HURRY UP THE DESTROYERS! What They Can Do to Overcome the Submarines, and What Our Government Has Done and Failed to Do to Get Enough of Them Built in Time To Be of Use T BY BURTON J. HENDRICK HE most effective step the United States has so far taken in the direction of ending the war is its elaborate programme for constructing airplanes and for developing aviators. The next are the plans which we have made, and which are already fairly well advanced, for building merchant ships. The first of these steps aims at that absolute control of the air which, if attained, should enable the Allies to engage in offensive operations on a large and successful scale. The construction of merchant ships is intended to supply the ravages in the world's shipping which have been caused by the German submarines. Both these undertakings are essential to any satisfactory prosecution of the war. But the American Government has another task which is equally important and which, if undertaken. in the proper spirit, may have even more decisive results. In response to Secretary Daniels's request, Congress has appropriated $350,000,000 for the construction of destroyers. Strange to say, this proposed programme has aroused little public interest. We get enthusiastic over airplanes and we even feel a thrill over the prospect of a great American-built and American-owned mercantile marine, but so far the destroyers have not deeply penetrated the American consciousness. Yet these three things, airplanes, merchant ships, and destroyers, if built in sufficient quantities, should certainly give us victory. We should devote all the industrial energies of America to turning them out on an enormous scale. Though there is every indication that we shall rise to the occasion in the production of aircraft and merchant vessels, the outlook is unfortunately not so favorable that we shall do our duty in the production of destroyers. Unless a greater spirit of activity gets possession of the Navy Department, the destroyers for which Congress has recently appropriated will not get into the naval war until 1919. We have evidently started this new construction, not in preparation for the submarine campaign next year, but for that of two years hence. Under the present programme we shall ultimately have a destroyer fleet comprising more than three hundred vessels; yet, unless the construction division of the Navy shows an unexampled energy, the extent to which this great flotilla will affect the course of the war is entirely problematical. To most people probably this insistence on the importance of destroyers comes as something of a revelation. No type of war vessel has appealed less to the imagination in the past, and no type has aroused less enthusiasm in the appropriating committees of Congress. We notoriously neglected our navy in the few years preceding the war, and in no respect did we neglect it more than in the construction of destroyers. Year after year the General Board has insisted that we should build four destroyers for every battleship, and year after year Congress has gone cheerfully on and voted one or two. Perhaps the fact that the destroyer was not a beautiful thing to look upon, that it lacked the majestic lines and the visualized fighting power of the dreadnaught and the battle cruiser, has had something to do with this neglect. Vice-Admiral Sims well described the destroyer as "a tin box built around a mighty big engine"-a description which truthfully suggested that this type of warship existed, not as a thing of beauty, but purely for utilitarian reasons. That naval officers disliked service on the destroyer in peace times, owing to its wretched living quarters and a general lack of human comforts, is perhaps not surprising. Probably the average citizen knew little about the ship and its responsibilities. Why "destroyer"? Were not all ships supposed to be "destroyers"? Why select this, the ugly duckling of the navy, as particularly worthy of such a destructive name? Those whose memories go back to the Spanish War have little difficulty in fathoming this mystery. In those days our navy-as all other naviescontained a considerable number of wasp-like little scampering vessels known as torpedo boats. Their exclusive business was to sneak up against a large vessel in the night time and deliver against it a new fangled war contraption which had recently come into popular favor— the automobile torpedo. The invention of these new vessels had produced almost the same effect upon naval experts-lay and professional-that the successful development of the submarine has caused in more recent years. Unless some antidote could be found, it was generally declared, the battleship was doomed. That antidote was discovered in the shape of a long, thin, light-drafted, almost incredibly swift vessel-Admiral Sims's "tin box built about a mighty big engine." This This new vessel received a descriptive but very awkward name, for it went on every naval list as the "torpedo boat destroyer." Awkward as was the name, this novel type performed its task in a manner that furnished a complete justification. It destroyed torpedo boats so successfully that this once-dreaded little vessel disappeared from the sea-the consequence being