Ross vs. The State of Georgia. JACKSON, Judge. The single question necessary to be decided in this case is, whether the judgment will be arrested on a charge in an indictment for receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, when the jury return a special verdict of "guilty of receiving stolen goods." We think the principle ruled by this court in the case of Couch vs. The State, 28 Georgia, 367, controls this case. The gist of the offense is the felonious knowledge. The jury did not find that, and the fact that they made a special verdict omitting the very gist of the of fense, is presumptive proof that they did not mean to find it. What they have found is no offense. The verdict is a mere nullity, and no legal judgment or sentence can be predicated thereon. We think the court erred, therefore, in not arresting it, and reverse his judgment. It becomes unnecessary to consider the motion for a new trial. Judgment reversed. WILLIAM ROSS, plaintiff in error, vs. THE STATE of GeorGIA, defendant in error. When an offense is committed against the laws of the United States, the person charged therewith must be prosecuted therefor in the courts of the United States. The state courts have no jurisdiction thereof. Criminal law. Jurisdiction. United States Courts. State. Before Judge KIDDOO. Randolph Superior Court. November Term, 1874. Reported in the decision. H. & I. L. FIELDER; L. S. CHASTAIN, for plaintiff in error. JAMES T. FLEWELLEN, solicitor general, by A. HOOD, for the state. Ross vs. The State of Georgia. WARNER, Chief Justice. The defendant was indicted for the offense of "perjury" in the superior court of Randolph county, and on the trial therefor, the jury found him guilty. When the evidence on the part of the state was closed on the trial, the counsel for the defendant made a motion to quash the indictment and proceedings, and to discharge the defendant, on the ground that the alleged false oath was taken before a United States commissioner in the investigation before him of an alleged violation of a penal law of the United States, punishable by the courts of the United States, and that the superior court of Randolph county had no jurisdiction to try said case, which motion, the court overruled, and the defendant excepted. It appears from the evidence in the record, that the oath of the defendant on which the perjury was assigned, was taken before a United States commissioner on the investigation of a charge preferred before him for a violation of the enforcement act of congress by one Kenney, and the question is, whether the state court had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts for the trial of the alleged offense, or whether the federal courts had the exclusive jurisdiction for the trial thereof. The offense charged in the indictment, is an offense against the public justice of the United States-and whatever may have been the conflicting decisions in the several courts of the United States in regard to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in similar cases, prior to the adoption of the Revised Code of the statutes of the United States on the 20th of June, 1874, there is now no longer any room for doubt or discussion in relation to that question. By the 5392 section of the Revised Statutes of the United States, it is declared that every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify truly, etc., wilfully and contrary to such oath, states any material matter which he does believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished, etc., and shall Bawknight vs. The Liverpool and London, etc., Company. moreover thereafter be incapable of giving testimony in any court of the United States until such time as the judgment against him is reversed. By the 629th section it is declared, that the circuit courts of the United States shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where it is or may be otherwise provided by law, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of crimes and offenses cognizable therein. By the 711th section it is declared that the jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states. When a crime is committed against the public justice of the United States, the party charged therewith is to be indicted and prosecuted therefor in the courts of the United States, and not in the courts of the state. When a crime is committed against the public justice of this state, the party charged therewith should be indicted and prosecuted in the courts of this state, and not in the courts of the United States. In our judgment, the offense charged in the indictment contained in the record was an offense against the public justice of the United States, and not an offense against the public justice of this state, and therefore the superior court of Randolph county had no jurisdietion to try it, and the court erred in not sustaining the defendant's motion to quash the indictment and proceedings had thereon, and to discharge the defendant therefrom. Let the judgment of the court below be reversed. 55 194 91 226 55 194 65 499 ELIAS BAWKNIGHT, plaintiff in error, vs. THE LIVERPOOL AND LONDON AND GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant in error. Georgia courts have no jurisdiction of suits in personam against a foreign corporation, unless the contract sued on has been made in Georgia, or the Georgia agent is connected therewith, within the scope of his authority as the maker of such contract. The remedy on the foreign contract or judg Bawknight vs. The Liverpool and London, etc., Company. ment is in rem, by attachment or garnishment. Such remedy will reach all the property belonging to the foreign corporation in Georgia; and it would be unreasonable, by construction, to extend the statutes of Georgia to embrace suits in personam beyond contracts made by the agents in our midst, and with which they are familiar, and which they will know how to defend. Foreign corporations. Actions. Before Judge TOMPKINS. Chatham Superior Court. February Term, 1875. Reported in the opinion. HARTRIDGE & CHISHOLM, for plaintiff in error. JACKSON, LAWTON & BASINGER, for defendant. JACKSON, Judge. The defendant is a corporation chartered by Great Britain, and having an agency in Savannah, Chatham county, Georgia. A judgment was obtained against it by the plaintiff, in Florida, and suit on this judgment was brought in the superior court of Chatham county. A motion was made by the defendant to dismiss it on two grounds: 1st. Because the superior court of Chatham county had no jurisdiction of the cause, (the motion on this ground having been made at a prior term, before Judge Schley, and refused by him, and excepted to pendente lite, and is here for review;) 2d. Because the judgment sued on was fraudulent on its face. The court granted the motion and dismissed the suit, the plaintiff excepted, and this dismissal of the suit is the error complained of. The first question is, has the superior court of Chatham jurisdiction of such a suit. This depends upon the construction of our statutes. The general rule is that a corporation can be sued only in the place where it was created--within the jurisdiction where it was born, and where its principal place of business is located. Has that rule been changed by our Code in respect to foreign corporations having agents in our midst, and to what extent? Foreign corporations are recognized by us on the principle of comity: Code, section Bawknight vs. The Liverpool and London, etc., Company. 1675; and if a domestic corporation, it may be sued wherever it has an agent who transacted its business and made contracts for it, and service upon such agent is good service: Code, section 3369. This corporation is an insurance company, and the statute provides that such companies may be sued at their principal place of business, or at any place where they have an agent or had one when the cause of action arose; and service upon the agent is declared to be good service: Code, sections 3408, 3409. These sections appear to apply to domestic corporations; but this court has held them applicable also to foreign corporations having agencies in Georgia and doing business here, and has construed them to give our courts jurisdiction in certain cases of suits to be instituted in personam against such companies: City Fire Insurance Company of Hartford vs. Carrugi, 41 Georgia Reports, 660, and National Bank of Augusta vs. The Southern Porcelain Manufacturing Company, decided at this term. But these cases arose out of contracts made here by agents in Georgia. We are not aware of any case which has decided that a foreign corporation may be sued in personam here on a foreign judgment, or on a contract or debt of any sort with which the Georgia agency has had no connection. It would be strange if such were the law. A debt created in England by this English corporation could then be sued here; a debt made in China might be sued in personam here, where this corporation is allowed to live only for certain purposes, instead of being sued at home, where it lives for all purposes. There is good reason for so restricting the statute. The agent in Georgia might be able easily to defend a Georgia contract, where he had made or supervised it, where all the witnesses lived, and were accessible to him; but it would be difficult for him, nay, impossible, to defend an English or a Chinese contract without great hazard and expense; and for the very reason that he could not well and readily defend such a contract, suit would be brought upon them here, judgment in personam be rendered, and then suit on that brought at the |