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the rule that knowledge of the attorney is imputed to the client when the

conveyance by the mortgagor, imputable to the client.

Hulbert v. Douglas (1886) 94 N. C. 122, sustaining a finding of the jury that the client did not take bona fide and without notice, where there was some evidence that the attorney representing the client in the particular transaction had notice.

PYEATT V. ESTUS (reported herewith) ante, 1570, charging a purchaser of land with the knowledge of the attorney for a loan company which was making a loan on the land, where such purchaser elected to rely upon the investigation and the opinion of such attorney, who examined the title for the purpose of making the loan to the purchaser, although the attorney was paid no fee by the purchaser.

Patterson's Estate (1912) 234 Pa. 128, 82 Atl. 1130, holding purchasers of a mortgage chargeable with notice to their attorney, employed to examine the title of the mortgagor, of a partition proceeding affecting the It does not seem mortgaged land. necessary, however, to have relied upon charging the client with the knowledge of his attorney in this case, as the partition proceedings were a matter of record.

Mutual Bldg. & L. Asso.'s Case (1893) 19 Pa. Co. Ct. 504, holding a mortgagee chargeable with the knowledge of its attorney who was also the mortgagor, that the deed of the property had not been delivered to him.

Scottish-American Mortg. Co. v. Clowney (1904) 70 S. C. 229, 49 S. E. 569, 3 Ann. Cas. 437, charging a mortgage company with the knowledge of an attorney who acted for its investing agents in making a loan, that the mortgagor was the wife of a trustee, from whom she had received a conveyance of the property.

Givens v. Taylor (1851) 6 Tex. 315, holding plaintiffs in attachment chargeable with knowledge of their attorney of the existence of a deed of trust upon the property.

Van Hook v. Walton (1866) 28 Tex. 59, holding execution creditors chargeable with knowledge of an assignment by the debtors, possessed by their attorney.

Riordan v. Britton (1887) 69 Tex. 198, 5 Am. St. Rep. 37, 7 S. W. 50, holding plaintiffs in attachment charge

attorney received such knowledge in the performance of his duties under

able with the knowledge of their attorney of a prior attachment.

Holmes v. Long (1918) Tex. Civ. App., 207 S. W. 201, holding a purchaser of notes chargeable with the knowledge of his attorney, who was also attorney for the payee, of defenses to the notes.

Sheldon v. Cox (1764) 2 Ambl. 624, 27 Eng. Reprint, 404, holding mortgagees chargeable with the knowledge of their counsel of a prior, unrecorded mortgage.

LeNeve v. LeNeve (1748) 3 Atk. 647, 26 Eng. Reprint, 1172, holding a second wife chargeable with knowledge of an unrecorded marriage settlement, made by her husband upon his first wife, where her attorney had knowledge thereof.

Rickards v. Gledstanes (1861) 3 Giff. 298, 66 Eng. Reprint, 423, 8 Jur. N. S. 455, holding notice of the assignment of a reversionary interest to the solicitor of a trustee, notice to the trustee.

Harrison v. Wiltshire (1835) 4 L. J. Ch. N. S. (Eng.) 260, holding a client affected with the knowledge of his solicitor of facts relating to the execution of a bond by another client, who is told that he is indebted to the solicitor and thereby induced to execute the bond to the first client, to whom the solicitor is indebted.

Dixon v. Winch [1900] 1 Ch. 736, 82 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 437, 69 L. J. Ch. N. S. 465, 48 Week. Rep. 612, 16 Times L. R. 276, imputing to a mortgagor the knowledge of his solicitor, who was the mortgagee, of an assignment of the mortgage.

