afford it, laid in an extra supply. The retail dealer's business was to sell his coal and turn it into money as soon as possible. With the public in an apprehensive mood about the future this was easier than usual. The result was excess supplies for many and scarcity for many more. But the railroads had no power over local retailers of coal to prevent this. Nevertheless, when the supply ran out in certain communities because some people had bought too much, the railroads were called on to rush extra coal. They were faced with frantic demands for rush deliveries in every direction. They had to try to comply with all these demands. They will continue to be faced with this kind of demand until Mr. McAdoo, who has the power which the railroads did not have, refuses to try to make the railroads make good the faults of local distribution and forces the local authorities or the Fuel Administration to handle the distribution so as to make a fair amount of coal suffice. And what applies to coal applies to many other things, also.

But, as railroad protector general, Mr. McAdoo has an even larger task in protecting the transportation system from abuse by other departments of the Government. Various branches of the Government had the power to issue, and quickly acquired the habit of issuing priority shipping orders for almost everything they wanted. The consequence was that some railroads were faced with the necessity of hauling nearly every piece of freight offered them before every other piece of freight! Moreover, the process of mobilization resulted in vast quantities of freight being sent to places which had no facilities. Places that had facilities were crowded beyond their abilities. Freight was rushed to the seaboard and there blocked the terminal facilities for four, five, six, even seven months, waiting to go abroad. The lack of ships was not the railroads' fault. Nor was the foolish practice of sending to the ports tonnage that could not be moved away the railroads' fault. But they were unquestionably the victims of these practices. The Senate Interstate Commerce Committee at a special hearing drew from Chairman Hall of the Interstate Commerce Commission the statement that the Government's failure to centralize priority administration was largely responsible for freight congestion.

Chairman Hall took occasion to exonerate

Chairman Lovett of the Priority Board of blame in connection with the issuance of unnecessary orders, placing responsibility on the action of the boards in the War and Navy Departments, as well as with the Shipping Board, which designate what freight for these departments is to be moved first.

"Couldn't the President have improved the situation last July by having these priority orders pass through one man?" asked Senator Kellogg.

"You can draw your own conclusions as well as I can," Chairman Hall replied.

But whoever else could have controlled the situation, the railroads could not because it was against the law. It has been against the law for railroads to combine as much as they have. The measure of unified control achieved by the Railroad War Board under the chairmanship of Mr. Fairfax Harrison was contrary to law but in strict accordance with necessity. If the problem had been merely one of unified operation the railroads could probably have worked it out themselves, but it was much more than that. The problem is based upon the conception of the United States as a huge workshop devoted to producing trained men and munitions for war. The job of the Director General of Railroads is to move men, raw materials, and finished products over the shortest and easiest routes, and to maintain an even flow to prevent congestion, just as materials are routed through the different departments of a factory. This means arbitrary power to say that a coal dealer in Indiana must get coal from an Indiana mine instead of a West Virginia mine to save hauling. Commercial competition has resulted in many needlessly long hauls of many kinds of things. And railroad competition. for freight has encouraged this. The Government with the arbitrary powers of war time can stop these cross hauls and needlessly long hauls and save a large amount of railroad operation for more useful purposes. The part of Mr. McAdoo's task which offers the greatest opportunity for public service is the direction of the traffic of a nation.

In the field of operation the Government can achieve a larger measure of unification of control than the railroads had already achieved, particularly in the use of terminal facilities. But the railroads have already made a very good record in the actual moving of freight. Traffic hauled in 1916 was a quarter more than

that in 1914. So that, while complete unification of control can undoubtedly do still more to improve operation, there is not likely to be as great an opportunity for improvement in pure operation as in the direction of the traffic. The number of ton-miles accomplished by the railroads in 1916 would probably suffice for even our war needs if all traffic were directed so that none of the tonnage was wasted.

Government operation will also take care of any difficulty that might otherwise have arisen in borrowing money to buy new equipment and to pay off former loans that are maturing. The Government may even see that the roads get the equipment, as well as see that they have money to pay for it. The railroads have ordered new cars and engines, but the military needs abroad have prevented their getting many of them. The Director General will have the power to get such cars and engines as the conduct of the war demands for our roads.

