submission to the Court under this specific provision would not be subject to the Connally reservation attached to the U.S. declaration accepting generally the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. That declaration was filed pursuant to article 36, paragraph 2, of that statute of the Court. The specific provision of Article XIII would govern references to the Court made under it. The Connally reservation would only apply to references where jurisdiction is premised on the declaration of general acceptance of jurisdiction. Hearings on Oil Pollution Convention 14-15." In reporting the Convention, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that it was aware that the Connally Amendment would not apply to disputes referred to the I.C.J. under the Convention, noting that “[a]s a practical matter it is hardly conceivable that any matter arising under this convention, pertaining as it does to oil pollution of the high seas by ships, could be construed as being within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States." S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960). The Convention, without reservation to Article XIII, was ratified by the Senate in 1961. While the Senate's speculation on the practical effect of Article XIII is arguably less relevant to a convention having the crime of genocide as its subject matter, the history of the sea law and oil pollution treaties in the Senate does indicate some agreement by the public participants in the ratification process on the effect of the Connally Amendment on compromissary clauses generally. There is accord, it would seem, on the proposition that the Amendment has no effect on submitting disputes to the I.C.J. under compromissary clauses of "specific" treaties unless clauses are qualified with a clear statement making a “selfjudging domestic-jurisdiction" reservation applicable. Bishop & Myers, "Unwarranted Extension of Connally Amendment Thinking," 55 Am J. Int'l L. 135, 140 (1961). As some have observed: "Whatever may be one's views as to the desirability or undesirability of the Connally Amendment as a limit upon general acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, there seems no sufficient reason to impose a similar restriction on the narrower acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction as to controversies between parties to a particular treaty when disputes concern interpretation or application of that treaty. This distinction between the broad general acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction over a wide range of international law questions, and the specific narrow acceptance of jurisdiction in the compromissary clauses, lies at the heart of the effort to include these clauses in our treaties. Id. 141." A compromissary clause may well be a means of indicating that the United States has determined that certain issues, i.e., those arising under a specific treaty, are not solely matters of domestic jurisdiction. Concerns that the Convention deals with a criminal matter, a subject that by its nature falls within domestic jurisdiction, may lead to an argument that the language of Article IX would deprive the United States of Connally Amendment protections were the Supreme Court to determine that a matter lay within such domestic jurisdiction. Any such determination would presumably involve a determination of the validity of the treaty itself, that is whether the treaty power has been used, improperly, to make domestic law within the United States. Admittedly, if the treaty power were held invalid by the Supreme Court, the United States, in the absence of a Connally-type reservation to Article IX, would seem potentially subject to adverse claims before the I.C.J. by other States Parties. Such claims could be based upon the continuing international obligations of the United States under the Convention, not withstanding any contrary requirements mandated by United States domestic law. Sec Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 145 (2), Comment c (1965); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Advisory Opinion on Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 44 at 22 (1932). However, whether the United States Supreme Court would hold the treaty invalid for lack of "international concern" seems doubtful in view of the extensive State adherence to the Convention and the widely-held view that human rights, as enjoyed domestically, is a proper subject for international agreement. Finally, numerous treaty parties, most notably Communist bloc countries, have ratified the Convention subject to the reservation that they do not consider themselves bound by Article IX. Were the United States to take exception to this practice, as a number of parties have already done, it would be able to invoke the reservation in its own favor in cases brought before the I.C.J. by the reserving states. 1977 Hearings 42 (written responses of Mr. Hansell to additional Committee questions). [Annex 2] PROXMIRE REFUTES ARGUMENTS OF LIBERTY LOBBY WHITE PAPER ctober 1981 the Liberty Lobby organization issued its White Paper on The de Convention. owing its release, I made a number of speeches refuting the arguments ned in that White Paper. text of those speeches follow: [From the Congressional Record, Oct. 19, 1981] GENOCIDE CONVENTION DOES NOT REQUIRE EXTRADITION PROXMIRE. Mr. President, when I first began to make my daily speeches over 30 years the Senate has withheld approval from a convention which e simple fact is that there is no provision for extradition within the Geno- othing in Article VI shall affect the right of any state to bring to trial e its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the international tribunal capable of prosecuting any American or other indial exists at the present time. Any future international court would be creonly as the result of a new treaty. Both the ratification of such a treaty, American acceptance of its jurisdiction would require Senate consent. It is ceivable that the U.S. Senate would approve of the creation of an institution h might jeopardize the rights of American citizens. e objections to the Genocide Convention are not based on a true appraisal he meaning of the document itself. Yet, for over 14 years, I have watched increasing unhappiness as these same issues are constantly reinvoked. It is to finally lay these criticisms to rest permanently, and to ratify the Genocide vention. he Genocide Convention is nothing more than an attempt to extend interonal protection of human rights in a more concrete and meaningful way. Over ations have already ratified this convention. The United States is overdue ts ratification of this meaningful document. [From the Congressional Record, Oct. 21, 1981] GENOCIDE TREATY DOES NOT ACCEPT POLITICAL MURDERS Ir. