CH. IV.] WASHINGTON URGES HALF-PAY FOR THE OFFICERS. 521 stances burnt what they could not de- riotism, and to cite a few examples fend. It may well be believed, that Washington was filled with anguish at the calamities of the army. But nothing gave him more pain, than to see his soldiers exposed to the most injurious example; the officers openly declared their design of resigning their commissions; and many of them had already left the army, and returned to their families. This determination was principally owing to the depreciation of paper money: it was become so considerable, and the price of all articles of consumption, as well for this reason as from the difficulties of commerce, was so prodigiously advanced, that the officers, far from being able to live as it became their rank, had not even the means of providing for their subsistence. Some had already exhausted their private resources; others had become deeply involved in debt; and it was evident that, unless some steps were taken to prevent it, the army would ere long be deprived of nearly all its best and most efficient officers. Washington spared no exertions to remedy this evil; besides holding out every encouragement in his power to his officers, he besought Congress to take some steps to meet the emergency. With great force and clearness,* he urged upon Congress to secure half-pay to the officers after the war, either for life, or for a definite term. Disclaiming absolutely any personal interest in the settlement of this question, he observed, that it was easy to talk of pat from ancient history, of great enterprises carried by this alone to a successful conclusion; but that they who relied solely upon individual sacrifices for the support of a long and bloody war, must not expect to enjoy their illusion long; that it was necessary to take the passions of men as they are, and not as it might be wished to find them; that the love of country had indeed operated great things in the commencement of the present revolution ; but that to continue and complete it, required also the incentive of interest and the hope of reward. Congress manifested, at first, very little inclination to adopt the propositions of the commander-in-chief, either because they deemed them too extraordinary, or from reluctance to load the state with so heavy a burden, or, finally, because they thought the grants of lands to the officers and soldiers, of which we have already spoken, ought to satisfy the wishes of men possessed of any moderation. But at length, in the spring of 1778, submitting to what seemed to be a necessity, they decreed an allowance of half-pay for life to the officers of the army, with the reservation, however, to the government, of the power to commute it, if deemed expedient, for the sum of six years' halfpay. A short time after, this resolution was reconsidered, and another passed, which restricted the allowance of half-pay to seven years, dating from the end of the war. These measures, though salutary, were not taken till too late, and, moreover, were not sufficient * See Sparks's "Life of Washington," pp. 258-63. ly spontaneous on the part of the gov VOL I.-68 ernment. Already more than two hundred officers of real merit had given up their commissions; and it was again exemplified on this occasion, that a benefit long delayed, and reluctantly conferred, loses a large part of its value in the eyes of those whom it is intended to serve. It would seem that Washington had a sufficiently heavy burden upon his shoulders, in the harassing cares and anxieties of his position, and that he might have been spared from trials of another sort, to which he was exposed at this time; but Washington experienced what every great and good man must expect to meet with in an envious and malicious world. Thus far, apparently, little else than ill success had attended the military exploits of the commander-in-chief. He had been compelled to retreat continually before a powerful enemy. New York and Philadelphia had been lost; and there was almost nothing of a brilliant or striking character in what had transpired during the war, under Washington's immediate direction. On the other hand, the victory at Saratoga, had thrown a lustre around Gates's name, which far outshone, for the time, the solid and enduring light of Washington's noble and patriotic devotion to his country. It was the first great victory of the war, and it was a victory which necessarily had a most important effect upon the future prospects of the United States. No wonder, then, that restless and envious men should make invidious comparisons between the hero of Saratoga and the commander-in-chief. No wonder, that Washington should suffer from detraction, and the intrigues of dissatisfied and scheming men, to whom his unsullied virtue, purity and integrity, were invincible obstacles to every design of theirs to promote selfish or ambitious ends. A direct and systematic attempt was made to ruin the reputation of Washington, and from the name of the person principally concerned, this attempt is known by the title of Conway's Cabal. General Gates, and General Mifflin, of the army, and Samuel Adams, and others in Congress, had more or less to do with this matter. Gates and Mifflin had taken offence at something, and were at no time well disposed towards Washington; Conway, a restless, boastful, and intriguing character, was disappointed in not receiving the appointment of inspector-general. Adams, and some of the New England members, do not seem ever to have cordially liked Washington's appointment as commander-in-chief; and now, when the capture of Burgoyne had been effected by the northern army, without the intervention of Washington, the malcontents ventured to assume a bolder attitude. Anonymous letters were freely circulated, attributing the ill success of the American arms to the incapacity, or vacillating policy of Washington, and filled with insinuations, and exaggerated complaints against the commander-in-chief. Washington was not unaware of what his enemies were attempting; but it was not till after the victory of Saratoga, that the matter assumed a definite shape. Wilkinson, on his way to carry the news to Congress, divulged CH. IV.] ANONYMOUS LETTER TO HENRY. part of a letter from Conway to Gates, which was communicated to Washington by Lord Stirling. A correspondence ensued, which is well worth reading, especially as it sets forth, in a very transparent manner, the dignity and uprightness of the father of his country. The result showed, how deep a hold he possessed upon not only the confidence, but also the love and veneration of his country. 