dollars from the enhanced price of Indian opium, should buy back from the merchants the stocks of opium now in their hands and destroy the drug. Should the present critical situation so eventuate, Commissioner Lin, who, by the seizure and destruction of twenty thousand chests of opium in 1837, brought on the so-called Opium War, would undoubtedly turn in his grave and sigh with satisfaction.

Quite apart from that aspect of the opium question as it affects China, the international side is interesting, for the International Opium Convention has, in addition to the original signatures, received the signatures of all the Latin American states but one, and, on December 17 last, Great Britain, one of the original signatories, signed on behalf of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and twenty-five Crown Colonies, dependencies and protectorates. In addition, most of the European countries have signed the instrument.

By the terms of the convention, if any civilized state had not signed the convention by the 31st of last December, it was incumbent upon the Netherland Government immediately to call a final conference of all the signatory Powers to assemble at The Hague to determine upon the deposit of ratifications of the instrument. That conference has now been summoned by the Netherland Government to meet at The Hague in June, and there is every reason to believe that when the conference assembles, it will be composed of representatives of every Power of America, Europe and Asia; that the convention will be amended and the time for the deposit of its ratifications decided upon. Thus, the original idea of the United States Government that four or five Powers should come to the assistance of China, has been enlarged and welded into a concrete agreement embracing all civilized states.

THE TREATY OF NOVEMBER 27, 1912, BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN

CONCERNING MOROCCO

As pointed out in previous comments, the ambition of France has been for years past to acquire, and having acquired them, to consolidate its possessions in the north of Africa. The conquest of Algiers began in the thirties, and the vast extent of territory formerly subject to the Bey of Algiers is now a department of the republic. Tunis was acquired in 1881 and is under French protection. Finally, Morocco has been subjected to French domination, but only after a struggle which threatened at one time the peace of the world. There were several serious obstacles

in the way of absorbing Morocco. France and Great Britain were at loggerheads about the occupation of Egypt. Spain coveted Morocco and had obtained a firm foothold in certain parts of it. Germany, acting in its own behalf and in the interest of equal commercial opportunity for the nations at large, had to be reckoned with.

By the treaty of April 8, 1904, France withdrew objections to English activity in Egypt, provided it was given a free hand in Morocco. The interests of Spain were safeguarded and Spain was invited to adhere to the declaration of April 8, 1904, which it did on October 3, 1904.1 The interests of France and Spain were defined in the so-called secret treaty of even date. The way was therefore prepared for France to extend its influence in Morocco without obstruction from Great Britain, on the one hand, and Spain, on the other. Germany, however, insisted not merely on being consulted but in having its interests recognized, which it skilfully identified with those of the Powers. After protracted negotiations and much friction France succeeded, with the support of Great Britain, in concluding the convention of November 4, 1911,3 which, while guaranteeing the interests of Germany and of the Powers generally, removed German opposition to French action in Morocco. But a modus operandi had to be reached with Spain, as its interests in Morocco were material as well as historic, for without this complete understanding France would have been unable to render its protectorate over Morocco effective as far as Spain was concerned. Concession, tact, and the feeling that the preponderance of France was inevitable, led to the treaty of November 27, 1912, by which the two countries defined their spheres of influence, their respective rights in Morocco, and provided for arbitration of any disputes which might arise between them regarding the interpretation and application of the treaty.4

Without analyzing in detail the provisions of the treaty, it should be said that Article 1 recognizes Spanish influence within the sphere defined in Article 2, and that in Article 5 Spain agrees, in conformity with previous stipulations, neither to alienate nor to cede under any form, even temporarily, its rights in the whole or any part of the territory composing its zone of influence.

1 For these important declarations see AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW for 1912, SUPPLEMENT, pp. 26–30.

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2 For the text of this important document, see idem, pp. 116-120.

3 For the text of this important document, see idem, pp. 62-66.

For the text of this important document see SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, p. 81.

The relations of France and Spain as regards the Spanish zone of influence are very skilfully arranged by Article 1 of the treaty, and Article 26 withdraws the intervention of the sultan under French control within the Spanish sphere. Thus "International agreements concluded in future by His Shereefian Majesty will not extend to the Spanish zone of influence except with the previous consent of the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain." As previously pointed out, differences arising between France and Spain concerning the interpretation of the present important treaty are to be arbitrated. This is provided for in Article 27, which by reason of its importance is quoted in full:

The convention of February 25, 1904, renewed on February 3, 1909, as well as the general convention of The Hague of October 18, 1907, will apply to differences which may arise between the contracting parties concerning the interpretation and the application of the provisions of the present convention, which may not have been settled through diplomatic channels. A compromis must be drawn up according to the rules of the said conventions unless it is dispensed with by express agreement at the time of the litigation.

Article 28 very properly provides that "all classes of treaties, conventions and former agreements which may conflict with the preceding stipulations are abrogated."

