Telegram (unnumbered). No. 546 The Czar to the Emperor1 HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, Berlin. PETERHOF, PALACE, August 1, 1914.2 I received your telegram. Understand you are obliged to mobilize but wish to have the same guaranty from you as I gave you, that these measures DO NOT mean war and that we shall continue negotiating for the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to all our hearts. Our long proved friendship must succeed, with God's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full of confidence await your answer. NICKY. No. 547 The Imperial Chancelor to the Ambassador at Constantinople 5 Telegram 296. BERLIN, August 1, 1914.* In case General Liman is convinced that Turkey will even now, in the event of war with Russia, take a stand for us actively and effectively, Your Excellency is authorized to close an alliance dating to 1918 with a clause providing for the possibility of extension. No. 548 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG. The Minister at Sofia to the Foreign Office" SOFIA, July 31, 1914.8 Telegram 41. Radoslavoff and Tontschew have jointly assured me that there exist no inimical intentions toward Roumania, and that no military measures will be taken on the Roumanian border. They had this announced at Bucharest yesterday. Should it not prove possible to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict, Bulgaria will observe a friendly attitude toward Roumania, and will renounce all intentions relative to the eventual regaining of the Dobrudja provided that Roumania will place no obstacles in the way of Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia. 1 From the copy [in English] of the Palace telegraph office. Cf. German White Book of May, 1915, p. 10. 2 Filed in Peterhof, Palace, 2.06 p.m.; arrived at the Palace telegraph office in Berlin at 2.05 p.m.; receipt stamp of the Foreign Office: August 1. 4 See No. 600. 3 See No. 480. Filed in Sofia July 31 at 7.10 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.14 p.m. on August 1; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated August I to the General Staff, Ministry of War, Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Office; sent by messengers at 9.40 p.m. Paragraph "Radoslavoff in Macedonia" telegraphed on August I to the Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest "for his information and any use that may appear appropriate"; to the Central Telegraph Office at 9.20 p.m. Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest reports that Russian Emperor has made telegraphic request for King Carol's support toward the maintenance of peace. MICHAHELLES. No. 549 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia 1 Telegram 43. BERLIN, August 1, 1914.2 We are advocating at Vienna an immediate understanding with Bulgaria concerning her attitude in the threatening European war. Please support emphatically any step of your Austrian colleague to this end. Wire report.3 No. 550 The Ambassador at Rome to the Foreign Office JAGOW. Telegram 166. ROME, August 1, 1914.5 According to information it is true that a Roumanian inquiry about military measures has been received here. But they have so far avoided making any answer to it here. San Giuliano takes the stand that direct assistance in the Austrian procedure against Serbia is as impossible for Roumania as for Italy. No. 551 FLOTOW. Telegram 210. PETERSBURG, August 1, 1914." Military attaché reports, also for the General Staff, Grand Duchy of Finland is placed under martial law. Maintenance of peace and order turned over to the commander in chief of the military district of Petersburg. Rumor in various quarters, uncorroborated, that a portion of the Guard is to be transported to Finland.8 POURTALÈS. 5 Filed in Rome at 12.55 p.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.25 p.m.; receipt stamp of the office: August 1, p.m. Copy of "According to information to it here was communicated to the General Staff on the 2d of August, after minor alterations had been effected. See No. 519. 6 From the decodification. "Filed in Petersburg at 11.35 a.m.; arrived at the Foreign Office at 3.25 p.m.; receipt stamp: August 1, p.m. Communicated on August I to the General Staff, Ministry of War, Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Office; dispatched by messengers at 4.30 p.m. See to the contrary No. 521. No. 552 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Stockholm 1 Telegram 25. For confidential use. 1 BERLIN, August 1, 1914.2 According to reports from St. Petersburg, Russia intends in the event of war against Austria and ourselves to leave Finland to herself, probably with the 22d Army Corps under Commander in Chief Ivanoff. JAGOW. 