filed its appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, who affirmed the action of the Architect.

Counsel intimates unfairness on the part of the Supervising Architect, but there is no just foundation for it; and, besides, there is no attempt to impugn the good faith of the Secretary of the Treasury who sustained the decision of the Architect, and the contract explicitly provides that "the decision of the Supervising Architect as to the proper interpretation of the drawings and specifications shall be final." If we may concede to appellant an ambiguity in the specifications arising from the use of the singular word "building" instead of the plural word "buildings" against the material conditions which appellant's officers had inspected and knew of and against as well the other parts of the specifications which among other things call for "rear walls" instead of a "rear wall," seemingly implying two buildings and not one only, at the utmost it could only be said that there was ground for dispute, and under the contract the decision of the Architect upon the dispute was final.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Syllabus.

241 U.S.

UNITED STATES v. JIN FUEY MOY..

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

No. 525. Argued December 7, 1915.-Decided June 5, 1916.

A statute must be so construed, if fairly possible, as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366. This court cannot assume to know judicially that no opium is produced in this country; nor is it warranted in so assuming when construing a statute itself purporting to deal with producers of that article. When Congress contemplates the production of an article within the United States, this court must construe the act on the hypothesis that such production takes place.

An attempt of Congress to make possession of an article in this case opium-produced in any of the States a crime, would raise the gravest question of power. United States v. De Witt, 9 Wall. 41. In construing a statute which calls itself a registration or taxing act and does not purport to be in execution of a treaty and which contains a provision not required by any treaty, a grave doubt arises whether such a statute is entitled to the supremacy claimed for treaties on the ground that it does in effect carry out existing treaty obligations on the general subject of both treaty and statute. While the Opium Registration Act of December 17, 1914, may have a moral end, as well as revenue, in view, this court, in view of the grave doubts as to its constitutionality except as a revenue measure, construes it as such.

Every question of construction is unique, and an argument that might prevail in one case may be inadequate in another.

Only definite words will warrant the conclusion that Congress intended to strain its powers, almost, if not quite, to the breaking point, to make a great proportion of citizens prima facie criminals by mere possession of an article.

The words "any person not registered" in § 8 of the Opium Registration Act of 1914 do not mean any person in the United States, but refer to the class dealt with by the statute-those required to register -and one not in that class is not subject to the penalties prescribed by the statute.

225 Fed. Rep. 1003, affirmed.

241 U. S.

Argument for the United States.

THE facts, which involve the construction and application of the act of December 17, 1914, relating to registration of, and tax on, persons producing and dealing in opium and other specified drugs, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Wallace, with whom Mr. William C. Herron was on the brief, for the United States: Section 8 of the act should not be restricted to those persons who are required to register and to pay the tax. United States v. Portale, 235 U. S. 27.

The decision of the court below goes only to the construction and not the constitutionality of the act; hence, the only question open on this writ of error is that of the construction of the act. United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72; United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370; United States v. Mescall, 215 U. S. 31; United States v. Portale, 235 U. S. 31; see also United States v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74; United States v. Blunt (Nor. Dist. Ill., not yet reported); United States v. Brown, 224 Fed. Rep. 135; United States v. Wilson, 225 Fed. Rep. 82; United States v. Woods, 224 Fed. Rep. 278.

The act is not exclusively a revenue measure, but is also one to comply with treaty obligations; see Treaty of 1912 and President's message of April 21, 1913.

The bill originated from the State, and not the Treasury, department.

The two acts of January 27, 1914, and this act were all enacted to comply with the treaty; see President's message of August 9, 1913. The Harrison Act was to cure conditions existing just before the passage of this bill.

The assertion that the acts were not passed pursuant to any treaty is erroneous as reports of committees show that purpose. Even without them, however, the court could not infer that revenue was the sole reason for the bill.

Argument for the United States.

241 U. 8.

The act, particularly § 8, is not limited to those required to register.

The constitutionality of the act is not here involved, nor is the constitutional reading of the act a feature. Considerations favor the Government's reading e. g., contrast of language in § 1 from that in § 8 and contrast of language in § 1 from that in § 4.

Without such contrast, some could not read the words "required to register" into § 8.

The language of § 8 is self-interpreting.

Specific exceptions show the act is not so limited.

The reading of defendant in error emasculates the act.

A draftsman seeking to accomplish the Government's theory of the act would have so worded it; see Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9, 97; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 612; United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 304; United States v. Goldenburg, 168 U. S. 95; United States v. Portale, 232 U. S. 27, 30; Black on Const. Law, § 49.

The Harrison law is meant to comply with treaty obligations. It is valid as in aid of the treaty.

This act is a legitimate regulation in aid of a proper subject of treaty-making power. Exports and imports are such a proper subject as is also interstate movement, manufacture, and jobbing of the drug, as all are reasonably related to the treaty object.

In support of these contentions see Adams v. New York, 92 U. S. 585; Baker v. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566; Carneal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. 181; C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U. S. 561; Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; Clerke v. Harwood, 3 Dall. 342; Compagnie Francaise v. Brd. of Health, 186 U. S. 380; Dick v. United States, 208 U. S. 340; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 313; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat.

241 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

489; In re Ah Chung, 6 Sawy. 451; In re Parrott, 1 Fed. Rep. 481; In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299; Maiorano v. R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 268; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; 22 Ops. A. G. 214; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138; Queue Cases, 5 Sawy. 552; Succession of Robasse, 49 La. Ann. 1405; Tellefsen v. Fee, 168 Massachusetts, 188; United States v. 43 Gals. Whisky, 93 U. S. 188; United States v. Portale, 235 U. S. 27; Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199; Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515; Wyman, Petitioner, 191 Massachusetts, 275; Anderson on Treaty Making Power; Devlin on Treaty Power; Calhoun on the Constitution; III Elliott's Debates; I & II Farrand; Federalist, No. 22, p. 134; Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, Vol. 5, p. 178; 1 Richardson's M. & P. of the Presidents; Tucker on Const. Law.

Mr. H. Ralph Burton and Mr. Levi Cooke, with whom Mr. George X. McLanahan and Mr. William Strite McDowell were on the brief, for defendant in error:

Acts of Congress must be construed to avoid absurdities. The Harrison Drug Act does not apply to mere consumers or possessors.

The words "any person" in § 8 can only apply to the persons upon whom the act intended to operate; to wit: those mentioned in title and previous sections.

There is no basis for argument that such words should be construed to mean "every other person."

Section 8 is only intended "to create a statutory rule of evidence"; it is only auxiliary to § 1 and it does not enlarge the class of unlawful acts.

Presumed crime cannot be the basis of valid legislation and by judicially determining a certain drug to be an "out