Opinion of the Court. 320 U.S. adversary litigations they were not in fact vigorously contested. While the rulings of the Supreme Court of Florida in the Andrews case must be taken as controlling here unless it can be said with some assurance that the Florida Supreme Court will not follow them in the future, see Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank, 306 U. S. 103, 107; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169, 177–178; West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U. S. 223, 236, we assume, as the Court of Appeals has indicated, that the Supreme Court of the State may modify or even set them aside in future decisions. But we are of opinion that the difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision. The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was generally to afford to suitors an opportunity in such cases, at their option, to assert their rights in the federal rather than in the state courts. In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613, 618; Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 378, 387; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 234-235; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 281-282. When such exceptional circumstances are not present, denial of that opportunity by the federal courts merely because the answers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court of the state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act. The exceptions relate to the discretionary powers of courts of equity. An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S. 45, 50. Exercise of that discretion by those, as well as by other courts having equity powers, may require them to withhold their relief in furtherance of a recognized, defined public policy. Di Giovanni v. Camden Insurance Assn., 296 U. S. 64, 73, and cases cited. It is for this reason that a federal court having jurisdiction of the cause may decline to interfere with state criminal prosecutions except when moved by most urgent considerations, Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 95; Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., supra, 49–51; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157; or with the collection of state taxes or with the fiscal affairs of the state, Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 530; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293; or with the state administrative function of prescribing the local rates of public utilities, Central Kentucky Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 290 U. S. 264, 271 et seq. and cases cited; or to interfere, by appointing a receiver, with the liquidation of an insolvent state bank by a state administrative officer, where there is no contention that the interests of creditors and stockholders will not be adequately protected, Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176; Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U. S. 186; Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30; cf. Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377, 381. Similarly it may refuse to appraise or shape domestic policy of the state governing its administrative agencies. Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315. And it may of course decline to ex Opinion of the Court. 320 U.S. ercise the equity jurisdiction conferred on it as a federal court when the plaintiff fails to establish a cause of action. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159. So too a federal court, adhering to the salutary policy of refraining from the unnecessary decision of constitutional questions, may stay proceedings before it, to enable the parties to litigate first in the state courts questions of state law, decision of which is preliminary to, and may render unnecessary, decision of the constitutional questions presented. Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496; cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478. It is the court's duty to do so when a suit is pending in the state courts, where the state questions can be conveniently and authoritatively answered, at least where the parties to the federal court action are not strangers to the state action. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168. In thus declining to exercise their jurisdiction to enforce rights arising under state laws, federal courts are following the same principles which traditionally have moved them, because of like considerations of policy, to refuse to give an extraordinary remedy for the protection of federal rights. United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352, 359–361; see Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 551-552 and cases cited; cf. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. United States Realty Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455 et seq. But none of these considerations, nor any similar one, is present here. Congress having adopted the policy of opening the federal courts to suitors in all diversity cases involving the jurisdictional amount, we can discern in its action no recognition of a policy which would exclude cases from the jurisdiction merely because they involve state law or because the law is uncertain or difficult to determine. The decision of this case is concerned solely with the extent of the liability of the city on its Refund ing Bonds. Decision here does not require the federal court to determine or shape state policy governing administrative agencies. It entails no interference with such agencies or with the state courts. No litigation is pending in the state courts in which the questions here presented could be decided. We are pointed to no public policy or interest which would be served by withholding from petitioners the benefit of the jurisdiction which Congress has created with the purpose that it should be availed of and exercised subject only to such limitations as traditionally justify courts in declining to exercise the jurisdiction which they possess. To remit the parties to the state courts is to delay further the disposition of the litigation which has been pending for more than two years and which is now ready for decision. It is to penalize petitioners for resorting to a jurisdiction which they were entitled to invoke, in the absence of any special circumstances which would warrant a refusal to exercise it. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, did not free the federal courts from the duty of deciding questions of state law in diversity cases. Instead it placed on them a greater responsibility for determining and applying state laws in all cases within their jurisdiction in which federal law does not govern. Accepting this responsibility, as was its duty, this Court has not hesitated to decide questions of state law when necessary for the disposition of a case brought to it for decision, although the highest court of the state had not answered them, the answers were difficult, and the character of the answers which the highest state courts might ultimately give remained uncertain. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank, supra; West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, 236–237; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field, supra, 177-180; Six Companies v. Joint Highway District, 311 U. S. 180, 188; Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464; Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 116-118. Even though our de cisions could not finally settle the questions of state law involved, they did adjudicate the rights of the parties with the aid of such light as was afforded by the materials for decision at hand, and in accordance with the applicable principles for determining state law. In this case, as in those, it being within the jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts by Congress, we think the plaintiffs, petitioners here, were entitled to have such an adjudication. The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON are of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 134 F. 2d 202. BELL v. PREFERRED LIFE ASSURANCE CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 17. Argued October 12, 13, 1943.-Decided November 8, 1943. 1. Where both actual and punitive damages are recoverable under a complaint invoking the jurisdiction of the federal district court on the ground of diversity of citizenship, each must be considered to the extent claimed in determining whether the jurisdictional amount is involved. P. 240. 2. A complaint in a federal district court, invoking jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship, alleged that the plaintiff had been induced to purchase a certificate of insurance through fraudulent misrepresentations by the defendants' agent as to the value, and claimed $200,000 as actual and punitive damages. The record showed that the plaintiff had paid $202.35 on the certificate, which had a maximum potential value of $1,000. Held: (1) Whether the decision be controlled by the law of Alabama, where the certificate was issued and mailed, or by the law of South |