this for the reason that it is alleged that neither of these men, "while performing the duties formerly performed by the petitioner, performed the duties pertaining to their former position, but devoted their entire time to the duties formerly done by petitioner." In all things the right to reinstatement is based on the same grounds as the relator sets up in his petition. It was held that the plaintiff in that case could not reinstate himself. It was contended there, as here, that the removal was illegal, but the court held that the civil service rules do not apply to a case where the incumbent is dismissed for want of funds or in order to reduce expenses. In Phillips v. New York, 88 N. Y. 245, a clerk of the fire department of the city was discharged, not for any personal reason, but because it was necessary for the department to conform its expenses to a smaller appropriation, thus necessitating a reduction of the clerical force. It It was held that the civil service rules did not apply; that it was not a case of removal within the meaning of those rules. The court said: "He [plaintiff] could not claim that the office or clerkship should be retained for his benefit, and the fire commissioners were not obliged to consult him before abrogating it." In Langdon v. New York, 92 N. Y. 429, a clerk in the financial department of the city was separated from the service, and his removal was sustained as not in violation of the civil service rules for the reason that "the business of the department had so diminished that the plaintiff's services were not needed." In People ex rel. Corrigan v. Brooklyn, 149 N. Y. 225, 43 N. E. 556, speaking of the civil service statutes, the court said: "While these statutes are positive in form, it is clearly not their intent to give to occupants of such positions a life tenure where, upon grounds of economy or for other proper reasons, the office or position is in good faith abolished." A case which we conceive to be more in point is that of People ex rel. Hartough v. Scannell, 48 App. Div. 445, 62 N. Y. Supp. 930. The relator, a civil war veteran, was employed as "an inspector of fire hydrants." He was discharged, and duties similar to those theretofore performed by him were performed by persons who were not veterans. The court found the real question to be: "Whether the fire department had the right to abolish the position held by the relator, without notice and hearing, so long as other laborers, not veterans, were retained in the service. .. We are thus left to the question whether the position which the relator had was abolished in good faith and for reasons of economy. This was a question of fact. It appears that sixteen other veterans occupying positions similar to that of the relator were removed in January, 1898, and that there was evidence tending to show that this was done so as to bring about uniformity in the rules and method of inspecting fire hydrants over the entire city by extending over Brooklyn and Queens the rules which had been in existence for many years in the old city of New York; the duty in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens being devolved upon the fire department instead of the water department, and that this was done from motives of economy. In such a change, standing alone, we can see no evidence of bad faith on the part of the commissioner." Judge Dillon finds the law to be: "The purpose of the civil service statutes and of other laws prohibiting the discharge of employees without cause assigned, notice, and a hearing is to insure the continuance in public employment of those officers who prove faithful and competent, regardless of their political affiliations. These statutes are not intended to affect or control the power of the city council or the executive right to comofficers of the city bine duties so as to abolish offices when they are no longer necessary Civil service to depose officer. (74 Wash. 199, 133 Pac. 11.) or for reasons of economy. They are not intended to furnish an assurance to the officer or employee that he will be retained in the service of the city after the time when his services are required. They do not prevent his discharge in good faith without a trial and without notice, when the office or position is abolished as unnecessary or for reasons of economy. But, although the operation of these statutes does not prevent the abolition of an office in good faith, the local authorities have no power to discharge an officer or employee of the city upon the pretense that his office is abolished and immediately thereafter assign another person to do the same work which has been done by the discharged employee." 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 479. See also People ex rel. Moloney v. Waring, 7 App. Div. 204, 40 N. Y. Supp. 275; State, Caulfield, Prosecutor, v. Jersey City, 63 N. J. L. 148, 43 Atl. 433; Re Kelly, 42 App. Div. 283, 59 N. Y. Supp. 30; People ex rel. Nason v. Feitner, 58 App. Div. 594, 69 N. Y. Supp. 141; 28 Cyc. 445, 594. er can combine two or more posi tions in one. We think this case it controlled by the authorities cited and commented upon. In passing it may not be out of place to say that many of the cases to which we have referred grew out of departmental orders, whereas we have had to deal with an expression of the lawmaking body. Nor do we find anything in Gilmur v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 289, 124 Pac. 919, or State ex rel. Powell v. Fassett, 69 Wash. 555, 125 Pac. 963; Foster v. Hindley, 72 Wash. 657, 131 Pac. 197, or State ex rel. Cole v. Coates, 74 Wash. 35, 132 Pac. 727, that in any way qualifies our view of this case. Those cases are in line with the general rule laid down by Judge Dillon and admitted in all the cases we have cited. In the Gilmur Case the court found that the position had been changed only in name. The plaintiff