In Fuller v. Bennett (1823) 2 Hare, 402, 67 Eng. Reprint, 165, purchasers were held chargeable with notice of the claim of third persons given to their solicitor while perfecting negotiations for the purchase of the property, where the negotiations had been discontinued and renewed with the heirs of the former owner about five years after the discontinuance of the first negotiation, the same solicitor being employed. A mortgagee of the purchaser, who employed the same solicitor, was likewise held affected by notice. The court states: "If, therefore, in order to decide the cause now before me, it was strictly necessary that I should decide, as an abstract question, that a purchaser who for the

his employment. Again the rule is stated that knowledge acquired by the

first time employs a solicitor (not being also the solicitor of the vendor) can be affected with constructive notice of anything known to the solicitor, save that of which the solicitor acquires notice after his retainer, and during his employment by the purchaser, I should certainly feel great difficulty in coming to the conclusion."

Spaight v. Cowne (1863) 1 Hem. & M. 359, 71 Eng. Reprint, 156, holding a mortgagee who had intrusted a considerable sum of money to a solicitor to invest, chargeable with knowledge of the solicitor with reference to an investment made by him.

Tunstall v. Trappes (1830) 3 Sim. 286, 57 Eng. Reprint, 1005; Gosling's Case (1830) 3 Sim. 301, 57 Eng. Reprint, 1011, holding a client chargeable with the knowledge of his solic itor of a lien upon property mortgaged.

Real Estate Invest. Co. v. Metropolitan Bldg. Soc. (1883) 3 Ont. Rep. 476, holding the knowledge of the solicitor for the purchaser of a number of mortgages, of an alteration in the description of one of the mortgages in a list previously furnished the purchaser, imputable to the purchaser.

In Brewin v. Briscoe (1859) 2 El. & El. 117, 121 Eng. Reprint, 45, 28 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 329, 5 Jur. N. S. 1206, 7 Week. Rep. 584, the knowledge of a solicitor who had been employed by the regular solicitor of a judgment creditor, that the debtor had committed an act of bankruptcy, was held to be the knowledge of the judgment creditor. The decision in this case was made to depend upon the fact that the solicitor had been vested by the regular solicitor of the execution creditor with a discretion as to how to act in carrying out instructions in regard to the execution; that the instructions did not give him a mere authority to execute process at all hazards.

See Lampkin v. First Nat. Bank (1895) 96 Ga. 487, 23 S. E. 390, infra, note 83.

11 May v. Le Claire (1870) 11 Wall (U. S.) 217, 20 L. ed. 217; Smith v. Ayer (1880) 101 U. S. 320, 25 L. ed. 955.

Armstrong v. Ashley (1907) 204 U. S. 272, 51 L. ed. 482, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 270, holding a nonresident loan company bound by knowledge of a defect

attorney in the course of the agency or employment is the knowledge of the in the title of the property on which the loan was taken, possessed by a local attorney who represented the company in his locality, and through whom loans were consummated, and to whom papers were sent by the company for such action as was necessary for the completion of the loan.

Price v. Carney (1883) 75 Ala. 546; Silvey v. Cook (1914) 191 Ala. 228, 68 So. 37, holding knowledge of an attor ney for the plaintiff in an action, acquired while the action was pending, from a petition in bankruptcy filed by defendant, of a vendor's lien on the defendant's real estate, imputable to the client so as to prevent him acquir ing a lien superior to the vendor's lien.

Allison v. Falconer (1905) 75 Ark. 343, 87 S. W. 639, holding notice to an attorney employed to have a deed executed and acknowledged, of a mortgage on the property, which by mistake described the wrong property and therefore did not appear on the record of title of this property, notice to the client, when acquired in the course of the duty he had been employed to perform.

Singfield v. Vogler (1917) 127 Ark. 618, 192 S. W. 906, holding notice to an attorney acting for a purchaser of property, of an unrecorded deed of the property to a third person, notice to the purchaser.

Watson v. Sutro (1890) 86 Cal. 500, 25 Pac. 64, 24 Pac. 172, holding notice to an attorney employed by a purchaser of land to examine the title, of an equity in a third person, notice to the client.

Mabb v. Stewart (1905) 147 Cal. 413, 81 Pac. 1073.

Sweeney v. Pratt (1898) 70 Conn. 274, 66 Am. St. Rep. 101, 39 Atl. 182, holding that notice to an attorney representing a client in a compromise agreement in which provision was made in a general way for the applica tion of certain insurance money, of the way in which the other party ac tually applied the money, is notice to the client.