4 No. 553 From the protocol of the twenty-seventh session of the Federal Council (SECTION 664) PRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION The Chairman 5 announced: Contrary to our desire and despite all our efforts, unless God performs a miracle at the eleventh hour, a crisis greater than ever was seen before, is breaking upon the peace of Europe and Germany. The cause is well known to the high and federated Governments. On the twenty-eighth of June of this year the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife were murdered. The investigation developed that the Greater-Serbia movement, of many years' standing, the object of which is the undermining of the existence of Austria-Hungary, had found its expression in the crime of Serajevo. It was not only the right but the duty of Austria-Hungary to take steps against this movement. The Emperor Franz Joseph has informed us of the steps to be taken. It is to our own interest that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy be kept powerful, that it shall not succumb in the struggle with the southern Slavs, over whom Russia believes herself able or compelled to act as protector. Should the Austrian nation be destroyed, a blow would at the same time be struck at the roots of the German Empire. It is from this view-point that the policy which we have pursued for thirty years has taken its guidance. For that reason, when AustriaHungary informed us that she was forced to take steps, we replied: "Concerning what you must do, we venture to express no judgment; it is not our affair. But it goes without saying that should an emergency of the alliance arise, we shall stand faithfully at your side." Austria's ultimatum to Serbia and Serbia's reply are well known. In her reply, Serbia complied in certain respects with the Austrian demands, but made many of her agreements strongly conditional, and refused some important demands. The historical experiences that Austria has had with Serbia have shown that Serbia's bare promises are of no value, and that, on the other hand, actual guaranties must be given. The conflict which thereupon broke out between Austria and Serbia we wished to localize. We supported this intention from the beginning, before all cabinets. We were in agreement with all of them, with the exception of Russia's, which declared from the beginning that it regarded it as impossible that Austria and Serbia should fight their fight out alone. Thus the state of affairs became more acute, although England was willing to mediate, in 1 From the original. Draft in Bergen's handwriting. 2 To the Central Telegraph Office at 3.40 p.m. • Done at Berlin, August 1, 1914. See No. 521. i. e., the Imperial Chancelor. order that an Austro-Russian conflict should not develop from the AustroSerbian quarrel. During this period Russia entered upon secret military preparations which at first were directed against Austria-Hungary. During these preparations Russia approached us and asked that we should undertake mediation at Vienna. This occurred by means of a telegram from the Czar to the Emperor. I will only touch briefly on the successive phases of the development of this action, as I have already gone into the preliminary history of the present crisis in a communication in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. In this telegram the Czar begged the Emperor in urgent phrases, appealing to our traditional friendship, to use his influence to persuade Austria-Hungary not to go too far with her demands. Thereupon His Majesty, although we ever took the view that the conflict between Austria and Serbia concerned in every way only those two nations, at once declared his willingness to undertake the rôle of mediator, in order to preserve the peace of Europe, and informed the Czar of this fact on the very same day. During this time the Russian Government was assuring us, with the most solemn professions, that no military measures of any sort were being undertaken against us. Thereupon we inaugurated the mediation action at Vienna; it was based upon the following facts and assumptions: Austria-Hungary had repeatedly declared at Petersburg that she intended to make no territorial acquisitions in Serbia, that her object was far more to secure peace for herself from the Greater-Serbian agitations. From this we evolved the consequent proposition that Austria be advised that she should, if this was her point of view, state it, once more, solemnly at Petersburg, and, in accordance with it, define the purpose of her military procedure as that of wishing to secure, by the occupation of portions of Serbian territory, a guaranty for the fulfilment of her demands. The mediation proposals of England, which we transmitted to the Austrian Government with the request to give them earnest consideration, were much along the same lines. During these transactions, we were taken by surprise on the thirtieth of July by the mobilization of the Russian corps against Austria-Hungary. The Emperor at once pointed out in a telegram to the Czar the fact that the mediation action was made difficult, if not impossible, by these measures; for it was perfectly plain that if Russia mobilized against Austria-Hungary, it would become extremely difficult for Germany to give advice as a mediator to the Austro-Hungarian Government. In spite of this, we continued with our mediation action. Yesterday it was to be decided whether or not Vienna should approach Russia along