1. General jurisdiction of the courts of a state is coextensive with its sovereignty, and attaches to all the property and persons within the limits thereof: State ex rel. Mackey v. District Court, 40 Mont. 359, 106 Pac. 1098, 1101.

2. Essentials of jurisdiction.-Jurisdiction may be defined as the right to adjudicate the subject-matter in a given To constitute this there are three case. essentials: First, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be before the court; and third, the point decided must be in substance and effect within the issues: Robinson v. Levy, 21 Mo. 498, 117 S. W. 577, 582, quoting from and approving Munday v. Vail, 34 N. J. L. 422.

3. Consent as conferring jurisdiction. -Consent can not confer jurisdiction of the subject-matter, but it may confer jurisdiction of the person: Maxwell v. Frazier, 52 Ore. 183, 96 Pac. 548, 550, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 102, quoting the rule stated in 12 Pl. & Pr. 126.

4. Consenting or agreeing to a continuance of a cause from one term to another operates as a waiver to the same effect, and confers complete jurisdiction: Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 21 S. W. 29, 35 Am. St. Rep. 726; Peters v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 59 Mo. 406; Seay v. Sanders, 88 Mo. App. 478.

5. Agreeing to reset a cause is likewise a waiver, and confers jurisdiction: Columbia Brewery Co. v. Forgey, 140 Mo. App. 605, 120 S. W. 625, 628.

6. Answer praying for affirmative relief. The defendant waives his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court when he has answered without objection to the jurisdiction, and has claimed affirmative relief: Kitcherside v. Myers, 10 Ore. 21; Municipal Security Co. v. Baker Co., 33 Ore. 338, 54 Pac. 174; O'Hara v. Parker, 27 Ore. 156, 39 Pac. 1004; Killgore v. Carmichael, 42 Ore. 618, 72 Pac. 637.

7. Jurisdiction to render personal judgment. A personal judgment in an action in personam can only be had after personal service of the defendant or his voluntary appearance in the action. Constructive service, such as service by publication, is ineffectual for this purpose: Silver Camp Min. Co. v. Dickert, 31 Mont. 488, 78 Pac. 967, 67 L. R. A. 940, 3 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1000.

8. Non-resident debtors. Statutory requirements for obtaining jurisdiction of non-resident debtors, and for attachment of property within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, which requirements are in derogation of the commonlaw mode of personal service, must be strictly complied with. Unless this is done in the case of such non-resident debtors who do not appear, the court acquires no jurisdiction for any purpose whatever as against them or their property. Even in proceedings in rem against the property of non-resident debtors the requirements as to publication or citation as expressly provided by law must be observed, whereby they may have their day in court; otherwise, the court will acquire no jurisdiction

or authority to adjudge a sale of their property to satisfy their debts: Smith v. Montoya, 3 N. Mex. 40, 1 Pac. 175.

9. Local actions, such, for example, as those relating to interests in lands, are usually laid in the district or the county where the subject-matter lies; but transitory actions may be tried wherever personal service can be made on the defendant: State ex rel. Mackey v. District Court, 40 Mont. 359, 106 Pac. 1098, 1101, construing Mont. Rev. Codes, § 6504.

10. Transitory actions.-Actions for injuries to the person are transitory, and follow the person; and therefore, so far as the nature of the action is concerned, one foreigner may sue another foreigner in the courts of a state for a tort committed in another country, the same as on a contract made in another country: Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31, cited in State ex rel. Mackey v. District Court, 40 Mont. 359, 106 Pac. 1098, 1102.

11. Government as party.-Jurisdiction of state courts.-Where the government invokes the jurisdiction of a court, it submits to that jurisdiction; presenting a claim for its adjudication, it asks that the claim be adjudicated upon its merits, and allowed or rejected accordingly. If it sues, it is subject to the defense of offset upon the amount of whatever claim it shall establish,-a defense which does not controvert the claim, but is in the nature of a limited or quasi cross-suit against it, allowed, not beyond the extent of the affirmative remedy, but only to the extent of defeating that claim: United States v. McDaniels, 7 Pet. 1, 8 L. ed. 587; United States v. Ripley, 7 Pet. 18, 8 L. ed. 593; United States v. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319, 9 L. ed. 142, cited in Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 2 Wyo. 170, 191, where the proposition above stated as to jurisdiction, and the effect of submission of a controversy thereto, is approved, and application made of a territorial statute to the measure of relief where judgment goes against the government.