Jones v. Bamford (1866) 21 Iowa, 217, holding knowledge of a mortgage which by mistake described the wrong land, acquired by an attorney in investigating the title for a prospective purchaser, notice to the purchaser.

Allen v. McCalla (1868) 25 Iowa, 464, 96 Am. Dec. 56, holding knowl

principal.12 Another Another form of the statement is that knowledge received

edge acquired by attorneys for attaching creditors during their employment, of an unrecorded mortgage on the goods attached, imputable to the client.

Bank of Commerce v. Hoeber (1885) 88 Mo. 37, 57 Am. Rep. 359, imputing to an insolvent debtor knowledge of an attorney employed by him to effect a composition with the creditors, that one of the creditors had been, by the attorney, paid a sum over and above that paid the creditors generally, to induce them to sign the agreement.

Wells v. McMahon (1888) 3 Wash. Terr. 532, 18 Pac. 73, charging a mortgagee with knowledge of her attorney that the mortgage was given to hinder and delay creditors.

Hyman v. Barmon (1893) 6 Wash. 516, 33 Pac. 1076, holding creditors in whose favor a failing debtor had confessed judgment, chargeable with knowledge of their attorney that the debtor intended to make an assignment.

Deering v. Holcomb (1901) 26 Wash. 588, 67 Pac. 240, 561.

Boursot v. Savage (1866) L. R. 2 Eq. (Eng.) 134, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 627, 14 L. T. N. S. 299, 14 Week. Rep. 565, holding that one who takes an assignment of a leasehold estate from one of three persons, who acts for himself and his co-owners, who are in fact trustees, is chargeable with knowledge of the existence of the trust, where the trustee who made the conveyance was a solicitor, and employed by the assignee in the transaction of the purchase.

It has been held that, where the knowledge was acquired previously to the creation of the relation of attorney and client, and none was obtained in doing business for the client to whom it is sought to be imputed, it will not be so imputed. Warner v. Hall (1894) 53 Mich. 371, 19 N. W. 40.

See Vermont Min. & Quarrying Co. V. Windham County Bank (1872) 44 Vt. 489, 3 Mor. Min. Rep. 312, infra, note 23.

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in the course of the business of the agency, or under such circumstances judgment, of the claim of a third person to the property through an unrecorded deed, is notice to the client.

Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel Co. (1866) 31 Cal. 160; see note 16 for facts.

Bunnell v. Holmes (1918) Colo. -, 171 Pac. 365, imputing to one who employed an attorney to ascertain whether there was any suit pending, affecting certain lands, knowledge of such a suit, acquired by the attorney in making the investigation.

Webber v. Clark (1891) 136 Ill. 256, 26 N. E. 360, 32 N. E. 748, holding the client chargeable "with notice of such facts as came to the knowledge of Grant (the attorney) during the course of his employment or agency."

Lambert v. Smith (1916) 53 Okla. 606, A.L.R., 157 Pac. 909, imputing to the assignee of a note the knowledge of the attorney who represented him in the assignment, as to the consideration for the note.

American Freehold Land Mortg. Co. v. Felder (1895) 44 S. C. 478, 22 S. E. 598, holding notice to the local attorney of the state representative of a nonresident mortgage company, whose duty it was to prepare abstracts of title and superintend the execution of all papers relating to the loan by the mortgage company in his county, that money borrowed and secured by a mortgage on the property of a married woman was in fact borrowed for the benefit of her husband, imputable to the mortgage company. The court states that it was the duty of the local attorney to pass upon the validity of the security, "and it is manifest that information received by him, showing that the mortgage would be invalid, would be within the scope of such agency, and, therefore, binding upon his principal."

Bexar Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Lockwood (1899) Tex. Civ. App. 54 S. W. 253, holding a building and loan association to which the payee of a note secured by a vendor's lien indorsed the same, chargeable with the knowledge. of its attorney, upon whom devolved the duty of passing upon securities offered, that the sale in which the vendor's lien note was given was a mere sham, to enable a loan to be secured on the property, which was a homestead.