the lines of our or of the English proposal. In any event, Austria-Hungary had taken up again, at our instigation, the direct transactions with Russia, which had been broken off. Thus an understanding was being considered at Vienna yesterday, and, in connection with the matter, we had gone to the utmost limit of the proposals which may be made to a Great Power, and an allied Great Power at that. We did this in the pursuit of the peace policy which we have followed for forty-three years. And at this moment Russia mobilized her entire military forces on land and sea. Only two days before, the solemn assurance had been given us that absolutely no measures were being taken against us. Actually, however, reports concerning such measures had been continually arriving. A general mobilization we can only accept as a hostile act directed against us. It places us in a position from which we can escape only by action, unless we are willing to sacrifice our honor and our security. It is nothing less than a challenge, when mobilization is directed against us while we are engaged in mediation. Russia is attempting to so represent matters that no hostile action against us will be per ceived in this mobilization. Should we commit ourselves to this view, we should be transgressing against the safety of our fatherland. Germany has been watching with an astonishing, not to say an almost inexcusable, calmness the preparations for war in Russia and France, which, if they did not actually constitute mobilization themselves, were nevertheless calculated to expedite it tremendously. By so doing we have become subject to the danger of losing the advantage of the start which lies in the possibility of the more rapid mobilization of our troops; we risked the danger of finding both on our eastern and western borders, within a short period of time, an army equipped for war and ready to strike; we no longer dared to remain inactive, unless Prussian territory in the east was to be occupied, and at the same time, the crown lands in the west, imperiled. Thus we have been obliged to direct an ultimatum against the mobilization in Russia, requiring the mobilization to be suspended within twelve hours; otherwise we should have to take corresponding steps ourselves: and we added that there existed no doubt with us as to what mobilization meant. In this situation it was not to be avoided, that His Majesty should, yesterday, declare a state of threatening danger of war. Simultaneously we inquired of France, while laying before her our point of view, what the attitude of France would be in the case of a Russo-German war. We attached to the ultimatum to Russia a very brief respite because our own safety did not permit of allowing a further postponement of military preparations. The reply was due today at twelve o'clock noon. I do not yet know what it is. In view of the congestion of the telegraph system, I shall probably have to wait several hours to find out. But I am afraid that Russia will not comply with our demands. The French reply is due at one o'clock in the afternoon. We do not know the exact terms of the alliance agreement between France and Russia. But from all that is known to us of this treaty, we are compelled to fear that France will not be able to avoid active participation on the side of Russia. If the Russian reply should prove unsatisfactory and France does not make a plain and unconditional declaration of neutrality-under the circumstances we must absolutely insist on a thoroughly reliable declaration of neutrality by France-the Emperor will declare to the Russian Government that he is forced to consider himself to be in a state of war with Russia, provoked by Russia herself; and to France he will state that we are at war with Russia, and, as France will not guarantee her neutrality, he must assume that we are at war with France also. I am still forced to make these statements as conditional, as I do not know what the replies will be. I wanted to make these explanations to the Federal Council now, however, in order to lose no more time. I hope that the Federal Council has gained from my exposition the conviction that Germany has been working up to the last moment for the maintenance of peace, along the lines of her ever-pursued peace policy. But the provocation we have received from Russia is impossible for us to bear, if we are not to abdicate as one of the Great Powers of Europe. In doing as we do, we shall have, on our part also, to take the consequences of the alliance existing between Russia and France. It is with a good and a clear conscience that I can ask the consent of the high and federated Governments to the measures which I have just laid before you. We did not wish the war; it was forced upon us. The war will demand from the German people the most extreme sacrifice that has ever been demanded from them. We rely, however, on the help of God, as we did not bring about the war, but wished to prevent it, and will go bravely and determinedly into the struggle, which we must wage for the honor, the freedom and the power of the German Empire. |