predeceasing her brother, this portion No trust is created by a will in n. "Desire and belief." No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his residuary estate to his wife, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, "with the desire and belief that she will execute a will giving and bequeathing whatever property she may have received from me" to his brothers and sisters and their children, in such proportions as she might think best. Taylor's Estate (1919) 28 Pa. Dist. R. 778. o. "Desire and direct." A trust in favor of testator's unmarried daughters is imposed by a will by which he devised and bequeathed all his property to his children, naming them, "and to their heirs forever," adding: "But I desire and direct that my said children shall keep my real estate intact and entire if they can do so, and that the income of all my property, both real and personal, shall be paid to my said daughters above mentioned excepting those who may be married at and after my death, until they all are married, or, in the event of the aforesaid daughters not marrying, until such time as they shall find in [it] convenient without loss to themselves, my said daughters, to divide the income of all said property equally among all my children named herein, sons as well as daughters." Plaut v. Plaut (1908) 80 Conn. 673, 70 Atl. 52. p. "Desire and hope." No trust is imposed in favor of the relations of the testator by a will in which he gave his residuary estate to his son, with words of inheritance, subject to certain charges, by the provision: "I hereby signify to my said son my desire and hope that he will so provide by will or otherwise that, in case he shall die leaving no lawful issue living, the property which he will take under this will shall go in equal shares to" certain named relations of the testator. Hess v. Singler (1873) 114 Mass. 56. q. "Desire and intention." A trust is created where testator, who had devised certain realty to his grandchildren, went on to say: "It is my desire and intention that Adeline Sibert, the mother of said children, shall use and occupy said land until the youngest of said children shall become twenty-one years of age, to support and educate such children." Sibert v. Cox (1885) 100 Ind. 392. r. "Desire and request." See also "Requesting and desiring." No trust is created by a will by which testatrix devised to her husband certain land, adding: "It is my desire and I hereby request my said husband to convey in such manner and as at such times he may deem best" such property to a Masonic lodge in such manner as to impose upon the lodge obligation properly to care for, protect, and maintain the cemetery lot in which the testatrix was buried, and further gave the residue of her real estate to her husband for life, with the following provision: "Out of the rents, issues, and profits of the land herein before devised to my said husband for life, I request him to invest the sum of $1,000 in some satisfactory security, and transfer the same to" such lodge, under a contract with such lodge that so much of the income or principal as might be necessary should be used for the proper care, repair, and maintenance of testatrix's burial lot; where the will further provided that, in case of the death of testatrix's husband before her own death, all that portion of her real estate specifically devised to him in fee simple, with the request that it be conveyed to such lodge, should go to the executor of the will in trust to convey said real property to said lodge under a contract from such lodge to carry out the wishes previously expressed regarding the care of her burial lot, the latter provision showing that, when testatrix desired to create a trust, she did not use words of a precatory character. Kauffman v. Gries (1903) 141 Cal. 295, 74 Pac. 846. The absolute character of a bequest is not affected by the further provision: "It is my desire that at the death of my said wife whatever property may be left shall thus be disposed of, and request of my said wife that she will and provide that the property so received from me shall be devised after her death as follows." Rona v. Meier (1878) 47 Iowa, 607, 29 Am. Rep. 493. In Deacon v. Cobson (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 122, 89 Atl. 1029, it was held, adhering to the early English rule, that a trust was created where testatrix, after giving all of her property to her daughter, "her heirs, and assigns forever," added: "But it is my wish and desire, and I hereby request, my said daughter [naming her] to keep intact, so far as may be possible and practicable, the body of my estate, which she is to receive by virtue of this third item of my will, using only the rents, issues, profits, and income therefrom for her own separate use and maintenance. And I further desire and hereby request my said daughter, Theodosia