NUMBER OF TRAINED SOLDIERS AVAILABLE IN SEVEN OF THE GREAT NATIONS, BY USE OF RESERVES, SHOWING ALSO THE NUMBER ASKED FOR BY GENERAL STAFF U. S. A., AND NUMBER ACTUALLY AVAILABLE IN U. S.

Russia-5,000,000

Germany-4,610,000

France-3,000,000

Austria-Hungary-1,800,000

Japan-1,300,000

England-1,000,000

U. S. Asked by General Staff-550,000

U. S. Actual-150,000

NOTE: Latest reports indicate even
larger forces in Russia and France.

PLATE NO. 10

CHAPTER XII

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NAVAL BOARD

OUR navy, though at present ranking third and

not, like the army, last among the military forces of the great powers, is, nevertheless, not what it should be at the present time in point of strength. It is not, moreover, the present, as much as the future condition of our navy which alarms the naval authorities. Like the recent report on the land forces by the General Staff of the army, the General Board of the navy, about ten years ago, made a report on the necessities of that service, and, unfortunately, like the army report, the advice of the naval experts received but little attention.

In considering our navy's needs we must consider that we have, unlike other great powers, two great coast lines, of our nation proper, with great cities and vast wealth bordering thereon. This nation is the only power on earth of which this is true. Even England with her vast colonial possessions has but a comparatively trivial and concentrated coast line of the kingdom proper to defend. The capture of England's greatest and most wealthy colony would be nothing as to the landing of a strong hostile force near London, nor would the

loss of the Philippines compare with the conquest of our Pacific Coast. Thus it is that a nation having two immense coast lines has additional need of a strong fleet, even if it is to be used only for defense, which is a serious error in naval warfare. A navy should be free to seek and destroy the enemy. By aggressive offensive action, if successful, it can quickly end a war; by defensive action it can but delay it.

On our navy depends much of the success of our foreign policies. We could not transport troops (if we had them) over any portion of the seas, unless our navy controlled those seas. Therefore our defense of the Philippines, Alaska, Oahu, the Panama Canal, Porto Rico, etc., depends greatly upon the navy. The Monroe Doctrine is largely as strong as the navy." The open door in China, the neutrality of the Panama Canal, the protection of our citizens abroad, and all of the other foreign policies of the United States could not be enforced by the biggest army in the world were it confined to the territory of the forty-eight states, and unable to move on the sea. An army insures only the territory which it can control, and it cannot control overseas territory without the aid of a navy. Dislike it as we may, it may some day be desirable to enforce our views of right and wrong on some overseas nation. The navy, without the army, is by no means a capable weapon for such an end; but similarly, the

army without the navy is most ineffective. It is a proper understanding of the coordinate relation of these forces that will bring success.

The General Board of the navy proposed that we should build two battleships per year, and had this plan been carried out, it would have called for a total of forty-eight capital ships in 1920, in addition to four torpedo boat destroyers for each battleship. This program, however, has not been followed, and the result is that in order to make up for the deficiencies of the past, the General Board is now asking four ships quite regularly. It is thus that parsimony in regard to the navy has been responsible for the seemingly large demands of the General Board, which never intended originally to ask for anything but a standard building program of two ships per year. It is our failure to make these appropriations that has placed the United States in third place in naval power instead of in its former position as second among the great navies. Should we continue our so-called economy in this respect, France, Japan, and Russia will have superior navies within a few years, and the United States will then drop to sixth place. Most of these nations have regular building programs, which they follow out; and, through systematic expenditures, they confine their appropriations within any one year to reasonable amounts, instead of economizing on one occasion and being compelled to forfeit their standing, or to spend vast