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such surgeon, for reasonable reward to be paid therefor, to set said broken bones in their proper place, and to attend on the plaintiff until he should be cured.

2. That the defendant thereupon entered upon said employment, but was so negligent and unskilful in setting said bones, and in attempting to reduce said fracture, and in attending and dressing said leg, that [state the consequences].

3. That by reason of said negligence and unskilfulness, [set out the special damages], to the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of

$

[Concluding part.]

FORM No. 876—For negligence of a dentist.

(In McGehee v. Schiffman, 4 Cal. App. 50; 87 Pac. 290.)1 [Title of court and cause.]

Comes now the above-named plaintiff and, with leave of court first had and obtained, files this her amended complaint, and for cause of action alleges:

1. That the defendant, A. F. Schiffman, at all the times mentioned in this her amended complaint, was a dentist, professing and practising in the city of Los Angeles, county of Los Angeles, state of California, and was at all the said times, and is now, obtaining and doing business, and carrying on said profession and practice of dentistry in said city, county, and state, under the name and style of the Schiffman Method Dental Company; that the said A. F. Schiffman is the owner and sole proprietor of said company.

2. That on the 7th day of December, 1903, the plaintiff Olive C. McGehee, visited the place of business of defendant in said city and consulted with defendant regarding her teeth, and defendant then and there, and for a pecuniary consideration or reward, did assume and undertake to extract from her jaws and to remove from her mouth certain of her teeth; and did then and there extract seven of said teeth and remove all of the same from her mouth, excepting one of said teeth, which by defendant's carelessness, negligence, and unskilfulness was permitted and allowed by him to drop and pass into plaintiff's right lung, without any fault or negligence on her part, where said tooth remained for a long period of time, to wit,

1 This complaint, form No. 876, was held by the court as sufficient, and in no sense as ambiguous or uncertain: McGehee v. Schiffman, 4 Cal. App. 50, 87 Pac. 290

from said December 7, 1903, until August 21, 1904, whereby, and by reason whereof, plaintiff was permanently injured in her health and body, and especially in her said lung, and by reason thereof became permanently sick, sore, diseased, and disabled, and suffered, and continued to suffer, great mental anguish and distress and physical pain, and ever since said time of said operation by defendant, and by reason thereof, she has been declining in health and bodily vigor, whereas at all times for many years prior and up to the time of said operation performed by defendant, she, plaintiff, had been in good, sound bodily health, and able to do and perform, and did do and perform, all her necessary and proper household and family duties, labor, and service, but which now, and ever since said time of said operation, and by reason thereof, she is unable to do or perform.

3. That by reason of the premises, and of said negligence, carelessness, and unskilfulness on the part of defendant in said operation, the plaintiff was compelled to pay, and did pay, the sum of $493, or thereabouts, medical expense in attempting to be cured, and has, also, suffered damages in the sum of $10,000.

Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant, A. F. Schiffman, for the sum of $10,493, and the costs of this action. E. Edgar Galbreth, Attorney for plaintiff.

[Verification.]

FORM No. 877-For negligence of grocer in selling a dangerous explosive. (In Kenny v. Kennedy, 9 Cal. App. 350; 99 Pac. 384.)

[Title of court and cause.]

Plaintiff complains of the defendant, and for cause of action alleges:

1. That the plaintiff and Rebecca Kenny are now, and were at all the times hereinafter mentioned, husband and wife, and that, as the wife of this plaintiff, the said Rebecca Kenny at all times had authority to buy and purchase for and on behalf of this plaintiff, and to act as his agent in the buying and purchasing, of all household supplies, and particularly the oil hereinafter mentioned.

2. That the plaintiff is now and was at all times hereinafter mentioned, the owner of [here lot is described], and was at all said times the owner and in possession of that certain five-roomed, onestory, frame dwelling-house situated on said lot, being known and designated as No. 1516 Winfield Street, and that the value of

the said house at and prior to the time of its destruction as hereinafter alleged was the sum of $750.

3. That the plaintiff was at all the times hereinafter mentioned the owner and in the possession of all the personal property contained in the said house, which consisted of furniture [etc., describing other property], and all property being in said house on the 29th day of September, 1906, and that the same was at the time of its destruction hereinafter alleged worth the sum of $750.

4. That the defendant at all the times hereinafter mentioned was, and now is, a dealer in groceries, coal-oil, gasoline, and other merchandise at a store known and designated as No. 1601 West Twelfth Street in said city.

5-7. [Here follow averments of facts showing the negligence of the defendant in selling the plaintiff upon an order for coal-oil, a quantity of gasoline, the same having been put in a can marked "coaloil" and delivered as such to plaintiff's wife.]