As for the railroad revenues themselves, under the Government any deficit that might arise in operation would be met by taxes.

Besides directing traffic, unifying operation, and financing the roads, Mr. McAdoo must face another problem-in many ways an even harder one. He has got to find some way of maintaining the personnel of the railroad organizations. The engineering companies,

the draft, and munition factories have all drawn on the railroad labor supply. Mr. McAdoo will have to meet these inroads and also meet the demands of the railroad brotherhoods for more and more wages. Two years ago the brotherhoods showed their strength to the Government, and their experience then would not deter them from trying the experiment again. Perhaps the patriotism of the railroad workers will remain uppermost in their minds during the whole course of the war. If not, Mr. McAdoo has a real test ahead of him. If such strikes as have spread over most of other war industries, despite the promises of labor leaders, come into the railroad field, it will make railroad conditions as bad as those which Mr. McAdoo was called on to improve.

Altogether the new Director General of Railroads is faced with many difficulties, and with an equal number of opportunitiesopportunities full of possibilities of service to the Nation in winning the war.

I delight in the fact that when we entered this war we were not, as our adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and inviting it.

Certainly all Americans will agree with Mr. Baker in being delighted that we were not anxious for this war. But our delight at being unready and unprepared is being tempered, if, indeed, most people had it. For a Secretary of War to have had this feeling about a war which had been directly threatening us for nearly two years causes some wonder as to what Mr. Baker considered the purposes of the War Department to be. When Mr. Baker, with the present situation abroad staring him in the face, told the Senate Committee that the war was 3,000 miles away and that there was no hurry, the suspicion of his unfitness was confirmed.

Mr. Lowry, the author of the Collier's article, gave the following description of Mr. Baker last September:

He has not disclosed a powerful, penetrating intellect of "flashing impulses," but he has a sound, good mind. He contends daily in the War Department with an almost impossible, impractical organization. The power and responsibility in that

archaic scheme of things are not intelligently placed. But Mr. Baker runs his job; it does not run him. Too infrequently can that be said of Cabinet officers.

It is not possible to erect Mr. Baker into a great heroic figure forging thunderbolts of war and launching them with majestic mien against a cowering and hated enemy. That is not his style. Neither is he the negligible quantity and colorless apparition some persons suppose.

The "almost impossible impractical organization," that "archaic scheme of things' which makes up the War Department, came into Mr. Baker's hands two years ago. As Mr. Lowry points out, the Secretary seemed to dominate the Department until war, which is the test of a War Department, struck it. But then, as the Senate investigation has shown, the task got somewhat away from him. The humiliating testimony given by General Crozier and General Sharpe indicated that there was not a vigorous controlling force in the Department. General Sharpe, for example, testified that he had not been officially informed of how many men he was to clothe,

but that he heard there were to be a half million more and went and asked about it.

Not only did the testimony seem to indicate a lack of a big enough man at the top, but the results were bad. It is announced now that we are to have 400,000 men in France by March. That is thirteen months after we broke relations and eleven months after we declared war. The British recruited and The British recruited and trained and delivered to the war area many more than that number from a population half the size of ours in the same length of time. And the army that Great Britain sent could not count on artillery, machine guns, or other munitions from its Allies as we are doing.

Mr. Baker has now shuffled the archaic scheme of things around and has gotten in some new blood. In peace times we should let it go at that, for Mr. Baker's personality is pleasant and his intentions are good. But we are now at war and delay means death, mistakes kill people. Big mistakes and long delays kill thousands. The President and Mr. Baker must know that the lack of foresight and the lack of efficiency in the War Department cause grave concern to the people in the United States and damage our reputation abroad and will lead to unnecessary deaths in our army. If the President and

Mr. Baker are sure that no one else can be had to do the job better than Mr. Baker is doing it and will do it, it is the part of courage and patriotism to keep him at his post.