that they are no longer built. But the antidote in this case survived the poison, chiefly because the destroyer, since it was itself provided with torpedo tubes, could perform more effectively than the abandoned vessel the task of launching torpedoes. Yet no type has presented more new uses than this neglected orphan of the American Navy. One of the strangest aspects of this world war has been the discussion which has raged about that all-absorbing subject, the submarine. The immediate necessity of finding some answer to the submarine has been forced upon us ever since the attack upon the Cressy, the Hogue, and the Aboukir in the early days of the war. When Germany started sinking merchant ships it appeared that, unless we found some way of quickly preventing this destruction, the Kaiser would dominate the world and the reign of barbarism would start anew. When America entered the war, the hopes of mankind suddenly turned to that American inventive genius which had never failed us in a great crisis. It suddenly became Mr. Edison's duty, forced upon him by all the world, to find the "answer" to this hideous but apparently effective method of warfare. Certain enthusiastic gentlemen at Washington even rushed into print with the good news that the secret had been found. The Navy Department formally informed us that it was receiving thirty or forty devices a day, and that it hoped some day to hit upon the key that would unlock the puzzle. Magazines received numerous contributions, accompanied by weird drawings, all of which the authors promised would destroy the German underwater boat. Elaborate schemes for building wire nets across the North Sea were put forth men who had never passed a few tempestuous hours in those very wicked and angry waters. There were propositions to "dig the rats out in their nests"-to send battleships into the shallow waters and against the heavy guns. of Kiel or Heligoland, and to repeat, on a much greater scale, the disaster of Gallipoli. When the Japanese destroyers crept upon the Russian fleet in Port Arthur at the begin--all of them naturally formulated by gentlening of the Japanese-Russian War, fired their torpedoes, and practically ended Russian naval power in Far Eastern waters, they completely demonstrated the offensive power of this ugly little ship. Since then-until the arrival of the submarine-attacks of this kind have held the greatest terrors for the commanders of battleships. Since the one thing that can make war upon the destroyer is the destroyer, it has been regarded as necessary that the battleships should be surrounded by a large fleet of destroyers, which in this way become their protectors. Up to the outbreak of the present war, therefore, the destroyer had two definite duties, that of delivering attacks against enemy vessels and that of protecting the great fighting ships from such torpedo assaults, especially in the night time. A fleet without an adequate screen of destroyers and light cruisers was, according to the accepted dictates of naval strategy, a fleet already lost. What makes all these proposed inventions and enterprises look so strange is that, in the opinion of the greatest authorities in all navies, we already had an effective method of handling submarines. While our naval authorities would. welcome an Edisonian device for deflecting torpedoes or locating undersea craft, these same authorities have by no means been reduced to that state of helplessness which the newspapers have described. They already possess a handy little craft, which, if supplied to them in sufficient numbers-and these numbers must be very large-would free the waters of submarines. The destroyer has once more justified its name in most eloquent fashion. This discovery is nothing new. I invite attention to the testimony given before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs on March 10, 1916 a year and a half ago-by no less a naval authority than the gentleman whom we have since found worthy to place at the head of our fleet in European waters, Vice-Admiral Sims. In that testimony Admiral Sims gave his ideas on submarines and the methods of combating them. He announced a new naval principle, based upon the experience of the European war up to that time. That was that the vessels that commanded the surface of any particular section of the waters also commanded the waters underneath. In discussing modern naval problems we need, as the Germans would say, a new "formula." Instead of the much worn phrase, "command of the sea," let us use a new one, commanded seas." By "command of the sea" we signify that general control of all waters which England maintains because she has a battle fleet so superior to Germany's that the latter does not dare to leave her ports for any extended period. This prowess frees the seas of German shipping and German warships and leaves the sea alleys the property of her enemies. By "commanded seas" we mean a particular mean a particular section which one Power controls by the actual physical presence of its warships in that section. Now the principle laid down by Vice-Admiral Sims is that any naval force which controls a certain area of waters has nothing to fear from submarine operations in those same waters. That