to the great banking institutions, whose duty it is said to be "to step into the breach when a grave danger threatens to bring about a general depreciation which, according to every prospect, is quite without any reason. The power of capital should by its attitude prove both to buyers and to the whole market itself what a poor counselor pessimism makes in bad times." The Montags-Revue says: The question whether or to what extent the complicity of official Serbia in the tragedy of Serajevo can be shown, is one that can not yet be conclusively answered. But it is certain that the events and information of the last few days disclose the whole foolhardiness and effrontery of the Serbian Austrophobia. It will be worthy of approval, if every precipitate action, every giving way to temperamental impulses can be avoided while our Government is coming to its conclusions. Public feeling must also remain quiet-even if diplomatic differences over the tragedy at Serajevo should take the same course as earlier discussions, in which official Serbia first sneered at us with insipid denials, and finally made promises to us which there was not for one moment any serious intention of keeping. No one among us can be so naive as to expect concrete results from an inquiry into the question of the murderers' accomplices instituted at Belgrade. Even the agreement of the Belgrade Cabinet to a demand for the formal disavowing of the Greater-Serbia propaganda, or to that for the future suppression of this movement would in itself be a diplomatic success of very slight comprehensible value. Only deeds will be able to prove that under the weight of an international verdict, the authorities at Belgrade will adapt themselves to a reversal of policy that will make an actual clarification of their relation to Austria-Hungary possible. Since the murder at Serajevo, the relations of Austria-Hungary to Serbia can only be determined and regulated on the basis of the most dispassionate realism. There are decisions to be made at Belgrade the effects of which will reach far beyond the objective consideration of a highly serious controversy. The affair is one which involves a final test of the common sense and insight of the national leaders of Serbia. If the test fails, the official policy of the Monarchy would lose an indispensable support by clinging to the methods made use of heretofore. For the people of Austria-Hungary, it would be unmistakable. VON TSCHIRSCHKY. No. 42 The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office1 Telegram 5. FIUGGI FONTE, July 14, 1914.2 While Marquis di San Giuliano is still asserting that the reports from the Italian Ambassador at Vienna relating to Serbia do not sound pessimistic, he has, nevertheless, sought the opinion of Mr. Fusinato, expert in international law, about the international legal status, and tells me that according to the Italian interpretation, 1 From the decodification. Filed at Fiuggi Fonte at 2.04 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 5.46 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 14, p.m. With the omission of the sentences "According Berlin," and "Austrian action," and with the addition of detailed explanations by Jagow, it was communicated on the 15th of July to the Ambassador at Vienna (see No. 46). a government can only be held to account for crimes against general law, and not for political propaganda, if this propaganda does not find expression in action. He fears, therefore, that Italy would not be able to support the Austrian accusation without setting itself in opposition to the deep-seated convictions of the Italian people and to liberal principles. I replied that the first thing to do was to await the Austrian accusation and see what it consisted of, but that, if a conflict should result, juridical questions would no longer be matters of concern, while political questions would be. Marquis di San Giuliano, however, insisted that the Italian Government could never take up arms against the principle of nationality. Minister is apparently trying to prepare us for the realization that, in case of further complications, he will no longer be able to stand by Austria. Austrian Government will have to reckon with this circumstance. According to my instructions I have not as yet initiated Marquis di San Giuliano into the conferences between Vienna and Berlin. Minister told me that Russia had been advising Belgrade to give way; it would be a good thing if all governments should follow this example. Austrian Ambassador tells me quite confidentially that Vienna is determined on decisive action.) No. 43 FLOTOW. Telegram 129. The Ambassador at London to the Foreign Office LONDON, July 14, 1914.3 I have already attempted to get cautiously and confidentially into touch with public feeling in the manner suggested, but in view of the well-known independence of the press here, I feel the assurance of but little result from that sort of influence. To brand the entire Serbian nation as a race of rascals and murderers, and thus to deprive it, as the Lokalanzeiger is endeavoring to do, of the sympathy of civilized Europe, presents difficulties; it is still more difficult to place the Serbs on the same level with the Arabs in Egypt and in Morocco or with the Indians in Mexico, as a high official personage has described them to the Vienna representative of the Daily Telegraph. It is much more to be expected that local sympathies here will turn instantly and impulsively to the Serbs just as soon as Austria takes to violence, and that the assassination of the heir to the throne, little enough liked here even now on account of his clerical tendencies, will be considered as being utilized merely as an excuse for injuring an inconvenient neighbor. The sympathies of Britain, and especially those of the Liberal Party, have almost always favored in Europe the principle of nationality in the struggles of the Italians against the Austrian, Papal or Bourbon domination, and during the Balkan crises have usually been on the side of the local Slavs. During the annexation crisis as well as at the time of the acute problems of last winter, English public opinion 1 See No. 64. 2 From the decodification. Filed at London July 14, 5.