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draw from the case in consideration of his release from all liability for the payment of any judgment that might be rendered therein in favor of the first-mentioned party. The court found that the action complained of had not prevented the complaining party from properly preparing his case, and held that such party, in stating that he was prejudiced thereby, was not in court with "clean hands," and was disentitled to the relief prayed.

Where, in furtherance of and as a part of a fraudulent scheme, a party to a suit has paid a mortgage debt on property, he is not in court with "clean hands" in claiming the right of subrogation to the claim of the mortgagee, and the benefit of the equitable doctrine of subrogation should be denied to him. Lovejoy v. Bailey (1913) 214 Mass. 155, 101 N. E. 63.

In Grocers' Journal Co. v. Midland Pub. Co. (1907) 127 Mo. App. 356, 105 S. W. 310, the purchase of a trade journal, its good will, etc., by the complainant, its merger into his own newspaper, and the discontinuance of the name of the merged paper, were held to preclude him from enjoining the publication by another of a newspaper bearing the name of the discontinued journal, it appearing that complainant used the name of the discontinued journal in advertising to deceive the public.

A complainant who sought the aid of a court of equity to restrain the defendants from discontinuing the telephone service at his premises by disconnecting his extension from the main line was held to be in court with "unclean hands," and not entitled to the relief prayed, because of his undertaking on numerous occasions following the disconnection by the defendants to redress his own alleged wrongs by reconnecting his line with the main line in such a way as to deprive others of the service to which they were entitled. Primm v. White (1912) 162 Mo. App. 594, 142 S. W. 802.

A wife who causelessly deserted her husband was held, in Black v. Black (1878) 30 N. J. Eq. 215, to be in court

with "unclean hands" in the suit, which was to recover from him the value of certain improvements on his property, made and paid for by her, and to recover for other expenditures made out of her separate estate.

In Camden Iron Works v. Camden (1902) 64 N. J. Eq. 723, 52 Atl. 477, reversing (1900) 60 N. J. Eq. 211, 47 Atl. 220, the fact that a lien claimant knowingly filed an excessive demand was held to bar a suit to foreclose his liens.

In Abraham v. Cincinnati (1903) 13 Ohio Dec. 627, the suit was in equity by the trustee of a decedent's estate to remove a possible cloud from the title of certain of the decedent's property that might result from certain acts of the decedent, which were done by him during his lifetime, with a view to the dedication of the land for a public park. The promise so to dedicate the property was made by the decedent as an inducement to prospective purchasers of real estate to buy adjacent property which he had for sale; and the court held, therefore, that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was in court with "unclean hands" in seeking its aid in removing any cloud on the title to the property that might have resulted from the acts of the decedent.

In Auman v. Cunfer (1906) 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 368, the plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the erection of one half of a line fence between the lands of the parties to the suit, which she sought to build under public authority, in order to charge the defendant with its cost. The court found that a partition fence between the properties had fallen into decay, and on notice of its condition the defendant had repaired one half thereof. Subsequently the defendant had erected a new and sufficient fence because the former had been destroyed by the plaintiff after its repair by the defendant. This fence had also been destroyed by the plaintiff. The latter, in seeking the relief prayed, was held to be in court with "unclean hands."

It was held in Wagner v. Wagner (1915) 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 526, a suit in equity in the nature of a bill to eject

the defendant from premises of which the plaintiff (defendant's husband) held the fee-simple title, that the plaintiff was in court with "unclean hands" in seeking the relief prayed, he having agreed, in proceedings previously instituted by the defendant for nonsupport, that she should occupy the premises involved in the suit.

In York Coal & Coke Co. v. Hamilton (1918) 182 Ky. 345, 206 S. W. 616, the suit was to quiet title, and was brought by one who had, under an abandoned survey, secured a patent to lands which he knew had been patented by another. It was held that he was not in court with clean hands.

In Sweeney v. Wilkes-Barre (1916) 62 Pa. Super. Ct. 54, the suit was in equity by an abutting property owner, but in the interest, as stated by the court, of an electric lighting company, to restrain a municipality from interfering with the use of a street under and across which the plaintiff had laid a pipe through which he had run a wire for the purpose of procuring electric light from the lighting plant for himself and neighbors, which pipe and wire he leased to the lighting company. Permission not having been first obtained from the city for the laying of the pipe and wire, and the purpose in laying them evidently having been to aid the lighting company to violate a statute requiring such permission, under the guise of an improvement made by a property owner on his property, the plaintiff was held to be in court with "unclean hands."