was "a foreman of outside construction." The council passed a new ordinance creating the position of "foreman pole gang;' such position being intended to cover the position then held by respondent; to wit, that of foreman of outside construction." The case was decided in favor of the plaintiff because "his duties remained the same after the passage of the second The council having the right to abolish the position occupied by relator, it would be an unwarranted usurpation for the courts to go beyond the question of the good faith of that body. We find nothing in the record to overcome that presumption of regularity and integrity which attends every act of a co-ordinate branch of the government. If there was anything proved that would challenge the good faith of the council, the fact that five positions were abolished in the ordinance which abolished the relator's posi- ployee of the city was dismissed ordinance, and the title of his office tion is a sufficient answer and enough to sustain our holding that the motive of the council was pure and prompted by a disposition to work economy. It would certainly be harsh doctrine to hold that a city council cannot reduce the expenses of a department. As has been held, the council can abolish an office and refuse to make an appropriation to pay the employee. If this is so, it cannot be denied that the same pow is of no moment." If the relator in this case were reinstated, his duties would not be the same. He would have to take the place now occupied by Farren and perform additional duties. This fact distinguishes this case from the Gilmur Case. In the case of Foster v. Hindley the em from the service by the mayor for the reason, as stated by that officer, that "the office that you now hold is discontinued." As required by the civil service rules, the mayor reported the cause of the separation to be "reduction of force." We held that the office was not discontinued; that the council and not the mayor had power under the charter to abolish offices. Here we have the act of a council with power "to modify or abrogate, from time to time as the needs of the city shall require, all proper offices and bureaus, and to provide for the conduct and government of such offices and bureaus, and the appointment, removal, duties, and compensation of officers. The Powell Case is so clearly without significance here that it needs no comment. The Cole Case, as does the Powell Case, holds that a civil service employee cannot be removed without cause, and further that a change in the method of compensation, although under a different title, did not change the nature of the employment; that the right of employment is to be determined from the character of the service performed by the new employee as compared with the services which had been performed by the ousted employee. In the case at bar the council, having authority so to do, has destroyed that standard of comparison. In a negative way that case sustains our present holding. The supreme court of Illinois was called upon in Fitzsimmons V. O'Neill, 214 Ill. 494, 73 N. E. 797, to distinguish a former decision. In the case of Chicago v. Luthardt, 191 Ill. 516, 61 N. E. 410, the court had held as we held in the Gilmur Case. The court distinguished the earlier case, saying: "The common council merely changed the name of the official but did not change his duties, and made an appropriation for the salary of the same office by another name. No such facts exist in the case at bar. The appropriation bill here did not designate the foreman of the repair shop by another name or appropriate any salary for his successor acting under another name." That Farren, the present incumbent, has had corporation- an increase of sal Municipal abolition of office-bad faith. ary and has not been able to keep up with his work can have no bearing. These facts do not indicate bad faith. People ex rel. Steers v. Health Dept. 86 App. Div. 521, 83 N. Y. Supp. 800. If the council errs in its judgment when it passes an ordinance combining two positions, the courts are powerless to correct the mistake. In the case just cited it is said: "If in good faith a department initiates a policy of enforced economy, but goes too far, that affords no reason for the reinstatement of a subordinate." Nor does the testimony offered to show that the comptroller has acted in bad faith have any bearing. Whatever his design may have been, it is lost in the ordinance. Our conclusion is that the ordinance was passed in good faith and in the interest of economy, and not for the purpose of circumventing or evading the Civil Service Act; that the function of the civil service commission, so far as the abolished position is concerned, has been performed. It may classify the present position and require an examination, but it cannot supplant a present employee of equal right to make way for one who claims under a position that is abolished. This court has been extremely liberal in upholding the powers of the civil service commissions of our cities. Notwithstanding the sentiment which sustains laws providing for classified civil service, there must be a limit to the right of such commissions to impose employees upon a city. A limitation is found in the power of the council to legislate and in the right of the taxpayers to insist on economy in the administration of public affairs. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to discuss the remaining assignments of error. