Andrew vs. Stewart Brothers. BLECKLEY, Chief Justice. 1. This was a distress warrant levied upon a crop. The levy was made while the crop was upon the premises which produced it. Claim was interposed, and the claimant moved to dismiss the levy, because it was not shown that the crop was in the possession of the defendant in the distress warrant. The motion was overruled, and we think, correctly. It was plainly inferable from the evidence that the crop was on the premises at the time it was levied upon; and besides, if it was doubtful under the plaintiff's evidence, it was made very certain by the defendant's evidence subsequently introduced, that it was upon the rented premises. 2. The point was made that the transfer of the rent note was before the crop was planted, and therefore that the lien has not passed from the landlord to the plaintiff in the distress warrant. That point was raised in Lathrop & Co. vs. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282, but it was afterwards met and fully disposed of, we think, by the act of September 27th, 1883, (acts 1882-3, 109,) which declares, in substance, that if a written rent contract be transferred in writing before the maturity of the crop, on the maturity of the crop a special lien shall arise in favor of the transferee. Here there was a written transfer before the maturity of the crop, even before the planting of it. It matters not that it was for collateral security, because there is as much law to transfer a negotiable instrument for collateral security as for any other purpose; and at the time the crop matured, the plaintiff in this distress warrant owned the rent note; and so we think that there is nothing in the point that there could be, as to this plaintiff, no lien. The plaintiff owned the debt at the time the rent note matured, and the parties fixed that time for its payment; Andrew vs. Stewart Brothers. and the maturity of the crop may be considered as complete at the maturity of the note, the time being the 1st of October. 3. It appears that the rent note was given for the rent of sixty-nine acres of land; and this crop levied upon was produced on only a part of the rented land. The tenant himself did not produce it, but he perhaps sublet a part of the premises; and this crop was grown upon the sublet portion, and was produced by the labor of the subtenant; and it is insisted that the produce of that part of the land is liable only for the rent of that part, and not liable to pay the whole rent of the entire premises. We think this point is not well-taken. There was no consent on the part of the landlord or of the transferee of the rent note to sublet the premises, and the crop being produced on part of the premises, is to be considered the crop of the tenant, and not of the subtenant, and as liable for the payment of the tenant's debt for rent, and for the whole rent. If the landlord had consented to any subletting, he would be bound by it; even if he had adopted it after it was done without his assent, and thus ratified it, this might have bound him, were he still the owner of the rent note. But there is no evidence of adoption or ratification in the case. And we think the tenant cannot defeat the landlord's claim for rent on any part of the crop-the whole rent, by subletting to tenants without the sanction of the landlord. 4, 5. There were some small points made on admitting parol evidence to explain the written assignment of the rent contract, and as to the difference between midling cotton and rent cotton, and as to there being no evidence of the value of the cotton, and as to the note being not alone for rent but also for an account; all of which we overrule. We think the note is for rent only, and embraces no account, but is a note adapted in its form Skellic, for use, vs. The Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia. to embrace an account. It is one of those foolish printed blanks prepared for some other purpose and used for this purpose; but the note expresses that it is for rent, and that implies for nothing else, or for rent only. We think the court did right in refusing to grant a new trial. Judgment affirmed. SKELLIE, for use, vs. THE CENTRAL RAILROAD AND BANKING COMPANY OF GEORGIA. 1. Where certain testimony was offered as a whole, part of which was relevant and part not, it was not error to reject the whole. 2. If the railroad company agreed to deliver certain melons for plaintiff into the city of Savannah, in due time to transport the same to Boston by a certain steamer, and failed to comply with such agreement, and the melons were, after their arrival too late in Savannah, by his consent, shipped to New York and there sold at a loss, such shipment and sale in New York was for the benefit of the railroad company, and it was their duty to make good the loss. (a) Plaintiff's declaration, being substantially to the effect just stated, was good as it stood, and while he had a right to amend in form or substance and the court had no right to refuse to allow him to amend, the terms of the amendment which he proposed and which were refused would have put him out of court. 