This comment leaves out of consideration the protocol attached to the treaty, which, however, is printed in the Supplement to the present number of the JOURNAL.

It would seem, therefore, that as a result of negotiations extending over years, France has succeeded in establishing its protectorate over Morocco with the consent of the Powers generally, and with the approval of Spain, whose special rights and interests are, however, satisfactorily recognized and adjusted. The price is the independence of Morocco, but the independence of a small state seems to be a matter of little or no concern to the Powers, provided they receive what is called, in the language of diplomacy, compensation. It is to be hoped that this highhanded procedure, for the chief party in interest - Morocco-consents to its annihilation under duress, will be justified, in so far as it can be justified, by good government in Morocco and the prosperity of its people.

CHANDLER P. ANDERSON

In the January, 1911, number of the JOURNAL attention was called to the appointment of Mr. Chandler P. Anderson as Counselor for the De

partment of State, and the training and experience he had had in international affairs which justified the appointment. The change of administration on March 4, 1913, will, according to uniform precedent and practice, involve a change of the personnel of the State Department, at least of the higher officials appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Mr. Anderson's successor has been announced and Mr. Anderson will shortly sever his connection with the Department of State. It will no doubt be a source of pleasure to the members of the American Society of International Law, of which Mr. Anderson has been treasurer since its organization in 1906, and to the readers of the JOURNAL, of which he is one of the editors, that he does not retire to private life, but that the government is to have the benefit of his services, for he has been appointed American member of the pecuniary claims tribunal between Great Britain and the United States, which it is expected will begin its labors in the month of May.

As Counselor for the Department of State, Mr. Anderson has been consulted in the negotiation of treaties and agreements, in the diplomatic negotiations relating to international differences, and in the proceedings taken in accordance with treaty stipulations. To give an idea of the extent and variety of his services it would be necessary to consider in detail the various questions of this nature which have arisen in the Department since his connection with it. This would, however, exceed the limits of an editorial comment. It is therefore only possible to mention some of the more important matters which were discussed and settled during his tenure of office and with which he is prominently and honorably identified. Some of these questions were of long standing and had been handled by Mr. Anderson as special counsel to Mr. Root when Secretary of State. Such, for example, were the delicate and complicated questions dealing with the preservation of the seal in Bering Sea, which resulted in the conclusion of the seal treaty with Great Britain of February 7, 1911, as preliminary to the North Pacific Sealing Convention between Great Britain, Japan, Russia and the United States of July 7, 1911, in which Mr. Anderson was one of the American representatives. Two other questions with which Mr. Anderson was connected as Counselor began under Mr. Root and were carried to completion under Mr. Knox: the treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan of February 21, 1911, and in the same way the treaty of February 25, 1913, between Italy and the United States amending Article 3 of the treaty of 1871. To the first of these the JOURNAL has already

devoted a special comment1 congratulating the Department of State upon its success in settling satisfactorily the difficulties which had arisen between the two countries since the unfortunate school incident in San Francisco.2 The treaty between the United States and Italy above referred to forms the subject of a special comment in the present issue of the JOURNAL.

It is, however, in connection with the settlement of the North Atlantic Fisheries controversy with which Mr. Anderson's name will be in time to come most closely associated. He was, it will be recalled, agent of the United States in the arbitration of this historic controversy, which was decided in part by the award of a temporary tribunal of the so-called Permanent Court of The Hague on September 7, 1910. Mr. Root's experience with the Alaska Boundary dispute showed him how easy it was to settle differences between nations when their relations were friendly and unruffled by untoward incidents, and how easily questions even of small moment assumed political importance and were difficult of adjustment in periods of storm and stress. On becoming Secretary of State he decided to open up and, if possible, to settle by diplomatic means the North Atlantic Fisheries controversy, as the friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States led him to believe that this question might be disposed of to the mutual satisfaction of both nations. He therefore opened up the question in October, 1905, and after much discussion between the two governments and the failure of diplomacy to compromise apparently irreconcilable differences of opinion, the special agreement of January 27, 1909, was negotiated, by which the questions at issue were submitted to arbitral determination. Throughout this period Mr. Anderson acted as special counsel to Mr. Root and was, as has been said, agent of the United States in the arbitration which took place at The Hague in 1910. The temporary tribunal decided most of the questions. It made a series of recommendations on Question 1 and Question 5, and it was the good fortune of Mr. Anderson as Counselor for the Department and as special representative of the United States to negotiate the North Atlantic Fisheries agreement of July 20, 1912, which secured the adoption of these recommendations with

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1 See AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 5, p. 442.

2 See editorial in this JOURNAL, Vol. I, p. 150, and address of Honorable Elihu Root, Proceedings for 1907, page 43, and this JOURNAL, Vol. I, page 273.

See editorial comment and text of this important treaty in this JOURNAL for January 1913, p. 140 and SUPPLEMENT, p. 41.