Borden, to make a will wherein and whereby she shall devise and bequeath all the corpus of my estate which she is to receive by the third item of this will, or so much as may be intact and remaining at the time of her death, as follows." No intention to create an imperative trust is evidenced by a will in which testator gave his household goods and residence to his wife, "and to her heirs and assigns forever," and, after legacies to various relatives, gave the residue of his estate to his wife and "to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever," and then stated as follows: "And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide for, and educate Lu cretia M. Wood, the daughter of my said adopted daughter, Josephine M. Wood. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said Lucretia M. Wood, Josephine M. Wood, and my nephews and nieces, the children of my brothers Caleb S. Clay and George Clay joint heirs after her death in the said estate which by this will I have bequeathed to my said wife." Clay v. Wood (1897) 153 N. Y. 134, 47 N. E. 274, affirming (1895) 91 Hun, 407, 36 N. Y. Supp. 317. No legal obligation is imposed by a will by which testatrix provided: "It is my desire and request that Frank L. Smith mentioned in the preceding clause in my will shall watch over and care for my friend Lena Wilde, who at one time lived in my family, and see that at no time is she allowed to suffer or want for the necessaries of life," and appointed said Frank L. Smith executor, and by codicil gave all her residuary estate to said Smith. Wilde v. Smith (1883) 2 Dem. (N. Y.) 93. No trust is created by a will in which testator, after stating that it was his main object to provide for his wife, gave her all his estate, by the provision that "if at her death she should have unconsumed any of said property, I desire and request that she give to" a Mrs. Clark the sum of $200, adding: "But this provision in favor of Mrs. Clark is in no way to interfere with the enjoyment of said property by my wife. It is to be hers to dispose of as she sees proper, and only in the event there is more than will be necessary for her wants and needs is she to give the $200 to Mrs. Clark." Clark v. Hill (1897) 98 Tenn. 300, 39 S. W. 339. r-1. "Desire and wish." See also "Wish and desire." Successive life estates in the testator's wife and daughter, with remainder in fee to the son, are created by a will in which testator gave his wife all his real estate "to her sole and separate use, behoof, and control forever," adding: "It is my desire and wish, after my wife's death, that" certain property should go to testator's son, and that certain other property should go to his daughter for life, and after her death to testator's son. Taylor v. Martin (1887) 6 Sadler (Pa.) 125, 20 W. N. C. 27, 8 Atl. 920. 8. "Direct." See also "Desire and direct;" "Request and direct;" "Wish and direct." The term "direct" is mandatory in its signification. Beakey v. Knutson (1918) 90 Or. 574, 174 Pac. 1149, rehearing denied in (1919) 90 Or. 583, 177 Pac. 955. It is a word of command, and is presumably used as such. Plaut v. Plaut (1908) 80 Conn. 673, 70 Atl. 52. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his wife certain real and personal property, with the provision: "At the death of said wife, I direct that she give certain real property so given her by me or the remainder thereof to my son" and another; the description of the property as that which was "given her by me," and the use of the words "or the remainder thereof," showing that testator recognized the effect of the previous devise as investing the wife with an absolute power of disposition. Re Hull (1926) — Cal. App. 247 Pac. 1093. A trust was held to be created in favor of testator's niece, who was a member of his household, by the following provision: "I direct my wife, Amelia A. Scranton, out of the property hereinafter given and bequeathed to her by this will, to use so much thereof for the support and benefit of my niece Georgie S. Collister as my said wife shall from time to time in her discretion think best so to do," the matter intrusted to the discretion of the wife being the amount of the gift, and not whether it should be made. Collister v. Fassitt (1900) 163 N. Y. 281, 79 Am. St. Rep. 586, 57 N. E. 490, affirming (1897) 23 App. Div. 466, 48 N. Y. Supp. 792. Collister v. Fassitt (N. Y.) supra, is said in Post v. Moore (1905) 181 N. Y. 15, 106 Am. St. Rep. 495, 73 N. E. 482, 2 Ann. Cas. 591, to have turned very largely upon facts and circumstances which appeared in the records dehors the will itself, and that much stress was laid upon the fact that the provision in favor of the niece appeared first in the will. In Carroll v. Adams (1907) 105 N. Y. Supp. 967, it was held that, in view of the fact that the whole scheme of the will seems to have been to devise