Opinion of the Court.

241 U.S.

conflict with the general commercial rule constituted a direct burden on interstate commerce and was therefore void need not now be considered. This is so because irrespective of that question and indeed without stopping to consider the general provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce it is not disputable that what is known as the Carmack Amendment to the Act to Regulate Commerce (act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, §7, 34 Stat. 593) was an assertion of the power of Congress over the subject of interstate shipments, the duty to issue bills of lading and the responsibilities thereunder, which in the nature of things excluded state action. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 505-506; Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U. S. 657, 671-672; Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 110; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173, 180; Cleveland & St. Louis Ry. v. Dettlebach, 239 U. S. 588; Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., ante, p. 190.

Indeed in the argument it is frankly conceded that as the subject of a carrier's liability for loss or damage to goods moving in interstate commerce under a bill of lading is embraced by the Carmack Amendment, state legislation on that subject has been excluded. It is insisted, however, that this does not exclude liability for error in the bill of lading purporting to cover an interstate shipment because "Congress has legislated relative to the one, but not relative to the other." But this ignores the view expressly pointed out in the previous decisions dealing with the Carmack Amendment that its prime object was to bring about a uniform rule of responsibility as to interstate commerce and interstate commerce bills of lading,-a purpose which would be wholly frustrated if the proposition relied upon were upheld. The principal subject of responsibility embraced by the act of Congress carried with it necessarily the incidents thereto. See the subject aptly and clearly illustrated by St. Louis & San

Francisco R. R. v. Woodruff Mills, 105 Mississippi, 214, where a statute of the State of Mississippi accomplishing the very result applied by the court below was decided to be no longer applicable to interstate commerce because of the taking possession by Congress of the field by virtue of the amendment referred to.

As it follows from what we have said that the court below erred in applying the local law to the interstate commerce shipment under consideration, its judgment - must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

And it is so ordered.

UNITED STATES v. HEMMER.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 86. Submitted May 5, 1916.-Decided June 5, 1916.

Where there are no repealing words in a later act, a former act relating to the same or a similar subject is repealed only by implication; and repeal by implication is not favored.

Section 15 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 131, 18 Stat. 402, permit

ting Indians under specified conditions to make homestead entries of the public lands, was not repealed or superseded by the Act of July 4, 1884, c. 180, 23 Stat. 96, permitting Indians then located on the public lands to make such entries.

An Indian who made his homestead entry prior to passage of the act of 1884, but who did not make his final proof until thereafter held to have made such entry under the act of 1875, and not under the act of 1884, and the period of inalienability was limited to five years under the act of 1875, and not to twenty-five years under the act of 1884.

While Congress has power to, and may if so advised, exercise control over lands to which claims have attached under existing statutes,

Opinion of the Court.

241 U. S.

the rule has been established that such lands are not regarded as public lands under acts of Congress passed thereafter. Nothing in the legislative history of the act of July 4, 1884, indicates that it was passed as an amendment to the act of March 3, 1875, or that Congress deemed the earlier act did not sufficiently protect the Indians in their retention of homesteads entered thereunder. 204 Fed. Rep. 898, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the construction of statutes relating to the right of Indians to make homestead entries on the public lands, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Ernest Knaebel for the United States.

Mr. Lewis Benson and Mr. George Rice for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the

court.

This suit was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States, Eighth Judicial Circuit, District of South Dakota, Southern Division, by the United States to remove clouds from the title to certain described lands and to cancel certain instruments purporting to convey the lands and praying that a certain judgment against the lands be declared no lien thereon, the ground of suit being that the conveyances and the judgment were obtained in opposition to the restrictions upon the alienation or encumbrance of the lands imposed by Congress.

After issue joined and hearing had, the District Court, successor of the Circuit Court, entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill. 195 Fed. Rep. 790. The decree was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and the case remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the bill. 204 Fed. Rep. 898. This appeal was then prosecuted.

The facts are the following: One Henry H. Taylor,

known and designated sometimes as Henry Taylor, is and was during the times with which the suit is concerned a Sioux Indian of the full blood, belonging to and a member of the Santee Sioux Band of Indians and is not a member of and has never had any connection with the Winnebago Band of Indians.

On October 7, 1878, Taylor entered upon the lands as a homestead, they being part of the public domain and subject to entry under the homestead laws of the United States then in force. He established and continued his residence and made satisfactory proof of all facts required by law.

On June 6, 1890, a patent was issued to him which recited among other things that it was granted upon the express condition that the title conveyed thereby should not be subject to alienation or encumbrance either by voluntary conveyance or by judgment, decree or order of any court or subject to taxation of any character, but should remain inalienable and not subject to taxation for the period of twenty years from the date thereof, as provided by act of Congress approved January 18, 1881, c. 23, 21 Stat. 315. This act applied only to Winnebagoes.

Taylor continued to own the land until August 8, 1908, when he and his wife made a contract with J. E. Peart, one of the appellees, by which they agreed to convey the land to Peart in fee simple by warranty deed for the sum of $2,400, certain land to be accepted in payment of $550 of such consideration. Time was made the essence of the contract and it was made binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the parties.

September 8, 1908, Peart assigned the contract to William W. Fletcher, also one of the appellees herein. After this contract Taylor and wife took possession of the land taken in part payment of the consideration and Peart took possession of the homestead land and paid the consideration in full.

Taylor and his wife refused to convey the homestead land to either Peart or Fletcher, and the latter instituted suit against them to compel specific performance, which suit resulted in a decree compelling such performance, and a deed was executed to Fletcher by a commissioner appointed by the court.

February 5, 1909, Fletcher conveyed the land by warranty deed to Louis Hemmer who, in April, 1909, denied possession to Taylor, who attempted to remove with his family back on the land, and has since denied possession to him.

June 10, 1909, the United States issued a patent to Taylor which recited that he had established a homestead upon the land in conformity with the act of Congress of July 4, 1884 (hereinafter set out), and that therefore the United States, in consideration of the premises and in accordance with the provisions of said act of Congress, did and would hold the land (it was described) for the period of twenty-five years in trust for the sole use and benefit of Taylor, or, in case of his decease, of his widow and heirs, according to the laws of the State where the land was located, and at the expiration of that period would convey the same by patent to Taylor, or his widow and heirs, in fee, discharged of the trust and free of all charge or encumbrances whatsoever. It was declared that the patent was issued in lieu of one containing the twenty-year trust clause dated June 6, 1890, which had been canceled.

In 1894 and in every year since the county treasurer of Moody County (appellee Henderson), its auditor (appellee Hornby), and board of county commissioners have assessed the land for taxation and levied taxes against it and have caused it to be sold and are asserting the right to tax the same. The other appellees assert interest in the land under tax sales.

It will be observed that Taylor made his preliminary