In McVey v. Brendel (1891) 144 Pa. 235, 13 L.R.A. 377, 27 Am. St. Rep. 625, 22 Atl. 912, a suit to enjoin the defendant from counterfeiting labels of the plaintiff, a cigar makers' union, which the latter, by agreement with certain manufacturers, was permitted to place on boxes containing cigars which were manufactured by union men, it was held that the purpose of the labels being "to do harm to nonunion men, to prevent the sale of their work, to cover them with opprobrium," the plaintiff was not in court with "clean hands," and was consequently not entitled to the relief prayed.

In Booker v. Smith (1892) 38 S. C.

228, 16 S. E. 774, the suit was to recover on attachment bonds executed by the defendant as surety in two actions at law, which involved the same questions and were precisely the same in every particular, with one apparently unimportant exception. The attachments had been set aside at the instance of the plaintiff, against whom they were issued, for informality in the attachment bonds, after an application of the attaching creditors to amend the bonds had been denied. The court held that the purpose of the attaching creditors in seeking the amendment of the bonds having been to give to the plaintiff a sufficient security against the results of unlawful attachments, he was in court with "unclean hands" in seeking to recover on the informally executed bonds.

In Longinette v. Shelton (1898) Tenn. -, 52 S. W. 1078, erasing funding stamp from bank notes with acid before a tender of such notes in payment of taxes and their refusal was held to bar a suit to recover money paid in satisfaction of such taxes and to test the validity of tender of said notes in payment thereof.

Cobb v. Gooch (1905) 40 Tex. Civ. App. 82, 88 S. W. 401, forcible ejection by plaintiff, who was an applicant for the purchase of public lands, of the defendant, who was also an applicant for the same section of land, from latter's position at the head of the line of applicants for land, formed on the day of sale at the door of the county clerk's office, was successfully pleaded in defense of a suit to try the title of the defendant, to whom the land was awarded.

In Sanders v. Cauley (1908) 52 Tex. Civ. App. 261, 113 S. W. 560, removal by the plaintiff, with the consent of the school trustees, of a house built on land dedicated to school purposes, to land of the plaintiff, who was, by agreement with said trustees, to become the owner thereof, disclosed in a suit to enjoin the removal of said house from plaintiff's land, was held to bar the plaintiff from equitable relief.

In Maxwell v. Maxwell (1911) 69 W. Va, 414, 71 S. E. 571, it was held

that where the plaintiff in a suit for divorce on the ground of cruelty, which consisted of accusations by the defendant of improper conduct, etc., was herself guilty of like recriminations, she was not entitled, under the principle of "unclean hands," to the relief sought.

In Raasch v. Raasch (1898) 100 Wis. 400, 76 N. W. 591, the act of the plaintiff in inducing a husband to leave his wife in order to procure a reconveyance of real estate sold to the husband, and participation in a fraudulent conveyance of personalty on said land to defeat an anticipated decree in favor of the wife in pending divorce proceedings, were successfully pleaded by the wife, who was decreed divorce because of such desertion, and awarded said property, in defense of a suit against her to enforce a lien on the property for unpaid purchase money. In Thomson Mach. Co. v. Brown (1918) N. J. Eq. 104 Atl. 129, it was held that injunctive relief against unlawful acts of strikers would not be denied because of a refusal of the employer to agree to mediation.

One who wrongfully appropriates the property of another for his own use will not receive the aid of a court of equity in any matter with which such reprehensible conduct is connected. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. v. Drake (1914) 131 C. C. A. 82, 214 Fed. 536 (misappropriation of funds loaned for purpose of satisfying mortgage); Commercial Nat. Bank V.