523 before us, and unless a Moses or a Joshua are raised up in our behalf, we must perish before we reach the promised land. We have nothing to fear from our enemies on the way. General Howe, it is true, has taken Philadelphia; but he has only changed his prison. His dominions are bounded on all sides by his out-sentries. America can only be undone by herself. She looks up to her councils and arms for protection; but alas! what are they? her representation in Congress dwindled to only twenty-one members One of these anonymous epistles just spoken of, was sent to Mr. Laurens, president of Congress, and was intended to operate upon that body. An-her Adams, her Wilson, her Henry, other was dispatched to Patrick Henry, governor of Virginia. Both these gentlemen forwarded the letters directly to Washington. We quote the letter received by Henry, as illustrating the mode in which it was intended to ruin the reputation of the commander-inchief. "YORKTOWN, January 12, 1778. "DEAR SIR,-The common danger of our country first brought you and me together. I recollect with pleasure the influence of your conversation and eloquence upon the opinions of this country in the beginning of the present controversy. You first taught us to shake off our idolatrous attachment to royalty, and to oppose its encroachments upon our liberties with our very lives. By these means you saved us from ruin. The independence of America is the offspring of that liberal spirit of thinking, and acting, which followed the destruction of the sceptres of kings and the mighty power of Great Britain. "But, sir, we have only passed the Red Sea. A dreary wilderness is still are no more among them. Her councils weak, and partial remedies applied constantly for universal diseases. Her army-what is it? a major-general belonging to it, called it a few days ago in my hearing, a mob. Discipline unknown, or wholly neglected. The quarter-master and commissary's departments filled with idleness, ignorance and peculation; our hospitals crowded with six thousand sick, but half provided with necessaries or accommodations, and more dying in them in one month, than perished in the field during the whole of the last campaign. "The money depreciating without any effectual measures being taken to raise it-the country distracted with the Don Quixote attempts to regulate the prices of provisions, an artificial famine created by it, and a real one dreaded from it. The spirit of the people failing through a more intimate acquaintance with the causes of our misfortunes; many submitting daily to General Howe, and more wishing to do it, only to avoid the calamities which threaten our coun men. try. But is our case desperate? by no "His Excellency P. HENRY." In reply to the letter of Mr. Laurens, enclosing the anonymous communication received by him, Washington, under date of January 31st, wrote 1778. as follows: "I cannot sufficiently express the obligation I feel to you, for your friendship and politeness "As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am unambitious of honors not founded in the approbation of my country, I would not desire in the least degree to suppress a free spirit of inquiry into any part of my conduct, that even faction itself may deem reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed to you, exhibits many serious charges, and it is my wish that it should be submitted to Congress. This I am the more inclined to, as the suppression or concealment may possibly involve you in embarrassments hereafter, since it is uncertain how many, or who, may be privy to the contents. "My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy of my situation, and that motives of policy deprive me of the defence I might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know I cannot combat their insinuations, however injurious, without disclosing secrets which it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect to be exempt from censure, the unfailing lot of an CH. IV.] RESULTS OF CONWAY'S CABAL. It is evident, from the proceedings of Congress for some time preceding, that there was a considerable party in that body, which lent themselves to this disgraceful attempt against Washington's good name. The appointment of a new Board of War, of which Gates and Mifflin were members, together with a projected expedition to Canada, without at all consulting Washington, were clear indications of the purposes of the Cabal, to endeavor to force the commander-in-chief to resign his post in disgust.* But Washington was not to be moved from his steadfastness. * Washington, in reply to certain insinuations which had reached him, wrote thus to a friend in New England: "I can assure you, that no person ever heard me drop an expression that had a tendency to resignation. The same principles that led me to embark in the opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain, operate with additional force at this day; nor is it my desire to withdraw my services, while they are considered of importance in the present contest: but to report a design of this kind, is among the arts which those who are endeavoring to effect a change, are practicing to bring it to pass. I have said, and I still do say, that there is not an officer in the United States, that would return to the sweets of domestic life with more heart-felt joy than I should. But I would have this declaration accompanied by these sentiments, that while the public are satisfied with my endeavors, I mean not to shrink from the cause; but the moment her voice, not that of faction, calls upon me to resign, I shall do it with as much pleasure as ever the weary traveller retired to rest." 525 Lafayette, also, whose love and veneration for the man who called him his friend, knew no bounds, although attempted to be flattered and cajoled into favoring the Cabal, openly and positively refused to have any connection with it. with it. "I am bound to your fate," he wrote to Washington, “and I shall follow it, and sustain it, as well by my sword, as by all the means in my power." And the army, as a whole, were roused to deep indignation at the audacious designs of certain restless and intriguing men against the beloved commander-in-chief. Gates and Mifflin, in letters quoted by Gordon, strongly asseverated that they were in nowise partakers in any plan for removing Washington from his post. Conway, too, made some efforts of a similar kind; but it may be regarded as certain, that the two former knew very well what was going on, and were prepared to profit by the result; and as to the latter, his am * Shortly after the surrender of Burgoyne, Gates took occasion to hold with Morgan a private conversation. In the course of this he told him, confidentially, that the main army was exceedingly dissatisfied with the conduct of General Washington, that the reputation of that officer was rapidly declining, and that several officers, of great worth, threatened to resign, unless a change was produced in that department. Colonel Morgan, fathoming in an instant the views of his commanding officer, sternly, and with honest indignation, replied, "Sir, I have one favor to ask. Never again mention to me this hateful subject; under no other man but General Washington, as commander-inchief, will I ever serve." From that time Gates treated Morgan with marked coldness and neglect; and in the official account of the surrender of Burgoyne, did not even mention Morgan's name, although that distinguished officer's services were well and widely known to the army and the country. See Graham's "Life of General Morgan," pp. 172, 173. |