the estate to the nephews and nieces of the testatrix, the children of her deceased brother and sisters, a trust was created by the following provision: "The remainder of my property, both real and personal, I direct to be divided into three shares, one share to my brother Horace's daughter Ida Mank, for her to divide as she thinks best with her mother . . . and sister and four brothers." No trust is created by a will in which testator, after giving his wife the income of his estate during her life, "subject to the direction contained in the third clause," provided in such clause: "I direct my wife, Ellen R. Lynch, from the surplus of the net income of my estate in each year to set aside such portion as she deems just and proper to create a sinking fund for the benefit of my grandchildren . . . until said sinking fund shall amount to the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) to be divided between said grandchildren, share and share alike upon the death of my wife. If at the death of my wife said sinking fund shall not have amounted to five thousand dollars ($5,000) I direct the trustees hereinafter named to add such amount as will, with the amount then in the sinking fund, make a total of five thousand dollars ($5,000) to be distributed to my grandchildren as hereinbefore directed." Re Lynch (1918) 102 Misc. 650, 169 N. Y. Supp. 321. A trust is created by a will giving all testator's property to his executrix, and stating: "I desire that my . . . executrix shall sell such property as she shall deem proper, that she shall take care of, educate, maintain, and nourish our three children. For the purpose of so doing, I direct and request that she use such or all of the money which may be the proceeds of any property she may sell as she may require for said purpose." Beakey v. Knutson (1918) 90 Or, 574, 174 Pac. 1149, rehearing denied in (1919) 90 Or. 583, 177 Pac. 955. The word "direct" was construed as the mere expression of a desire or wish of the testator to his wife in a will by which he gave his residuary estate to her "absolutely, with full power to sell at any time she may see fit" adding: "I direct that, after the demise of my beloved wife the following property be given to my son," the property enumerated being among that included in the gift to the wife. JANSEN'S WILL (reported herewith) ante, 5. t. "Enjoin." While the use of the word "enjoin," if specially qualified by other expressions in a will, does not necessarily mean that a trust is thereby created, yet it is a mandatory word. Clifford v. Stewart (1901) 95 Me. 38, 49 Atl. 52. But, although the word "enjoin" is ordinarily an imperative one, it may be given less than mandatory force. Good v. Fichthorn (1891) 144 Pa. 287, 27 Am. St. Rep. 630, 22 Atl. 1032; Smith v. Bloomington Coal Co. (1925) 282 Pa, 248, 127 Atl. 627. A trust entitling the father and mother to support from the income is created by a bequest the object of which is stated by the testator, "not only to make a provision for the said Martha, but enable her to assist in the support of her father and mother . . . as long as they shall live, and this duty I strictly enjoin upon her." Whittingham v. Scofield (1902) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2444, 67 S. W. 846. A trust is created by a will in which a testatrix who left four sons, three of whom were deeply involved financial ly, gave to one son one fourth of the residuum absolutely and gave the other three fourths to the wives of the other three sons, adding: "And I wish that . . . the property so as above given to said three wives of my three sons be for the education of their children and the support of their families respectively, and I enjoin upon them so to use and expend it." Clifford v. Stewart (1901) 95 Me. 38, 49 Atl. 52. A trust is created in favor of the legatee and her family by a will in which testator gave to the wife of a son, her personal representatives, heirs, and assigns, a share of his residuary estate, adding: "And I earnestly advise, recommend, and enjoin it upon her, the said Sarah McClernan, and upon my son James McClernan, that the portion hereby given her be at once invested with the advice of competent counsel, so that it may be preserved for the use and benefit of said Sarah McClernan and James McClernan during their joint lives and the life of the survivor of them and for their children, to the end that it may not be squandered or jeopardized in any business scheme or undertaking or speculation, and may not be in any way liable for the debts of my said son James." McClernan v. McClernan (1890) 73 Md. 283, 20 Atl. 908. No trust in favor of the children is created by a will by which testator devised to his wife a third of his real estate "to her sole use and behoof forever," adding: "And the other two thirds I leave in her power, and bequeath to her for her support during her lifetime, and leaving it as an injunction on her to divide it on the children at her death as she deems best and as they deserve." Gibbins v. Shepard (1878) 125 Mass. 541. