S. H. Emanuel, for the appellant. The county court judge was wrong. There must be an express authority to create a lien: Buxton v. Baughan. (1) No such authority can be implied from the hire-purchase agreement. The lien was only good as against Robertson, and had no validity as against the plaintiff. E. Grimwood Mears, for the respondent. The county court judge was right. Robertson was lawfully in possession of the dogcart when he sent it to the defendant to be repaired. By the terms of the hire-purchase agreement he was bound to preserve it from injury, and he therefore had authority from the plaintiff to get it repaired when repairs were necessary. It is part of the reasonable user of the hired chattel: Singer Manufacturing Co. v. London and South Western Ry. Co. (2) He created a lien, not only as against himself, but as against the plaintiff. A lien may be created without any express words: Weldon v. Gould. (3) Emanuel replied. LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. This case raises an important point, and one on which there is not much direct authority. I am rather surprised indeed that there is not more, but probably hire-purchase agreements were not so common formerly as they are now. I think that the county court judge has come to a right conclusion. The real question that we have to decide is that stated by Alderson B. in Buxton v. Baughan (1), namely, whether the man who made the bargain with the repairer had authority from the plaintiff to make such a bargain. There is no doubt that Robertson made the bargain that the trap should be repaired by the defendant. The hire-purchase agreement expressly says that Robertson is "to keep and preserve the said dogcart from injury (damage by fire included)." No doubt there might be some circumstances in which Robertson would not be responsible to the plaintiff under this clause, but it is not necessary for us now to consider the exact extent of Robertson's responsibility thereunder. The clause does give Robertson (1) (1834) 6 C. & P. 674; 40 R. R. 842. (2) [1894] 1 Q. B. 833. (3) (1801) 3 Esp. 268; 6 R. R. 832. 1904 KEENE V. THOMAS. 1904 KEENE v. THOMAS. Lord Alverstone authority to take care of the cart and to keep it in proper order, and that in my opinion implies an authority on the plaintiff's behalf to get the trap repaired if it needed repair, as it cannot be contended that Robertson was bound to do the repairs with his own hands. The case of Buxton v. Baughan (1) is not an authority in favour of the plaintiff. The facts there were not the same. In that case Alderson B. said: "If you trust your goods into a man's possession, and he makes a bargain about them without your authority, you are not bound by that bargain, and may reclaim the goods. . . . . A man has no right to keep my property, and charge for the standing of it, unless there was a previous bargain between him and me, or between him and some agent authorized by me"; and he held there on the facts in that case that there was no such authority. The principle laid down by Collins J. in the case of Singer Manufacturing Co. v. London and South Western Ry. Co. (2) goes a long way to support the proposition that the hirer is entitled to use the hired chattel for all reasonable purposes, and in my opinion in this case the hirer of the chattel having undertaken to keep it in repair, and having at any rate a duty to take care of it, and having employed the defendant to repair it, has created a lien in respect of the proper cost of the repairs, not only against himself, but also against the plaintiff, the owner of the trap. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. KENNEDY and RIDLEY JJ. concurred. Appeal dismissed. Solicitor for appellant: P. J. Nicholls, for Hallett & Martin, Southampton. Solicitors for respondent: Speechly, Mumford, Rodgers & Craig, for Lamport, Bassitt & Hiscock, Newport, Isle of Wight. (2) [1894] 1 Q. B. 833. (1) 6 C. & P. 674; 40 R. R. 842. A. P. P. K. ASH, APPELLANT v. NICHOLL, RESPONDENT. COX, APPELLANT v. MERRIMAN, RESPONDENT. Parliament Franchise Qualification Non-payment of Rate- Passive Resister-Representation of the People Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102), s. 3, sub-ss. 3, 4—Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), 8. 9, sub-s. 2 (d), (e). A person who on or before July 20 in any year has not paid the whole of the rates assessed upon him as poor-rate in respect of the qualifying property up to the preceding January 5 is not entitled to be on the parliamentary or burgess list of voters. ASH v. NICHOLL. CASE stated by the revising barrister for the borough of Scarborough. The facts of the case were as follows: "The borough of Scarborough is a parliamentary and a municipal borough, and has a borough fund for which a borough rate is levied. "A poor-rate for the said borough for the year 1903-4 had been duly made and signed by the overseers, and had been duly signed by the justices on April 24, 1903. A demand note for payment of the said poor-rate had been duly made upon the appellant. "The said poor-rate included among other charges an education rate of 1d. in the pound and a burial rate of 1d. in the pound. "No separate rate had been levied for the education rate under s. 18 of the Education Act, 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. 