12. The superior court has jurisdiction of an action brought to recover a statutory penalty by one who alleges title in himself and puts in issue by a verified answer the plaintiff's title, although the amount involved is less than $300 (this amount being the limit of

jurisdiction in the justice courts under the California statute, where the title to real property is not drawn in question): Randolph v. Kraemer, 106 Cal. 199, 201, 39 Pac. 533.

For a specific averment in defense of a demand as a basis for certifying the case to a court of higher jurisdiction, see form No. 382, paragraph 3.

13. Entry of Judgment terminates jurisdiction of the court in general: Los Angeles v. Lankershim, 100 Cal. 525, 35 Pac. 153, 556; Ayres v. Burr, 132 Cal. 125, 64 Pac. 120.

14. Publication of notice.-It is settled in the state of California that where the statute requires that a notice be published for a designated number of weeks in some newspaper published in the county, the same is fully satisfied by a publication once each week for the designated number of weeks in a daily newspaper published in the county: Sherwood v. Wallin, 154 Cal. 735, 739, 99 Pac. 191, citing People v. Reclamation Dist., 121 Cal. 522, 524, 50 Pac. 1068, 53 Pac. 1085; Chapman v. Soberlein, 152 Cal. 216, 92 Pac. 188, 190.

15. A publication for fourteen consecutive days constitutes a publication of "at least two weeks," where the requisite period of two weeks had fully elapsed prior to the date noticed in the publication for the meeting: Derby v. Modesto, 104 Cal. 515, 38 Pac. 900. See State v. Yellow Jacket etc. M. Co., 5 Nev. 415.

16. Purpose of affidavit for service by publication. An affidavit for service by publication is not designed to convey any information to the defendant to be served. Its purpose is to bring upon the record the statutory foundation for the publication of a notice. When the affidavit discloses that the action is one to foreclose a real estate mortgage and to sell land under such mortgage, a sufficient basis for publication is established: Sharp v. McColm, 79 Kan. 772, 101 Pac. 659, 660, citing Gillespie v. Thomas, 23 Kan. 138, and Kan. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 72, 74, (Gen. Stats. 1901, $$ 4506, 4508).

17. Defective service waived by answering over.-If the defendant desires to stand upon insufficient service of a writ or summons, its remedy is to move specially to quash the same, and. if the motion be overruled, then to withdraw from further appearance; the defective

service is waived by a general answer to the jurisdiction over the defendant: Eddy v. Lafayette, 49 Fed. 809, 1 C. C. A. 441; Ogdensburgh R. Co. v. Vermont R. Co., 63 N. Y. 176; Handy v. Insurance Co., 37 Ohio St. 370, 371; Gilbert v. Hall, 115 Ind. 549, 18 N. E. 28; Kronski v. Railroad Co., 77 Mo. 362; Thomasson v. Mercantile etc. Ins. Co., 217 Mo. 485, 116 S. W. 1092, 1095.

18. Time to answer pending motion to quash service.-Time to answer is not extended by and during the pendency of a motion to quash service of summons: Garvie v. Greene, 9 S. Dak. 608, 70 N. W. 847.

19. The word "process" signifies a writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings. Under this signification a notice of appeal has been held to be not process: Gooler v. Eid

ness (N. Dak.), 121 N. W. 83, 85, citing and construing N. Dak Rev. Codes 1905, § 6738.

20. Process under Kansas statute.Under the Kansas statute, it is provided that the style of process shall be: "The state of Kansas"; that the same shall be under the seal of the court from whence it issues; that it shall be signed by the clerk and dated the day it is issued. It is held, however, that a notice employed by the attorney in obtaining service by publication is not a process within the meaning of the constitution or statute, and need not bear the style of "state of Kansas," nor the seal of the court in which the action is pending, nor be signed or issued by the clerk of such court: McKenna V. Cooper, 79 Kan. 847, 101 Pac. 662, 663.

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