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 8.43 p.m.; receipt stamp: July 15, a.m. See No. 36. leaned toward the side of Serbia and Montenegro, and it would thus have been very difficult at that time to have induced England to agree to energetic proceedings against King Nicholas. No matter how fully the just and relentless punishment of the murderers might be understood and approved, just as little, I fear, would it be possible to capture public opinion in case the matter should be transferred to the political field and turned into a point of departure for military activities against a nation of criminals. In such an event the present Cabinet, already weakened by the effect of the internal crisis, would hardly prove able to support a policy contrary at once to the ethical sense of the nation and to the tastes of the (Liberal)1 Party." LICHNOWSKY. No. 44 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Rome and to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest3 Telegrams 4, 36. BERLIN, July 14, 1914. Should the outcome of the inquiry into the assassination at Serajevo cause Austria-Hungary to adopt severe measures against Serbia, we, like the rest of Europe, should be greatly interested in localizing any conflict that might eventually result. This would depend on public opinion throughout Europe making it possible for the various Governments to look on inactively while Austria and Serbia settled their difference. For this purpose it is necessary that the press in your locality should give space to the view that this conflict involves a matter which concerns only the two participants. Austria should not be blamed for placing herself in a position of defense against the continual menace to her existence contained in the harassing mischief-making of a neighboring country. The sympathies of the whole civilized world should be on her side in this struggle, as it is a struggle for the purpose of finally strangling a propaganda that does not even hesitate at assassination as a weapon of war, and that constitutes a stain upon European culture and an enduring menace to European peace by the unscrupulous and criminal manner in which it operates. Kindly use your influence to the best of your ability on the local press in line with these suggestions, carefully avoiding, however, in so doing, everything that might arouse the impression that we were instigating the Austrians to war. 1 "Liberal" lacking in the decodification, as the cipher group was unintelligible. 2 See No. 48. From the first draft. Copy in Radowitz's handwriting. Telegram to the Central Telegraph Office at 10.35 p.m. on July 14. See Nos. 47 and 54. JAGOW. No. 45 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors at Vienna For Your Excellency's confidential information. BERLIN, July 14, 1914.2 Count Szögyeny read to me yesterday a dispatch from Count Berchtold in which the latter inquired of Margrave Pallavicini whether in his opinion Turkey could be won over to a union with the Central Powers of Europe. The Ambassador replied approximately to the effect that it could not be denied that for the time being there seemed to be in Constantinople a certain inclination to turn toward Russia.] This tendency was even being strengthened by a lively distrust of Italy, caused by her aspirations in Asia Minor, which the Turks suspected. Turkey would be most likely to seek a support in Austria and the Triple Alliance if the Monarchy, by energetic and successful procedure against Serbia, should assure itself of a commanding position in the Balkans. In connection with this matter, Count Berchtold instructed Count Szögyeny to ask me whether in my opinion now was not the time to influence Turkey to conclude an agreement with the Central Powers. I replied that in my opinion, which was further shared by the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, Turkey could only be regarded as a passive factor for some years to come, on account of the poor state of her army. She would be entirely incapable of aggressive action against Russia. Furthermore, she would, should we make her the proposal to join our group, unquestionably make demands of us on her part. However, we could not guarantee her absolute protection against an attack of Russia on Armenia, for instance. I believed that in her present circumstances, Turkey could absolutely adopt no other attitude than that of balancing here and there between the Powers, or else of joining herself to the strongest and most successful group. If Roumania stood firmly by the Triple Alliance and if, perhaps, Bulgaria should also seek to connect herself with us, it would unquestionably exercise some influence on the attitude of Turkey. To take steps at Constantinople at present in the line of Count Berchtold's suggestion seemed to me to be pointless, if not-in view of the demands for a quid pro quo which we should have to expect and could not fulfil-very dubious. 1 From the draft in Jagow's handwriting. * Dispatched to Vienna on the 15th, to Constantinople on the 17th. JAGOW. No. 46 Confidential. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at Vienna1 BERLIN, July 15, 19142 The Imperial Ambassador at Rome telegraphs: "While Marquis di San Giuliano follow this example." Just as Italian public opinion is in general touched with Austrophobia, it has always proved itself up to the present time as Serbophile. So that there is no doubt in my mind that in case of an Austro-Serbian conflict, it would take a pronounced stand by the side of Serbia. Any territorial extension of the AustroHungarian Monarchy, even an extension of its influence in the Balkans, would absolutely horrify Italy, and would be regarded as damaging to Italy's position there. As the result of an optical illusion, the actually far greater Slavic menace is not visioned at all, in view of the mistakenly conceived danger from her neighbor, Austria. (Entirely apart from the fact that the policy of the Italian Government depends not immaterially on the expression of public opinion, the view mentioned above is entertained by the majority of Italian statesmen. Every time the threatening of Serbia by Austria came into question, I have noted an extraordinary nervousness in their manner. Should Italy take the part of Serbia, the Russian lust for strife would unquestionably be materially encouraged. Petersburg would count not only on the presumption that Italy would not fulfil the obligations of her alliance, but that she would turn directly against Austria wherever it was possible. A collapse of the Monarchy would of course also offer to Italy the prospect of winning various territories that she has long coveted. In my opinion, therefore, it is of the greatest importance that Vienna should come to some understanding with the Cabinet at Rome regarding its aims to be sought in Serbia in case of war, and should retain Italy on her side, or-as a conflict with Serbia alone would not mean a casus foederis-keep her strictly neutral. Italy has, according to her compact with Austria, a right to claim compensation for every change that takes place in the Balkans to the advantage of the Danube Monarchy. This, then, would constitute both the object and the bait of negotiations with Italy. According to our information, the cession of Valona for instance, would not be regarded at Rome as an acceptable compensation. In fact, Italy seems for the present to have abandoned her desire to fix herself firmly on the altera sponda of the Adriatic. As I may remark in strict confidence, the acquisition of the Trentino is probably the only thing that would be regarded as ample compensation by Italy. This morsel would truly be a dainty enough one to close the mouth even of the Austrophobic public opinion. That the surrender of an ancient portion of the territory of the Monarchy would be very hard to reconcile with the feelings of the rulers as well as of the people of Austria cannot be ignored. But on the other hand the question is, of what value is Italy's attitude to Austrian policy, what 1 From the original draft in Jagow's handwriting. 2 Sent to Vienna July 15. 'Here Flotow's telegram of the 14th of July (see No. 42) is included, with the omission of the sentences "According to my . . . and Berlin," and "Austrian Ambassador decisive action." |