(53 Okla. 666, 157 Pac. 756.) Daniel. While she had attended school for short time, the evidence is convincing that she was illiterate, uneducated, and inexperienced in business affairs. The several instruments executed by her were each signed by mark. Plaintiff's action is for a cancelation of her purported deed to Tolon, the deed of Tolon to Dickson, and the lease made by Tolon to Teter and Gilbert, on the ground, as stated by counsel: "By her petition herein plaintiff in error admits the execution by her of one deed on the property in controversy, and asks that the same be canceled on account of there being no consideration, or no sufficient consideration therefor, under the existing fiduciary relations existing between the plaintiff in error and defendant Clinton Tolon, and that it be canceled for the further reason that it was secured by false representations as to its character, and is therefore a forgery and void under §2646, Rev. Laws 1910." While there is some conflict in the testimony, particularly as to the belief of Eliza as to the character of instrument that she was called upon to execute on February 6, 1912 (believing it, as she contends, to be an oil lease), the material facts respecting the fiduciary relations and the consideration for the deed are undisputed. As to the consideration, the testimony of Tolon is that the deed was taken in settlement of an account owing him by Eliza for board for some eight years prior to the time he was appointed guardian, and that as she did not get sufficient out of the mortgage to Kennedy to pay him, it was agreed that she would deed him the land subject to the mortgage, which he was to take care of. Being asked on cross-examination concerning the transaction, the following testimony was adduced: Q. How much did she owe you for keeping her and taking care of her? A. Well, we did not have any arrangement over it; we thought Q. You sold 120 acres of her mother's allotment, her surplus, and spent that during that time, didn't you? A. Yes, sir; I did. Q. That money which was derived from the sale of her mother's surplus allotment was used by her mother and by you in buying clothing for this girl and keeping her, was it not? A. A portion of it was. Q. Her mother was satisfied and wanted that done, did she? A. She didn't say anything about it. Q. You finally sold all of your interest in Eliza's mother's land, and spent it all, didn't you? A. Yes, sir; here last fall I did. Q. Who is your last wife? What is her name? charges, $376.44. Eliza's testimony is that she did not receive any portion of this money, but that her stepfather, guardian, and attorney in fact got it. This Tolon denies, and says that the money was paid to Eliza. The testimony of the loan agent showed that the 120 acres of land in controversy was reasonably worth from $1,400 to $1,500. There is testimony tending to show that Eliza, while living with her stepfather, worked about the house and in the fields. Section 4378, Rev. Laws 1910, provides that "a husband is not bound to maintain his wife's children by a former husband; but if he receives them into his family and supports them, it is presumed that he does so as a parent, and where such is the case, they are not liable to him for their support, nor he to them for their services." In Barker v. Barker, 25 Okla. 48, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 909, 105 Pac. 347, we held that a stepfather is neither entitled to the custody or the earnings of the children of his wife by a former husband, and that there is no reciprocal obligation to maintain them; but, where he does admit them into his family and assumes the relationship of parent, the reciprocal rights, obligations, and duties of parent and child attach, and continue as long as that relationship exists. Parent and child-support of stepchildliability. principle on which the court acts in cases of this description is that wherever there exists such a confidence, of whatever character that confidence may be, as enables the person in which confidence or trust is reposed to exert influence over the person trusting him, the court will not allow any transaction between the parties to stand, unless there has been the fullest and fairest explanation and communication of every particular resting in the breast of the one who seeks to establish a contract with the person so trusting him. Whenever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person se availing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although the transaction could not have been impeached if no such confidential relation had existed. Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 1 Eq. 536, 14 L. T. N. S. 163, 14 Week. Rep. 449; Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. 55, 60, 15 L. T. N. S. 549, 15 Week. Rep. 321; Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252, 257, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 267, 12 Jur. N. S. 178, 13 L. T. N. S. 778, 14 Week. Rep. 292. The principle announced and its effect upon the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto extends to transactions between a trustee and a beneficiary, principal and agent, attorney and client, guardian and ward, parent and child, as well as to other relations. Of transactions between a guardian and his ward, it is said in 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 961: "The equitable rules concerning dealings between guardian and ward are very stringent. The relation is so intimate, the dependence so complete, the influence so great, that any transactions between the two parties, or by the guardian alone, through which the guardian ob -dealings betweenequitable rules. (53 Okla. 666, 157 Pac. 756.) tains a benefit, entered into while the relation exists, are in the highest degree suspicious; the presumption against them is so strong that it is hardly possible for them to be sustained. The general doctrine of equity applies to the parties after the legal condition of guardianship has ended, and as long as the dependence on one side and influence on the other presumptively or in fact continue. This influence is presumed to last while the guardian's functions are to any extent still performed, while the property is still at all under his control, and until the accounts have been finally settled. It follows, therefore, that any conveyance, purchase, sale, contract, and especially gift, by which the guardian derives a benefit, made after the termination of the legal relation, but while the influence lasts, is presumed to be invalid and voidable. The burden rests heavily upon the guardian to prove all the circumstances of knowledge, free consent, good faith, absence of influence, which alone can overcome the presumption." In the following section, speaking to the relationship between parent and child, the author says: "The transaction may be one of bounty from the child to the parent, soon after the child has attained twentyone. In such cases the court views the transaction with jealousy, and anxiously interposes its protection to guard the child from the exercise of parental influence. "The law on this subject is well settled. A child makes a gift to a parent, and such gift is good if it is not attended by parental influence. A child is presumed to be under the exercise of parental influence as long as the dominion of the parent parent lasts. Whilst that dominion lasts it lies on the parent maintaining the gift, to disprove the exercise of parental influence by showing that the child had independent advice, or in some other way. When the parental