Optimism About the Shipping Situation

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FFICIAL statements, from both the United States and England, give grounds for optimism concerning the general shipping situation. Mr. Bainbridge Colby, a member of the United States Shipping Board, goes so far as to say that the shipping problem is solved. "America's stupendous ship-building programme is the answer to the submarine." The recent parliamentary statement of Sir Eric Geddes, the new First Lord of the British Admiralty, gives more definite reasons for thinking that the German submarine has done its worst. The net losses in British shipping, in three and a half years of warfare, have amounted to 2 million tons. That is, England has that much less tonnage afloat now than in August, 1914. But the explanation for this falling off, Sir Eric says, is not primarily the German submarine. For

the first two years of the war, the English shipyards almost stopped building mercantile ships, devoting all their energies to constructing war vessels. The annual output of warships in England has exceeded the product of peace years by 300 or 400 per cent. The general impression that England's navy is at least twice as large as when war began is apparently substantiated by this official declaration. British yards can now turn their attention to recouping the losses in England's mercantile fleet. Sir Eric supplies another new fact: had England in these three years of war maintained her construction of mercantile ships on the pre-war level, English shipping, despite the depredations of the submarines, would be 2 or 3 million tons to the good. Now that the British yards have begun building merchant ships on a much greater scale than prevailed before 1914, the chances of making good the losses seem favorable.

Since February, 1917, when Germany's unrestricted campaign began, England has lost 3 million tons-at the rate of about 300,000 tons a month. How much shipping has been constructed in that same period? From January 1st to June, according to Chairman Hurley, American yards launched 500,000 tons; that is, even before the United States adopted its present large programme, we were building at the rate of one million tons a year. Shipping statistics are so entangled that it is impossible to tell how many tons England has turned out in this same period. We can get some idea of British capacity, even before the augmentations required by war, from the fact that, in 1913, British yards turned out 3 million tons. Probably the statement is therefore entirely justified that English and American yards have replaced at least 2 million of the 3 million tons which England has lost since February, 1917. But there have been other sinkings than those of English ships. The best figures estimate that Germany has been destroying about 500,000 tons a month of the world's shipping since she decided to play her last card. This is at the rate of 6 million tons a year. If English shipyards produce 3 million tons and Americans 5 million tons, it is quite apparent that Germany has failed, even though the English and American navies find no more effective method of handling the submarine. Though Mr. H. L. Ferguson, president of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company, insists

that our yards will produce only 3 million tons in 1918, Chairman Hurley still promises 5 million tons.

So far as our "programme "-the situation on paper is concerned, the German submarine is already defeated. But our shipyards are still disorganized, the labor problem is still unsolved, and there is yet no definite assurance that we shall build 5 million tons this year. The necessity for action exists as much as ever.

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The Attacks on Mr. Hoover

HE attempt which is now being made to discredit Mr. Herbert C. Hoover will make little headway with the American people, or at least that part of it which is interested in the thorough prosecution of the war. It is necessary at the present moment to maintain a constant attitude of criticism toward any public man whose activities, intentionally or otherwise, help to promote the German cause. There is no probability that Senator Reed, of Missouri, is a German agent; there is not the slightest doubt, however, that his activities for the past year and a half have been more helpful to Germany than to the United States. While there is no desire to do injustice to an American Senator, there are certain phases of Mr. Reed's career which it is necessary to keep in mind. He comes from a state-Missouriwith a large German population, and with his colleague, Mr. Stone, Mr. Reed has taken a stand throughout the war which has not been displeasing to this element in his following. His attitude on food conservation has sufficiently demonstrated his hostility to the great enterprise in which we are engaged. Every country, especially Germany, has found it necessary to subject its food supply to the most minute supervision. In face of this fact Senator Reed fought the food bill all last sum

was a crowning shame. The American people should let Mr. Hoover know that they support him whole-heartedly in the present crisis.