(1892) 141 Ill. 519, 33 Am. St. Rep. 331, 31 N. E. 420 (forcibly taking books of accounts of corporation); Bennett v. Stuart (1914) 161 Ky. 264, 170 S. W. 542 (fraudulent misappropriation of money advanced to purchase mining land); Avery v. Central Bank (1909) 221 Mo. 71, 119 S. W. 1106 (fraudulent appropriation of funds of a bank by an officer and director thereof); Lewis v. Holdrege (1898) 56 Neb. 379, 76 N. W. 890, modified so as to correct error in computation (1898) 57 Neb. 219, 77 N. W. 656 (diversion by bank president to his personal use of bank's funds, causing failure of bank, disclosed in suit

by assignees of his interest in syndicate, to require syndicate to pay to them his share of syndicate's funds deposited in defunct bank, and lost by its failure).

In Mitchell v. Leland Co. (1917) 158 C. C. A. 329, 246 Fed. 103, the suit was to compel the transfer of a certificate of stock on the books of a corporation. It was held that the plaintiff, having been implicated in a concerted plan to despoil the rightful owner of the certificate of his property therein by forcibly and unlawfully taking the certificate from the latter's possession and pretending to sell it at an execution sale in satisfaction of a judgment by default, obtained against the owner thereof, was in court with "unclean hands," and was not entitled to the relief prayed.

In Public Service Commission v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (1918) 105 Misc. 254, P.U.R.1919B, 258, 172 N. Y. Supp. 790, it was held that years of delay on the part of a street railway company to provide needed cars precluded it from objecting that an order requiring the furnishing of cars was inequitable, because of the high prices due to war conditions, the court saying: "If the companies had ordered the 250 cars when they ought to have done so, they would have had them long ago, and much of this very serious congestion could have been prevented. In view of these just public claims, which outweigh all others, the court should give little heed to nice considerations of equity, which might be applicable were this a litigation between private parties, involving only private rights and interests. 'He who seeks equity must do equity,' and 'He who comes into equity must come with clean hands,' are maxims which are clearly pertinent in these proceedings, in answer to the respondents' claims to be relieved on equitable grounds from compliance with the order of the Commission."

In Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Assmann (1918) 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N. Y. Supp. 334, it was held that a corporation was not precluded from relief against the illicit use of a secret process because of the fact that it in

troduced a spy into the works of the rival concern solely to obtain evidence of the infringement of its rights, and not for the purpose of copying any methods of the rival.

In Dean v. Elyton Land Co. (1896) 113 Ala. 276, 21 So. 213, it happened that a landlord, instead of proceeding in a legal manner to enforce his landlord's lien on the personal property of a tenant for rent in arrears, took possession thereof, sold it, and applied the proceeds to the payment of the rent. One who held a mortgage on the goods then sued the landlord in an action at law and recovered a judgment for damages for the appropriation of the goods. In a suit instituted by the landlord against the mortgagee to enforce his lien on the goods for the rent and for relief against the judgment at law, the court denied the relief prayed, saying: "It is an ancient maxim that he who seeks equity must come with clean hands. A complainant who cannot state his case without showing that he has violated the law, offending the property rights of him whom he sues, will be denied relief in a court of equity. The principle is universal and recognized in many decisions of this court."

If two authors, in preparing similar works, follow the same procedure in obtaining the material for their publications, and their acts constitute literary piracy, a court of equity, in applying the maxim, "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands," will not aid one in a suit against the other for the infringement of his copyright. Therefore, in Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co. (1903) 62 L.R.A. 607, 59 C. C. A. 148, 122 Fed. 922, reversing (1903) 121 Fed. 907, which was a suit between law-book publishers for the alleged infringement of a copyright, the question raised by the acts of the defendants complained of is stated in the opinion of the court as follows: "Is a copyrighted law book infringed by a subsequent work on the same subject where the only accusation against the second author is that he collected all available citations, including those found in the copyrighted work, and,

after examining them in textbooks and reports, used those which he considered applicable to support his own original text?" The court was of the opinion that these acts did not amount to an infringement, but held that inasmuch as the evidence disclosed that the same methods had been employed by the plaintiffs in the preparation of their work, if these acts constituted literary piracy, then the plaintiffs were not in court with "clean hands," and were not entitled to the relief prayed.

