of statutory interpretation are the same throughout the Empire, and when those principles are applied in Australia to extract the meaning of a clause or a phrase, the process is scarcely likely to diminish the security of life, liberty, or property elsewhere. If a controversy is finally decided by the High Court of Australia the decision will, of course, be a guide, but in Australia only, to the settlement of subsequent controversies in similar cases; but that is to-day the fact with respect to the decisions of the Superior Courts, in all parts of the Empire, when not appealed from; and however closely those decisions may be followed in the Courts which give them, it will scarcely be contended that they injuriously affect the rights of litigants in other parts of the Empire, or shake the principles upon which those rights are upheld. || It is, however, generally contended, in opposition to clause 74, that its operation would ,,tend to destroy uniformity of decision on constitutional questions", and would in this way raise confusion and uncertainty, which would be against the interests of the rest of the Empire. The principles of the interpretation of Statutes are so well understood that any lack of uniformity in that regard is out of the question. But in their application to the words of an Australian Constitution, the occasion for uniformity of the decisions with those given on the meaning of other Constitutions does not even arise. The decisions of the particular Court would be consistent, one with another, whether pronounced by the High Court or by the Privy Council; since the same Court does not usually give inconsistent judgments; but the questions which may be raised as to the construction of the Constitution must themselves differ so completely from questions affecitng Constitutions of different design, that uniformity of decision is in this respect as unattainable as it is undesirable. The Constitution of Canada is entirely different from the Commonwealth Bill in many points, but especially as regards the reservation of residuary powers affected by the enumeration in clause 5, and by the express reservations of clauses 106, 107 and 108. Uniformity of decisions in questions such as these would be an attempt to bring two differing Constitutions into line, with the result of confusion and disaster. || Judicial knowledge of local conditions is an essential to true interpretation which, nevertheless, differs with the conditions; and where the structural methods of two Constitutions are as widely apart as the countries to which they apply, and where also the local conditions are as far asunder as the methods or the countries, to strain after uniformity of decision is to grasp at peril with both hands. If uniformity of legislation in widely separate parts of the Empire is unattainable, as it will be so long as

men of British race are free, it cannot be said to be so important as to be essential to Imperial interests that there should be uniformity in the interpretation of dissimilar Constitutions. Moreover, sensible business people do not resort to lawyers at a distance from a country to find out what the law of that country is. If a merchant in London wants to know the Australian law affecting his interests he seeks the advice. of competent counsel in Australia; he does not prefer the opinion on such questions of even the most eminent of English lawyers. Why is this? Clearly because his common sense tells him that an intimate knowledge of local laws and conditions is of the highest importance in the formation of a sound opinion. Suppose, then, that the leading counsel in Australia and the eminent jurist in England are both promoted to the Bench, will it follow that the promoted Englishman will understand the local law as well as his promoted brother in Australia, to whom a superior knowledge of that law was accorded in practice before his promotion? || Her Majesty's Judges in Her Australian Courts may be as fairly trusted to abstain from infringing the rights of Her subjects residing elsewhere as any Judges in any other of Her Courts. Justice is administered in the name of the Queen. The Courts, wherever situated, are constitutionally Hers, and the Judges are constitutionally Her selection, nor has it been found difficult to give Australian Judges the status of Privy Councillors. Her Advisers in Australia are, and will be, as responsible for wrong guidance as are Ministers in this Kingdom, and Australians are not so un-British as to admit that 4000 000 of them cannot properly conduct their own affairs, or properly choose Judges who can say, better than any authority elsewhere, what those Australians mean in their Constitutions. It may, of course, be said that the Commonwealth Bill will be an Imperial Act. Nevertheless, it is an instrument of Government framed by chosen Australians and ratified by those who chose them. If the Australians had not made it the occasion for this discussion would never have arisen.

In discussing the first of the questions which they take to be involved, the Delegates have found it impossible to avoid touching the second; but probably it will be opposite to the second question to remark briefly on the contention, that to reserve to Her Majesty's Judges in Australia the final decision of a few Australian questions will shatter, or at least weaken, a „link of Empire". The Delegates reflect with pride that there are sentiments which will constitute eternal links of Empire", but are quite unable to understand how there can ever be the least hope that we can merely, „by insuring uniform interpretation of the law throughout