is to consider the matter in connection with the submarine— if the British Navy picks out a particular section of the sea, say the British Channel, and decides that she will obtain complete and actual command of the surface in that section, no submarine can exist in that particular neighborhood. England's general control of the surface everywhere enables her admirals to place in this British Channel a flotilla of surface craft composed of light cruisers and destroyers-above all, destroyers-which has entire freedom in operating against submarines. If Germany could send out a fleet that could drive away these light surface craft-that is, if Germany controlled the surface of the sea, which she does not-obviously these lighter craft could not operate. Clearly, therefore, successful operations on submarines depends on two elements: control of the surface in the old sense, which enables the nation so controlling to place her anti-submarine craft where they can render the greatest service; and, secondly, the possession of craft, which, when left undisturbed in control of the surface, can actually destroy submarines. Admiral Sims, in the testimony to which I have referred, shows why the destroyer is an extremely effective weapon in this kind of naval warfare. In order to do this, the Admiral dissipates a great misapprehension. which generally prevails, even in well-informed circles. He indicates that the name "submarine" is something of a misnomer. This type of warship is an underwater boat only incidentally, since, for the greater part of its career, it travels on the surface. Like the whale, it can keep under the water only for a limited time. According to Admiral Sims, the submarine can sail continuously under water for forty or fifty or sixty miles, according to its size. After such a voyage it has exhausted its THE DESTROYER'S ADVANTAGE OVER THE SUBMARINE One of the greatest advantages the destroyer has in a gun fight with a submarine is "high platform." It shoots down at the underwater boat, whereas the latter has to shoot up, with the "curve of the earth" and the roughness of the sea against it. Gunfire is practically the only way in which a submarine can fight the destroyer, and, because of "high platform," the odds are all against her electric motive power which, for under-sea traveling, is obtained from storage batteries, and has to come to the surface to recharge. This recharging is done with the gas engine apparatus, which can be worked only on top of the water; the recharging process takes four or five hours and makes a noise that can be heard five miles away. Should the submarine, when it comes to the surface, suddenly find itself face to face with a surface fighting craft, its situation is an unpleasant one. Against the destroyer it is practically helpless, for this versatile vessel combines many qualities that make it invulnerable. In the first place the destroyer draws only eight or nine feet of water. Now the torpedo travels most successfully at a depth of fifteen feet; if it sails nearer the surface than this, it cannot be depended on to pursue a straight course. Clearly, therefore, a submarine cannot fight the destroyer with torpedoes, for these usually glide harmlessly under the keel. Occasionally, it is true, the torpedo may take a course nearer the surface; but even then it stands little chance of hitting the destroyer, for this boat makes a speed of from thirty to thirty-five knots and can make such sudden turns that the expert helmsman can almost invariably evade the torpedo, especially as this always leaves a tell-tale wake upon the surface. In its combats with the destroyer, therefore, the submarine can rely only upon its guns, usually three- or four-inch rifles in the case of a few submarines the guns may be larger-one placed fore and one aft. There, again, the larger, swifter surface boat has everything in its favor; it usually carries a gun that has a longer range, and it has the great advantage of higher "platform"—that is, it shoots down upon its enemy from a height, whereas the latter has to shoot up from below. Above all, the destroyer has the opportunity of ramming its enemy. But it is hardly necessary to go into further detail, for this war has completely shown that the submarine cannot live in the same waters with the destroyer. We may now regard this fact as fundamental. The submarine can neither submerge and attack the destroyer with a torpedo nor can it come to the surface and fight with a gun. I have asked many naval experts whether they knew of a single case in this war in which a submarine has sent a destroyer to the bottom. They all dismissed the question with a wave of the hand. Possibly, they added, such an event may have hap WHY A DESTROYER IS ALMOST TORPEDO-PROOF It is almost impossible for a submarine to sink the destroyer with a torpedo. The torpedo, in order to make a direct course, has to travel about fifteen feet under the surface. The destroyer draws only eight or nine. The torpedo, therefore, usually glides harmlessly under the keel pened, but they personally could not point to a solitary instance. It is also true that the destroyers do not sink many submarines. And that mere fact is the most eloquent tribute to their