Manheim ct al. vs. Claflin & Company. specific legal remedy by which to attack the fraudulent mortgages, and the bill does not explain why it was not used, or why, if used, it would not be efficacious. Again, suppose it would not be so, and that for some good reason an injunction, the appointment of a receiver, etc. would be needful, there would be no occasion for changing forum and resorting to a court of equity, since by the act of October 16th, 1885, (acts 1884–5, p. 36,) a court of law is just as competent to supply all such aid and render it effectual. Moreover, since the act of 1887, (acts 1887, p. 64,) any equitable relief appropriate to such a case, whether by injunction receiver or otherwise, can be obtained by petition addressed to the superior court, and as the act was designed to establish uniformity, by that mode only. Thus the code, §3979, the act of 1885 and the act of 1887, all point to the superior court, the one to which all the mortgage fi. fas., including that in favor of Claflin & Co., were returnable, as a court competent to settle every question of every kind, legal or equitable, which has arisen or can arise in this litigation, a court competent also to supply all the machinery requisite to securing in behalf of those entitled to them all the fruits of the controversy. Why, then, should Claflin & Co. turn aside and enter, or try to enter, another forum, a technical court of equity? 2. As to the goods in another store, those not included in the mortgages and which were sold fraudulently by Manheim, the debtor, they were subject to attachment under section 3297 of the code. The statute embraced in that section was passed for just such a case, a case in which the creditors have no judgment and no lien by contract, and the bill suggests no obstacle to the use of the attachment remedy. If these goods were fraudulently purchased by Manheim, from these creditors, Claflin & Manheim et al. vs. Clalin & Company. Co., that is, by committing a fraud upon them, they had a right to rescind their contract of sale, or pray for a rescission and reclaim the goods as their own, but this course they have not taken. They proceed against the goods as the property of Manheim, their debtor, and do not seek to defeat his title but only the title which he has passed, or attempted to pass, into his fraudulent or pretended vendee. This they could do as well by attachment as by bill and receiver, even were equity jurisdiction exercisable by bill still in full vigor, as full vigor as it ever was; but we apprehend that did these creditors need equitable relief on this branch of their case, they would now have to obtain it, not by bill in a technical court of equity, but by petition, according to the act of 1887, to the superior court. On such a petition that court could act as a court of equity, or as a court of law, or as both; that is, it could and would act as the superior court, simply using all the remedies and remedial machinery appropriate to the case, and administering all the relief, legal and equitable, to which the respective parties were entitled. A case in the superior court on such a petition might have both feet in equity or both in law, or one in equity and the other in law. But with few if any exceptions, the superior court is no longer a technical court of equity, the court whose jurisdiction and intervention this bill invokes; for most cases it is more, a court of law and equity. To reach it as such, however, it has to be approached not by bill but by petition, and the defendant has to be warned to appear not by subpana but by process. As the act is so plain, and its provisions so simple, there seems to be no reason why it should not be complied with, and the scheme of uniformity which it seeks to establish be observed. As this is the first time we have had occasion to apply it, we shall start by applying it correctly, Dunlap vs. The Richmond and Danville Railroad Co. and not attempt to sacrifice the law in order to save the case. The chancellor erred in granting an injunction and appointing a receiver, and in all the rest of his order. Judgment reversed. DUNLAP VS. THE RICHMOND AND DANVILLE RAILROAD Co. 1. A railroad company sending its locomotive engineer (employed by the month) with one of its engines to haul temporarily for another company the trains of the latter over the line of such latter company, is not responsible to the engineer for the bad condition of the track, nor for the want of adaptation of the engine to the track, it not being alleged that the employer company knew of such bad condition or want of adaptation, and concealed its information. 2. When a railroad company, chartered by a public law of this State, is in fact in open possession and use of its own line, there is no presumption that another company, who sends an engineer with an engine to haul the trains temporarily, has leased the road from the proprietary company or is otherwise using its franchises, although the other company may own a majority of the stock, vote the same at stockholders' meeetings, thus electing such directors and officers as it sees fit, and has and uses a connecting line, and pays habitually from its regular pay-car the operatives of its ally or dependent. It is the duty of an engineer running trains upon a chartered railroad to know who is in possession of the line and its franchises, or to use due diligence to ascertain, a public law of the State putting him upon notice of the ownership. July 11, 1888. Railroads. Damages. Negligence. Master and servant. Before Judge VAN EPPS. City court of Atlanta. December term, 1887. Dunlap sued the Richmond and Danville Railroad Company, alleging, in brief as follows: Defendant substantially controlled and operated the Northeastern railroad; that is, it held a majority of the stock of said company, and managed the same as part of its system by voting the majority of its stock at stockholders' meetings and elect Dunlap vs. The Richmond and Danville Railroad Co. ing such directors and officers as it saw fit, though the two corporations were separate bodies. In August, 1882, while employed by defendant as an engineer, plaintiff was ordered by it to run an engine over the Northeastern railroad; and while doing so, by reason of certain named defects in the track, the engine was thrown therefrom, and plaintiff was injured, without fault on his part. He was still acting as the servant of the defendant. It was the custom of defendant to send its engineers from time to time over the Northeastern railroad; and at the time in question, plaintiff went over it in pursuance of an order of defendant and as its employé. He further specifies the defects in the track and machinery, the character and extent of his injuries, etc. The day before he brought suit against the defendant, he sued the Northeastern railroad for the same injury. The case was removed to the United States court, in which a verdict for the defendant was directed and judgment against plaintiff rendered, from which he took a bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court of the United States, where it is pending. At the time of his injury, he was in the employment of the defendant; he had made a contract with it by the month, and was ordered by it to go to a point near a station of the Northeastern road to relieve another engineer. He did so, and there took charge of an engine belonging to defendant, and was injured while running it on the Northeastern road, which he never knew was a corporation separate and independent from defendant until afterwards, but believed he was working for defendant and never took employment from any other company. It was defendant's custom to pay, from its own regular pay-car, the employés who worked on the line of the Northeastern road. It was admitted that the Northeastern Railroad Com Dunlap vs. The Richmond and Danville Railroad Co. pany knew of and approved plaintiff's being sent upon its road and of his running the train that injured him; but plaintiff was not informed of the understanding. The defendant demurred on the grounds that no cause. of action against it was set out, and because the declaration disclosed that the cause of action against it, if any ever existed, was barred by the judgment in the United States court. The demurrer was sustained and the case dismissed, and the plaintiff excepted. HOKE & BURTON SMITII, for plaintiff. HOPKINS & GLENN, for defendant. BLECKLEY, Chief Justice. 1. The engineer, being employed by the month to run trains upon the road of his employer, could have declined to go upon another road to run the trains of the company owning that road. IIe consented to go for temporary service, went accordingly, and was injured by reason of the bad condition of the track, and the want of adaptation of the engine (which belonged to his employer) to the track in its actual condition. It is not alleged that the employer knew either of the bad condition or the want of adaptation. For aught that appears, the parties were on equal terms as to their knowledge or information touching both these matters. IIad the engineer needed information, more than he had, he should have obtained it or declined to go. The question is, whether he had a right to take for granted, as against his employer, that the track of the other company was not defective, but in a fit condition to be used under this particular engine with safety. Did the employer owe to him the diligence of seeing that this was so, before requesting him to go, and accepting his con |