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ROM the very configuration of the frontier line, it was inevitable that the Italian battle line should have taken a form which was both peculiar and dangerous. The Italian offensive was limited to the front along the Isonzo River. Once the battle line left the river, it ceased to be an offensive line and became purely defensive-blocking up the passes through the Carnic and the Julian Alps which eventually lead to the plain of northern Italy-the plain of Friuli. It will be seen from following on the map the battle line as it was before it broke under the German attack about Tolmino, that its general form was that of a horseshoe. Such a line is always a sounce of danger. If it is broken at any point, the entire front is of necessity affected.

Ordinarily it is an easy line to supply, as practically each part of it is readily reached from any central base. But the case of Italy is far from the ordinary. Italy must import all her war material. It comes naturally from France and England, the transshipping by rail enabling the ships to escape the submarine perils of the Mediterranean. This fact, therefore, destroys the advantage which would normally be hers by reason of the interior character of her principal lines. The Italian line as it now exists has certain other advantages over that held before the German attack. It is practically straight except for the very gradual bend where it leaves the mountains and turns down the Piave River. It is now practically one with the line in France so that the Allies' battle line may properly be described as running from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

The assistance which was sent to Italy after the break in her lines and the ensuing retreat was not needed because Italy was short of man power. It was because the morale of the Italian army had received a severe shock by reason of the defeat and needed bolstering up. The more than successful resistance which the combined armies have made to the efforts of the Teutonic Allies both in the mountains and along the Piave front has

given the Italians new life and courage. There is no reason now why the Italians' ability to fight should not be just as great as when the Isonzo offensive was first started in the early fall. As near as can be estimated, Italy has at least 3,000,000 men under arms. As a purely defensive proposition, she can hold her lines with not more than half of that number. In return for the aid which the Allies have given Italy, it might be possible to effect the transfer of some of this surplus to France should they be needed to stem a similar Teutonic effort later on. Just how many men Austria has is not known, but it is not believed that she can muster 2,000,000 effectives.

There is, however, a disadvantage in the present Italian position over that which was held previous to the retreat. With superior numbers which Italy held, it was possible to man a much longer length of line without that line becoming too attenuated than could the Austrians with inferior forces. Moreover, the old Italian line was a constant menace to the Austrians and so constant a menace that they did not dare withdraw troops for service elsewhere and so weaken their front. But now the Italian line, as may be seen from the map, has been shortened by many miles. It can therefore be held by much fewer troops, so that Austria has, in effect added many thousands of men to her former strength. Moreover, the defensive advantages of the Italian positions are possessed in equal measure by the Austrians and for the same reasons with the single exception of the means of communication. The Austrian line from the point where it leaves the Piave Valley must be fed from mountain railroads over mountain trails. The Italian line has excellent supply lines in the plains with but a short distance to go through the mountains before the battle lines are encountered. But the Piave is between the two lines and must be crossed by either in attack, while in the mountains with the exception mentioned the difficulties are identical. In fact the entire Italian situation looks perilously like a permanent fixture.