disputes with any nation, a sudden attempt might be made to destroy the canal, by stealth or by force, previous to any declaration of hostilities, or diplomatic rupture that would place us on our guard. The Japanese action in the recent war with Russia affords an excellent example of this possibility.

Captain Harry S. Knapp, U. S. N., in a paper in the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, concludes that without a canal the navy on each ocean should be capable of meeting the strongest probable opponent on that ocean. Such a navy he calls a "Two Ocean Standard; " the one fleet called the "Standard Atlantic Fleet" and the other the "Standard Pacific Fleet." Captain Knapp, after fully expounding the facts bearing upon the question, in which the matter of steaming distance, time, and available force figure largely, concludes:

When the canal is finished, our policy should be to have eventually, and as soon as possible, a total strength not less than that of the Standard Atlantic Fleet plus three-quarters that of the Standard Pacific Fleet. These so-called "standard" fleets are not fixed quantities, but will vary from year to year as foreign nations increase their own naval strength. The policy itself can, however, be fixed, and some policy should be established.

This seems not unreasonable, yet it is more than the General Board of the navy has yet asked for. Our navy or rather the modern navy, which

has come into existence after we lost our position as a commercial maritime power -has not had a real test against a first-class power. As with the army, we see in victory only excellence on our part, and overlook weakness on the part of our enemy. The easy naval victories of the Spanish War are responsible for the general opinion that the modern United States Navy is invincible.

Actually, however, the Spanish navy was unfit for action with a force of its own size. When we fought it we outnumbered it. The Spanish ships were poorly provisioned, short of ammunition, their bottoms were foul, and many of their guns useless. With such conditions it was but little credit to the American navy to win a victory and but little reflection on the bravery or skill of the Spaniards to lose. Our credit was that of doing well our part - almost as if simply practicing - against an enemy which could do but little to hinder us.

Said Admiral Cervera, speaking of his squadron, when ordered to sail for the West Indies to meet the American fleet:

It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return; while if it should remain in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation. The Colon does not yet have her

big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, with the exception of about three hundred rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the Vizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the Colon cannot be recharged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo. But I will trouble

As the act has been con

I will try to sail tomorrow. summated I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken! conscience I go to the sacrifice.†

With a clear

Captain Villaamil, of the Spanish Navy, who was second in command, and who was killed in the naval battle of Santiago, made the following remarks in a private telegram sent to the Spanish premier:

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you should know, through a friend that does not fear censure, that while as seamen we are all ready to meet an honorable death in the fulfillment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless in terminating the war if the representations repeatedly made by the Admiral to the Minister of Marine are not taken into consideration.*

* The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba, by Colonel H. H. Sargent, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

† Ibid.

We should by no means consider our navy · ship for ship or man for man as necessarily superior to that of any other first-class power. It is positively not an invincible force. Unless we so view it and heed the General Board of the navy we will some day meet disaster on the sea which will only be exceeded by the disaster on land that will follow neglect to consider the reasonable suggestions of the General Staff of the army.

WE

CHAPTER XIII

DEMAGOGUE VERSUS STATESMAN

E ARE not, in this work, expressing the theories of any one man, nor of any set of men; but we endeavor to express facts as they have been determined to exist by all those who actually make a thorough study of war, its possibilities, probabilities, and the consequent needs of the United States. The asininity of those who first form pacifist and antimilitarist opinions and then set out to seek some evidence which will corroborate their ideas, is, unfortunately, equaled by the money and resources which are at the disposal of these men, in order that they may spread broadcast their propaganda. Equally unfortunately, armies and navies afford an excellent chance for politicians to make a reputation for economy without, in most cases, appearing parsimonious to the direct interests of those constituents who are always so dearly thought of, and an equal opportunity is afforded by the military forces for eloquent and impressive oratory, which will inflame the country with the great, but economic, patriotism of their representatives.

There is no attempt on the part of the majority