Economic Organization: Firms, Markets and Policy Control

activities adaptations agreement Alchian analysis antitrust argument assessment asset specificity assumed award behaviour bounded rationality buyer capital market CATV circumstances Coase collusion competition complex condition conglomerate contract renewal interval control loss CTIC Demsetz developed discretion discussion divisionalized divisions economies of scale effects efficiency enterprise entry exchange executive executive compensation favour firms and markets Focus franchise bidding function governance structures hierarchical Ibid idiosyncratic incentive industry internal organization investment issues Journal of Economics labour learning-by-doing M-form structure managerial marginal cost market failure merger modern corporation modes natural monopoly neoclassical observed oligopolistic oligopoly operating opportunism output parties posed Posner price discrimination problems profit-maximizing profits received microtheory regulation relation requires respect result Simon span of control specialized staff stage Stigler strategic supplier supply TelePrompTer theory tion transaction cost economics transaction-cost economizing transaction-specific uncertainty variable vertical integration Williamson