Fordtran v. Cunningham (1911) Tex. Civ. App., 141 S. W. 562, hold

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ing a purchaser of property chargeable with the knowledge of a lien thereon, possessed by an attorney, and acquired by him in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority. Upon a second appeal of this case in (1915) Tex. Civ. App., 177 S. W. 212, the court, in holding the client not chargeable with the knowledge of the attorney, states that even if the attorney had knowledge of the lien there was evidence that he agreed with the defendant not to reveal the fact to the plaintiff, and that under such circumstances the defendant could not claim that such acts of the agent were binding upon the person defrauded, because the agent became the agent of the person he collusively served.

Newton v. Easterwood (1913) Tex. Civ. App., 154 S. W. 646, knowledge of an attorney employed to clear up title to lands, of the minority of a party interested therein, is imputable to his client.

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Mitchell v. Morgan (1914) Tex. Civ. App. 165 S. W. 883, holding one who took a deed to property, which was in effect a mortgage, chargeable with the knowledge of the attorney who represented him in the transaction that the property was a homestead.

13 Williams v. Tatnall (1862) 29 III. 553, holding knowledge of an attorney for the plaintiff, of a mortgage on the defendant's lands, imputable to the plaintiff.

Smith v. Wilson & B. Sav. Bank (1892) 1 Tex. Civ. App. 115, 20 S. W. 1119, holding one who employed an attorney to assert offsets against certain judgments, chargeable with knowledge of the assignment of such judgments, possessed by any member of the firm to which the attorney belonged.

14 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Baker (1900) 60 N. J. Eq. 170, 47 Atl. 6, holding that knowledge of an attorney who was employed to pay and secure the release of a previous mortgage out of the

General knowledge of an attorney for the collection of a claim against merchants in the town of his residence, of the insolvency of the merchants, is imputable to his clients.15

Knowledge acquired by an attorney in the course of litigation is imputable to his client.16 This rule applies in amount of a loan made by his client secured by mortgage on the same premises, and who, instead of doing so, appropriated the money to his own use, that he subsequently secured the money to pay the mortgage by a forged check on a bank, will not be imputed to his client.

Barnes v. M'Clinton (1831) 3 Penr. & W. (Pa.) 67, 23 Am. Dec. 62.

And see Pennsylvania cases cited in notes 38, 39, 68, 69, all of which recog nize the rule as thus limited. Ives v. Culton (1917) App., 197 S. W. 619.

Tex. Civ.

Warrick v. Warrick (1745) 3 Atk. 291, 26 Eng. Reprint, 970, holding the assignee of a mortgage not chargeable with knowledge that the mortgagor had only a life estate in the property, where such knowledge was acquired prior to his employment by the assignee.

15 Wiley v. Knight (1855) 27 Ala. 336.

16 Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel Co. (1866) 31 Cal. 160, holding that notice to an attorney who began an action in which a garnishment was obtained, that the garnishee had previously giv en his obligation to the defendant in full settlement of his claim, and that the obligation had been assigned to a third person, is notice to the client, with which the client is charged in a subsequent compromise of the suit.

Rauer v. Hertweck (1917) 175 Cal. 278, 165 Pac. 946 (knowledge of an attorney representing a party to an action, of a judgment entered in the ac tion, is knowledge of his client).

People v. Duncan (1908) 8 Cal. App. 186, 96 Pac. 414 (knowledge of the attorney for the defendant in a crimi nal prosecution, of facts with reference to the substitution of a juror, is the knowledge of his client).

Brown v. Oattis (1875) 55 Ga. 416 (knowledge of one of several attor neys acting for a party in litigation, of the incompetency of a juror, is knowledge of the party, so as to pre

vent this from being ground for a new trial).

Jones v. Lamon (1892) 92 Ga. 529, 18 S. E. 423, holding, in an action for wrongful attachment, that knowledge of an attorney for the plaintiff in the attachment suit that the property attached belonged to the plaintiff in the suit for wrongful attachment, is imputable to his client.

