the importation of intoxicating liquors. Reliance for enforcement is placed upon §§ 49 and 49.2 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. The argument for this claim is bottomed upon our decision in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, where we held that a statute imposing a $500 license fee for importing and a $750 license fee for brewing beer did not violate

"Sec. 49. Alcoholic beverages shall be brought into this State from without this State for delivery or use within the State only when such alcoholic beverages are consigned to a licensed importer and only when consigned to the premises of such licensed importer or to the premises of a public warehouse licensed under this act. Alcoholic beverages which are consigned to a destination within this State shall be presumed to be for delivery or use within this State. Alcoholic beverages imported into this State contrary to the provisions hereof shall be seized by the board. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Statutes 1937, ch. 758; operative July 1, 1937.

"Sec. 49.2. Common or private carriers transporting alcoholic beverages into this State from without the State for delivery or use within this State must obtain the receipt of the licensed importer, distilled spirits manufacturer or distilled spirits manufacturer's agent for the alcoholic beverages so transported and delivered and, if the consignee refuses to give such receipt and show his license to the carrier, the carrier shall be relieved of all responsibility for delivering said alcoholic beverages. Where the consignee is not a licensed importer, distilled spirits manufacturer or distilled spirits manufacturer's agent or where the consignee refuses to give his receipt and show his license the carrier shall immediately notify the board at Sacramento giving full details as to the character of shipment, point of origin, destination and address of the consignor and consignee, and within ten days such alcoholic beverages shall be delivered to the board and shall be forfeited to the State of California. If any alcoholic beverages seized under the preceding section or forfeited under this section are sold by or under the direction of the board the common carrier's unpaid freight and storage charges accruing on the shipments of such alcoholic beverages shall be satisfied out of the proceeds of any sale made by the State after deducting the cost of such sale and any excise taxes accruing thereon. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Statutes 1937, ch. 758; operative July 1, 1937.

the commerce clause or the equal protection clause, because the words of the XXI Amendment "are apt to confer upon the State the power to forbid all importations" and "the State may adopt a lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition" (pp. 62, 63).32 The lower court was of the opinion that though the Amendment may have increased "the state's power to deal with the problem . . ., it did not increase its jurisdiction." With this conclusion, we agree. As territorial jurisdiction over the Park was in the United States, the State could not legislate for the area merely on account of the XXI Amendment.33 There was no transportation into California "for delivery or use therein." The delivery and use is in the Park, and under a distinct sovereignty. Where exclusive jurisdiction is in the United States, without power in the State to regulate alcoholic beverages, the XXI Amendment is not applicable."

34

Conclusion. The bill of complaint states that the defendants, the state officials, "assert that said Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of the State of California applies to complainant's operations within said Yosemite National Park; . . . that it is obligated to pay the fees and taxes imposed by said Act and is subject to the penalties thereof for the possession and sale of said beverages without compliance with the provisions of said Act." In the prayer of the bill, the complainant prays for an injunction restraining the defendants "from enforcing in any manner within the limits of Yosemite National Park, or in respect of transactions within said Park, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of the State of California."

32

The conclusions have been reiterated in Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., ante, p. 401.

"Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U. S. 242.

34

Compare Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274; Yellowstone Park Transportation Co. v. Gallatin County, 31 F. 2d

The final decree forbids entering upon the premises of complainant; seizing, impeding or interfering with any shipments to complainant in Yosemite National Park; from instituting any actions or proceedings in any court of law or equity for violations or alleged violations of said Alcoholic Beverage Control Act in respect of the importation, possession or sale in the Park; from requiring or demanding reports on the importation, possession or sale of said beverages; from enforcing in any manner within the limits of Yosemite National Park, or in respect of transactions within said Park, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of the State of California.

From the pleadings and decree it is clear that until now the controversy has turned not upon special provisions of the Act in question but upon its applicability as a whole. As in our judgment, as heretofore pointed out, the tax provisions are enforceable and the regulatory provisions unenforceable, it is necessary to reverse the decree and remand the cause to the District Court for a determination by the Court in accordance with this opinion of the applicability of such sections of the Act as the State may threaten to enforce.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS is of opinion that the decree below should be reversed because as stated by counsel for appellants, "The acts of cession and acceptance reserved to the State the right to levy upon and collect from the appellee company the type of tax imposed by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act." Also, that discussion should be confined to that point.

MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

DECISIONS PER CURIAM, ETC., FROM APRIL 12,

1938, THROUGH MAY 31, 1938.*

No. 887. EUREKA PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. LEHMAN, GOVERNOR, ET AL. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Decided April 25, 1938. Per Curiam: The motion of the appellees to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U. S. 230, 240, 241; Mutual Film Corp. v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 248, 258. Mr. Henry Pearlman for appellant. Mr. Henry Epstein, Solicitor General of New York, for appellees.

No. 965. TENNESSEE ELECTRIC POWER Co. v. ICKES, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WORKS. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. Decided April 25, 1938. Per Curiam: The motion of the appellee to affirm is granted and the decree of the District Court is affirmed. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464; Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 302 U. S. 485. Mr. Spencer Gordon for appellant. Acting Solicitor General Bell for appellees. Reported below: 22 F. Supp. 639.

No., original. EX PARTE VICTOR J. EVANS. April 25, 1938. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

* Mr. Justice Cardozo was absent from the bench, on account of illness, during the period covered by this volume.

For decisions on applications for certiorari, see post, pp. 552, 558; for rehearing, post, p. 586.