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man regards this net as a possibility. A large force of destroyers, however, constantly operating in this passage, would accomplish the same result. Such a fleet would have to be a very large one, patrolling east and west for a distance of one hundred miles and north and south for a distance of fifty or sixty; the fact that it would have to be so large perhaps puts it out of the question for the present. Until we have destroyers by the thousands, probably our naval experts would locate them along the trade routes in St. George's Channel and west of the Irish Sea. At present the British food supply from America takes this course, disembarking at ports on the western coast of England. An unfortunate consequence is that these

ship lines converge in

the narrow waters separating England and Ireland, the ships gathering here almost

in clusters. Naturally

this renders them comparatively easy marks for submarines. The more destroyers the Allies have, however, the further they can push these submarines out to sea. With a fleet of three or four hundred they could probably form an area, reaching five hundred miles out to sea, in which the submarines could not operate. The further they are pushed to sea, the wider will become the entrance for the merchant ships; that is, these ships will no

longer all be practically forced into a narrow opening, crowded with submarines. Then chances of getting safely through would naturally be infinitely increased. In fact, an' effective destroyer patrol, reaching four or five hundred miles out to sea, would mean that the submarines could not operate at all. The food supply would be secure, and, if necessary, troops and supplies could be sent from this

0000

III

PUSHING THE SUBMARINES OUT TO SEA

At present the Germans operate most successfully in the waters between Ireland and England, where the trade routes from America converge and, bringing the ships together here in clusters, make them easy marks for submarines. As the English and American destroyer fleets are increased, they will be able to patrol a wider area in these waters, gradually pushing the submarines farther out to sea, and widening the entrance the merchant ships will have to English ports. Thus the submarines, as this circle gets farther to sea, will not get at the ships in mass. In these diagrams, the tear-shaped figures represent destroyer areas, the smaller black dots submarine areas, and the dotted lines shipping lanes

side to France by way of England and the Channel. The only reason the Allies do not establish such a patrol is that they do not have the destroyers.

1916,

ap

And the sad fact is that, at the present rate of production, it is not likely that they will obtain them in the immediate future. That is the most distressing fact in the navy situation. Our record in destroyers in the last three years is disheartening. Here are a few facts. few facts. The naval bill of 1915 provided for the construction of six destroyers; inadequate as that programme was, these six destroyers have not yet been finished. They are now gradually being commissioned at the rate of about one a month. And the bill providing for them was passed two and a half years ago! The great naval programme programme of August, of August, 1916, appropriated for twenty destroyers and provided that they should be constructed in the shortest possible time. The last naval list issued for general circulation bears the date of March 1, 1917. This records the progress made upon these twenty destroyers as "o.o." That is, despite the Congressional direction that work should be speeded, and despite the general world situation, nothing had been done on these vessels seven months after Congress had appropriated the money. To the layman such a delay seems simply incredible. In the naval bill of 1917, Congress appropriated for fifteen more destroyers, making thirty-five in all. Probably progress up to date on these thirtyfive ships is not much more than 10 per cent. In addition to these the department, under certain blanket appropriations, has planned a considerable addition to the destroyer fleet; and now Congress has adopted a $350,000,000 programme for building destroyers exclusively. Just how many ships this latter amount will give is not clear. The naval bill of 1916 placed the cost of a destroyer, without armament, at $1,200,000, but the cost, particularly on vessels where construction must be speeded, has greatly increased since then. At the rate of $2,000,000 per vessel, this latest appropriation will give us 175 destroyers. With the sixty effective ships of this type which we had when the war began, and the vessels under construction, the likelihood is that, when this building programme is finished, we shall have between 300 and 350 destroyers. If we could

send such a fleet to England to-morrow, we could make an end of the submarines. But we shall not send them to-morrow, and, the way things are going now, we shall not send them next year. Hitherto our best record in destroyer building has been two years. Mr. Daniels says that we can now build one in twelve months and that he expects soon to cut the period down to nine months-which is the English record. The best information obtainable is that the navy is by no means building destroyers in twelve months, and that the nine month period, at the present rate of progress, is nowhere within view. Perhaps by the summer of 1918 we shall have from 100 to 150 destroyers in European waters. But that will not be enough for the task in hand. Unfortunately, while we are building destroyers the Germans are building submarines, so that an addition of our new destroyers by next June or July would not materially change the existing situation.

BUILD ALL THE DESTROYERS WE NEED!

The United States has begun seriously the creation of a great air fleet. We have established splendid aviation schools in all parts of the country, have already developed a motor that promises to give the most efficient service and we have laid the foundation for building airplanes by the thousand. All this will tell in. the campaign of 1918. Why cannot we adopt a similar programme for destroyers, the one effective weapon so far found for overcoming the submarine? Instead of planning 150, why not plan 300, 400, 500, 1,000-as many as the great cause calls for? Why not give up work on battle cruisers, battleships and other vessels which can never see service in this war and concentrate all our war-building resources on the one type of vessel which can actually do something toward turning the scale? We are standardizing airplanes; why not standardize destroyers and turn them out in any quantity desired? We can do it if we only try. Meantime months are passing, and at least two great merchant ships are going to the bottom every day. If the navy is looking for a chance to distinguish itself and render the greatest service to the world, it will find that chance in the rapid construction of a large destroyer fleet.

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