Davis vs. Howard. general aspect of the case does not look well for the defendants to the bill. The bills of sale are not produced, the goods were hurriedly valued at night, they were hurriedly removed at night, they seemed to have been taken to other stores with very unseemly and suspicious haste, the counsel for the creditors who are preferred becomes counsel for the insolvent debtor, a bill of sale is made to him of part of these goods to pay a retainer fee for this insolvent debtor, and thus the most vigilant enemy of the man who has smuggled off a large portion of the goods, and who undoubtedly has committed a great fraud on all the other creditors, is transferred, by virtue of a fee of part of the goods to himself and others to his clients, into his fast friend and legal adviser and defender. We say the outlook is not handsome; the affair may need a closer scrutiny, and as the proceedings at law seem, by the agreed order, to have been merged into this bill, we wish to be distinctly understood as only reversing the judgment of the court below in granting the injunction, and not as passing judgment at all upon the question of general equity which the facts may make. Judgment reversed. LARKIN H. DAVIS, administrator, plaintiff in error, vs. THOMAS C. HOWARD, defendant in error. 1. An order granting leave to an administrator to sell land, obtained upon the published notice required by section 2559 of the Code, is valid so far as authority to sell is concerned. 2. Upon ejectment against the heir in possession, such order will not be conclusive of the question of their being debts of the intestate outstanding. Aliter, if obtained upon personal notice to the heir of such application. JACKSON, Judge, dissenting: 1. A judgment of a court of general and exclusive jurisdiction, questioned for want of notice or irregularity in the mode of giving it, should be attacked in the court which rendered it, and if the notice to defendant be insufficient, the judgment should be there set aside: Code, section 3593. Davis vs. Howard. 2. Courts of ordinary are courts of original, general and exclusive jurisdiction of the sale and disposition of the real property belonging to, and the disposition of, deceased persons' estates, and of all other matters and things relating to estates of deceased persons: Code, section 331. 3. Section 2486 of the Code empowers the ordinary to grant an order to sell real estate in the possession of the heir to pay debts of the estate; and this order, after notice to the defendant, is conclusive evidence that the administrator needs the land to pay debts. No defective notice appearing on the face of the proceedings, the presumption is that the proper notice was given before the court granted the order to sell, and the judgment of sale is a valid subsisting judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and will stand as such until set aside on proof that the proper notice was not given: Code, section 2486. 4. It follows, when the heir is sued in ejectment by the administrator and has to meet on the ejectment trial this apparently valid and conclusive order, and has moved in the court of ordinary to set it aside because the notice was a mere advertisement, when he was entitled to personal notice under section 2486 of the Code, and because he can show the court that there were no debts to pay, and when this question was pending in the superior court on appeal from the ordinary, but the ejectment was first on docket and would be first reached, and this judgment of the ordinary would confront and conclude him, it follows that on a bill in equity alleging the foregoing facts, an injunction should be granted to postpone the ejectment until the motion to set aside the judgment could be heard. Injunction. Administrators and executors. Judgments. Notice. Ejectment. Before Judge PEEPLES. DeKalb County. At Chambers. February 22d, 1876. Reported in the decision. L. J. WINN; L. J. GLENN & SON, for plaintiff in error. R. H. CLARK, for defendant. WARNER, Chief Justice. This was a bill filed by the complainant against the defendant as administrator of Jane C. Howard, deceased, praying for an injunction to restrain the defendant from prosecuting an action of ejectment pending in the superior court of DeKalb county, until an appeal case from the court of ordinary, pending in said court, should first be tried. On the hearing Davis vs. Howard. of the application for the injunction prayed for, the chancellor granted it, whereupon the defendant excepted. The allegations in the bill, upon which the complainant's equity is based are, that at the death of the defendant's intestate the complainant was her sole heir-at-law; that the land which the defendant is seeking to recover in his ejectment suit descended to him as such heir; that he is in the possession thereof, and that the defendant's intestate owed no debts at the time of her death; that the defendant obtained an order from the court of ordinary for leave to sell the land of his intestate for the payment of her debts, upon the issuing of the usual citation by the ordinary, and publication thereof, as required by the 2559th section of the Code; that the complainant never saw that published notice, and had no other notice of the application for leave to sell the land by the defendant until after the order was granted; when he ascertained that such an order had been granted he applied to the ordinary to have said order set aside, on the ground that he had no legal notice of the application for leave to sell the land of the defendant's intestate, which motion the ordinary