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, today I would like to once again refer to alleions made in the recent "White Paper on the Genocide Convention," a docunt distributed by the Liberty Lobby. The criticisms which have been leveled the treaty since 1949, and which appear once again in this document, conently point to supposed loopholes and shortcomings of the treaty. t is my belief that those who oppose ratification of the Genocide Convention not understand either the meaning of the treaty nor its underlying principles. Under the heading "Political Mass Murder Accepted," the Liberty Lobby's ite paper essentially makes the assumption that by the noninclusion of itical groups, as potential genocide victims within the treaty, this form of ss murder is therefore made acceptable. The white paper then makes the argument that on the basis of this and similar alleged weaknesses, the Genocide Treaty should not be ratified. In the first place, to believe that the omission of political groups from the treaty's definition of genocide is equal to the approval of the commission of genocide against such groups is an exercise in misguided logic. Any international agreement is enormously difficult to negotiate; it is imperative to build a foundation upon which all parties may agree. The definition of a particular crime in a treaty does not perpetually exclude other acts not originally covered. Later negotiations may well expand the scope of the original treaty. Does the limitation in scope of one aspect of the treaty warrant the denial of protection to the other groups which are protected by the Genocide Convention? Absolutely not. Second, the implication of the White Paper that the omission of "political groups" permits the Soviet Union or any Communist or non-Communist state to reclassify any group of citizens as a "political group" and then freely commit mass murder is ludicrous. It is clear that attempts to destroy members of an ethnic, racial, religious or national group, in whole or in part, constitute genocide. The public relations efforts of such murderous henchmen do not excuse or permit such unconscionable acts under the treaty. Third, a point that friends and foes alike should heed is that this convention would apply to Communist and non-Communist nations alike. And I want to make it absolutely clear that this Senator intends to speak out loud and clear regarding any Communist transgressions of the spirit or letter of this convention. Mr. President, the Genocide Convention stands as an affirmation of human rights, and a movement toward international protection of human life. Ratification of the treaty would enhance the position of the United States as a leader in the cause of human rights. Certainly, ratification would aid in the credibility and overall strength of international law. The treaty is not a plot by Communist sympathizers or bleeding hearts, nor is it an attempt to abridge the constitutional rights of Americans by allowing indiscriminate extraditions and international trials. No treaty-and I mean none can override any constitutional rights of Americans. Those who would seek to invalidate the benefits of the treaty by engaging in these ill-conceived exercises in sophistry must not prevent ratification of the Genocide Convention any longer. The United States must ratify the Genocide Convention. [From the Congressional Record, Oct. 22, 1981] GENOCIDE CONVENTION WOULD STRENGTHEN AMERICA'S EFFORTS TO PROTEST SOVIET ABUSES Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the "Liberty Lobby's White Paper" on the Genocide Convention makes the following assertion and I quote: "It is clear that the ratification of the Genocide Convention will in no way serve the interests of the United States nor those of the citizens, voters and taxpayers. The only argument for it reduces to infinitely repeated assertions that it will somehow aid our 'foreign policy'—an elusive thing which itself has never been defined." Mr. President, statements such as this one could not be further from the truth. The only thing that is clear from reading this White Paper is that the Liberty Lobby needs only to read the hearing record of the Foreign Relations Committee to determine how this treaty will serve the interests of the United States, its citizens, voters and taxpayers. The benefits to our foreign policy are more than elusive, undefined ideas. First, ratificatiion of the Genocide Convention would strengthen our hand in attacking the gross violation of human rights by the Soviet Union and its allies. While the Genocide Convention itself is a narrowly drafted human rights treaty, the testimony of Nixon administration officials during the 1970 hearing make it clear that ratification of this convention would strengthen our foreign policy. Rita Hauser, a Republican respected on both sides of the aisle, and, at the time, our delegate to the Human Rights Commission, testified: have frequently invoked the terms of this convention (the Genocide Con.) as well as the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human in our continued aggressive attack against the Soviet Union for its es, particularly as to its large Jewish communities but also as to its ians, Tartars, Baptists and others. It is this anomaly . . . that while we elt free to invoke the Genocide Convention against others, we have not yet es ratified it. This often leads to the retort in debates plainly put, simply Who are you to invoke a treaty that you are not party to?'" O indeed, Mr. President? In that same hearing, Ambassador Charles Yost, er foreign service officer, and President Nixon's choice to represent the States at the United Nations, noted: an assure the subcommittee that in my diplomatic life, at the United Naand elsewhere, no question has ever been asked me about the policy of my y which has been more difficult to answer than questions about American on on this convention." that was 1970, Mr. President. Does our failure to ratify this convention · our ability to conduct our foreign policy? Does it impair our ability to out against abuses by the Soviet Union and its allies today? Absolutely. mer Associate Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, who