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Seals, trustee, vs. Benson, for use.

his wife in possession of the land. The evidence somewhat indicates a collusion between Brinson and his wife and this sheriff to prevent Mrs. Lassiter from obtaining knowledge of the sale in time for her to redeem the land. Brinson and his wife occupied the land nearly two years, up to this verdict. The land was proved to be worth $125 or $150 a year rent. Brinson hauled wood and rails away from the land. Instead of being simply agent for his wife, as contended for by the plaintiff in error, we think the record shows that he was a confederate with her in the injury and damage which occurred to this defendant in error, and the verdict against both was right and proper.

The rulings upon these points control this case, and it is unnecessary for us to discuss the other grounds of the motion for a new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

SEALS, trustee, vs. BENSON, for use.

When Palmer, being indebted to Benson, made a voluntary deed to certain land to Mrs. Seals, as trustee, and Benson subsequently obtained judgment and had execution levied on the land, and a claim was filed by Mrs. Seals, as trustee, but a consent verdict was taken, finding the land subject, and the original judgment against Palmer becoming dormant before the judgment in the claim case was enforced, it was revived by scire facias and the revived judgment levied on the land, and a claim again imposed by Mrs. Seals, as trustee; no new facts being shown by her in addition to what she showed on the first claim case, and it appearing that Palmer was in possession up to within two weeks of the trial of the last claim, it was not error to hold the land subject. (a) It makes no difference whether the lien of the first judgment was lost when it became dormant, or when the lien of the revived judgment attached; the debt on which it was predicated still existed, and the deed being a voluntary one, the land was still subject to the debt Palmer owed before he made the deed.

May 4, 1888.

Scals, trustee, vs. Benson, for use.

Wilkes

Voluntary deed. Debtor and creditor. Dormant judgment. Liens. Before Judge LUMPKIN. superior court. November term, 1887.

This case was submitted to the court without a jury, on the following agreed statement of facts: On December 8, 1877, John T. Palmer conveyed to Mary Seals, as trustee for her children, the tract of land levied on. The deed was recorded February 7, 1878. At the time of its execution, Palmer owed Benson and others. Benson obtained judgment against him on March 4, 1879, and on the 29th thereafter the fi. fa. issuing therefrom was levied on the land named in the deed; and Mary Seals, as trustee for her children, interposed a claim. On November 6, 1879, the fi. fa. was transfered to S. R. Palmer. On November 7, a consent verdict and judgment were rendered, finding the property subject. S. R. Palmer took no steps to enforce his fi. fa., and it became dormant. On March 14, 1887, it was revived by proper proceedings. The fi. fa. issuing thereon was subsequently levied cn the land in question; and Mary Seals, as trustee, again interposed a claim. She returned the land for taxes and paid them from the time the deed was made to this last trial, and with her two children has lived on the place since the date of the deed. The defendant in fi. fa. also has lived on the same place since the same date, until within two or three weeks of the trial. The beneficiaries of the deed are both still minors.

The consideration of the deed is recited therein as love and affection for the children borne to the grantor

by the grantee.

The court held the property subject; and this ruling is excepted to and assigned as error.

W. M. & M. P. REESE, for plaintiff in error.

Seals, trustee, vs. Benson, for use.

S. H. HARDEMAN, contra.

SIMMONS, Justice.

