YOUR highness hath an imperial name. It was a Charles that brought the empire first into France; a Charles that brought it first into Spain; why should not Great Britain have its turn? But to lay aside all that may seem to have a show of fumes and fancies, and to speak solids: a war with Spain, | if the king shall enter into it, is a mighty work; it requireth strong materials, and active motions. He that saith not so, is zealous, but not according to knowledge. But nevertheless Spain is no such giant and he that thinketh Spain to be some great overmatch for this estate, assisted as it is, and may be, is no good mint-man; but takes greatness of kingdoms according to their bulk and currency, and not after their intrinsic value. Although therefore I had wholly sequestered my thoughts from civil affairs, yet because it is a new case and concerneth my country infinitely, I obtained of myself to set down, out of long continued experience in business of estate, and much conversation in books of policy and history, what I thought pertinent to this business; and in all humbleness present it to your highness hoping that at least you will discern the strength of my affection through the weakness of my abilities: for the Spaniard hath a good proverb, "De suario si empre con la calentura;" there is no heat of affection, but is joined with some idleness of brain. To a war are required, a just quarrel; sufficient forces and provisions; and a prudent choice of the designs. So then, I will first justify the quarrel; secondly, balance the forces; and lastly, propound variety of designs for choice, but not advise the choice; for that were not fit for a writing of this nature; neither is it a subject within the level of my judgment; I being, in effect, a stranger to the present occurrences.

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Wars, I speak not of ambitious predatory wars, are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice, where there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause and they are, as civil pleas are, plaints, or defences. There are therefore three just grounds of war with Spain: one plaint, two upon defence. Solomon saith, "A cord of three is not easily broken:" but especially when every of the lines would hold single by itself. They are these: the recovery of the Palatinate; a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate; a just fear of the subversion of our church and religion. For in the handling of the two last grounds of war, I shall make it plain, that wars preventive upon just fears

are true defensives, as well as upon actual invasions: and again, that wars defensive for religion, I speak not of rebellion, are most just; though offensive wars for religion are seldom to be approved, or never, unless they have some mixture of civil titles. But all that I shall say in this whole argument, will be but like bottoms of thread close wound up, which with a good needle, perhaps, may be flourished into large works.

For the asserting of the justice of the quarrel, for the recovery of the Palatinate, I shall not go so high as to discuss the right of the war of Bohemia; which if it be freed from doubt on our part, then there is no colour nor shadow why the Palatinate should be retained; the ravishing whereof was a mere excursion of the first wrong, and a super-injustice. But I do not take myself to be so perfect in the customs, transactions, and privileges of that kingdom of Bohemia, as to be fit to handle that part: and I will not offer at that I cannot master. Yet this I will say, in passage, positively and resolutely; that it is impossible an elective monarchy should be so free and absolute as an hereditary; no more than it is possible for a father to have so full power and interest in an adoptive son as in a natural; "quia naturalis obligatio fortior civili." And again, that received maxim is almost unshaken and infallible; "Nil magis naturæ consentaneum est, quam ut iisdem modis res dissolvantur, quibus constituuntur." So that if the part of the people or estate be somewhat in the election, you cannot make them nulls or ciphers in the privation or translation. And if it be said, that this is a dangerous opinion for the pope, emperor, and elective kings; it is true, it is a dangerous opinion, and ought to be a dangerous opinion, to such personal popes, emperors, or elective kings, as shall transcend their limits, and become tyrannical. But it is a safe and sound opinion for their sees, empires, and kingdoms; and for themselves also, if they be wise; "plenitudo potestatis est plenitudo tempestatis." But the chief cause why I do not search into this point is, because I need it not. And in handling the right of a war, I am not willing to intermix matter doubtful with that which is out of doubt. For as in capital causes, wherein but one man's life is in question, in favorem vitæ the evidence ought to be clear; so much more in a judgment upon a war, which is capital to thousands. I suppose therefore the worst, that the of fensive war upon Bohemia had been unjust; and