overruled, and the complainant entered an appeal to the superior court; that the ejectment suit of the defendant stands. first on the docket of that court, and will be called and tried before the appeal case, unless the defendant shall be restrained from doing so by the injunction prayed for. Assuming the allegations in the complainant's bill to be true, as the defendant's demurrer thereto does, are the same sufficient to authorize a court of equity to interpose by granting the injunction prayed for by the complainant? The solution of this question necessarily depends as to what is the proper construction to be given to the statutes in relation to the question involved. The 2559th section of the Code declares that "If at any time it becomes necessary for the payment of the debts of the estate, or for the purpose of distribution, to sell the land of the decedent, the administrator shall, by written petition, apply to the ordinary for leave to sell, setting forth in the petition the reason for such application; and no Davis vs. Howard. tice of the same shall be published once a week for four weeks before the hearing, in the gazette in which the county advertisements are published. If no objection is filed, and the ordinary is satisfied of the truth of the allegations in the petition, an order shall be passed granting the leave to sell, specifying therein the land as definitely as possible." It will be perceived that this is the section of the Code which authorizes the ordinary to grant leave to the administrator to sell the land of his intestate for the payment of debts, and the only notice which is required to obtain such leave is, that notice of the application shall be published once a week for four weeks before the hearing, in the gazette in which the county advertisements are published; that having been done, no other notice is required to make the order granting leave to sell the land, a legal and valid order for that purpose, for the simple reason that the law does not require any other notice in order to obtain leave to sell. What will be the effect of that order when the administrator seeks to recover the possession of the land from the heir, is an entirely different question. The administrator cannot sell the land for the payment of the debts of his intestate until he recovers possession of it from the heir, when the heir holds the same adversely to him: Code, section 2564. The 2486th section of the Code declares that "the administrator may recover any part of the estate from the heirs-at-law, or purchasers from them; but in order to recover lands it is necessary for him to show upon the trial, either that the property sued for has been in his possession, and, without his consent, is now held by the defendant, or that it is necessary for him to have possession for the purpose of paying the debts, or making a proper distribution. An order for sale, or distribution, granted by the ordinary after notice to the defendant, shall be conclusive evidence of either fact." The construction which we give to the 2559th and the 2564th sections of the Code is, that an order for leave to sell land by the ordinary, on the published notice, as required by section 2559, is a legal and valid order so far as the question of notice is concerned, and that no other notice than that Davis vs. Howard. required by that section is necessary to obtain leave of the ordinary for the sale of land by an administrator. That when such administrator brings his action to recover the possession of the land from the heir, as provided by section 2486, the order for the sale thereof, under the provisions of section 2559, will not be conclusive upon the defendant so as to prevent him from showing that there were no debts due by the intestate of the administrator, unless the defendant had personal notice of the granting of the order for leave to sell the land for the payment of the debts of the intestate. The words "after notice to the defendant," should be construed to mean personal notice, when it is sought to make the order of the ordinary conclusive upon him. To grant leave to sell the land of an intestate by an order of the ordinary for the payment of debts on the notice required by section 2559, is one thing, but to make that order conclusive upon the heir, is another and different thing. The fair and reasonable interpretation of these two sections of the Code is, that the ordinary may grant an order for leave to sell the land of an intestate for the payment of debts, as provided by section 2559, and such an order is legal and valid; but where the administrator seeks to recover the land from the possession of the heir, for the purpose of administering it for the payment of debts, under the 2486th section, that order granting leave to sell the land for the payment of debts, is not conclusive upon the heir, unless it be shown, that he had personal notice of the granting of the order, and in the absence of any proof of such personal notice, he may show that there were no debts due by the intestate at the time of her death. According to the view which we have taken of this case, the order of the ordinary granting leave to sell the land of the intestate, was a legal, valid order, which should not be set aside either in the court of ordinary or in the superior court, on the appeal trial, for want of notice; inasmuch as the published notice in the gazette, is all the notice which the statute requires to obtain an order for leave to sell the land of the intestate by the administrator. To hold that personal notice was necessary before an order could be ob |