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Opinion of the Court.

in like situation, those rules, which must be assumed to be founded on principles of justice applicable to individuals, are to be relaxed only in response to some persuasive demand of public policy generated by the nature of the suitor or of the claim which it asserts. That this is the guiding principle sufficiently appears in the many instances in which courts have narrowly restricted the application of the rule nullum tempus in the case of the domestic sovereign. It likewise appears from those cases which justify the rule as applied to the United States suing in a state court, on the ground that it is sovereign within the state and that invocation of the rule nullum tempus protects the public interest there as well as in every other state. United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338; Swearingen v. United States, 11 Gill. & J. 373; McNamee v. United States, 11 Ark. 148; cf. United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 186.

We are unable to discern in the case where a foreign sovereign, by suit, seeks justice according to the law of the forum, any of the considerations of public policy sovereign plaintiff "should so far as the thing can be done be put in the same position as a body corporate." Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 171, 174; Republic of Peru v. Weguelin, L. R. 20 Eq. 140, 141; cf. King of Spain v. Hullett, 7 Bligh N. S. 359, 392.

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The presumption of a grant by lapse of time will be indulged against the domestic sovereign. United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, 464. The rule nullum tempus has never been extended to agencies or grantees of the local sovereign such as municipalities, county boards, school districts and the like. Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1; Boone County v. Burlington & Missouri River R. Co., 139 U. S. 684, 693. It has been held not to relieve the sovereign from giving the notice required by local law to charge endorsers of negotiable paper, United States v. Barker, 12 Wheat. 559; cf. Cooke v. United States, 91 U. S. 389, 398; Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 124, and in tax cases has been narrowly construed against the domestic sovereign. Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co. 273 U. S. 346, 350. Compare United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301; Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U. S. 272.

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which support the application of the rule nullum tempus to a domestic sovereign. The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, designed to protect the citizens from stale and vexatious claims, and to make an end to the possibility of litigation after the lapse of a reasonable time. It has long been regarded by this Court and by the courts of New York as a meritorious defense, in itself serving a public interest. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 360; M'Cluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270, 278; Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 617; United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290; Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N. Y. 210, 227; 90 N. E. 834; Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 302; 200 N. E. 824. Denial of its protection against the demand of the domestic sovereign in the interest of the domestic community of which the debtor is a part could hardly be thought to argue for a like surrender of the local interest in favor of a foreign sovereign and the community which it represents. We cannot say that the public interest of the forum goes so far.

We lay aside questions not presented here which might arise if the national government, in the conduct of its foreign affairs, by treaty or other appropriate action, should undertake to restrict the application of local statutes of limitations against foreign governments, or if the states in enacting them should discriminate against suits brought by a foreign government. We decide only that in the absence of such action the limitation statutes of the forum run against a foreign government seeking a remedy afforded by the forum, as they run against private litigants.

Second. Respondent, relying on the New York rules that the statute of limitations does not run against a suit to recover a bank account until liability upon it is repudiated, Tillman v. Guaranty Trust Co., 253 N. Y. 295; 171 N. E. 61, and that the statute of limitations.

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does not run against a plaintiff who has no forum in which to assert his rights, Oswego & Syracuse R. Co. v. State, 226 N. Y. 351, 359, 362; 124 N. E. 8; Cayuga County v. State, 153 N. Y. 279, 291; 47 N. E. 288; Parmenter v. State, 135 N. Y. 154, 163; 31 N. E. 1035, argues that until recognition of the Soviet Government there was no person to whom notice of petitioner's repudiation could be given and no court in which suit could be maintained to recover the deposit.

It is not denied that, in conformity to generally accepted principles, the Soviet Government could not maintain a suit in our courts before its recognition by the political department of the Government. For this reason access to the federal and state courts was denied to the Soviet Government before recognition. The Penza, 277 Fed. 91; The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294; Russian S. F. S. Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255; Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 192 N. Y. Supp. 275. But the argument ignores the principle controlling here and recognized by the courts of New York that the rights of a sovereign state are vested in the state rather than in any particular government which may purport to represent it, The Sapphire, supra, 168, and that suit in its behalf may be maintained in our courts only by that government which has been recognized by the political department of our own government as the authorized government of the foreign state. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212; Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 293 Fed. 133, 135, aff'd sub nom. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396, 409; Matter of Lehigh Valley R. Co., 265 U. S. 573; Russian S. F. S. Republic v. Cibrario, supra; Moore, International Law Digest, §§ 75, 78.

