then and fall it ought to be possible to send over another 500,000. Giving them three months to finish off their training would mean that we should have a million men ready to fight on February 1, 1919 [less casualties], with your other 500,000 in reserve in France finishing its training. From that time on the numbers should increase rapidly.

This programme limits us to a minor part in the conflict this year. It is even hard to find a military authority who believes that this is a sufficient programme to be sure of victory over the German armies in 1919. It is certainly the least accomplishment which the American public expects, for the public cannot but believe that the energies of 100 million intelligent people, if properly directed, should, after two years, be able to deliver a blow that would defeat the armies of 70 millions who are already outnumbered and who will then have suffered five years of war. Even 3,000 miles of ocean ought not to prevent that.

Your tone of optimism and your figures give us reason to hope for at least such a result. But, Mr. Baker, there are other things which have come to our attention which give us misgivings, which sometimes make us doubt whether you are not misleading yourself and

us.

It was only a few days before you announced that there were 1,500,000 men ready to go to France that there appeared a statement by the medical branch of the Army that during the four months ending on January, 18, 1918, the average enrolment in all cantonments, forts, etc., in the United States was 1,100,000 men. The men added since can not be far advanced in training. Even this million, on a service basis, would have been short of rifles, machine guns, shoes-in fact, short of practically every item of equipment-if they had gone when you stated they were ready to go. Undoubtedly you were counting upon the fact that they would get equipment before transportation could be arranged for them. Moreover, it is hardly possible that all these men can go abroad even if they are equipped, for we shall need a good many to guard the Mexican border, to garrison Panama and other outlying posts, and to protect military and munition-making property in this country. These things cause most people who follow our war preparations closely grave concern.

They arouse the fear that you are not planning to insure German defeat even in 1919. Moreover, you do not yourself set the German defeat as your standard. When you tell us that no other army was ever raised, equipped, and trained as rapidly as ours, you seem to set other nations' accomplishments as our goal. But if we beat all records and lose the war or even prolong the war, it is nothing.

But even if this standard you set were a sufficient one, we still have some misgivings about your facts. The comparison is, of course, aimed at Great Britain, for it is the only nation which had to raise, train, and equip an army under conditions similar to ours. Great Britain is a nation of less than half our population. In the British Isles a million men were raised in two months-not counting the regular army and territorials. Two million men were raised in a year. The regular army and territorials began fighting immediately. The first of the new armies attacked the Germans nine months after war began. At the end of fifteen months the British forces, including Canadians and Australians, had had 495,000 casualties. In that time, too, they had transported a substantial expeditionary force to Gallipoli.

The United States is just as willing and able to fight as is Great Britain, and if our record does not compare favorably with the British record it is the fault of the management of the war, not of the country's ability to fight.

The anxiety

We had misgivings, Mr. Baker, about your attitude toward preparedness, and they were justified. We had misgivings about your early vision of our part in this war. They too, unhappily, have been verified. about your present vision is not altogether allayed. We have been at least as worried as you have been about the organization of your department. Its recent reorganization has happily cleared much of that misgiving

away.

We are still of the opinion that there are too many boards of advisers in and around the War Department, but there is great comfort in the fact that you have in vital positions such men as Mr. Tripp, Mr. McRoberts, Mr. Franklin, Mr. Stettinius, and General Goethals.

It is a great encouragement to the public, also, that you have reorganized the General Staff. That body's main duty was to give you and the President a military programme com

mensurate with the particular war we are engaged in. It evidently failed to do so or failed to convince you, for when you recently stated that you had shipped more men abroad than you originally intended you gave evidence that the original intention for this year was very small indeed.

The public is grateful to you for the fact that you have set a new standard of honesty in the conduct of war by this country. There has been the inevitable waste and extravagance which goes with the necessity of making all war preparations after war is declared, but the management of our war effort has certainly been cleaner and less influenced by politics and favoritism than ever in the history of this country. We have you to thank, also, for having set and maintained a new level of morality in and around the camps and canton

ments.

On the other hand, neither before the war nor since does it seem that you have had much appreciation of the magnitude of preparation for war or the vital pressing necessities of this particular struggle. It is for this reason that we earnestly urge you now to plan adequately for the men who are to follow the army of a million and a half which you assure us is ready to sail. If a million and a half ready to fight in 1919 will not finish this struggle, let us have three or four million there in 1920. To accomplish such a result we must begin on a big scale now.

