proceeds of said sale." Croft v. Chelten Trust Co. (1922) 272 Pa. 514, 116 Atl. 479. An expression of a "desire" that a monument, for the erection of which the testator left a sum of money, should be erected on a particular location, is precatory, and not imperative. Ogden's Petition (1903) 25 R. I. 373, 55 Atl. 933. No trust in favor of testator's children is imposed by a will in which testator directed that, after the payment of debts and funeral expenses, the balance of his estate should "remain in the possession of my wife and children for their support and the education of my children; and, as my children shall arrive of age or marry, I desire that my wife shall advance to such child or children such an amount either in property or money as she deems prudent, but not exceeding a distributive share of my estate, as it is my intention for my said wife to keep as much of my estate as will make her comfortable during her widowhood." Rowland v. Rowland (1888) 29 S. C. 54, 6 S. E. 902. An intention to create a trust in the residuary estate is manifested by a will in which testatrix directed that, if there should be a surplus after paying other legacies in full, $500 or such portion thereof as such surplus will pay should be paid to a person named, and then proceeded to devise the residue to the same person, adding: "It is my desire that he shall distribute the same or the proceeds thereof among my nephews and nieces and to such of them and in such proportion as he shall deem just and proper;" since, had she intended that he should take the residue absolutely, there would have been no object in making the gift of $500. Re Dewey (1914) 45 Utah, 98, 143 Pac. 124, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 475. In Hunt v. Hunt (1897) 18 Wash. 14, 50 Pac. 578, it was held, in view of the fact that the testator's property was of the value of only $18,000, so that a payment of the amount named in the testamentary provision along with No intention to confer upon the wife either a fee simple in the testator's real estate or absolute property in his personal estate is manifested by a will in which testator gave his wife "in trust and for her support and maintenance during her life, all my estate, both real and personal, with full power and privilege to sell and convey any, all, or so much of my real estate in such a manner as she may see fit in as full and complete manner as I myself can do, to sell and dispose of my personal estate, or so much as she may see fit, for her own support according to her condition in life, and for the benefit of my estate so far as she may see proper. At the death of my dear wife . . . I desire the residue of my estate, both real and personal, to be distributed as follows: One half of the same, after giving my dear wife a full and liberal support to my brother," etc. Cresap v. Cresap (1890) 34 W. Va. 310, 12 S. E. 527. No trust in favor of the children is created by a will in which the testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife, "desiring her .. at her decease to dispose of what shall be left among my children in such manner as she shall judge most proper," the words, "what shall be left," showing that testator meant that his wife should have power to dispose of the property as she would. Pushman v. Filliter (1795) 3 Ves. Jr. 7, 30 Eng. Reprint, 864. No trust is created by a will in which testator appointed his mother his residuary legatee, "with the desire that my residuary estate be afterward left by her, in her own and my name, to charitable purposes," the words used being too vague to cut down the beneficial gift. M'Culloch v. M'Culloch (1863) 11 Week. Rep. (Eng.) 504. No trust attaches to a gift to a testator's son by a will in which testator said: "It is my earnest hope and I particularly request my said son to keep all and single the said manors, etc., herein before devised to him, . . and not to sell, alien, or dispose of the same or any part thereof except by way of exchange or for reinvesting the value in the purchase of other estates. And in case my said son shall die without leaving issue male of his body him surviving, it is my anxious desire that he will so settle and devise the same manors, etc., . . . in such manner and to such persons that the same manors, etc., and every part thereof, may continue in the name of Oglander." Hood v. Oglander (1865) 34 L. J. Ch. N. S. (Eng.) 528, No trust is created by a will in the residue given the nieces by the words, "my desire being that they shall distribute such residue as they think will be most agreeable to my wishes," the testatrix having shown elsewhere in the will that she knew how to create a trust by apt words, and the language used showing that the nieces were to be the judges of the mode of distribution. Stead v. Mellor (1877) L. R. 5 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 225. No intention to create a trust is manifested by a will in which testatrix gave all her property to her daughter, her heirs, and assigns, by the provision, "It is my desire that she allows to my relative and companion, Anne Gregory, now residing with me, an annuity of £25 during her life." Re Diggles (1888) 39 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 253. No imperative force is to be given to the provision of a will by which testator, who had given most of his property to his son absolutely, stated: "I desire that out of the income thereof be appropriated a sum not exceeding £1,500 per annum for his household expenses, and that he shall, after deducting all costs and expenses of and incident to the management and working of my estate, appropriate the remainder of such income for the purpose of reducing the liabilities upon the same in such manner as he in his sole and uncontrolled discretion shall think fit." Re Sanson (1896) 12 Times L. R. (Eng.) 142. No imperative obligation sufficient. to create a trust is imposed by a will in which testatrix gave all her property unto and equally amongst her two daughters "for their own absolute use and benefit," appointing them executrixes and adding: "My desire is that each of my said two daughters shall, during the lifetime of my son, pay to him one third of the respective incomes of my said two daughters accruing from the moneys and investments under this my will." Re Oldfield (1904) 90 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 392. No trust is created by a will in which testator bequeathed to his sisters "the rest of my stock shares, subject to a legacy," with the further provision: "I specially desire that the sums herewith bequeathed shall be specifically left by the legatees to such charitable institutions of a distinct and undoubted Protestant nature as my sisters may select, and in such proportions as they may determine." Re Conolly [1910] 1 Ch. (Eng.) 219. A trust capable of being enforced is created by the words, "I desire the £300 which I have bequeathed to A to be divided by her on her death as she shall think fit amongst the daughters of my cousin B." Re Jevons (1911) 56 Sol. Jo. (Eng.) 72, as digested in Mews, Eng. Cas. Law Dig. 1911-1915, col. 1819. Only precatory force is to be given to the provisions of a will by which testator bequeathed to his son shares in companies of which the testator was a director, by the provision: "I hereby specially desire that at the death of my son, should he die without issue, his portion shall pass to my daughter. In the event of my daughter |