3. Testimony that at the time the bill of lading was delivered by the railroad to plaintiff, at the same time and in the presence and with the consent of the agent of the railroad, a draft was drawn upon the bill of lading by plaintiff in favor of his usees, and the bill of lading and the draft both turned over in the presence of such agent to such usees, who were known by such agent to be the real owners of the bill of lading and the melons, was irrelevant and was properly rejected. 4. Under the testimony in the case, a nonsuit was proper. May 28, 1888. Evidence. Railroads. Contracts. Damages. Before Judge GUSTIN. Houston superior court. October term, 1887. T. O. Skellie, for the use of Cooper & Harper, sued the Skellie, for use, rs. The Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia. Central Railroad and Banking Company for $213.75, with interest, for that, on July 13, 1886, defendant made a contract with plaintiff by which it agreed to receive at Dasher's Station, in Houston county, and thence to transport, by rail and boat, to Boston, Mass., three car-loads of watermelons, consigned to J. S. Chamberlain & Co., commission merchants of Boston, who had agreed to pay for the same the sum above stated, if delivered to them at Savannah, by placing the melons on the steamer "Gate City," of defendant's line of steamers, which was to sail on the day of July, 1886, from Savannah to Boston; defendant contracting to deliver the melons at Savannah on board that steamer in due time for the trip. The con. tract between plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff's usees and Chamberlain & Co. was based wholly on defendant's agreement to deliver the melons on the steamer at Savannah in the time agreed, and this was well-known to defendant at the time, it having, through its agents, actually solicited the shipment of melons on the terms stated. Relying on defendant's agreement, plaintiff purchased of his usees three car-loads of melons, delivered them to defendant at Dasher's Station, receiving from defendant the bill of lading which is to the court shown, and which plaintiff at once turned over and transferred to his usees. He drew on Chamberlain & Co. against the bill of lading for the sum which they had agreed to pay for the melons if delivered as above recited. Defendant, without default on the part of plaintiff or his usees, totally failed to deliver the melons on board the steamer. Chamberlain & Co. refused to pay the draft because of such non-delivery on the steamer; whereby defendant became liable, etc. The defendant pleaded the general issue. On the trial, the plaintiff introduced three bills of lading, each of the same tenor and effect, dated at Fort Skellie, for use, vs. The Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia. Valley, Georgia, July 13, 1886, each receipting T. O. Skellie for a car-load of melons shipped from Dasher's Station to Boston to J. S. Chamberlain & Co. The bills of lading do not specify over what lines or by what method the melons shall be carried. It is stated that the railroad company is to deliver the goods in good order, losses occurring from the perishable nature or inherent defects of the property excepted; it is also stipulated that the railroad will not be responsible for any loss or damage that may result from any change of destination that may be made, either through the direction of the shipper or owner or his agent or consignee. The plaintiff also introduced three sight drafts, each for $85, dated Fort Valley, July 13, 1886, drawn by T. O. Skellie on J. S. Chamberlain & Co., Boston, Mass., payable to the order of Cooper & Harper. He further showed that Cooper & Harper agreed to sell to him four car-loads of watermelons, to be shipped by the Central railroad to Chamberlain & Co., Boston, and plaintiff was to give Cooper & Harper a draft on Chamberlain & Co., who were to pay it when the melons were loaded on the steamer "Gate City." One of the cars was loaded, transported and paid for; the other three were loaded by the shippers, who finished loading them the day after the first car left the station, and these three cars missed the steamer. Plaintiff's testimony tended to show that due diligence was exercised in loading the cars, the duty to do which was on the shippers; that Chamberlain & Co. had agreed to pay seven and a half cents apiece for the melons, and 2,850 melons were shipped in the three cars; that the bills of of lading were turned over by Skellie to Cooper & Harper; that the last three car-loads never were delivered in Boston; that they could have gone from Savannah to Boston only by boat; that the boat sailed only once a week; that they would have been ruined if allowed to remain |