Sabattie vs. Baggs. county, and all others holding said Wimberly in custody under and by virtue of said judgment should discharge said Wimberly from custody," was error: The Mayor and Council of the City of Mucon vs. Shaw, 14 Georgia Reports, 162; Taylor vs. Gay, 20 Georgia Reports, 77. The legal presumption was that the judgment rendered by the county commissioners was a legal and valid judgment until reversed for error in the manner as prescribed by law. The order of the judge, which directed that Wimberly should pay over to the county authorities the amount admitted by him to be due in his answer, as a condition of his discharge, was also error, but it was an error against him of which he does not complain, and the county has no right to complain of that error. Let the judgment of the court below be reversed. C. SABATTIE, administrator, plaintiff in error, vs. JAMES W. BAGGS, defendant in error. 1. A sheriff's deed based on a sale of land for taxes, is not evidence without the execution under which the sheriff acted. 2. A judgment right in itself, will not be reversed because predicated, in whole or in part, on a wrong reason. Deeds. Sheriff. Execution. Evidence. Judgments. Before Judge HARRIS. Liberty Superior Court. November Term, 1875. This case was complaint for land. The title of the plaintiff rested on a sheriff's deed made on a sale of the property in controversy for taxes. When this instrument was offered in evidence, unaccompanied by the execution under which the sheriff acted, the defendant objected to its introduction upon the following grounds: 1st. Because the deed did not recite that the sheriff sold between the hours of 10 o'clock A. M., and 4 o'clock P. M. 2d. Because it did not show on its face that the sheriff first Varner et al. vs. Varner et al. offered said land for rent, and on failure to rent the same, then offered a portion for sale, and then the whole. The objections were sustained, and plaintiff excepted. From this ruling a non-suit resulted. Error is assigned upon the above ground of exception. WALTER A. WAY, by Z. D. HARRISON, for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendant. BLECKLEY, Judge. 1. Whether section 893 of the Code was intended to free tax titles from any of the strictness of the prior law need not be considered. It certainly does not give them a higher status than belongs to a deed made by the sheriff under the judgment of a court, and such a deed, unsupported, is generally not admissible in evidence: Clark & Wilson vs. Trawick, Jannuary term, 1876. 2. The foregoing being a sufficient reason for excluding the deed, it is needless to inquire what recitals such a deed should contain, or what would be their effect. The judgment excepted to was right, no matter on what ground it was based. Judgment affirmed. JOSEPH L. VARNER et al., plaintiffs in error, vs. MARY J. 1. Before a judgment of the circuit court will be reversed, the burden is upon the party complaining to show affirmatively that it is erroneous, and if the bill of exceptions and transcript of the record, show no demurrer and the case turned on the demurrer, this court cannot intelligently review it, and will affirm the judgment. 2. The above rule of practice is the more necessary when the bill is demurrable on several grounds, such as the misjoinder of parties, the absence of essential parts of the record, and the failure to append important exhibits. 55 573 65 368 Varner et al. vs. Varner et al. 3. Considering the demurrer a general one, for want of equity, which is most favorable for plaintiffs in error, we see nothing in the bill which shows that their remedy is not adequate and complete at law. Practice in the Supreme Court. Equity. Demurrer. Before Judge KIDDOO. Quitman county. At Chambers. May Sth, 1875. Reported in the opinion. H. & I. L. FIELDER, for plaintiffs in error. No appearance for defendant. JACKSON, Judge. 1, 2. This case seems to have gone off below on a demurrer, but what the demurrer was, and on what grounds it rested, we cannot tell. No copy of it is in the bill of exceptions, and while that paper is made to assert that all the facts necessary are in the record, this, the most important fact, indeed the only fact, together with the bill, absolutely necessary to enable us to pass upon the case, is not in the record at all. It is needless to say that we cannot pass upon it and must affirm the judgment below. In a similar case this court pursued that course, and it appears to be the only reasonable one: Mayor and Council of Rome vs. Duke, 19 Georgia Reports, 93. 