represented nited States at the United Nations for 3 years, pleaded with the Foreign ons Committee in the 1977 hearings not to send our people to Belgrade, e "Helsinki Accord Conference" the fall of that year, and talk about human when our country still has not ratified the most basic human rights conn-the Genocide Convention. t Belgrade conference, Mr. President, included a major effort by the ern powers to hold the feet of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European s to the fire on the basic human rights issues. Our representatives to this ubsequent conferences have repeatedly stated that our hand would have strengthened in protesting Communist transgressions on basic human rights Senate had acted on the Genocide Convention. es the Liberty Lobby believe that we should continue to have our diplomats the Soviets and other human rights transgressors-with one arm tied d their back? I would hope not. cond, the ratification of this convention eliminates a point of attack for our ies. As a self-proclaimed leader in the area of human rights—and Mr. Presiour record is clearly unequalled in the world-the United States has been ted by its failure to take action on basic human rights treaties, which parour ideals and our practice here at home. It is time to end, for once and for hese taunts of hypocrisy from nations who wish us ill. It's time to eliminate uzzlement of our allies, who have ratified this Convention, and are amazed ar procrastination. ird, ratification of the Genocide Convention would help to accelerate the lopment of a firm principle of international law that life is sacred. That the d cherishes and will solemnly pledge to safeguard the right of every national, ic, racial or religious group to exist. Perhaps this is what Liberty Lobby finds ve. Perhaps they oppose all international law. ut this Senator is one American, who is proud of our country, proud of the doms enumerated in our Declaration of Independence and guaranteed by our of Rights and Constitution, and I do not fear seeing the most basic right that e documents protest-the right to live-protected on an international scale. r. President, we have led the way in the protection of every citizen's liberties at home. I have enough faith in those principles to see them extended abroad. ould have thought that any organization named Liberty Lobby would have I same faith in the principles we pioneered to see them extended abroad. But main hopeful that they will—some day. [From the Congressional Record, Oct. 23, 1981] THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE WORLD COURT Ir. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Liberty Lobby's White Paper on the Genocide vention alleges that: Ratification of the Genocide Convention would have the unfortunate but cern side-effect of repealing the Connally Reservation, six key words inserted into resolution accepting the jurisdiction of the World Court in 1946. . . . Without them, the World Court would make its own determination of what is to be deemed domestic and foreign matters, subjecting American citizens to the jurisdiction of aliens." Mr. President, I can well understand how any American who is not an expert in international law would find such an allegation frightening. Unfortunately, the allegation represents a lack of understanding of the treaty, a lack of understanding of the "Connally Reservation" and an abysmal lack of knowledge of existing United States treaty practice. WHAT DOES THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION SAY? Mr. President, first, let me turn to the actual wording of the Genocide Convention. Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides that: "Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the disputes." Does this mean that another nation can haul Americans before the World Court or any foreign court? Absolutely not. The language refers to disputes "between the Contracting Parties”. In plain English that means disputes between nations which have signed and ratified the Genocide Convention. Not foreign nations and U.S. citizens. In addition, the understanding recommended by the Foreign Relations Committee makes it clear that the United States reserves the right to see that all Americans all Americans-charged with genocide are tried before American courts with every constitutional guarantee, and the proposed implementing legislation directs the Secretary of State to see that any extradition treaties that we consider in the future say just that. THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT But that is just the beginning, Mr. President. You may ask "C'mon, Proxmire, that article may not result in Americans going before foreign Courts but it certainly violates our sovereignty by letting the World Court meddle in our affairs." That is a fair question, Mr. President, but let us look at the record. During the Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Genocide Convention in 1970, the committee examined this question very carefully. And what did they find? They found that language providing for the referral of disputes to the World Court the language of article IX to which the Liberty Lobby objects-was already contained in 27 multilateral treaties, 2 bilateral treaties and 19 commercial treaties. That is 48 treaties, Mr. President, which are on the books in which the United States has agreed to referral of disputes to the World Court. Has this diminished our sovereignty in any way. Of course not. Has the Liberty Lobby or any other group been able to cite one case, just one, in which this language has hurt U.S. sovereignty in any way? Absolutely not. This record is important, Mr. President, because it clearly demonstrates that this language providing for referrals of treaty disputes to the World Court is accepted American practice, ratified time and again, by the Senate and it has never hurt American interests. For that reason, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a list of these treaties be reprinted in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1). "RECIPROCITY"-A SAFEGUARD AGAINST COMMUNIST TREACHERY Mr. PROXMIRE. But perhaps genocide is different, Mr. President. Even though the record is clear that the language providing for the referral of disputes to the World Court has never harmed American interests, it is fair to ask whether unfounded al'egations of American genocide might permit the Soviet Union and its allies an attempt to embarrass the United States. The answer is loud and clear: No way. |