58 Opinion of the Court. APPEAL from a decree dismissing a bill to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. Leo P. Day, with whom Messrs. Guernsey Orcutt and Anthony P. Donadio were on the brief, for appellants. Mr. J. Stanley Payne, with whom Solicitor General Jackson, Assistant Attorney General Arnold, and Messrs. Elmer B. Collins and Daniel W. Knowlton were on the brief, for the United States et al. Mr. J. V. Norman, with whom Mr. Hugh White was on the brief, for the Alabama Iron & Steel Shippers Conference. Messrs. William H. Swiggart, Charles Clark, and Elmer A. Smith submitted on brief for the Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry Co. et al. MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants, nineteen railroads operating within what is known as Central Territory-Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan-by their bill filed in the District Court, Northern District of Illinois, July 22, 1936, challenged the validity of two Interstate Commerce Commission orders affecting the rate structure on coke moving into that territory from southern points. Questions in respect of these rates have often been before the Commission. The court made findings of fact upon the evidence and dismissed the bill without opinion. The first challenged order, dated March 11, 1935, followed an earlier suspension of certain proposed schedules and an investigation. It cancelled these schedules and determined what thereafter would be maximum reasonable rates upon a mileage basis. Subsequently, the proceed Opinion of the Court. 304 U.S. ings having been reopened, this order was modified and reaffirmed. In the circumstances, we think the court below properly declined to pass upon its validity. The second challenged order, April 30, 1936, followed one entered April 15, 1936, which upon petition and replies reopened the proceedings for reconsideration on the record as it then stood. The later order affirmed former findings that the schedules suspended by the one of March 11, 1935, had not been justified, and prescribed future maximum rates upon a mileage basis. These were lower (some ten per cent.) than those authorized prior to 1935. Here, counsel specially insist this second order exceeded the jurisdiction of the Commission since it undertook to determine rates concerning which there had been no proper notice or opportunity for hearing. But this contention rests upon an assumed construction of the order not obviously correct. The Commission has not so construed it, nor has that body been asked so to do, or for any further action in respect of it. Another construction brings the order clearly within the jurisdiction assumed by the Commission. In the circumstances appellants cannot prevail on this point. Appellants further urge that the order is contrary to the weight of the evidence, not supported by substantial evidence, disregards ordinary standards for determining reasonableness of rates, is not supported by necessary findings, and represents a mere attempt to equalize geographical and transportation disadvantages, fortune and opportunities. The findings by the court below we think are adequately supported by the record. They negative these claims and leave no sufficient basis for our interference with the action there taken. The challenged judgment must be Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or decision of this cause. Counsel for Parties. ARKANSAS LOUISIANA GAS CO. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS. No. 645. Argued March 31, 1938.-Decided April 25, 1938. 1. A corporation acquired natural gas in Louisiana, piped it into Arkansas, and there disposed of it, partly by selling it as a public utility to consumers in cities-an activity carried on through a special department of the corporate business-and partly by sales to selected industrial and other customers, under special contracts made in Louisiana, delivery of gas being made to them directly from the main pipeline, or through connecting spurs. Held, that a general order of an Arkansas state agency requiring all public utilities to file schedules of their rates is not unconstitutional when applied to the sales under the special contracts even though they be sales in interstate commerce. P. 62. In the circumstances it may be highly important for the State, which regulates local rates, to have information of all the operations. Merely requiring comprehensive reports of such operations would not materially burden or unduly interfere with interstate commerce. 2. The Court is not called upon to decide whether the sales under the special contracts are subject to rate regulation by Arkansas. P. 63. 194 Ark. 354; 108 S. W. 2d 586, affirmed. APPEAL from a judgment which reversed that of a court of first instance holding invalid an order of the State Department of Public Utilities. The case got into the latter court by petition for a review of the order. Mr. H. C. Walker, Jr., with whom Mr. J. Merrick Moore was on the brief, for appellant. Messrs. Thomas Fitzhugh and John E. Benton for appellees. Mr. P. A. Lasley was on a brief with Mr. Fitzhugh. By leave of Court, Mr. Clyde S. Bailey and Mr. Benton filed a brief on behalf of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, as amicus curiae, in support of appellees. Opinion of the Court. 304 U.S. MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, a Delaware corporation, lawfully purchases and produces natural gas in Texas and Louisiana and thereafter transports and delivers it through pipe lines to selected industries and public utility distributing corporations so-called "pipe line customers"-at points in Arkansas. These deliveries are made under contracts entered into at Shreveport, Louisiana, and are effected by tapping a main pipe line or through connecting spurs. They amount annually to some eight billion cubic feet. Appellant, by admission, also maintains a distribution department, through which it acts as a public utility, for the local sale and distribution of gas in many Arkansas towns; but this organization is distinct from the one which supplies pipe line customers. The Arkansas Department of Public Utilities, proceeding under a local statute, in April 1935 issued a general order (No. 13) requiring public utilities to file, upon specified forms, schedules cf rates, charges, etc. Appellant presented such schedules for local utility service in the State. but declined to file copies of contracts, agreements, etc., for sales and deliveries to pipe line customers. Thereupon the Department issued an order to show cause for this failure. In response appellant "set forth that the sale and delivery of gas from its Texas and Louisiana fields to its pipe line and industrial customers in Arkansas constitute interstate commerce, and that in making such sales and deliveries it was and is not acting as a public utility, and that accordingly the sale and delivery of said gas and the rates, schedules and charges upon which the same is delivered and sold were and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Department and are 61 Opinion of the Court. beyond its power to regulate, and that Order No. 13 is not legally applicable to said business." After a hearing upon the citation and response and much evidence, April 30, 1936, the Department ordered compliance with the general order. The matter then went for review to the Circuit Court, Pulaski County, and it held the challenged order invalid. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the sales and deliveries in question were not free from state regulation because parts of interstate commerce, and directed compliance with the Department's general order. The question for present determination is whether this general order, valid under the laws of the State, which only compels appellant to file certain designated information, amounts to an infringement of any right or privilege guaranteed to it by the Federal Constitution. And to this a negative answer must be given. If, as claimed, certain of appellant's activities in Arkansas are parts of interstate commerce, that alone (and no other defense is relied upon) would not suffice to justify refusal to furnish the information presently demanded by the State. Appellant operates locally at many places in Arkansas, also delivers within the State great quantities of gas said to move without interruption from another State. In such circumstances it may be highly important for the state authorities to have information concerning all its operations. We are unable to see that merely to require comprehensive reports covering all of them would materially burden or unduly interfere with the free flow of commerce between the States. In case the Department undertakes by some future action to impose what may be deemed unreasonable restraint or burden upon appellant's interstate business, through rate regulation or otherwise, that may be con |