then make the case, which is no sooner made than resolved, if it be made not enwrapped, but plainly and perspicuously. It is this in thesi. An offensive war is made, which is unjust in the aggressor; the prosecution and race of the war carrieth the defendant to assail and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimony of the first aggressor, who is now turned defendant; shall he sit down, and not put himself in defence? Or if he be dispossessed, shall he not make a war for the recovery. No man is so poor of judgment as will affirm it. The castle of Cadmus was taken, and the city of Thebes itself invested by Phoebidas the Lacedæmonian, insidiously, and in violation of league: the process of this action drew on a re-surprise of the castle by the Thebans, a recovery of the town, and a current of the war even unto the walls of Sparta. I demand, was the defence of the city of Sparta, and the expulsion of the Thebans out of the Laconian territories, unjust? The sharing of that part of the duchy of Milan, which lieth upon the river of Adda, by the Venetians, upon contract with the French, was an ambitious and unjust purchase. This wheel set on going, did pour a war upon the Venetians with such a tempest, as Padua and Trevigi were taken from them, and all their dominions upon the continent of Italy abandoned, and they confined within the salt waters. Will any man say, that the memorable recovery and defence of Padua, when the gentlemen of Venice, unused to the wars, out of the love of their country, became brave and martial the first day, and so likewise the re-adeption of Trevigi, and the rest of their dominions, was matter of scruple, whether just or no, because it had source from a quarrel ill begun? The war of the duke of Urbin, nephew to pope Julius the second, when he made himself head of the Spanish mutineers, was as unjust as unjust might be; a support of desperate rebels; an invasion of St. Peter's patrimony; and what you will. The race of this war fell upon the loss of Urbin itself, which was the duke's undoubted right; yet, in this case, no penitentiary, though he had enjoined him never so strait penance to expiate his first offence, would have counselled him to have given over the pursuit of his right for Urbin; which, after, he prosperously re-obtained, and hath transmitted to his family yet until this day. Nothing more unjust than the invasion of the Spanish Armada in 88, upon our seas; for our land was holy land to them, they might not touch it; shall I say therefore, that the defence of Lisbon or Cales, afterwards, was unjust? There be thousands of examples; "utor in re non dubia exemplis non necessariis;" the reason is plain; wars are vindictæ, revenges, reparations. But revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And therefore when a voluntary offensive war, by the design or fortune of the war, is turned to a necessary defensive war, the scene of the tragedy is changed, and it is a new act to begin. For the particular actions of war, though they are complicate in fact, yet they are separate and distinct in right; like to cross suits in civil pleas, which are sometimes both just. But this is so clear as needeth no far

ther to be insisted upon. And yet if in things so clear, it were fit to speak of more or less clear in our present cause, it is the more clear on our part, because the possession of Bohemia is settled with the emperor. For though it be true, that "non datur compensatio injuriarum;" yet were there somewhat more colour to detain the Palatinate, as in the nature of a recovery, in value or compensation, if Bohemia had been lost, or were still the stage of war. Of this therefore I speak no more. As for the title of proscription or forfeiture, wherein the emperor, upon the matter, hath been judge and party, and hath justiced himself, God forbid but that it should well endure an appeal to a war. For certainly the court of heaven is as well a chancery to save and debar forfeitures, as a court of common law to decide rights; and there would be work enough in Germany, Italy, and other parts, if imperial forfeitures should go for good titles.

Thus much for the first ground of war with Spain, being in the nature of a plaint for the recovery of the Palatinate; omitting here that which might be the seed of a larger discourse, and is verified by a number of examples; that whatsoever is gained by an abusive treaty, ought to be restored in integrum: as we see the daily experience of this in civil pleas; for the images of great things are best seen contracted into small glasses; we see, I say, that all pretorian courts, if any of the parties be entertained or laid asleep, under pretence of arbitrement or accord, and that the other party, during that time, doth cautelously get the start and advantage at common law, though it be to judgment and execution; yet the pretorian court will set back all things in statu quo prius, no respect had to such eviction

dispossession. Lastly, let there be no mistaking: as if when I speak of a war for the recovery of the Palatinate, I meant, that it must be in linea recta, upon that place for look into jus fæciale, and all examples, and it will be found to be without scruple, that after a legation ad res repetendas, and a refusal, and a denunciation or indiction of a war, the war is no more confined to the place of the quarrel, but is left at large and to choice, as to the particular conducing designs, as opportunities and advantages shall invite.

To proceed therefore to the second ground of a war with Spain, we have set it down to be, a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate. So then, the war is not for the Palatinate only, but for England, Scotland, Ireland, our king, our prince, our nation, all that we have. Wherein two things are to be proved: The one, that a just fear, without an actual invasion or offence, is a sufficient ground of a war, and in the nature of a true defensive: the other, that we have towards Spain cause of just fear; I say, just fear: for as the civilians do well define, that the legal fear is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem virum," in private causes: so there is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem senatum, in causa publica;" not out of umbrages, light jealousies, apprehensions, afar off, but out of clear foresight of imminent danger.

