Shores vs. Brooks. race problem in a mild form, which problem, in all its forms, can be solved by the golden rule, "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you." The landlord broke open his tenant's house, and took therefrom 3,000 pounds of cotton in the seed. This was done in the month of October; and the excuse for it was that the tenant had not paid the charges to which the cotton was subject, and would not sell the cotton nor carry it to market as soon as the landlord thought it desirable. If the cotton was subject (and the tenant did not deny this) to the charges upon it, the landlord had his remedy by law, and had no right to act as his own sheriff in making the seizure. The end which he had in view was not improper, but he was bound to the observance of proper means, as well as a regard to a proper end. Why should he have violated the law to do right, when he could equally as well have observed the law and done right? We cannot doubt that by breaking open the locked out-house to get possession of the cotton, he committed a trespass for which punitive damages might be awarded. And that he acted fairly in selling the cotton and applying the proceeds to the debt for supplies, would be no excuse for the outrage which he committed by illegally and forcibly obtaining possession of it. 2. The tenant sold to the landlord certain property, and locked it up in one of the out-houses of which he was entitled to the use. The landlord, finding that the tenant had put on his lock, added another and let it remain several days. Then, (we may suppose) taking off his own, he violently broke open the house and took therefrom the property which he had purchased. We cannot discover that in all this time, he had demanded possession of the subject-matter of his purchase, and no reason appears why he should have used the violence Shores vs. Brooks. that he did to obtain possession. We think that his conduct in this transaction was also the subject-matter of an award for punitive damages. 3. The landlord proposed to show by evidence that, in breaking open the house which contained the goods he had purchased, he acted under the advice of counsel; but he did not offer to prove that in obtaining that advice, he had submitted to counsel the real facts of the case, or such as were material to the question upon which counsel was consulted. The code, §3066, declares, that "in every tort there may be aggravating circumstances, either in the act or the intention, and in that event the jury may give additional damages, either to deter the wrong-doer from repeating the trespass, or as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff." This being a case in which exemplary damages might be awarded, we have no doubt that in mitigation of those damages, the advice of counsel was admissible. 1 Suth. Damages, p. 747; Cochran vs. Tuttle, 75 Ill. 361. Compare Jasper vs. Purnell, 67 Ill. 358. Wherever intention is involved as an element of aggravation, advice of counsel is pertinent, although not receivable as matter of justification. Code, $410. Advice of counsel to withdraw claim to avoid damages: Perkins vs. Attaway, 14 Ga. 27(4). Motive for entering an appeal: Gilmore vs. Wright, 20 Ga. 199; Hartridge vs. McDaniel, Ibid. 398. Excuse by sheriff on rule: Green vs. Jones, 39 Ga. 521; Harrell vs. Feagin, 59 Ga. 821. As to suing out distress warrant: Dye vs. Denham, 54 Ga. 224. Malicious prosecution: Fox vs. Davis, 55 Ga. 299; Ventress vs. Rosser, 73 Ga. 535. Suing out attachment maliciously and without probable cause: McLaren vs. Birdsong, 24 Ga. 271. Contra as to fraudulent conveyance: Smith vs. Wellborn, 75 Ga. 800(5). The offer to prove advice, to be available, should em Watson vs. The Georgia Pacific Railway Company. brace an offer to show that the advice sought and given was based on the actual case. 1 Hilliard Torts, 437, 438. Judgment affirmed. WATSON US. THE GEORGIA PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY. Where the evidence for plaintiff showed that she was transported to the depot to which she had purchased a ticket, but relied on a promise of the conductor to let her get off the train at a certain street crossing, as the train was going back from the depot to the railway yard, and, the train not being stopped at such crossing, she jumped from it while it was in motion and was injured, a nonsuit was properly granted. (a) While she might possibly recover for a breach of the promise, she could not do so for the injuries sustained, which she could have avoided by ordinary care. October 12, 1888. Railroads. Negligence. Passengers. Nonsuit. Before Judge MARSHALL J. CLARKE. Fulton superior court. March term, 1888. Mrs. Lou Ella Watson, a married woman, living with her husband, brought her action against the railway company for damages for a personal injury sustained by her while she, a passenger, was attempting to alight from defendant's cars. On the trial, she proved that, on the evening of July 7, 1886, she received a telegram at Salt Springs, summoning her to the bedside of her mother, who, it informed her, was lying at the point of death. She boarded the train of defendant early the next morning, accompanied by two small children, and asked the conductor if he would stop at Simpson street in Atlanta and put her off. He promised to do so, but the train did not stop at that street on reaching it, but moved on to the passenger depot. Her father jumped on the train at that street and accompanied her to the depot. On arriving there, she started to Watson vs. The Georgia Pacific Railway Company. leave the train with her father and children, the other passengers having left the coach she was in, but the conductor, standing at the car steps, told her not to get off, as he had to back the train out, and would stop it for her at Simpson street crossing. She asked him when he would go back, and he replied, immediately, and at once signalled the engineer to pull out. She and her father and children remained in the coach, and the train was pulled slowly out to Simpson street crossing, but did not stop there; and finding that it did not, and being anxious to reach her mother, after the train had run some distance beyond Simpson street, her father stepped out, taking one of the children with him and commanding the other to stand on the car-step until he could take it off, put the first down and ran back and got the other safely off; and then the plaintiff undertook to step off, stepping from the car to the ground, in doing which she fell or was thrown, and was seriously injured. She did not see the conductor after she had the conversation with him at the depot. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, which was granted; and the plaintiff excepted. GEORGE T. FRY, F. A. ARNOLD, JOHN G. COLDWELL and JOHN C. SMITH, for plaintiff, cited: 58 Ga. 461; 45 Ga. 288; 51 Ga. 489; 71 Ga. 714; 76 Ga. 780; Rorer R. 967; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 322, 412; 12 Id. 119; 6 Wait Act. & Def. 586. JOHN L. HOPKINS & SONS, for defendant, cited: Hutch. Car. 617; 2 Redf. R. 261; 50 Ga. 353; 76 Ga. 508, 333; 71 Ga. 415; 5 S. E. Rep. 496; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115; 1 Id. 240; Rorer R. 1091; 1 Shear. & Redf. Neg. 167; Patterson Rwy. Ac. 21; 38 Ga. 437; 74 Ga. 611; 77 Ga. 789; 76 Ga. 333. The Western & Atlantic Railroad Co. vs. Jackson. BLANDFORD, Justice. We think the court peiow was right in nonsuiting this case. If the railroad company was liable to the plaintiff for anything, it was liable to her for damages for the breach of promise to let her off at Simpson street crossing. Whatever damages accrued to her by reason of the breach of that promise she might perhaps recover, but we do not decide whether she could or not. But she chose to bring her action for the injuries which she sustained; and we think her testimony clearly shows that she could have avoided the consequences to herself by the use of ordinary care. If she had just kept her seat in the car, she would not have been hurt. According to her testimony, she took the risk of getting off, and we think, as she took the risk, she must take the consequences. Her departure from the train, under the circumstances, showed no want of diligence on the part of the railroad company. Judgment affirmed. THE WESTERN & ATLANTIC RAILROAD Co. vs. JACKSON. A petition for certiorari must set forth specifically the ground of error relied upon, and is not amendable. December 12, 1888. Certiorari. Amendment. Before Judge FAIN. Bartow superior court. January adjourned term, 1888. Reported in the decision. JOHN W. AKIN, for plaintiff in error. JAMES B. CONYERS, contra. BLANDFORD, Justice. This was a certiorari case. The petition for certiorari |