pense disproportionate with the wealth of our nation.

We may conclude that, as long as wars are probable, military forces are a reasonable insurance.

CHAPTER II

A LESS EXPENSIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR TRAINED FORCES

IN

N THE foregoing chapter it has been assumed that wars are still possible, if not probable. For the present we will continue the assumption that nations will continue to resort to force from time to time, as occasion may offer or seem to offer a sufficient casus belli. The correctness of this assumption will be discussed in full in a further chapter. We have seen that under the above assumption military force is a comparatively inexpensive protection for the nation. To return, however, to our business comparison, our fourth point for determination is, in effect, Is there a cheaper protection that would be just as effective? In other words, can we find a less expensive but equally good insurance against defeat in war?

It is true that the cost of military force is small compared with other expenditures of the American nation. Yet this is no reason for spending even a comparatively small sum if we can attain the same results at less cost.

The favorite substitute for trained military forces, in so far as the United States is concerned,

is an "aroused citizenship "the substitution of an army of untrained and inexperienced volunteers for the trained soldier. If this substitution is "just as good," then, as it is admittedly cheaper during peace, it is the more desirable form of defense.

The United States has, throughout its history, always experimented with the volunteer army, or its equivalent, the untrained militia. This country, better than any other, affords proof that the substitution of citizens en masse for a trained soldier is not an economy but a tremendous expense. The school boy and the man growing from such a boy would state that the successes of this country are conclusive proof of the practicability of the volunteer system. Such has been the American citizens' interpretation of the wars of the United States, their battles and the results thereof, as these things are shown in the historical textbooks used in our schools and colleges. It is thus that the American citizen, attributing false efficiency to the volunteer of the past, becomes converted to a belief that even the present small army, navy, and national guard are an unnecessary expense, and might well be greatly reduced, if not abolished. History, they believe, has shown the practical efficiency of the volunteer.

It is not our purpose to discuss the military needs of the United States at this point. We merely desire to show that the conclusions of those who believe in the efficiency of the volunteer are formed

on a totally erroneous presentation of the facts of history concerned.

At one time, it is true, armies fought with the same weapons with which the members thereof hunted, worked, and secured their dinner. Every man was familiar with the soldier's weapon, and there were as many, and more, of such weapons as there were men in the land. Even then, however, those who fought as unorganized individuals were no match for those who were organized, disciplined, and, to some extent, trained. Gradually as civilization progressed, the art of war, like all other arts and sciences, became one of specialization. Less and less did the weapon of the soldier resemble the tools or the arms of the civilian, until today the soldier's weapons are strange implements to all other trades and professions. Witness the early club, the battle axe, the bow and arrow, useful and used alike in domestic affairs and war. Witness the muzzle loading flint locks of the Colonial Wars and the Revolution an implement hanging on every man's wall, used in the protection of the home against beast and man, for support and for subsistence and witness the modern United States magazine rifle, model 1903, a high-powered weapon throwing a bullet over three miles, but with which the average civilian can hardly hit a six foot target 200 yards off. Again, witness the complex modern three-inch field piece of our field artillery, or the big caliber

rifles of our coast artillery and navy, both requiring the most skillful preparation in various sciences and in the art of their use. No civilian can learn. to use these weapons in a short time, and no untrained mob as a mass of such civilians would be, can compete with any army previously trained, disciplined, and practiced in the use of modern implements of war.

Not only have the weapons of the modern soldier progressed in a manner which makes their effective use by civilians impossible, but the entire science of warfare has advanced to a degree that makes a lifetime of study insufficient for a complete mastery. No modern soldier will seriously claim that he has mastered the intricacies of this most complex science. Yet an officer of the United States Army studies four years at the United States Military Academy at West Point; graduating he joins his regiment and studies at the Garrison Schools; presumably, he continues his study in order to pass the examinations required for each promotion, and probably he is detailed at one of the Service Schools, including The Army School of the Line, The Army Staff College, The Army Signal School, The Army Field Engineer School at Fort Leavenworth, The Coast Artillery School at Fort Monroe, The Engineer School, Washington Barracks, D. C., The Army Medical School at Washington, D. C., The School of Fire for Field Artillery, or the School of Musketry at