prowess, for the destroyers do not "get" their underwater foes simply because the more subtle craft keep away from their neighborhood. If you station a couple of policemen in front of your house, they will not catch many burglars, because all burglars will carefully keep away. For a similar reason the English and American destroyers do not sink German submarines by the dozen, though they occasionally "get" their prey. This, then, is the one definitely established fact in this terrific warfare with German submarines. These boats will give a clear berth to any waters which are thickly strewn with destroyers. Any destroyers. Any "commanded seas" which are dominated by destroyers and other light cruising craft are free of these pests; the submarines are safe so long as they sail deeply under the sea or rest peacefully upon a shallow bottom; but let them once come to the surface, or even show their periscopes, and they are simply courting disaster. But the very nature of the submarines compels them not only to come to the surface periodically, but to stay there for a considerable time, recharg DESTROYER FLEETS TO TRAP THE SUBMARINE There are only three places through which German and Austrian submarines can escape into the open sea-the English Channel, the northern entrance to the North Sea, and the Straits of Otranto at the base of the Adriatic. A large destroyer fleet, patrolling the waters in these three places, would leave the ocean highways open and undisturbed to the Allies. The English have closed the English Channel for three years with destroyers and other light cruising craft, but they have not destroyers enough to maintain the necessary patrol in the other sections ing their batteries and making a hullabaloo in the process that widely advertises their presence. This fact is not a theory; it is a demonstration. There is one part of the seas where the British control not only the surface, but the sub-surface. The presence of a large destroyer force in the British channel and immediately adjacent waters explains the ease with which England maintains her communications to France, transports millions of troops and unlimited mountains of war supplies. If the German submarines could sink ships at will, irrespective of surface conditions, this is the very first place where they would strike; for by cutting these communications, Germany could keep England out of the war. But so far she has not made the slightest impression on this area. England's destroyer fleet-combined with England's command of the surface, which, let me repeat, enables this destroyer fleet to operate-is the explanation. For three years Canada has maintained a constant fleet of transports to France, and has not lost a single soldier in transit, as a consequence of a German attack. This is because a flotilla of destroyers conducts these ships safely to port. The United States is now constantly transporting thousands of troops with much the same success and for the same reason. Just once say the word "destroyer" to a submarine and this cowardly vessel slinks away under the water to safety. It loses all its fighting spirit in an instant. Still the German submarines are daily sinking merchant ships. But they are sinking them only in waters that are free of destroyers. The trouble is that England has had only enough destroyers to protect completely her channel communications, her overseas transports, and her battle fleet. It is not quite true that the outbreak of war found the British Navy ready for all eventualities. It was prepared, indeed, for everything that human ingenuity could foresee. But there was one thing which the most imaginative mind had never once conceived of as within the bounds of possibility. This is that a great Power, laying superficial claims to civilization, would conduct naval operations against merchant ships and against unarmed men, women, and children. Only the course of events has made this kind of warfare a reality -something which -something which naval preparations in future must constantly keep in mind. England had armed her navy for naval warfare, not against piracy and murder. Therefore, the war found her navy without the destroyer fleet essential for this brand of Germanic strategy. The British yards have been turning out destroyers on a liberal scale since 1914, but not in sufficient quantity to patrol all the seas which are penetrated by German submarines. Yet the problem, as the accompanying maps show, is not an insuperable one. Once given an adequate number of destroyers-perhaps a thousand-and we could promptly chase the submarine out of the war. The thing to do, we have been told, is not to "swat" the undersea raiders after they have escaped into the open seas but to prevent them from ever leaving their native waters. Merely limiting their activities to the North Sea would accomplish essentially the same purpose. The German submarines can break into the Atlantic only by way of the English Channel, or by way of the stretch of waters between Scotland and Norway. England's destroyer fleet already bars the former passage. A large net, stretched from Scotland to the Shetland Islands and thence to Norway, would similarly close this northern entrance. But no experienced naval |