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trict court of said county until the next annual selection of trial jurors under this act. The said board shall thereupon select from the qualified electors of the county, whether registered or unregistered, not exempt by law from jury duty, such number of qualified electors as it has been estimated to be necessary. The names of the electors so selected shall be entered upon the minutes of said board, together with the occupation and place of residence of each of such electors so selected."

Section 4931, Rev. Laws, provides: "It shall be the duty of the district judge and any one of the county commissioners of the county, at least once in each year and as much oftener as the public interest may require, to select from the jury list twenty-four persons who shall be summoned to appear as grand jurors at such time as the judge may order. If from any cause a sufficient number do not appear, or those who appear are excused or discharged, an additional number, sufficient to complete the grand jury, shall be selected from the jury list by the judge and clerk and summoned to appear in court at such time as the court may direct."

It will be noted that these statutory enactments follow the direction of the constitutional provision. By § 4937 the board of county commissioners are required to select a jury list for the ensuing year, which list shall contain the names of qualified electors only. Section 4931 makes it the duty of the district judge, whether acting with one of the county commissioners or with the clerk of the court, to select the members of the grand jury from this jury list, the names of which have been previously selected by the county commissioner from the qualified electors of the county. Nowhere do the statutory provisions lose sight of the constitutional requisite and direction as to the qualifications of grand jurors, to wit, that they shall be qualified electors. Hence, while it may properly be said

that we have taken our grand jury system from the common law, it must be recognized that the class of persons which the common law declared to be subject to grand jury duty was, at the adoption of our Constitution, changed, and in its place was substituted a class defined as "qualified electors." So, qualified electorship in grand jury service holds the same place under our organic law as was held by the term, "liege subjects of the King," at common law.

Section 1 of article 2 of our Constitution, as adopted by our constitutional convention, provided that "every white male citizen of the United States (not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution) of the age of twenty-one years and upwards who shall have actually, and not constructively, resided in the state six months, and in the district or county thirty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote," etc.

By the amendment of 1877, approved and ratified in 1880, the word "white" appearing before the word "male" was stricken out. We mention this amendment because it becomes significant at a later place in our opinion. This section of our Constitution, as it now stands after adoption and ratification, reads as follows: "All citizens of the United States (not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution) of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have actually, and not constructively, resided in the state six months, and in the district or county thirty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote. There shall be no denial of the elective franchise at any election on account of sex."

By this last amendment, the right of electorship at any election was accorded to accorded to women. Hence, any woman of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has actually and not constructively resided in this state six months, and in the district or county thirty days next preceding an election, is a qualified

(Nev., 174 Pao. 706.)

elector, and has the right to vote at any district, county, or state election, providing she has complied with the Election Laws governing such elections.

It is contended by petitioner that the granting to woman of the right to vote, although the same makes her a qualified elector, does not thereby clothe her with the privilege or obligation of grand jury duty. In other words, it is contended that while, by the constitutional amendment, women are made qualified electors, this does not of itself make them qualified for grand jury service.

We think that the contention of petitioner has been answered by the courts in those cases where the same contention was raised, following the adoption of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The enactment of the 14th and 15th Amendments gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons, without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The adoption of the 14th and 15th Amendments rendered inoperative the provisions in the organic law of the several states whereby the right of suffrage was limited to the white race. The question of the right of members of the colored race to serve as jurors where a statute confined the selection of jurors to persons possessing the qualifications of electors, and where such was limited to the white race, was dealt with by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567, and in the opinion of that court, rendered by Mr. Justice Harlan, it was held that though no constitutional amendment had been adopted by the state of Delaware conforming to the 15th Amendment, nevertheless, by operation and by force and effect of the Federal amendment, a statute confining the selection of jurors to persons possessing the qualifications of electors was enlarged in its operation so as to embrace all those who by the Constitu

tion of the state, as modified by the Federal amendment, were entitled to vote. To the same effect was the case of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. ed. 664, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 515. The question was again dealt with by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110, 27 L. ed. 354, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625.

