Dobbs vs. The State of Georgia. derwriters' Agency to settle the damage. Payment was refused. The local agent continued to urge upon the company that the claim was a proper one, and an adjusting agent held correspondence with the insured, by letter, from the home office, after the twelve months for suit fixed by the contract had expired. Suit was not brought until nearly two years had elapsed after the first demand upon the company. The regular course of the navigation required transhipment at Apalachicola, and a temporary landing there on the wharf for that purpose. The law of the case is stated in the head-notes, and the judgment is reversed. Judgment reversed. MARTIN W. DOBBS, plaintiff in error, vs. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, defendant in error. 1. Where a rule nisi for contempt of court charges the defendant with an attempt to bribe another to warn witnesses to avoid subpoenas issued for them, and the answer of the defendant purges himself of the contempt, and the traverse of that answer by the solicitor general is not sustained by the proof, and the court fines the defendant $100 00: Held, that the court erred; and this court, while reluctant to interfere with the courts below in matters of contempt, will correct such an error. 2. Where the subpoenas for the witnesses, in connection with whom the contempt is charged, issue in blank as to the names of the parties to the case : Held, that such subpoenas are not valid processes on which to predicate such rule for contempt. Criminal law. Contempt. Subpoenas. Before Judge KNIGHT. Forsyth Superior Court. April Term, 1875. Reported in the opinion. H. P. BELL; J. N. DORSEY, for plaintiff in error. C. D. PHILLIPS, solicitor general, by W. S. THOMPSON, for the state. JACKSON, Judge. The rule nisi in this case charged the defendant to the rule with offering a bribe to one Fowler, to warn witnesses, for Dobbs vs. The State of Georgia. whom subpoenas to attend court were issued, to avoid being served with the subpoenas. The bribe charged was the loan of a mule to Fowler to ride from court home. The subpoenas did not state the case and names of parties in which the witnesses were summoned to testify, but that was left blank. The defendant answered the rule, admitting that he had offered to lend the mule, but denying that he had done so upon condition that Fowler should warn the witnesses to avoid the process. The solicitor general traversed this answer; the court heard testimony, and fined the defendant $100 00. The error complained of is this judgment and fine. The witnesses sworn were the clerk, who proved that he issued the subpoenas in blank as to the case, which was his habit in cases before the grand jury; the sheriff, who swore that Dobbs told him the parties subpoenaed were not at home, and that he would serve them on their return, and who then gave Dobbs the subpoenas; and Fowler, who swore that Dobbs offered to lend him the mule, and told him, if he saw the witnesses, to say to them that there might be trouble at court about matters in no way connected with these subpœnas. It further appeared that Dobbs was the prosecutor in the indictment before the grand jury, and no motive is shown or hinted in the record, on his part, to procure the absence of witnesses to aid in his own prosecution. There may be something behind the curtain not contained in this record, but we can see no evidence in it authorizing the fine imposed. We are clear, too, that a subpoena issued in blank is not a valid process on which to predicate such action. While, therefore, very reluctant to interfere with the courts in their administrative duties and practice, and especially in punishing for contempt of their authority or process, we think that this record discloses such a case as demands our interference, and accordingly we reverse the judgment. Judgment reversed. Bell vs. Hanks. 55 274 58 279 72 198 JAMES BELL, plaintiff in error, vs. STEPHEN L. HANKS, defendant in error. 1. Plaintiff recovered a judgment against defendant on December 9th, 1861. At the March term, 1869, the defendant moved to set aside said judgment on the ground that it had been rendered for the hire of a slave. The court so ordered. At the March term, 1874, the plaintiff moved to set aside said vacating order because based on a grouud unknown to the law, unconstitutional, and beyond the jurisdiction of the court to pass. The court sustained the motion: Held, correct. 2. The statute prescribing the time. within which a judgment should become dormant, was an act of limitation, and was suspended during the late war, and until July 21st, 1868. 