more active fronts supplied have been so great that the continued supply of this army is a serious problem. The efficiency of ocean tonnage is in inverse proportion to the distance which has to be traveled, and in this case the distance is so great that at least twice the number of men can be maintained in France by the same tonnage necessary to supply the army in Saloniki. This is at least one reason for the continued inactivity.

WHAT ABOUT
UT NEXT YEAR?

I have sketched, hastily and without detail, the principal fields of activity largely that we may retain in our minds what has been accomplished during the year so that we may have a fair basis for conclusions as to the true condition as of the time this is being written. First there is the consideration of man power on the different fronts. The German strength on the western front, not including what might be termed general reserves located in the more important bases, can be seen from the diagram on the preceding page.

Roughly, it is somewhat more than a million men, while at least that number are in the main bases. Against this number there are approximately two million British and three million French. There is this difference, however: while the German total is more than two million, there is nothing left to replace losses. There is no free reserve, there are no means of repairing wastage. The French are in very much the same condition. It is doubtful whether France can keep her present numbers in the field unimpaired more than a very few months longer. This condition constitutes the great necessity for sending American troops to Europe as fast' as there is available transport. The British, however, have ample reserves from which to draw in order that their superiority in numbers may be maintained. The present preponderance in numbers will therefore not only be maintained in 1918 but will be gradually increased as American troops become fit to move up into the trenches. When the campaign opens next spring, Germany is certain to find herself outnumbered about three to one. These troops, too, will be superior to her own. They will all be forces which have tasted victory, which have been plowing through the German lines for months, and who know that Germany's best is in no wise sufficient to hold them back. The question of morale

thus introduced will, as it has ever done in the past, play a not unimportant part.

A GREAT SUPERIORITY IN ARTILLERY

As to artillery, there is no question of the great superiority of that of the Allies. Powerful in the Somme fighting, it has been even more so during the last year. Over the entire fighting front the British heavy guns are only about six yards apart and they were throwing, during the series of battles for the Paschendaele ridge, nearly five tons of metal for every yard of front attacked to not more than half that amount by the Germans. On the French front the same general condition prevails. Coupled with all this is the superiority in air service which is an important adjunct to the artillery arm. Not only are the Allies able to correct the inaccuracy of fire of their own gunners, but to a large extent they prevent the German airmen from performing a like service. This is shown conclusively by the fact that nearly all the air battles are fought over the German lines and few German machines are brought down within the Allied lines. Both in men and in the mechanics of war, then, the Allies in the west have a superiority that, with the assistance they have a right to expect from other fronts, should give them a deciding advantage.

AUSTRIA BLED WHITE

On the Italian front, due to the crushing defeat administered in October and November, practically nothing may be expected next year. With Russia in a state of quiescent transition both Austria and Germany are able to concentrate the bulk of their forces against Italy without exposing their lines elsewhere to the slightest danger in consequence. Austria, it is true, is much more nearly bled white than is France, and the Austrians alone are utterly unable to hold the Italians back. This was shown in August when against the concentration of practically the full Austrian strength the Italians ploughed their way through almost insuperable obstacles to the point of endangering the entire Austrian army. But against the flood of German reinforcements Italy will be strained to the limit to hold her own. Especially is this true because of the great loss of artillery sustained in her defeat. By November 1st this loss was estimated at 1,000 guns and it is a loss that is almost irreparable due to Italy's lack of war material and the scarcity

of ocean tonnage by which means alone she can secure an uninterrupted stream. But the danger is more than Italy's alone. To prevent the conquest in Northern Italy and the consequent threat against the southern wing of the battle line in France, the French and British must rush to Italy's aid, even at the expense of the front in France. The result may be that the spring offensive on the latter front will be vitally affected.

On the Russian front there is nothing but chaos and but few comparisons can possibly be drawn. The Russian army, formerly estimated at nine million men, has been reduced to five million, and these cannot be counted upon to fight. There is no generally recognized authority and but little discipline. Even if there were, there is a conspicuous absence of the machinery for enforcing it. The present status of the Russian army is that of an uncontrolled mob which fights or not as it may choose. Against this military pot-pourri, the Germans have probably about two million men, the Austrians not one fourth of this number. In artillery the Russians are hopelessly inferior. Hundreds of guns were shamefully abandoned in the retreat from Halicz and from Bukovina, and great accumulations of shell were either allowed to fall in German hands or were destroyed. The most serious drawback is the transportation system, which, through strikes on the part of the workers, has fallen below 40 per cent. of what it was a year ago. Change after change has taken place in Russia with such kaleidoscopic frequency that it is impossible to form any opinion as to what may happen. But there is not the slightest indication that the Russian eggs can be unscrambled in sufficient time to permit this socialist-ridden state to be of the slightest value to the Entente next year.

THE OUTLOOK IN MESOPOTAMIA

On the Mesopotamian front, the situation is to a large extent in Russia's keeping. The British have on this front nearly a half million men. This is a far greater number than is popularly supposed, but these figures may be taken as authentic. The Russian strength is problematical-probably about the same but in the same general condition as is the army of the west. The Turks have certainly not more than half of this combined force. The supply situation, however, is one difficult of solution both as regards food and war ma

terials. The artillery of the British is certainly more numerous than is that of the Turks, due in part to the heavy loss by the Turks in the retreat up the Tigris. But as the war in this theatre is open and strategy has a wider play, artillery is not needed on the same scale as in the other fields.

THE “IRON RING" THEORY

It

With these general conditions on the various fronts in mind, what is the most that the new year can bring to either side? As far as the Entente is concerned, any conjecture as to next year must be made from an understanding of the relation of the various fronts to the geographical location of the battle lines. is a phrase oft repeated and true, although it produces an impression not altogether accurate, that Germany is surrounded by an iron ring. This ring has been Germany's great asset while at the same time promising to be her greatest peril. The advantage lies in the fact that the Central Powers, by virtue of their interior position, with short lines of communications and accessible bases of supplies, were able to shift troops about literally like men on a chess board, using them where they would do the most good and meeting, with a minimum of delay, a threat at any particular point. The Allies had found and had demonstrated in the 1916 campaigns that there was but one way to combat this advantage effectively and that was by exerting about the circumference of this ring a continuous pressure so that, under the strain of keeping all points at maximum strength simultaneously, the ring would break. Any plans of the Allies for a general campaign must be predicated upon this plan of uniform pressure. Otherwise, in spite of local superiority, the advantage is apt still to lie with Germany, even though it be a temporary advantage. This can be effected only through the coöperation of Russia. But how can we count upon Russia? It is difficult enough for a democracy to wage successful war. In fact it is impossible unless democracy is willing for the period of hostilities to cease to be a democracy and to concentrate the powers of government into an autocrat of its own selection. But when instead of democracy we have the socialistic State, ruled over by those who have theories which they are not willing to put in practice, whose fine ideals are not sufficiently fine to be worth fighting for, a State the government