To the suggestion that in adopting the grand jury system we adopted such system as it was known and as it existed at common law, it may be said, conceding that we adopted the system itself, or rather the principle of the grand jury system, from the common law, that when we incorporated the system into our laws we departed most emphatically from the lines which establish grand jury qualifications at common law, for under the ancient system, not only must a grand juror have been a liege subject of the King, but the venire facias prescribed that they be liber et legalis homo. Chitty reminds us that the regulation was that they be freemen or freeholders, and later statutes of England fixed a more restricted latitude from the standpoint of property qualifications, thus: "That every man between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years, residing in any county in England, who shall have in his own name, or in trust for him, within the same county £10 by the year above reprizes, on lands or tenements, whether of freehold, copyhold, or customary tenure, or of ancient demesne, or in rents issuing out of any such lands or tenements, or in such lands, tenements, and rents, taken together, in fee simple, fee tail, or for the life of himself or some other person, or who shall have within the same county £20 by the year above reprizes, in lands or tenements, held by lease or leases, for the absolute term of twentyone years, or some longer term, or for any term of years determinable on any life or lives, or who, being a householder, shall be rated or assessed to the poor rate, or to the

inhabited house duty in the county of Middlesex, on a value not less than £30, or in any other county on a value not less than £20, or who shall occupy a house containing not less than fifteen windows, shall be qualified, and shall be liable to serve on juries for the trial of all issues in the civil and criminal courts, such issues being respectively triable in the county in which every man so qualified respectively shall reside, and shall also be qualified and liable to serve on grand juries, in courts of sessions of the peace, and on petty juries, for the trial of all issues joined in such courts of sessions of the peace and triable in the county riding, or division, in which every man so qualified respectively shall reside."

How far we departed from all of these qualifications as prescribed and recognized at common law may be measured at a glance, when by our organic law we expressly declared that the basis of exclusion from service on juries, so far as their primary selection was concerned, was the lack of qualified electorship. Nev. Const. § 27, art. 4. It may be urged that at the time of the framing of our organic law, qualified electorship was not considered as being attributable to women. But time has wrought the unanticipated change, and by amendment to our Constitution women have been clothed with the qualification of electorship, and by this change the female citizens of the state have automatically become members of the class from which class alone grand jurors may be drawn, and which classification, as established by the organic law, constitutes the only circumscription defining, limiting, and fixing the citizenry from which grand jurors might be, in the first instance, selected.

Grand juryeligibility of

women.

Blackstone tells us that the term "homo," though applicable to both sexes, was not regarded in the common law, applicable to the selection of grand jurors, as embracing the

female. Woman, he says, was excluded propter defectum sexus. The right of electorship is, by our laws, made incident to the right, duty, and privilege of grand jury service. It is the basis of grand jury selection. To say that women, after being empowered with the right of electorship, were nevertheless excluded from grand jury service, would be to say that, although the organic law made electorship the basis of grand jury service, there was nevertheless within the body of the electorate a class excluded from grand jury service, the only basis for this exclusion being, as Blackstone puts it, propter defectum sexus. When the people of this state approved and ratified the constitutional amendment making women qualified electors of the state, it is to be presumed that such ratification carried with it a declaration that the right of electorship thus conferred carried with it all of the rights, duties, privileges, and immunities belonging to electors; and one of the rights, one of the duties, and one of the privileges belonging to this class was declared by the organic law to be grand jury service. Nor can we, with any degree of logical force, exclude women from this class upon the basis established by Blackstone, propter defectum sexus, because we have eliminated the spirit of this term from our consideration of womankind in modern political and legal life. Woman's sphere under the common law was a circumscribed one. By modern law and custom she has demanded and taken a place in modern institutions as a factor equal to man. She may own and enjoy property, on which she may be taxed for maintenance of government. She may enjoy equal educational rights and privileges. may exercise the right of citizenship, and cast her vote for public servants. She may be an elector, or she may be elected to public office of honor, trust, and responsibility. The grand jury, whatever its ancient functions may have been,

She

(— Nev., 174 Pac. 706.)

has, under modern law, become an institution endowed largely with inquisitorial powers. Not only does it have to do with criminal investigations, but by statutory provision it may inquire into the affairs, conduct, and regulation of public offices, boards, and commissions. The public health and public welfare, as well as the moral atmosphere of a community, are matters of proper inquiry for our modern grand jury. Can we reasonably say that although woman, on whom has been conferred the right of electorship, the right to enjoy public office, the right to own and control property, and on whom has been imposed the burden of taxation in a common equality with men, is nevertheless deprived of the privilege of sitting as a member of an inquisitorial body, the power, scope of inquiry, and significance of which affect every department of life in which she, as a citizen and elector, is interested, and of which she is a component part? The spirit of the constitutional amendment silences such an assertion.