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and remanded, with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal. Gose, Mount, and Parker, JJ., concur. ANNOTATION. Power to abolish or discontinue office. I. Introductory, 205. II. Creation of substituted office, 206. IV. Abolition by Constitution, 210. VI. Abolition by legislature: a. Office created by Congress, I. Introductory. It is not intended to include cases of the abolition of a mere position, but some cases of this kind are cited, notably among the cases as to abolition of offices or positions where there are tenure of office or civil service laws. Cases of removal from office or of shortening terms are not included except in so far as these questions bear on abolition of the office. (It may be noted that the Illinois Constitution states that "an office is a public position, created by the Constitution or law, continuing during the pleasure of the appointing power, or for a fixed time, with a successor elected or appointed. An employment is an agency, for a temporary purpose, which ceases when that purpose is accomplished." People ex rel. Akin v. Loeffler (1898) 175 Ill. 585, 51 N. E. 785.) The fundamental principles of this subject are two, first, that in general the power to create an office includes the power to destroy it; second, that in our law there is no vested or contract right in or to an office. The leading authority upon the proposition that under American law the holder of an office has no vested property right therein is Butler v. Pennsylvania (1850) 10 How. (U. S.) 402, 13 L. ed. 472, a case beyond the scope of this note. The only jurisdiction taking the contrary view was North Carolina (King v. Hunter (1871) 65 N. C. 603, 6 Am. Rep. 754; State ex rel. Walser v. Bellamy (1897) 120 N. C. 212, 27 S. E. 1007, which has now adopted the general rule (Mial v. Ellington (1903) 134 N. C. 131, 65 VI. continued. b. Constitutional offices: 2. Changing districts, 212. 1. Constitutional provisions, 2. General principles, 217. VII. Abolition by city, 221. L.R.A. 697, 46 S. E. 961). "The right There is in this country no contract In Ward v. Elizabeth City (1897) There is a single case in Massachu- N such office or appointment, constitutes, in our judgment, a contract between the city and him, which cannot be dissolved or changed by the mere will and act of the city." This case was apparently overlooked in Donaghy v. Macy (1896) 167 Mass. 178, 45 N. E. 87, where under ordinance a city council elected a person second assistant engineer of the fire department for the term of four years and some two years later repealed the ordinance and under a new ordinance shortly afterwards elected another person to the same position. It was held that the last-mentioned person was lawfully elected even if the person first elected had a contract binding the city; and the court said: "But we know of no decision in this commonwealth that the petitioner has a contract which binds, or purports to bind, the city to keep him in his office after the office shall have been abolished lawfully, except for the contract. It is going a long way to say that there was any contract, however qualified, to continue the petitioner in office during his term, or to accept the corollary that the petitioner had not a right to resign whenever he saw fit. But the notion that an appointment for a term under an ordinance providing that the officer shall be removable for cause, without more, is a contract that the office shall be kept up for the term irrespective of the public welfare, seems to us to go beyond any possible view, and to be contrary to such decisions as we have seen which bear upon the point." Most of the cases holding that there is no vested or contract right to an office are cases of mere removals from office and thus beyond the scope of this note. II. Creation of substituted office. There are a good many cases where offices have been abolished in terms and promptly recreated under the same name or under a different name. It is clear that the legislature may not evade the Constitution by a sham or pretended abolition. Thus a mere change of name by the legislature will not oust a constitutional officer who holds during good behavior. Gibbes's Case (1800) 1 S. C. Eq. (1 Desauss.) 587. Where the constitutional term of office of a judge of inferior courts was eight years, the legislature having created the office of county judge for a certain county could not during his constitutional term abolish the office and create the new office of chairman of the county court, an office identical except in name, and devolve the old duties upon the holder of it. State ex rel. Orr v. Leonard (1888) 86 Tenn. 485, 7 S. W. 453. In holding an act unconstitutional which took from a locality the appointment of officers by change of names the court said: "The Constitution cannot be evaded by a change in the name of an office, nor can an office be divided and the duties assigned to two or more officers under different names, and the appointment to the offices made in any manner except as authorized by the Constitution; and courts will scrutinize acts of the legislature and see that the Constitution is not evaded and its intent frustrated by a mere colorable change in the designation and title or the duties of an officer, when the appointment is taken from the locality, and will hold the act void unless the change is real and substantial." People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson (1873) 55 N. Y. 50. But it was held to be within the constitutional authority of the legislature by general law to abolish the office of register of probate and insolvency and transfer the powers and duties thereof to a new officer called the clerk of the court of probate and insolvency, where the Constitution required the legislature to prescribe, by general law, for the election by the people of registers of probate, as well as clerks of the courts of common law, in each county, but expressly left it to the legislature to prescribe the term of office, and restricted the power of the legislature over such officers in no other respect. Opinion of Justices (1875) 117 Mass. 603. But the determination of the legis. lature in abolishing an office created by it and creating a new one, that the |