In International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 63 L. ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 317, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68, affirming (1917) 2 A.L.R. 293, 157 C. C. A. 436, 245 Fed. 244, which modified (1917) 240 Fed. 983, the action was to enjoin the pirating of the complainant's news service by the appropriation and republication of items thereof without further investigation. It appeared that the complainant had habitually taken items published by other news agencies as "tips" to be investigated, the result of the investigation being later sold for publication. It was held that this did not debar the complainant from the relief sought, the court saying: "In the case before us, in the present state of the pleadings and proofs, we need go no further than to hold, as we do, that the admitted pursuit by complainant of the practice of taking news items published by defendant's subscribers as tips to be investigated, and, if verified, the result of the investigation to be sold, the practice having been followed by defendant also, and by news agencies generally, is not shown to be such as to constitute an unconscientious or inequitable attitude towards its adversary so as to fix upon complainant the taint of unclean hands, and debar it on this ground from the relief to which it is otherwise entitled."

Under the principle of the maxim, a court of equity "would hesitate to hear" one who, by actual violence, or duress per minas, has procured a power of attorney to sell lands, sold the property to himself, and then acquired an equitable title thereto. Davis v. Davis (1890) 9 Mont. 274, 23 Pac. 715

And in Swan v. Castleman (1874) 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 257, it was held that the plaintiff, who was charged by the defendant with having coerced his (plaintiff's) wife into conveying her real estate to a third person, who then reconveyed it to him and his wife jointly, was in court with "unclean hands" in a suit against one who, under a lease of the property, had acquired possession thereof and continued in possession after the expiration of the term, under color of title.

Furthermore, it has been held that where the execution of an instrument is procured by promises not to prosecute someone charged with criminal conduct, or by threats of a criminal prosecution, the consideration being illegal, a court of equity will refuse its aid to either party to the transaction. Shattuck v. Watson (1890) 53 Ark. 147, 7 L.R.A. 551, 13 S. W. 516 (promise not to prosecute for forgery); Atwood v. Fisk (1869) 101 Mass. 363, 100 Am. Dec. 124 (promise not to prosecute for embezzlement).

A court of equity, in the application of the principle involved in the maxim, will refuse its aid to a litigant who has committed forgery in connection with the subject-matter of the suit in. which such aid is sought. Harton v. McKee (1896) 73 Fed. 556. In that case the suit was for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of lands. The defendant had given to the plaintiff an option in writing to purchase certain lands of the former, which option it was sought to exercise. The correct dates of certain letters alleged to have been fraudulently changed by the plaintiff were essential to be known in determining whether the option had been abandoned. The evidence showed that the dates had been changed, and the court denied the plaintiff the relief prayed, saying: "It is unnecessary to determine here as to whether or not these changes were fraudulent to the extent contended for by the defendants; but certainly, if the changes were fraudulent in the way which has been indicated above, for the purpose of making a case for complainants, no court of equity would grant the complainants any relief. They must come into a court of

equity with clean hands; and if they come with papers forged for the purpose of making a case, certainly they would have no standing in court."

In Simcox's Estate (1894) 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 386, it appeared that a widow had forged an instrument, alleged by her to be the will of her deceased husband, conveying the bulk of his estate to her, after destroying the authentic will by which the property was left to an infant without a guardian. She was held to be in court with "unclean hands" in resisting the assessment by the court against her of the attorneys' and witnesses' fees incurred in a suit ordered by the court to be instituted for the purpose of contesting the widow's right to retain the property.

In BARNES V. BARNES (reported herewith) ante, 4, it was held that where the certain forgeries complained of were only as to some of the items of an account, a court of equity could not refuse an accounting as to other items which were not forged.

One who, by his conduct, has acquiesced in a wrong, is estopped from claiming that it precludes the wrongdoer from equitable relief.

In Snyder v. Kelter, 4 Alaska, 447, acquiescence in the presence of bawdyhouses was pleaded against plaintiff in a suit for their abatement.

In Conners v. Conners Bros. Co. (1913) 110 Me. 428, 86 Atl. 843, it was held that whether certain business transactions of the defendant corporation were in accordance with approved business methods or were fraudulent in law or reprehensible ir. morals, the fact that the complainant had knowledge thereof and consented thereto was sufficient to bring his case within the principle of this maxim.

In Ryan v. Miller (1911) 236 Mo. 496, 139 S. W. 128, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 540, a subscriber to the stock of a corporation the purpose of which, known to him, was to use the money subscribed to gamble on horse racing, was held to be in court with "unclean hands" in seeking to rescind the contract, and, after the undertaking had failed, to recover the money invested in the enterprise on the ground of fraud.

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