Adjustment of Business to the War

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HE adjustment of business throughout the country to war conditions has so far been effected with very little trouble. Business was universally in a highly prosperous state when we entered the war last April. That helps to account for the small number of failures since. But the real adjustment of business to a war basis is likely to come this year, and we are coming to that with business generally in a satisfactory condition. There are exceptions, of course, to this commercial prosperity; and these point the way that the readjustment must take, and give warning to those engaged in activity that must be curtailed. During 1917 there were fewer commercial failures in the United States, according to reports of R. G. Dun & Co., than in any of the three years previous, when we ourselves were not involved in the war. The total liabilities of the failures last year were $183,441,371, which is smaller than the corresponding figures for nearly ten years back. There were 20 per cent. fewer failures in trading occupations, such as stores, in 1917, both in numbers and in the amount of the liabilities, than the year before. Among manufacturers, on the other hand, there was an increase of 8 per cent. in liabilities, although the number of failures showed a 12 per cent. decline. Manufacturing plants are generally hard to convert from one product to another, and consequently a manufacturer of luxuries has the hardest task in adjusting himself to war conditions. It is on such manufacturers that the pressure of war has begun to tell.

about in the national capital, but, owing to the peculiar restrictions of censorship and an atmosphere of official intimidation, the American people were denied news that might have been the basis for the same kind of helpful criticism which is only now stimulating the Government to greater effort in prosecuting the war.

Washington knew about the shortage of rifles and the changes in ordnance, the complaints of visiting manufacturers, their offers to supply the Government with munitions, and the lack of equipment. It was even predicted by men within the army exactly what the suffering would be, both on the transports and in the camps. Not a word of this, however, was it possible to print because of the strict rules barring any discussion of military plans. No one in the Government would permit any

Efforts

information to be released which tended in any way to reflect unfavorably on officials. were made frequently by the Committee on Public Information headed by George Creel to bring about relations of frankness with the press, but these failed. Similarly War Department officials, when confronted with the stories of inefficiency which were current here in many cases, actually entered denials and forbade their subordinates to throw any light whatsoever on these subjects. The usual reply was that the information would be useful to the enemy, but no person in authority either in the Committee on Public Information or any other branch of the Government weighed the advantage to America in a revelation of inefficiency as compared with the alleged disadvantages of having Germany learn details of American equipment.

The return of Congress has been the first healthful influence brought to bear on a situation the gravity of which had long been known inside the national capital. The attitude of smug complacency which some officials adopted toward their work was not disturbed, because criticism has been for many months virtually impossible. Rumors galore were prevalent, but newspaper inquirers, anxious to obtain the facts on which to base a judgment, were repeatedly thwarted and told that military matters were none of the public's affairs.

The creation of a Department of Munitions is again being urged as a way out of the ordnance troubles and the difficulties of handling questions involving contracts and supplies on a large scale. This suggestion has been repeatedly made in the sessions of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and a separate munitions organization responsible for ordnance would have been formed many months ago, could a public opinion have been aroused as to the need of such a step.

There are several deductions from Mr. Lawrence's narration of facts, which is in no way an exaggeration.

The fact, of course, is that there was and is something rotten in the state of the War Department.

The second is that the press failed in its duty. Censorship or no censorship, a paper with the information and the courage could have forced the issue.

The third deduction is that even if the censorship did stop the press from telling the whole truth, there is nothing to stop Congress from finding out whether the executive branches of the Government are doing their duty. It is the fundamental safeguard of all liberal government that the legislature elected by the people shall control the expenditure of the people's money and that the executives, whether elected or appointed, are in the last analysis responsible to that body, which, with us, is Congress.

But the difficulty with our system is that Congress does not attend to that function of supervision except periodically. Most of the executive departments go their way between appropriations with little responsibility to any one but the press. The press has assumed the task of watching the operations of the executive departments and reporting on them to the people. But it is a voluntary responsibility. The Washington correspondents who really perform this service to the Nation are not elected by the people to do this. It is in reality the duty of Congress, and the fact that the press generally does it does not excuse Congress from its obligations.

If the Committees of Congress had representatives of the departments empowered to answer questions about the department activities before them every week, Congress would keep posted and the departments would have to keep up with their work all the time. As it is, the Congressional investigations only occur after there is good reason for the public to believe that there has been a failure or a scandal.

The opportunity for Congress to assume its responsibilities and serve the country lies before it. In practically all other countries with democratic governments the executives resign when their conduct is unsatisfactory to a majority of the legislature. Our cabinet members are not responsible to the legislature to the degree that an adverse vote would mean resignation, and to make them so would require a constitutional amendment, but they are, nevertheless, responsible in that few adminis