What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial question, and is to be determined by the political department of the government. Objections to its deter

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mination as well as to the underlying policy are to be addressed to it and not to the courts. Its action in recognizing a foreign government and in receiving its diplomatic representatives is conclusive on all domestic courts, which are bound to accept that determination, although they are free to draw for themselves its legal consequences in litigations pending before them. Jones v. United States, supra, 212; Agency of Canadian Car & F. Co. v. American Can Co., 258 Fed. 363; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, supra.

We accept as conclusive here the determination of our own State Department that the Russian State was represented by the Provisional Government through its duly recognized representatives from March 16, 1917 to November 16, 1933, when the Soviet Government was recognized. There was at all times during that period a recog

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The United States accorded recognition to the Provisional Government March 16, 1917 and continued to recognize it until November 16, 1933, when the Soviet Government was recognized. During that period the United States declined to recognize the Soviet Government or to receive its accredited representative, and so certified in litigations pending in the federal courts. The Penza, supra; The Rogdai, supra. It recognized Mr. Bakhmeteff as Russian Ambassador from July 5, 1917 until June 30, 1922, when he retired, having designated Mr. Ughet as custodian of Russian property in the United States. Mr. Ughet, after his appointment as Financial Attache April 7, 1917, continued to be recognized as such by the United States until November 16, 1933. He was recognized by the United States as Charge d'Affaires ad interim, during the absence of the Ambassador from December 3, 1918 to July 31, 1919. Their diplomatic status as stated was certified in the present suit by the Secretary of State, who stated that he considered Mr. Ughet's status unaffected by the termination of the Ambassador's duties.

Their status was certified to by the Department on October 31, 1918 and July 2, 1919, respectively, in Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 293 Fed. 133. Mr. Bakhmeteff's status as Ambassador was certified May 18, 1919 in Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 258 Fed. 363, 368; on April 6, 1920 in The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, 295; on June 24, 1919 in The Penza,

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nized diplomatic representative of the Russian State to whom notice concerning its interests within the United States could be communicated, and to whom our courts were open for the purpose of prosecuting suits in behalf of the Russian State. In fact, during that period suits were brought in its behalf in both the federal and state courts, which consistently ruled that the recognized Ambassador and Financial Attache were authorized to maintain them."

We do not stop to inquire what the "actual" authority of those diplomatic representatives may have been. When the question is of the running of the statute of limitations, it is enough that our courts have been open to suit on behalf of the Russian State in whom the right to sue upon the petitioner's present claim was vested, and that the political department of the Government has accorded recognition to a government of that state, received its diplomatic representatives, and extended to them the privilege of maintaining suit in our courts in behalf of their state. The right and opportunity to sue upon the claim against petitioner was not suspended; and notice of repudiation of the liability given to the duly recognized diplomatic representatives must, so far as our

277 Fed. 91, 93. Certificate with respect to both Mr. Bakhmeteff and Mr. Ughet was given February 19, 1923 and with respect to Mr. Ughet December 22, 1927. On the faith of the two last mentioned certificates the Court, in the Lehigh Valley Railroad case, supra, as stated by the Government's brief in the present case, ordered to be paid to Mr. Ughet approximately $1,000,000, of which more than $700,000 was paid to the United States Treasurer "on account of interest due on obligations of the Provisional Government of Russia by the Treasurer."

Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 293 Fed. 133; 293 Fed. 135, aff'd 21 F. (2d) 396; State of Russia v. Bankers' Trust Co., 4 F. Supp. 417, 419, aff'd 83 F. (2d) 236. See also Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 258 Fed. 363.

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