or those of the producing nations, I think we should confine exportations to home bottoms or to those nations having treaties with us. Our exportations are heavy, and would nourish a great force of our own, or be a tempting price to the nation to whom we should offer a participation of it in exchange for free access to all their possessions. (To George Washington, written in Paris, 1788. F. V., 58.)

COMMERCE. Instead of embarrassing commerce under piles of regulating laws, duties and prohibitions, could it be relieved of all its shackles in all parts of the world, could every country be employed in producing that which nature has best fitted it to produce, and each be free to exchange with others mutual surpluses for mutual wants, the greatest mass possible would then be produced of those things which contribute to human life and human happiness; the numbers of mankind would be increased and their condition bettered.

Would even a single nation begin with the United States this system of free commerce, it would be advisable to begin it with that nation, since it is one by one only that it can extend to all. Where the circumstances of either party render it expedient to levy a revenue, by way of import, on commerce, its freedom might be modified in that particular by mutual and equivalent measures, preserving it entire in all others. (From a Report on the Commerce of the United States, 1793. F. VI., 480.)

COMMERCE. Where a nation imposes high duties on our productions or prohibits them altogether, it may be proper for us to do the same by theirs; first burdening or excluding those productions which they bring here in competition with our own of the same kind; selecting next such manufactures as we take from them in greatest quantity, and which, at the same time we could the soonest furnish to ourselves or obtain from other countries; imposing on them duties lighter at first, but heavier and heavier afterwards, as other channels of supply open. Such duties having the effect of indirect encouragement to domestic manufactures of the same kind, may induce the manufacturer to come himself into these States, where cheaper subsistence,

equal laws, and a vent of his wares free of duty may ensure him the highest profits from his skill and industry. And here it would be in the power of the State Governments to co-operate essentially by opening the resources of encouragement which are under their control, extending them liberally to artists in those particular branches of manufacture for which their soil, climate, population, and other circumstances have matured them, and fostering the precious efforts and progress of household manufacture by some patronage suited to the nature of its objects, guided by the local informations they possess, and guarded against abuse by their presence and attentions. The oppressions on our agriculture in foreign ports would thus be made the occasion of relieving it from a dependence on the councils and conduct of others, and of promoting arts, manufactures and population at home. (From a Report on the Commerce of the United States, 1793. F. VI., 481.)

COMMERCE. What a glorious exchange it would be could we persuade our navigating fellow citizens to embark their capital in the internal commerce of our country, excluding foreigners from that and let them take the carrying trade in exchange; abolish the diplomatic establishments and never suffer an armed vessel of any nation to enter our ports. (To Edmund Pendleton, 1799. F. VII., 326.)

COMMERCE. I hope with you that the policy of our country will settle down with as much navigation and commerce only as our own exchanges will require, and that the disadvantage will be seen of our undertaking to carry on that of other nations. This, indeed, may bring gain to a few individuals, and enable them to call off from our farms more laborers to be converted into lackeys and grooms for them, but it will bring nothing to our country but wars, debt and dilapidation. (To J. B. Stuart, 1817. C. VII., 64.)

COMMON LAW.-Of all the doctrines which have ever been broached by the Federal Government the novel one of the common law being in force and cognizable as an existing law in their courts is to me the most formidable. All their other assumptions of un-given powers have been in the detail. The bank

*

law, the treaty doctrine, the sedition act, alien act * * have been solitary, unconsequential, timid things, in comparison with the audacious, barefaced and sweeping pretension to a system of law for the United States without the adoption of their legislature, and so infinitely beyond their power to adopt. If this assumption be yielded to, the State courts may be shut up, as there will then be nothing to hinder citizens of the same State suing each other in the Federal courts in every case, as on a bond for instance, because the common law obliges payment of it, and the common law they say is their law. (To Edmund Randolph, 1799. F. VII., 384.)

COMPROMISE. A government held together by the bands of reason only, requires much compromise of opinion; that things even salutary should not be crammed down the throats of dissenting brethren, especially when they may be put into a form to be willingly swallowed, and that a great deal of indulgence is necessary to strengthen habits of harmony and fraternity. (To Edward Livingston, 1824. C. VII., 343.)