De Louis v. Meek (1849) 2 G. Greene (Iowa) 55, 50 Am. Dec. 491 (knowledge of attorneys who represent one party in an action, and claim to represent another also, that they do not in fact represent the latter, is imputable to the former).

Walker v. Schreiber (1877) 47 Iowa, 529, holding knowledge of an attorney for a plaintiff in an action to foreclose a mortgage, of the claim of a person not made a party to the proceedings, of an interest by reason of an assignment of one of several notes secured by a second mortgage, acquired by the attorney before final judgment in the foreclosure suit in a second action begun by such person, in which the attorney represented the owner of the premises, imputable to the first client. Cochburn v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Asso. (1913) 163 Iowa, 28, 143 N. W. 1006, knowledge or notice of facts acquired by one who is general attorney for an insurance company, and also attorney for it in an action against it, in relation to an assignment of the claim involved in the action, is notice to the company.

Sermonin v. Duerson (1891) 13 Ky. L. Rep. 169, holding knowledge of an attorney employed in litigation, of facts acquired therein relating to the subject of litigation, imputable to the client.

Presstman v. Mason (1887) 68 Md. 78, 11 Atl. 764, Shartzer v. Mountain Lake Park Asso. (1897) 86 Md. 335, 37 Atl. 786, imputing an attorney's actual or constructive knowledge of irregularities in a proceeding conducted by the attorney, to his client.

Baltimore v. Whittington (1893) 78 Md. 231, 27 Atl. 984, imputing to a city tax collector the knowledge of the existence of a leasehold estate, acquired by his attorney in a foreclosure proceeding, in which the tax collector sought to enforce a lien for taxes.

Bates v. A. E. Johnson Co. (1900) 79 Minn. 354, 82 N. W. 649, imputing to a judgment creditor notice of the fact that land standing in the name of the judgment debtor in fact belonged 4 A.L.R.-101.

to a third person, where the third person notified the attorney for the creditor after the action was begun, and before judgment was entered.

Riley v. Pearson (1913) 120 Minn. 210, L.R.A.1916D, 7, 139 N. W. 361, imputing to a party to a land registration under the Torrens Law, knowledge of her attorney as to the duration of easements.

Allen v. Poole (1877) 54 Miss. 323, knowledge of an attorney for the plaintiff, acquired in a suit to foreclose a mortgage and before a confirmation of the sale of the mortgaged premises, of a claim upon the property, is imputable to the plaintiff.

Edwards v. Hillier (1893) 70 Miss. 803, 13 So. 692, imputing to a purchaser of land under a bond for title, who had filed a bill for specific performance, the knowledge of his attorney that the land was then claimed by another.

Priddy v. Mackenzie (1907) 205 Mo. 181, 103 S. W. 968, imputing to a litigant knowledge of his attorney of prejudice of a judge.

Hunter v. Wabash R. Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 243, 130 S. W. 103, imputing to a defendant against whom a judgment had been rendered, knowledge of his attorney of duress in obtaining from the plaintiff a "satisfaction piece" of such judgment.

Dickerson v. Bowers (1886) 42 N. J. Eq. 295, 11 Atl. 142, imputing to a judgment debtor the knowledge of his attorney, acquired while attempting to collect the claim, of the ownership by another of certain property standing in the name of the debtor.

Taft v. Wright (1873) 47 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 1, affirmed in (1875) 59 N. Y. 656, imputing to a judgment creditor knowledge obtained by his attorney of a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor.

Greenlee v. McDowell (1847) 39 N. C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 481, imputing to a litigant facts known by his attorney.

Bigsby v. Eppstein (1913) 39 Okla. 466, 135 Pac. 934, holding a client chargeable with the attorney's knowledge of the assignment of a cause for trial, and of a judgment rendered.

Peeples v. Warren (1897) 51 S. C. 560, 29 S. E. 659, imputing to the plaintiff in an action to recover property claimed by him, knowledge of his attorney that the property was claimed by another, who was not made a party to the action.

Presidio County v. Shock (1900) 24 Tex. Civ. App. 622, 60 S. W. 287, hold

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