3. The demurrer is the more necessary here because the bill seems to us demurrable upon various grounds. Assuming that it was a general demurrer and went to the whole bill, and was grounded on want of equity, which is the most favorable assumption for the plaintiff in error, and which may be inferred from the fact that the bill was dismissed, we think the remedy of the party complainants ample at law. From their statements it seems the property was always held as theirs and for them; they all appear to be sui juris; they seek no discovery, and we see no reason why they could not recover at law. But we place our judgment upon the ground that we cannot review a case without the pleadings; that Clark vs. Warren. plaintiff in error must see to it that the pleadings are here, or take the consequences, and that the consequences will always be the affirmance of the judgment of the court below. Judgment affirmed. CHESTER M. CLARK, administrator, plaintiff in error, vs. JAMES W. WARREN, defendant in error. A and B purchased land, delivering their joint and several promissory note, secured by mortgage thereon, in payment therefor. They divided the land, executing, each to the other, a quit-claim deed. B sold his portion to a purchaser, who had constructive notice of the mortgage from the fact of its being of record, and died insolvent. A died solvent. His administrator was compelled to pay off in full the aforesaid joint and several note. He then filed his bill against the purchaser of B's portion to enforce contribution: Held, that there was no equity in his bill. Equity. Mortgage. Vendor and purchaser. Contribution. Before Judge HARRIS. Calhoun Superior Court. September Term, 1875. Reported in the decision. STROZER & SMITH; LYON & BUTLER, for plaintiff in error. VASON & DAVIS; R. N. ELY, for defendant. WARNER, Chief Justice. This was a bill filed by the complainant, as the administrator of Wilkinson, against the, defendant, in the year 1860, alleging that in the year 1848 complainant's intestate, and one Spicer, purchased from the Messrs. Costers, several described lots of land, for which they executed their joint and several promissory notes, to secure the payment of which, they, on the 6th of December, 1848, executed a mortgage on the land so purchased, to the Costers. Subsequently, on the 29th of December 1849, Wilkinson and Spicer, by agreement, divided Clark vs. Warren. the land between them, each executing a quit claim deed to the other for their respective shares thereof; that in the year 1856 Spicer departed this life insolvent, and his estate is unrepresented, leaving, at the time of his death, two of the notes so given as aforesaid to the Costers for the land secured by the mortgage thereon, unpaid; that Wilkinson died, and the complainant, as his administrator, was compelled not only to pay his intestate's share of said notes but was also compelled to pay Spicer's share thereof, his intestate being a joint and several promissor thereon, and did pay the same, amounting to the sum of $2,686 45, on the 5th day of December, 1859. The complainant also alleges, that after the partition of the lands between Wilkinson and Spicer, Spicer sold and conveyed his share thereof to the defendant, Warren, who went into the possession thereof and still occupies the same; the time of this sale is not alleged in complainant's bill, but is stated in the defendant's answer to have been in the spring of 1853. The complainant alleges that the defendant, Warren, had notice of the mortgage on the land to the Costers, at the time he purchased it from Spicer, and insists that the land in his hands is chargeable with the amount which he has paid to the Costers for Spicer's share of the money due on the notes given by Wilkinson and Spicer for the land, the payment of which was secured by the mortgage thereon. The prayer of the bill is, that the land may be sold and so much of the proceeds thereof as may be necessary, be applied to the extinguishment of the amount paid by the complainant to the Costers for Spicer, and the surplus, if any, paid to the defendant, and for such other relief as the nature of his case may require, according to equity and good conscience. The defendant, in his answer, admits that he purchased the land from Spicer in the spring of 1853 for the sum of $10,000, and has paid for the same; defendant also admits that he had constructive but not actual notice of the mortgage on the land to the Costers, at the time of his purchase, but had at the same time notice that the mortgage debt was the joint debt of |