It was the grand jury system as an institution that we adopted from the common law, but in adopting this institution we specifically changed the qualification of the class from which grand jurors should be selected. Had we adopted the institution without designating or making mention of the qualifications of grand jurors, then, indeed, it might with some force be argued that in adopting the institution we adopted it in its entirety, as it existed at common law. Section 5 of article 4 of our Constitution provides: "Senators and members of the assembly, shall be duly qualified electors in the respective counties and districts which they represent," etc.

Section 3 of article 5 of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be eligible to the office of governor, who is not a qualified elector," etc.

Section 19 of article 5 provides: "A secretary of state, a treasurer,

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Section 1 of article 18 provides: "The rights of suffrage and office holding shall not be withheld from any male citizen of the United States by reason of his color or previous condition of servitude."

It will be noted that the last-mentioned section specifically puts office holding in the masculine. Shall it be said that, notwithstanding the amendment to our Constitution which gives to woman the right of suffrage and electorship, these lastmentioned sections of the organic law would have to be amended to entitle woman to the right of office holding in this state? It is said, by way of argument, that when our constitutional convention incorporated the section providing for the grand jury system in this state it implied that members of that body should be males. The same argument might, with the same degree of consistency, be put forth in furtherance of the assertion that when the framers of our Constitution adopted the sections last named, none but males being then eligible to electorship, they impliedly declared that none but males should enjoy the right to hold the several offices established. Such a contention would scarcely gain the sanction of reason, nor would such be supported by the rules of statutory or constitutional construction of which we are familiar.

Qualified electorship is the primary basis of the right to hold public office. Qualified electorship is the primary basis of the right or duty of jury service. It is conceded that by the amendment to our Constitution entitling women to the right of electorship the sections of

the Constitution which make electorship the basis to office holding were impliedly amended so as to make women equally eligible. This can only be true because qualified electorship impliedly carried with it. the right and privilege of the enjoyment of public office. But qualified electorship carries with it the right, privilege, and duty of jury service, and the rule which injects the force of the constitutional amendment into the sections of the Constitution making none but qualified electors eligible to office must, with equal force, affect that provision of the Constitution making none but qualified electors eligible to jury duty. It is not a certain class of qualified electors who are eligible to jury duty, but all qualified electors.

While it may be of minor significance, it is, we think, worthy of note that the legislature of this state has regarded women as being subject to jury duty, and in an amendment to the jury laws providing for additional exemption from jury duty, passed by the legislature of 1915, and approved on March 6th of that year, we find it specifically provided that married women may claim exemption from jury service. Sess. Acts 1915, p. 84; Sess. Acts 1917, p. 32.

We note the decision of the supreme court of Washington territory in the case of Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 13 Pac. 453. In the last-mentioned case the decision of the majority of the supreme court of Washington in the case of Rosencrantz v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 267, 5 Pac. 305, was overruled by a divided court. In the Rosencrantz Case, Judge Turner, who wrote the opinion in the Harland Case, dissented, and, the personnel of the court having changed in the interim, his dissenting opinion became the prevailing opinion in the Harland Case. ther the reasoning of Judge Turner's opinion nor the rule in that case is of assistance to us here. In deed, the question determined in both of the latter cases was entirely

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The decisions of the Washington court did not turn on the question of qualified electorship, because at that time (1884-1887) women did not possess the right of electorship under the Washington laws. Both of the decisions mentioned rather turned on the question of the qualification of a married woman to serve as a juror under the language of the Washington Code, providing that householders should be competent for such service. No such question confronts us here. The sole qualification for grand jurors made by our Constitution and by the laws enacted thereunder is qualified electorship, and we can do naught else than conclude that, in view of the fact that women, having been enfranchised by the amendment to our Constitution, may therefore become qualified electors, as such they are privileged to and subject to jury duty.

We take guidance from the decisions of this court in the cases of State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39, and State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 28 L.R.A. 33, 40 Pac. 372, because of the profound learning there displayed by our eminent predecessors; but if these cases furnish any light on the question at bar, such only serves to illuminate the position which we take. In neither of these cases is there a single assertion decisive of the one question presented in this phase of the case. Not only is the adoption of the grand jury system from the common law recognized and conceded in our views, but we concur in the views expressed in both the McClear and Hartley Cases, and would cite them approvingly in support of our position.

A second contention is made by petitioner here upon which relief

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