42), and no separate rate had been levied for the burial rate under s. 1 of the Burial Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 64). "The said education rate and the said burial rate were not collected with the poor-rate for the sake of convenience. “The name of the appellant had been omitted by the overseers from the list of inhabitant householders on the ground that the poor-rate on the qualifying property, due on January 5, 1904, had not been fully paid on or before July 20, 1904. 1904 Nov. 18. 1904 ASH v. NICHOLL. "On or before July 20, 1904, the other ordinary occupiers, with the exception of the appellant and thirty-nine other persons, all of whom were known by the name of 'passive resisters,' had bonâ fide paid all poor-rates that had become MERRIMAN. payable by them in respect of the premises occupied by them up to the preceding January 5, 1904. Cox V. "The inhabitant householders list is made out in three divisions, carrying the following franchises : "I. Both Parliamentary and Burgess. "II. Parliamentary only, and "III. Burgess only. "It was admitted that the appellant had refused to pay and had not paid that portion of the poor-rate levied for the purposes of education in the said borough, and that the amount of 1s. 6d. was due thereon on January 5, 1904, and had not been fully paid on or before July 20, 1904. "Thirty-nine other persons, whose names and qualifications are set out in a schedule to the case, claimed to be inserted in the said list of inhabitant householders under similar circumstances. "Three points of law were taken : "A. That the education rate was not a poor-rate, and that non-payment of poor-rate alone and of no other rates disqualified an inhabitant householder in a parliamentary and municipal borough from being inserted in Division I. of the list of voters. "B. That the education rate was not a borough rate for the purposes of the Registration Acts. "C. That non-payment of the burial rate did not disqualify an inhabitant householder in a parliamentary and municipal borough from being inserted in Division I. of the list of voters. "A. On the first point I decided that the education rate was chargeable upon the poor-rate according to law, that it formed part of the poor-rate, and that the said poor-rate as made and demanded was one rate and indivisible. 'Poor-rate' is defined in s. 20 of the Poor Rate Assessment Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41) in these words: 'Poor-rate shall mean the assessment for the relief of the poor and for the other purposes chargeable thereon according to law'-clearly indicating that there may be poor-rates other than those to be expended simply for the relief of the poor. "Statutes dealing with education point to the conclusion that the education rate is part of the poor-rate. "By s. 18 of the Education Act, 1902, the expenses of the council of an urban district other than a borough are to be raised in the manner provided by s. 33 of the Elementary Education Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 79)—that is, they are to be paid out of a fund to be raised out of the poor-rates for the parish or parishes for which the committee of management act; and as to a borough, by the same section (18) of the Education Act, 1902, the expenses are to be paid out of the borough fund or rate, and by s. 145 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50) the council of a borough has power to order a parish within the borough to pay its contribution to the borough rate out of the poor-rate. "I further decided that in a parliamentary and municipal borough an unpaid poor-rate was not the only disqualifying rate; that payment on or before July 20, 1904, of all borough rates as well as poor-rates due on on January 5, 1904, was essential to registration in Division I. of the said list of inhabitant householders as to the parliamentary franchise by s. 3, sub-ss. 3, 4, of the Representation of the People Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102), and as to the burgess franchise by s. 9, sub-s. 2, (d), (e), of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882; and I also decided that these disqualifications operated respectively in regard to the insertion of the name of the appellant either in Division II. or in Division III. "B. On the second point I decided that the education rate was a borough rate payable out of the borough fund for the purposes of the Registration Acts. "The point seemed to me unarguable; having regard to s. 18 of the Education Act, 1902, the words 'the expenses under the Act shall be paid out of the borough fund or rate' seem to me to admit of no other construction. "C. On the third point it was contended that by s. 1 of the Burial Act, 1860, the burial rate was levied as a separate rate, VOL. I. 1905. M 2 1904 ASH v. NICHOLL. Cox v. MERRIMAN. |