8. That the said gasoline so delivered by the defendant as aforesaid was of a highly explosive nature or character, and was not intended for the use or purpose for which the plaintiff or his said wife had bought or ordered coal-oil, all of which was well known to the defendant; that said gasoline was a liquid of the same color and appearance as coal-oil.

9. Not knowing that the defendant had so carelessly and negligently filled the said can or receptacle with gasoline as aforesaid, and relying upon the defendant to fill the said can with coal-oil, and believing that the said can contained coal-oil, the plaintiff's wife filled the lamps in the said house of plaintiff with said gasoline, and without knowing or discovering the fact that the said fluid was not coal-oil, as had been ordered, but was gasoline, the plaintiff's said wife, on the 29th day of September, 1906, lighted one of said lamps, and, as a result thereof, the same immediately exploded, and the said house and its contents as aforesaid were set on fire and totally burned and destroyed at said time.

10. That there was no insurance upon the said house or the said contents thereof, and that the same were a total loss to plaintiff; that the said loss was wholly caused by the carelessness and negligence of defendant as aforesaid.

Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,500, and costs of suit.

[Verification.]

Powers & Holland, Attorneys for plaintiff.

FORM No. 878-By servant, for damages caused by vicious animal.

(In Gooding v. Chutes Co., 155 Cal. 620; 102 Pac. 819; 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1071n.)

[Title of court and cause.]

Plaintiff complains of the defendant, and for cause of action alleges, that:

1. The defendant is, and at all the times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation owning and engaged in the business of conducting a place of amusement in the city and county of San Francisco, in the state of California, known and called "The Chutes."

2. During all of said times the defendant owned and had in its possession and under its control a camel. Said camel was at all of said times of a vicious and ferocious nature and disposition, and the defendant at all of said times knew that said camel was of a vicious and ferocious nature and disposition.

3. During the month of January, 1906, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, to look after, care for, and attend to said camel. 4. The defendant did not at any time inform the plaintiff of the vicious and ferocious nature and disposition of said camel, and previous to the attack hereinafter mentioned plaintiff did not know that said camel was of a vicious and ferocious nature and disposition.

5. On the 29th day of January, 1906, the plaintiff was ordered by the defendant to clean the stall of said camel. On said day, while the plaintiff was cleaning the said stall, the said camel, without warning of any kind, attacked plaintiff and bit plaintiff's left leg, and crushed and mangled said leg so badly that it became necessary to amputate said leg, and it was thereafter amputated.

6. By reason of the defendant's carelessness and negligence in failing to inform the plaintiff of the vicious and ferocious nature and disposition of said camel, plaintiff has lost his left leg, and as a result and consequence of the injury sustained by plaintiff as aforesaid he has undergone great and grievous bodily and mental suffering, and for the rest of his days will be incapacitated from attending to any of his ordinary business, and will continue to be deprived of the

means of earning a living. By reason of the premises plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $50,000.

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays that he have judgment against the defendant for the said sum of $50,000, and costs of suit.

Carl Westerfield, and

R. D. Duke,

[Verification.]

Attorneys for plaintiff.

FORM No. 879.-To recover damages against abstracters of title for negli. gence in reporting upon title to real property.

(Substantial portion of pleading sustained in Hershiser v. Ward, 29 Nev. 228; 87 Pac. 171, 172.)

[Title of court and cause.]

Now come the plaintiffs and complain of the defendants, and for cause of action allege:

1-3. [Here follow preliminary allegations, and allegation as to the defendants being a copartnership.]

That on or about the 24th day of June, 1902, the plaintiffs employed defendants, copartners as aforesaid, for fees and a reward to them by plaintiffs paid, to examine and furnish to plaintiffs a true, accurate, full, and correct abstract of the title to that said lot, piece, or parcel of land, lying and being in the then town [now city] of Reno, in the county of Washoe, state of Nevada, bound and particularly described as follows, to wit: [Here follows description], for the purchase of which, in fee-simple, and without encumbrances, the plaintiff had theretofore contracted with one W. H. Hancock, who claimed to be the owner thereof.

4. That defendants, in the performance of the duties of such employment, did thereafter, and on or about the 25th day of June, 1902, furnish to plaintiffs a pretended abstract of title to said land, and did report and represent to plaintiffs that the same was a full, true, accurate, and correct abstract of title to said land; that by said pretended abstract of title it appeared and was shown that the said W. H. Hancock was the owner of said land and premises in feesimple, without any encumbrances; that in reliance on said pretended abstract of title, and depending solely thereon, plaintiffs were induced to, and did, on or about the 28th day of June, 1902, purchase said land and premises from said Hancock, and did pay him therefor the sum of $1,100 in lawful money of the United States, and, as evi

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