the Empire, facilitate that unity of action for the common interests which will lead to a real Federation of the Empire". The „unity of action" and the uniform interpretation of the law" seem to them wholly unrelated, and certain to remain so. The consciousness of kinship, the consciousness of a common blood, and a common sense of duty, the pride of their race and history, these are the links of Empire, bands which attach, not bands which chafe. When the Australian fights for the Empire, he is inspired by these sentiments, but no pratriotism was ever inspired or sustained by any thought of the Privy Council. | The Delegates fail to see how its monopoly of the right of final interpretation can tend to make the Australian feel that it binds his affections more closely to the mother of his race. The tie of affection will last as long as its causes. May that be for ever. The tie which is not rooted in affection is no boon, it is an injury, and yet we are told it is to be maintained lest Her Majesty's Judges in Australia should give interpretations to the British Laws and Constitutions of that land which will usurp the powers, or endanger the interests, of their fellow-subjects elsewhere. Even now Australian Legislatures have the power to make declaratory laws, and cases have arisen in which they have declared by Act of Parliament the meaning of their laws to be the reverse of that which the Judicial Committee has attributed to them. Will it be said that this legislative power thus exercised by Australians, to interpret finally their own laws, is a danger to British interests or a destroyer of any link of Empire? Unless the power is so chargeable its existence and exercise seem quite inconsistent with the position set up by the Memorandum of the Government. Why should not Australians have the alternative of interpreting their meaning on the Bench as in the Senate? Are their Judges less trustworthy than their legislators? || The Delegates are not unaware that representations, which they have not had the advantage of seeing or hearing, have on this subject been addressed to Her Majesty's Government. If they have come from private citizens they have generally emanated from members of the minority who have opposed the Bill. If they come from men of high official position, they are as destitute of authority as in all cases ought to be the pronouncements of officials in derogation of the action of Government when backed by Parliament and people. Contrast with these criticisms the explicit language of the Right Honourable G. H. Reid, speaking as Premier of New South Wales in August last: There will be no safety or security for Australian union until it is known that the Bill that Australia has drafted for the Imperial Parliament to pass word for word is passed by

that august Tribunal word for word." Without citing the numerous expressions of similar opinions from leading public men of all parties in Australia, the subscribing Delegates may be forgiven if they refer to their own qualification sfor interpreting the views of the Australian people. Four of them were elected members of the Convention which framed the Bill, at a time when the Colony of Queensland was not represented in the Councils of Federation. One of them was the elected President of the Convention, another of them was elected to that Convention by the largest number of votes ever polled for any candidate in Australia, and he was subsequently made the leader of the Convention by the voices of all the Colonies. Mentioning these facts, merely to show that they speak from personal knowledge, the Delegates assure Her Majesty's Government that the proposed alteration of the Constitution, even through a covering clause, cannot fail to be distasteful and harassing to the Australian people. If they accepted the Constitution with such an amendment, it would be because they were made to choose between the bowl of intervention and the dagger of delay. || In conclusion, the Delegates submit that the object of all those who seek to draw closer together all parts of the Empire“ will be best served in Australia by never permitting its Federation to be placed, under any circumstances, in even apparent opposition to,,the larger question of Imperial Federation". So far from there being any necessary conflict between the two movements, it has always been maintained in the Colonies that local union is an essential preliminary to any practical scheme of Imperial co-operation. The suggestion that they are antagonistic is therefore to be deprecated, as it is not only unjustified, but must deal a serious blow to the prospects of Imperial Federation all over Australia. || The Delegates therefore plead most earnestly with Her Majesty's Government that effect may be given to the representations made by the Australian Premiers in their recent telegram. That despatch makes it clear that the clause as it stands was repeatedly considered and ratified by Convention, Premiers, and people; that the electoral adoption of the Bill is a mandate to Executives and Legislatives to seek its enactment in the form which the people gave it by their representatives, and confirmed by their votes; that the Premiers decline to accept. alterations, because that course is unauthorised in view of the mandate, and would therefore be improper; and that they decline to authorize others to do on their behalf that which they cannot rightly do themselves. This request implies no questioning of the trusteeship of Her Majesty's Government, of the wisdom of Parliament, or of its sovereign power; but often it has been the truest wisdom of sovereignty to abstain from the

exercise of its power, or so to exercise it only as to win the gratitude of those who are subject to its authority.

Edmund Barton.
Alfred Deakin.

C. C. Kingston.
P. O. Fysh.

Nr. 13143. QUEENSLAND. - Der Gouverneur an den englischen Kolonialminister. Die Kolonie teilt Chamberlains

Standpunkt.

(Received 12.44 p.m., April 27, 1900.)

Telegram. | My Government are astonished at attitude of Mr. Deakin at Colonial banquet, and they are in favour of inclusion of your amendment re Privy Council in Federation Bill. The Premier says that the people of this Colony are strongly in favour of amendment. Chief Justices of South Australia, New South Wales, and Queensland, whom I have seen, are all strongly of opinion that you should insist on amendment without reference to local Parliaments.

Nr. 13144. GROSSBRITANNIEN. - Der Kolonialminister an den Gouverneur von Westaustralien. Die koloniale Regierung soll ernstlich die Schwierigkeiten zu heben suchen.

(Sent 4.5 p.m., April 27, 1900.)

Telegram. | Referring to my telegram of 5th April, as you are probably aware, Premiers of Federating Colonies have declared that they have no authority to accept amendments in Bill, and they have not given the delegates any instructions in regard to any suggestion. I cannot in these circumstances press the matter further, and I would now urge your Ministers earnestly to concider whether they should not, in the best interests of the Colony, as well as of Australia, make a resolute effort to bring the Colony into Federation at once. || Western Australia, unless it joins as original State, can only enter later on condition of complete intercolonial free trade. It will thus lose the temporary protection offered by Clause 95, and looking to present population of Colony, it may also be found difficult to secure such large representation as it would receive as original State, and which will enable Colony to secure adequate protection for all its interests in Federal Parliament. Your Ministers will also, of course, take into consideration effect of agitation of the Federalist party, especially in goldfields, if Western Australia does not enter as original