A

Have We Got the Ships?

FTER Secretary Baker had said that shipping was the weak link in our effort to defeat Germany, the figures of our shipping began to take on an even greater interest than before.

There are now about 2,400,000 tons of American ocean shipping. There are about 700,000 tons of German and Austrian shipping that has been taken over by the Government. There is a prospect of 300,000 tons of Japanese ships available in exchange for plates and shapes. That is, altogether, about 3,400,000 tons. During the year 1918 Mr. Hurley expects that we shall build at least 4,500,000 tons. If the estimate of 5 tons per man is correct we could keep nearly 700,000 men abroad on the 3,400,000 tons if it were all available for army uses, which is very far from the case at present. The total present tonnage plus

the estimated tonnage building for 1918 is 7,900,000, which would maintain nearly 1,600,000 men abroad on the basis of 5 tons per man. There is a possibility of adding to this in two ways. There are coastwise and lake ships which can be added to the overseas fleet, but only if adequate foresight is shown in arranging to meet the added burden which will fall upon the railroads. The improvement in the docking facilities here and in France, the improvement in the management of the fleet, and the increase in the average speed of the vessels might be made to lower materially the average tonnage necessary per man in France, though Mr. Baker's estimate of two tons per man seems very optimistic. Improvements are being made at the points of debarkation. The American-British Committee to manage the fleet on this end ought to help materially to shorten the waste time of vessels here. As most of the new ships are faster than the present average of cargo ships, the time taken in passage ought to be somewhat reduced. Added to this, Mr. Baker says the British are willing to squeeze their food and munitions supply and turn over a million tons to us.

On the other hand there are several discouraging elements in the situation. In 1917, the U-boats sank about 6,000,000 tons of shipping. We built during that time 1,400,000 tons, the British certainly did not build more than 1,200,000 tons, and the building of Japan and all neutrals would not add up to more than 1,000,000 tons. The world has much less shipping, therefore, now than at the corresponding time in 1917. If the sinkings continue it will mean that England will probably have to call back the tonnage she now offers, to keep her people fed. A good deal of our estimated shipbuilding, as a matter of fact, was ordered by the British and commandeered by us after it was begun. Moreover, so far we have not been able to devote by any means all of our shipping to the army and the navy.

The first and most vital difficulty in our way is the German submarine campaign. We have tried to fool ourselves into the belief that when the submarines sink only eight or ten big ships a week we are having a victory. But it is not true. Six million tons of shipping was sunk in 1917-that means that we and our Allies were defeated at sea in 1917. The task of the combined navies was to blockade Germany and to keep the seas open for food, muni

tions, and men going to England and France. Germany was blockaded, but the sea lanes are less open in 1918 than they were in 1917 by at least two million tons of shipping. Our Navy has done extremely well for its numbers engaged, but the numbers have been insufficient, so far, to accomplish the task which it must accomplish if we mean to win the war by fighting. There is reason to believe that the destroyer programme is now making good progress, but when sufficient destroyers will be at sea to reduce radically the successes of the submarines we do not know. If this happy result occurs early this year, we shall save thousands if not millions of tons of vitally needed shipping. If it occurs late this year, or next year, we shall probably lose this shipping. Whether we lose it or not is the test of the management of our Navy. However smoothly it functions ashore, it is not fulfilling its real purpose unless it gives us victory at sea. Victory at sea means the suppression of the U-boats.

II

The second obstacle which we have to overcome in our shipping efforts is a shortage of labor. Mr. Hurley had an investigation made by an outside agency as a check on his estimates of the building for 1918. This estimate was 4,500,000 tons. His own hopes are higher than this. But he is frank to say that neither his hopes nor the more conservative estimate can be realized without an increase in the labor supply.

The labor situation in the shipbuilding industry has been difficult mainly for two reasons. The great increase in yards necessitates a new army of workmen. The shipbuilding plants were forced by circumstances and allowed by the Government to bid against each other for labor, and other industries bid against them. The result has been that the total supply of ship workers has not been adequate and, what is far more serious, the men have, under the pressure of solicitation, moved rapidly from one place to another. This has led to a smaller output than these same men would normally have accomplished. The high wages with the resulting competition for men, as often occurs, instead of stimulating production has actually decreased it. Another disadvantage has been the lack of housing facilities near many of the new yards.

