him on the fifth or at furthest the 6th. On receipt of the letter of the 8th informing us of the almost total deficiency of New Kent. we ordered 164 men from Chesterfield and 187 from Dinwiddie to be immediately assembled and marched to General Muhlenburg's Head quarters. We can only be answerable for the orders we give and not for the execution. they are disobeyed from obstinacy of spirit or want of coertion in the Laws it is not our fault; we have done what alone remained for us to do in such case, we have ordered other militia from other Counties. If The Quarter Master applied to us on the subject of the Horses required. He was furnished with impressing powers. He again applied for militia to aid him in the execution of the Powers. We did not think proper to resign ourselves and our Country implicitly to the demands of a Quartermaster, but thought we had some right of judgment left to us. We knew that an armed force to impress horses was as unneccessary as it was new. The fact has been that our citizens have been so far from requiring an armed Force for this purpose that they have parted with their horses too easily delivering them to every man who said he was riding on public business and assumed a right of impressing. When therefore the militia have on their hands a sufficiency of real calls to duty, we did not think it proper to harrass them in cases where we had reason to suspect they were not wished by the Quartermaster as militia, but as servants. It was mentioned to the Quartermaster that in our opinion he could and should do but little in this neighbourhood & that of Petersburg which had been drained by constant impresses: Nevertheless we furnished him with the blank Powers to be exercised where he pleased. I have laid your letter before the Assembly according to your desire. TO MAJOR-GENERAL MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE. V. S. A. SIR,-Intending that this shall await your arrival in this State I with great joy welcome you on that event. I am induced to from the very great esteem your personal character and the Hopes I entertain of your relieving us from our enemy within this State. Could any circumstances have rendered your presence more desirable or more necessary it is the unfortunate one which obliges me to enclose you the enclosed papers. I trust that your future Acquaintance with the Executive of the State will evince to you that among their faults is not to be counted a want of disposition to second the views of the Commander against our common Enemy. We are too much interested in the present scene & have too much at stake to leave a doubt on that Head. Mild Laws, a People not used to prompt obedience, a want of provisions of War & means of procuring them render our orders often ineffectual, oblige us to temporise & when we cannot accomplish an object in one way to attempt it in another. Your knowledge of these circumstances with a temper to accommodate them ensure me your coöperation in the best way we can, when we shall be able to pursue the way we would wish. I still hope you will find our preparations not far short of the Information I took the Liberty of giving you in my letter of the 8th instant. I shall be very happy to receive your first Applications for whatever may be necessary for the public service and to convince you of our disposition to promote it as far as the Abilities of the State and Powers of the Executive will enable us. TO THE SPEAKER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.1 (RICHARD HENRY LEE.) IN COUNCIL, March 10, 1781. SIR, At the request of Major General Baron Steuben, expressed in the enclosed letter, I take the liberty of laying it before you. The number of militia necessary to be called into the field, and time of their being there, we begged the baron to advise. He did so. Apprehending the deficiencies, we ordered a considerably larger number. As soon as we received the letters informing us of the deficiencies from New Kent, and desertions from Cabin Point, finding that, with those of Loudoun, the number would be reduced below what he desired, we ordered three hundred and fifty one from the counties of Chesterfield and Dinwiddie. The time fixed by the baron, for the first reinforcement, was the sixth instant; our orders were that they should be there on the 5th or 6th, at farthest; they were not there, it seems on the 7th. A number of horses were required for special purposes; we furnished the quartermaster with impressing powers. He applied for militia to aid him in the execution of the powers. We knew that an armed force to impress horses was unnecessary as it was new. The fact has been, that our citizens, so far from requiring an armed force for this purpose, have parted from their horses too easily, by 1 From Lee's Life of R. H. Lee, II, 191. delivering them to every man who said he was riding on public business, and assumed a right of impressing. When, therefore, the militia have on their hands a sufficiency of real calls to duty, we did not think proper to harass them in cases where, we had reason to believe, they were not wished by the quartermaster as militia, but as servants. It was mentioned to the quarter-master, that, in our opinion, he could and should do but little in this neighborhood, and that of Petersburg, which had been drained by constant impresses; nevertheless, we furnished him with blank powers, to be exercised where he pleased. TO MAJOR-GENERAL MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE. V. S. A. RICHMOND, March 12th, 1781. But SIR, The enclosed is the Copy of a Letter which was intended to have awaited you in Virginia. as there seems to be a probability that you will be detained at the Head of Elk longer than could have expected I have thought it best to send a Copy there also. An idea having unfortunately got abroad that the militia now called on are intended to storm the Enemy's works at Portsmouth the numbers which actually march from the several Counties are so far short of what we ordered as never happened before & as to have baffled our calculations on probable Deficiencies. As these have become further known & expected we have ordered in additional numbers. From this cause I am informed the Blockade of Arnold on the Norfolk side has not taken place as I had reason to believe when I wrote to you on another occasion. By the last accounts I can get the Enemy have three vessels of Force in the Bay in addition to those Arnold had before. What few armed vessels we could get are in James River & cannot be got out nor, could we get them out, are they of Force sufficient to venture up the Bay. Should a French naval Force superior to that of the Enemy arrive in the Bay, I make no doubt you will still think it necessary to be assured that there are not in the upper part of the Bay vessels of the Enemy sufficient to do you Injury. I fear the number of boats requisite for landing your men and cannon will be very defective. Steuben thinks 20 necessary but there cannot be half Baron that number procured. The boats built for use in the upper part of James river cannot navigate the lower parts nor can any be brought round from the other rivers, perhaps it will be in your power to bring a number of boats with you. We have every instrument in motion which can avail us on this most interesting Occasion, but the want of means circumscribes our exertions. I think it proper therefore to reduce your expectations from what should be ready to what probably will be ready, and even calculating on probabilities I find it necessary to reduce my own expectations at Times. I know that you will be satisfied to make the most of an unprepared people, who have the war now for the first Time seriously fixed in their Country and have therefore all those habits to acquire which their Northern Brethren had in the year 1776. and which they have purchased at so great an ex pense. |