Under the facts of this case as disclosed by the official report, the court below did not err in holding that this land was subject to the execution. When Palmer conveyed the land to Mary Seals, as trustee for her children in December, 1877, he was indebted to Benson, on which indebtedness Benson subsequently recovered a judgment against Palmer. It makes no difference, in our opinion, whether the lien of the first judgment was lost when the judgment became dormant, or when the lien of the revived judgment attached; the debt on which it was predicated still existed. The deed from Palmer to Mrs. Seals, trustee, being a voluntary deed, the land was still subject to the debts Palmer owed before he made the deed. This was admitted by Mrs. Seals when she consented to a verdict subjecting the land to the original judgment; and if it was subject to the original judgment, we can see no reason why it would not be subject. to the revived judgment under the state of facts as agreed upon by the parties and sent up in this record. The case now under review being between the same parties, and being the same debt, and the same land being levied on, we think the consent verdict in the first case, taken in connection with Palmer's possession up to within two weeks of the trial, is at least prima facie evidence that the land levied on under the revived judgment is subject to the payment of this debt. When she consented to the first verdict, it was an admission on her part that the land was subject, and that the deed she now relies on did not protect her. In this trial she showed no additional facts other than what she showed before, or which she could have shown. We think, therefore, that the judgment was right in holding the land subject, under this record.

Judgment affirmed.

The White Star Line Steamboat Company vs. The County of Gordon.

THE WHITE STAR LINE STEAMBOAT COMPANY VS. THE COUNTY OF GORDON.

1. A justice's court has no jurisdiction of a claim for damages to a steamboat company by reason of the detention of one of its steamers at a river bridge. James vs. Smith, 62 Ga. 345, distinguished. (Rep.) 2. There is no statutory provision subjecting counties to actions for detaining steamers or craft of any kind upon the water. Whether done by means of bridges or by other obstruction, there is no redress for it against the county. Indeed, the county cannot do it, because there is no agency recognized by law to represent it in committing torts of this character. (Rep.)

3. As there was no cause of action against the county, there was nothing to amend by, and whatever may have been the amendment proposed, it was properly rejected. (Rep.)

May 11, 1888.

Justice courts. Jurisdiction. Damages. Counties. Amendment. Before Judge MADDOX. Gordon superior court. August term, 1887.

Reported in the decision.

HENRY WALKER, for plaintiff.

W. R. RANKIN, by E. J. KIKER, for defendant.

BLECKLEY, Chief Justice.

1. The suits in the justice s court were for damages to the plaintiff, the steamboat company, by reason of the detention of one of their steamers at the Calhoun bridge upon the Oostanaula river. We have, then, the question whether a justice's court has jurisdiction over cases of this character. The jurisdiction is rested by the plaintiff in error upon the constitution, (code, §5152,) which declares that justices of the peace have jurisdiction in cases of injuries or damages to personal property, where the principal sum does not exceed $100. It is said that damages to the steamboat company by

The White Star Line Steamboat Company vs. The County of Gordon. reason of the detention of its steamer at the Calhoun bridge upon the Oostanaula river, are injuries to personal property, and therefore that the case is within the constitutional grant of jurisdiction. And to uphold this construction, the case of James vs. Smith, 62 Ga. 345, is relied on, in which it is ruled that the conversion of personal property is a matter for the jurisdiction of a justice's court. But the detention of a steamer does not imply a conversion of it, nor any injury or damage done to it. If it is detained upon a river in consequence of the defective construction of a bridge (and that seems to be the intimation here), the steamer is not damaged or injured, but the owner is. It is a case of damages to the company, and it is so alleged here. alleged here. It is a case of damages to the company and not to the property; and for this reason, we think the court, in dismissing this action, ruled correctly.

2. But there is another reason. The one we have just dealt with applies between party and party generally; but the other applies only where a county is involved; and such is the case here. The county could not detain a steamer upon the Oostanaula river in a way to create a cause of action against the county for it. There is no statutory provision subjecting counties to actions for detaining steamers or craft of any kind upon the water; and whether they do it by means of bridges or other obstructions, there is no redress for it against the county. Indeed the county cannot do it, because there is no agency recognized by the law to represent the county in detaining steamers and committing torts of this character. By consulting the case of the County of Monroe vs. Flynt, decided at this term, (80 Ga. 489,) it will be found that we recognize the doctrine that a county is not subject to suit unless there is some statutory provision which renders it subject. And the same doctrine was recognized in Smith vs.

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