CONFEDERACIES.-Whether we remain in one Confederacy, or form into Atlantic and Mississippi Confederacies, I believe not very important to the happiness of either part. Those of the Western Confederacy will be as much children and descendants as those of the Eastern, and I feel myself as much identified with that country, in future time, as with this; and did I now foresee a separation at some future day, yet I should feel the duty and the desire to promote the Western interests as zealously as the Eastern, doing all the good for both portions of our future family which should fall within my power. (To Joseph Priestly, 1804. F. VIII., 295.)

CONFEDERATION.-The power of declaring war and concluding peace, of contracting alliances, of issuing letters of marque and reprisal, of raising and introducing armed forces, of building armed vessels, forts or strongholds, of coining money or regulating its value, of regulating weights and measures, we leave to be exercised under the authority of the Confederation; but in all cases respecting them which are out of the said Confederation, they shall be exercised by the Governor under the regu

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lation of such laws as the legislature may think it expedient to pass. (From a proposed Constitution for Virginia, 1783. F. III., 326.)

CONFEDERATION.-It has often been said that the decisions of Congress are impotent because the Confederation provides no compulsory power. But when two or more nations enter into compact it is not usual for them to say what shall be done to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this, and it is unnecessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion naturally results to the party injured by the breach. When any one State in the American Union refuses obedience to the Confederation by which they have bound themselves, the rest have a natural right to compel them to obedience. Congress would probably exercise long patience before they would recur to force; but if the case ultimately required it, they would use (From Answers propounded by M. de Meusthat recurrence.

nier, 1786. F. IV., 140.)

CONFEDERATION.-The Confederation is a wonderfully perfect instrument considering the circumstances under which it was formed. There are, however, some alterations which experience proves to be wanting. (From answers to questions propounded by M. de Meusnier, 1786. F. IV., 141.)

CONFEDERATION.-It has been so often said as to be generally It believed, that Congress have no power by the Confederation to enforce anything, for example, contributions of money. was not necessary to give them that power expressly; they have it by the law of nature. When two parties make a compact, there results to each a power of compelling the other to execute it. Compulsion was never so easy as in our case, where a single frigate would soon levy on the commerce of any State the deficiency of its contributions; nor more safe than in the hands of Congress which has always shown that it would wait, as it ought to do, to the last extremities before it would execute any of its powers which are disagreeable. (To Edward Carrington, written in Paris, 1781. F. IV., 424.)

CONFIDENCE. It would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety

of our rights; confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism -free Government is founded on jealousy, and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited Constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power; our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which, and no further, our confidence may go; and let the honest advocate of confidence read the Alien and Sedition acts and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing limits to the government it created, and whether we should be wise in destroying those limits. In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution. (From "Kentucky Resolutions," 1798. F. VII., 304.)

CONGRESS.-Resolved unanimously that this Assembly of Virginia will not listen to any proposition or suffer any negotiation inconsistent with their national faith and Federal union, and that a proposition from the enemy for treating with any Assembly or body of men in America other than the Congress of these United States is insidious and inadmissible. (Resolutions concerning peace with England, 1778. F. II., 160.)

CONGRESS.-The negative proposed to be given Congress on all the acts of the several legislatures is now for the first time suggested to my mind. Prima facie I do not like it. It fails in an essential character that the hole and the patch should be commensurate. But this proposes to mend a small hole by covering the whole garment. Not more than one out of one hundred State acts concern the Confederacy. This proposition, then, in order to give them one degree of power which they ought to have, gives them 99 more which they ought not to have, upon a presumption that they will not exercise the 99.

* Would not an appeal from the State judicatures to a Federal court in all cases where the act of Confederation controlled the question be as effectual a remedy and exactly commensurate to the defect? A British creditor, for example, sues for his debt in Virginia; the defendant pleads an act of the State excluding him from their courts; the plaintiff urges the Confederation and the treaty made under that, as controlling the