After some five months' discussion the De

partment of Labor had decided [when this was written] on a national wage for all shipyards to prevent competitive bidding for each other's employees, and the Emergency Fleet Corporation had called for 250,000 volunteers-skilled mechanics to build ships for the period of the war-men who will serve the country as shipbuilders as soldiers serve it in the field. Here every manufacturer can serve his country by explaining this call to such men of his establishment as are fit to meet it and by urging them to join the shipbuilding army. The building of ships is a vital link in our effort to defeat Germany.

Our shipping condition is bad, but there are ships to get our men to France if all possible are used to their utmost capacity and if our building programme suffers no further checks. If all possible ships are used to carry our troops abroad and supply them, it will mean giving up trade we now have, and it will mean increased burdens on our railroads. They can meet this situation only if they are relieved of some non-essential business that is now going on. The German submarine has forced the economic war into the United States just as our blockade has forced the war into the homes of the Germans. And we have got to meet it by drastic economies in our use of transportation and labor for anything but war purposes. If the Government will state the facts in all their seriousness and apply the remedy, the people of the United States will do their part. They are willing to go to any length to drive this war to complete victory at the earliest possible moment.

T

A New Era

HE modern conception of the Red Cross marks a new era in the history of civilization. Until the time of this war, civilization had progressed as far as to prescribing as unlawful the confiscation of private property without compensation in war but the damage done by war to humanity was looked upon as inevitable. Even in our Civil War, which was cleanly conducted, the world-friend, foe, and neutral alikelooked upon the destruction which Sherman wrought from Atlanta to the sea as something which the women and children of that section would have to bear unaided. There was no Commission for Relief in Georgia. There was no Red Cross to rebuild ruined villages

either during or after the war. We sat by and let the camp-followers of war-disease and poverty-carry on their campaigns year after year against people who had been robbed of most of the means of defense against these evils. That is the war after the war which civilization should dread. That is the war after the war which the Red Cross means to stop. Our Red Cross, the British, the French, the Italian, and many agencies, governmental and otherwise, are banded together to rob war of its terrible and continuing after-effects. It is the Red Cross idea to give the war orphans a chance in life, to keep hope and self-respect in the hearts of the refugees, to fight sickness behind the lines while the war is still going on, to rebuild the villages in order that communities may live and work again in civilized conditions. It is the Red Cross idea to start industry again, even to start new industries, that widows and wounded may not sink into poverty and dependence. It is the Red Cross idea to keep the morale of the people high during the war and the courage of the people clean for the time after the war. It is the purpose of the Red Cross to help win the war, and, when that is done, to keep the aftereffects of the war from so lowering the economic health and moral standards of people that they cannot enjoy the political liberty they have preserved at such a cost.

The Red Cross idea goes on further even than this.

Serbia is a devastated, ruined, depopulated nation. The German-Austrian-Bulgarian object has been to obliterate the Serbian people. Of a million and a half Armenians who lived in Turkey in 1914, a million are dead of Turkish persecution and massacre. prosperous districts of Belgium and Northern France have been systematically ruined and depopulated.

The

The people of these and the other blasted regions of Europe must have a chance to begin their economic life again. There must be money to rebuild the factories and restock the farms, remake roads, and set up again the schools. No matter how just such an idea might be, it is not within the realms of possibility to get money for these purposes from Germany. The Germans have wrought the destruction, but they have not the wherewithal to repair it. The money must be raised elsewhere and raised with governmental backing, for it cannot be raised

way.

otherwise. England has already led the It has furnished most of the money which the Commission for Relief in Belgium has spent to keep Belgium alive during the war. That was no ordinary financial transaction. The only security that Great Britain had that Belgium would exist again to honor the debt was that her armies and the French armies would drive the invader out. And when that was done Belgium would be ready, not to repay, but to borrow more. When we are done fighting, we must be ready to finance the rehabilitation of the frontiers of civilization that have been destroyed by the Hun. This cannot be done by gifts through the Red Cross. The Red Cross can be of immense assistance, invaluable assistance. But the vast sums necessary are an obligation that will fall on the Allied governments, just as do the expenses of war. In previous times the richer nations took advantage of their less fortunate neighbors to lend them money on terms that made them economic dependents. If we do not deal generously with these scarred places, the diseases which they will suffer will infect the whole of Europe and America as well. We shall have lost the war after the war unless we can finance the rehabilitation of civilization's ruined frontiers on generous and successful terms-terms which will not mean economic servitude or foreign domination.