Concerning the former proposition, it is good to hear what time saith. Thucydides, in his induce

it out with a war, and never take up peace at credit and upon interest. It is so memorable, as it is yet as fresh as if it were done yesterday, how that triumvirate of kings, Henry the eighth of England, Francis the first of France, and Charles the fifth emperor and king of Spain, were in their times so provident, as scarce a palm of ground could be gotten by either of the three, but that the other two would be sure to do their best, to set the balance of Europe upright again. And the like diligence was used in the age before by that league, wherewith Guicciardine beginneth his story, and maketh it, as it were, the calendar of the good days of Italy, which was contracted between Ferdinando king of Naples, Lorenzo of Medici potentate of Florence, and Lodovico Sforza duke of Milan, designed chiefly against the growing power of the Venetians; but yet so, as the confederates had a perpetual eye one upon another, that none of them should overtop. To conclude therefore; howsoever some schoolmen, otherwise reverend men, yet fitter to guide penknives than swords, seem precisely to stand upon it, that every offensive war must be ultio, a revenge, that presupposeth a precedent assault or injury ; yet neither do they descend to this point, which we now handle, of a just fear; neither are they of authority to judge this question against all the precedents of time. For certainly, as long as men are men, the sons, as the poets allude, of Prometheus, and not of Epimetheus, and as long as reason is reason, a just fear will be a just cause of a preventive war; but especially if it be part of the case, that there be a nation that is manifestly detected to aspire to monarchy and new acquests; then other states, assuredly, cannot be justly accused for not staying for the first blow; or for not accepting Polyphemus's courtesy, to be the last that shall be eaten up.

Nay, I observe farther, that in that passage of Plato which I cited before, and even in the tenet of that person that beareth the resolving part, and not the objecting part, a just fear is justified for a cause of an invasive war, though the same fear proceed not from the fault of the foreign state to be assailed: for it is there insinuated, that if a state, out of the distemper of their own body, do fear sedition and intestine troubles to break out amongst themselves, they may discharge their own ill humours upon a foreign war for a cure. And this kind of cure was tendered by Jasper Coligni, admiral of France, to Charles the ninth the French king, when by a vive and forcible persuasion he moved him to a war upon Flanders, for the better extinguishment of the civil wars of France; but neither was that counsel prosperous; neither will I maintain that position: for I will never set politics against ethics; especially for that true ethics are but as a handmaid to divinity and religion. Surely St. Thomas, who had the largest heart of the school divines, bendeth chiefly his style against the depraved passions which reign in making wars, speaking out of St. Augustine: "Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, implacatus et implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si quæ

| sunt similia, hæc sunt quæ in bellis jure culpantur." And the same St. Thomas, in his own text, defining of the just causes of a war, doth leave it upon very general terms: " Requiritur ad bellum causa justa, ut scilicet illi, qui impugnantur, propter aliquam culpam impugnationem mereantur:" for impugnatio culpæ is a far more general word, than ultio injuriæ. And thus much for the first proposition, of the second ground of a war with Spain: namely, that a just fear is a just cause of a war; and that a preventive war is a true defensive.

The second or minor proposition was this; that this kingdom hath cause of just fear of overthrow from Spain. Wherein it is true, that fears are ever seen in dimmer lights than facts. And on the other side, fears use, many times, to be represented in such an imaginary fashion, as they rather dazzle men's eyes than open them: and therefore I will speak in that manner which the subject requires; that is, probably, and moderately, and briefly. Neither will I deduce these fears to present occurrences; but point only at general grounds, leaving the rest to more secret counsels.

Is it nothing, that the crown of Spain hath enlarged the bounds thereof within this last sixscore years, much more than the Ottoman's? I speak not of matches or unions, but of arms, occupations, invasions. Granada, Naples, Milan, Portugal, the East and West Indies; all these are actual additions to that crown. They had a mind to French Britain, the lower part of Picardy, and Piedmont ; but they have let fall their bit. They have, to this day, such a hovering possession of the Valtoline, as an hobby hath over a lark; and the Palatinate is in their talons: so that nothing is more manifest, than that this nation of Spain runs a race still of empire, when all other states of christendom stand in effect at a stay. Look then a little farther into the titles whereby they have acquired, and do now hold these new portions of their crown; and you will find them of so many varieties, and such natures, to speak with due respect, as may appear to be easily minted, and such as can hardly at any time be wanting. And therefore, so many new conquests and purchases, so many strokes of the alarm bell of fear and awaking to other nations; and the facility of the titles, which hand-over-head have served their turn, doth ring the peal so much the sharper and louder.

Shall we descend from their general disposition to enlarge their dominions, to their particular disposition and eye of appetite which they have had towards us: they have now twice sought to impatronise themselves of this kingdom of England; once by marriage with queen Mary; and the second time by conquest in 88, when their forces by sea and land were not inferior to those they have now. And at that time in 88, the council and design of Spain was by many advertisements revealed and laid open to be, that they found the war upon the Low Countries so churlish and longsome, as they grew then to a resolution, that as long as England stood in state to succour those countries, they should but consume themselves in an endless war; and therefore there was no other way but to assail and depress England,