3. Notice of a motion to set aside a judgment should be given to the adverse party. Constitutional law. Slave debt. Judgments. Statute of limitations. Notice. Before Judge KIDDOO. Clay Superior Court. March Term, 1875. Reported in the decision. R. E. KENNON, for plaintiff in error. JOHN T. CLARKE, for defendant. WARNER, Chief Justice. court. This was a motion to set aside a judgment in Clay superior It appears from the record before us that on the 9th day of December, 1861, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $148 35 for his principal debt, with interest and costs of suit. Afterwards, at the March term of said superior court, 1869, the defendant in said judgment made a motion to set it aside, on the ground that the consideration of the debt on which said judgment was obtained, was for the hire of a negro slave. On the hearing of that motion the court rendered the following judgment: "It appearing that the consideration in the above stated case, (the names of the parties and judgment being stated,) was for ne Bell vs. Hanks. gro hire, ordered that said judgment be set aside as well as the fi. fa. from it." At the March term of said court, 1874, the plaintiff in the original judgment made a motion to set aside the judgment rendered in 1869, setting aside his original judgment obtained in 1861, on the grounds that said order and judgment of 1869, as appears on the face thereof, was based on a ground wholly unknown to the law, and was in violation of the constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state; that the court had no jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of 1861, on the ground stated in the order and judgment of 1869; and because the order and judgment of 1869, was passed and rendered without any notice to the plaintiff of the motion therefor. On the hearing of the motion to set aside the order and judgment of 1869, the court sustained it, and ordered that judgment to be set aside. Whereupon the defendant in the original judgment of 1861 excepted, and assigns the same as error. 1. There was no error in setting aside the judgment of 1869 on the statement of facts disclosed in the record. My individual reasons in support of the judgment of the court below will be found in the case of Prescott vs. Bennett, 50th Georgia Reports, 266; and in my dissenting opinion in the case of Tison vs. McAfee, Ibid, 284; and in my dissenting opinion in the case of Fannin vs. Durden, 54th Ibid., 476, and will not be again repeated here. 2. The plaintiff in error insisted, on the argument before us, that inasmuch as the original judgment was rendered in 1861, and more than seven years having elapsed from the date of that judgment before the motion to set aside the judgment of 1869 was made, the judgment of 1861 had become dormant, and for that reason the motion to set aside the judgment of 1869 should not have been allowed. The reply is, that the statute prescribing the time within which judgment liens shall be enforced or become dormant, is a statute of limitations, and the statute of limitations was suspended until the 21st of July, 1868, and therefore the judgment of 1861 was not dormant when the motion to set aside the judgment Story vs. Kemp et al. of 1869 was made in 1874. But it was not the judgment of 1861 the plaintiff made his motion to set aside, but the judgment of 1869, and the seven years had not run from the date of this last named judgment, until the motion was made to set it aside at the March term of the court, 1874. 3. We recognize the rule that notice should have been given to the plaintiff of the motion to set aside the judgment. of 1861 when it was made in 1869. Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed. BENJAMIN A. STORY, plaintiff in error, vs. SARAH KEMP et al., defendants in error. If a garnishee, by his answer, plead a set-off against all the plaintiffs, and he admit to the court at the trial, without amending his answer, that his set-off is against some of the plaintiffs only, his set-off will not be allowed. In such case, it cannot be said that the garnishee has plainly, fully and distinctly set forth his defense, and while the rules of pleading have, in this state, been much relaxed, it is still necessary that the allegations and proof shall substantially correspond. Garnishment. Set-off. Before Judge JAMES JOHNSON. Marion Superior Court. April Term, 1875. Reported in the opinion. BLANDFORD & GARRARD, for plaintiff in error. E. N. MILLER; E. M. BUTT; LITTLE & CRAWFORD; PEABODY & BRANNON, for defendants. BLECKLEY, Judge. There was a judgment for a gross sum in favor of numerous heirs-at-law against the administrator. Upon it a garnishment issued, addressed to Strong, the plaintiff in error. In his answer, the garnishee admitted a certain indebtedness from himself to the administrator, and sought to protect him |