This high conception of decent economic aid has underlain President Wilson's attitude toward Mexico, but Mexico's irresponsibility has made the practical application of the idea almost impossible. But that difficulty will not interfere with the rebuilding in Europe.

Economic Pressure on the United States

M

R. THEODORE H. PRICE, in Commerce and Finance, has pointed out that three fifths of our annual effort as measured in dollars must be spent in carrying on the war. If we could hire some one else to carry on the war, supplying the 15 billion dollars would not be difficult. But we cannot hire any one else. We have got to get about three fifths of all the human energy in this country directly hitched to the war machine. That means that very little labor can be left to non-war industries, that very little raw material can be given non-war industries, and very little railroad facilities given non-war

freight. Every person should of his own accord cut to the minimum the money he spends which encourages people to produce nonessentials for war. Every person should of his own accord turn every bit of labor he can into war work. And when the Government prescribes general rules toward these same ends, every one must do his utmost to see that they are accorded instant and complete observance.

And the country will do this. It could hardly have a more severe test to begin with than Dr. Garfield's fuel order. A large proportion of the men who had to close their factories under this order honestly and sincerely believed that the remedy was not the proper one for the evil. They knew that the order was suddenly promulgated, that it had not been worked out carefully, that it was not the result of foresight, but the result of a sudden realization of how bad a situation we had drifted into. Yet the order was obeyed, as any other order will be obeyed. The public will, of course, protest against ill-conceived measures which fail in their object, but even these will have their chance.

There has been a theory in political circles that the American people had to be coaxed carefully into this war and, once in, must be led gingerly along into real participation. There has been nothing to substantiate this. From the time of the Lusitania sinking, if not before and directly in the face of our position of neutrality, a large and ever-increasing part of the population recognized, then, the reasons for participation in the war that the President stated last April, and the rest of the country agreed the minute they had official confirmation of the German intentions. Since April the public voice has ever been on the side of the more vigorous prosecution of the war. The public response to the recent Congressional investigations is but the latest manifestation of this. The American people want, above all things, to defeat the Kaiser's armies. When that is done, the main war aim of the average American is to get rid of the Kaiser and all his kind, for he recognizes that the close corporation of kings is a direct menace to democracy, ours included, just as it was in the days of the Holy Alliance. Wherever the theory of Divine right obtains, or dynastic purposes influence foreign policy, the king business is a menace to America.

To Take Advantage of Strikes in Germany

T

HE recent strikes in Germany stirred again the hopes of those who believe that the German people have in them the desire and the power to throw off the Kaiser's theory of Divine right and the control of the Government by the military caste. Strikes in Germany and the possibility of a revolution there are direct aids to us, just as strikes here are an aid to the German armies. And we should take the utmost advantage of the German internal disorders. When their armies are weakened in numbers by the withdrawal of men to maintain order in the interior, and weakened in morale by conditions behind the lines, it is the favorable time for us to strike if we have the force to do it. A German defeat at such a time would still further lower the prestige of the military party and the morale of the army. And if the pressure on the front is so severe that the General Staff cannot spare men to cow the people in the cities, then perhaps we can expect the much discussed revolution to materialize. There are many men in Germany with a big following who are eager to get rid of Kaiserism. But they have little hope of a successful revolution as long as the German army is intact and unbeaten. If once that army is so driven that the prestige of its leaders is gone at home and it sees no hope of victory, then perhaps we can expect that a rising in Germany will hasten the end and also provide a Government with which we could make peace with a clear conscience and a hope for the future. Every internal disturbance in Germany is, then, but another clear call to us to redouble our efforts on the fighting front.

The Coördination of Coöperation Vs. The Man on the Job