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave the residue of his estate to his daughter, "to have and to hold the same unto her and her heirs and assigns forever," by the clause, "I commit my granddaughter to the charge and guardianship of my daughter in whose honesty, good will, and integrity I repose the utmost confidence. I enjoin upon her to make such provision for said grandchild out of my residuary estate now in her hands in such manner at such time and in such amounts as she may judge to be expedient and conducive to the welfare of said grandchild and her own sense of justice and Christian duty shall dictate." Lawrence v. Cooke (1887) 104 N. Y. 632, 11 N. E. 144, reversing (1884) 32 Hun, 126. In Good v. Fichthorn (Pa.) supra, where testator gave his wife all his estate "as her absolute property; vesting her, my said wife, with all the powers and rights of my estate, real, personal, or mixed, that I myself possess while living," providing that she should be at liberty to dispose of any part of it, in which case the proceeds should be her absolute property, and went on to provide: "I further direct that, should my dear wife Isabella during her lifetime not consume or use all my property, real and personal, for her proper support, then I do hereby enjoin and direct her to make and publish her last will and testament, that after her decease all the rest and residue not consumed, used, or sold by her, shall be divided, the one half in equal shares among my brothers and sisters or their heirs, and the other one half in equal shares among the brothers and sisters of my said wife or their hes," it was held that, in view of the evident intention of the husband to give his wife an absolute interest, the clause last quoted should be considered as having only precatory force, notwithstanding the words. used, "enjoin and direct," are in their natural meaning mandatory and imperative. A dominant intent to give testator's wife an absolute estate unencumbered by any trust is manifested by a will in which he devised to her his residuary estate, adding: "I hereby, however, enjoin upon my said beloved wife that she make, execute her last will and testament wherein and whereby she will make, give, bequeath, and devise all of her estate which she has derived or secured from me under this will to her heirs and to my legal heirs and devisees under this will in equal proportion." Smith v. Bloomington Coal Co. (1925) 282 Pa. 248, 127 Atl. 627. No trust in favor of testator's nephew is created by a bequest in trust for his sisters on condition that they should "support Maria Moore," adding: "They are hereby enjoined to take care of my nephew John as may seem best in the future," since, apart from the vagueness of the provision, it is obvious that the testator drew a distinction between the quasi obliga tion which he wished to commend to his sisters to take care of the nephew, and the positive obligation which he made a condition in the case of Maria Moore. Moore v. Roche (1886) 55 L. J. Ch. (Eng.) 418. u. "Expect." See also "Wish and expectation." Words of expectation merely, not amounting to a recommendation, will not create a trust, particularly where the expectation was merely that the devisee would act under the promptings of natural affection. Spooner v. Lovejoy (1871) 108 Mass. 529. v. "Expect and desire." The estate given by testator to his wife in words importing an absolute interest is not qualified by the words, "and I expect and desire that my said wife will not dispose of any of said estate by will in such a way that the whole that might remain at her death shall go out of my own family and blood relation." Re Gardner (1893) 140 N. Y. 122, 35 N. E. 439. w. "Expect and hope." See also "Hope and expectation." An intention to create a trust for the benefit of testator's illegitimate children, notwithstanding his disclaimer of such intention, is manifested by a will in which he devised and bequeathed property to certain persons "in the confident expectation and hope that they will permit my children. by Sally Bryson" to enjoy it in the manner indicated, and also stating it to be his wish that such friends should hold the property thus devised to them "free from all trust whatever." Bouknight v. Brown (1881) 16 S. C. 155. x. "Faith." A trust is created by the will of a testatrix who was without children of her own, and who had taken into her household the two children of her deceased brother, who were without means of their own, in poor health, and incapable of supporting themselves, in which testatrix gave all her property to her husband absolutely, with the statement: "I make this bequest in the full faith that my husband |