influence is disproved, or that influ ence has ceased, a gift from the child stands on the same footing as any other gift, and the question to be determined is, whether there was a deliberate, unbiased intention on the part of the child to give to the parent."" We mention the relation of guardian and ward and parent and child together, for the reason that here both existed; indeed, more than that, the relation of principal and agent had also attached. The same rule is announced in Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 2d ed. § 317, where it is said, referring to the relation of guardian and ward: "In this most important and delicate of trusts the same principles prevail, and with a larger and more comprehensive efficiency. It is obvious that, during the existence of the guardianship, the transactions of the guardian cannot be binding upon the ward if they are of any disadvantage to him; and indeed, the relative situation of the parties imposed a general inability to deal with each other. But courts of equity proceed yet further in cases of this sort. They will not permit transactions between guardians and wards to stand, even when they have occurred after the minority has ceased and the relation become thereby actually ended, if the intermediate period be short, unless the circumstances demonstrate, in the highest sense of the term, the fullest deliberation on the part of the ward, and the most abundant good faith (uberrima fides) on the part of the guardian. For in all such cases the relation is still considered as having an undue influence upon the mind of the ward, and as virtually subsisting, especially if all the duties attached to the situation have not ceased, as if the accounts between the parties. have not been fully settled, or if the estate still remains in some sort under the control of the guardian." As said by Lord Hardwicke, in Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sr. 548, 28 Eng. Reprint, 349: "Where a man acts as guardian or trustee in nature of a guardian for an infant, the court is extremely watchful to prevent that person's taking any advantage immediately upon his immediately upon his ward .. coming of age, and at the time of settling accounts or delivering up the trust, because an undue advantage may be taken. It would give an opportunity, either by flattery or force, by good usage unfairly meant, or by bad usage imposed, to take such advantage.' In even more emphatic language, Lord Eldon expressed himself in Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. Jr. 297, 32 Eng. Reprint, 617, 1 Smith, 226. By Lord Chancellor Manners, in the High Court of Chancery in Ireland, it was said in Dawson v. Massey, 1 Ball & B. 219, 232: "Generally speaking, there are no transactions in a man's life that ought in this court to be more scrupulously, or with more jealousy, examined, than those which occur recently after he attains the age of twenty-one, affecting his real property; antecedent to that period his infancy is his protection, his disabilities are his security; but instantly after he attains the age of twenty-one, as if he had acquired all the prudence and experience necessary to the management or disposal of his property, with the possession are given the absolute control and dominion over his estates. At law all his acts are binding, all his deeds are valid, unless upon some distinct case of fraud, they can be impeached; but it is not so in this court: those reiations of guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and cestui que trust, which are little regarded in a court of law, are in this court decisive against the validity of a transaction which, between strangers, could not be impeached." To the same effect are the decisions of the courts of this country, to a few of which we call attention. In McParland v. Larkin, 155 Ill. 84, 39 N. E. 609, a deed was made by a female ward, practically without knowledge or experience in business affairs, a few days after attaining her majority, and before her guardian had made his final report, to the guardian's wife, who was her elder sister, and with whom she was living, and it was said, quoting from Schouler, on Domestic Relations, § 389: "But such transactions are always to be regarded with suspicion; and where the influence still continues, as, if the ward be a female or a person of weak understanding, and the guardian continues to control the property or to furnish a home, the court is strongly disposed to set aside the bargain altogether." In that case the peculiar interests of the guardian were opposed to that of the ward. His wife then owned the other two thirds of the realty in question, and by the deed. was acquiring the one third belonging to the ward. The latter was induced to execute the deed prepared by her guardian for her signature, for an inadequate consideration, greatly less than the real value of her interest, unless there was taken into consideration her prior support and maintenance in her sister's family. Note the language of the court: "It is not necessary, in such cases, that actual and intentional fraud be established. It is sufficient, when the parties sustain the relation of guardian and ward, that the former has gained some advantage by the transaction with his ward, to throw the burden of proving good faith and absence of influence, and of knowledge and free consent of the ward, upon the guardian." In Gillett v. Wiley, 126 Ill. 310, 9 Am. St. Rep. 587, 19 N. E. 287, where the guardian procured his ward, after the latter (a young man) had attained his majority, to sign a receipt in full of all money which came into his hands as guardian, the ward not reading the paper or acquainting himself with its contents, but relying solely on the statement of his guardian as to its character and import, it was held that the transaction was void, and even as against the surety upon such guardian's bond, who had (53 Okla. 666, 157 Pac. 756.) held to have known the contents, and will not be permitted to assert his ignorance of its contents to avoid responsibility according to its real import. Here, however, the signing of this receipt was the will and act of the guardian, rather than that of appellee. Courts will watch settlements of guardians with their wards, or any act or transaction between them affecting the estate of the ward, with great jealousy. From the confidential relation between the parties, it will be presumed that the ward was acting under the influence of the guardian, and all transactions between them, prejudicially affecting the interests of the ward, will be held to be constructively fraudulent." Transactions between guardian and ward are learnedly discussed in Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465, 100 Am. Dec. 314, id. 50 Mo. 206, where, in the latter opinion, it is said: "When a ward has but recently arrived at age, any acts of his conferring an advantage or bounty upon his late guardian excite the strongest suspicions, and are viewed by the courts with an almost invincible jealousy. They are considered as constructively fraudulent on account of the confidential relations existing between the parties. They are withdrawn from the operation of the ordinary rules of evidence, and the burden is devolved on the beneficiary of showing that the gift was fair and conscientious and beyond the reach of suspicion. A rule of public policy and pure morals lies at the foundation of this principle and demands its stringent enforcement. Anyone occupying a fiduciary relation so recently that the influence is presumed to still exist cannot avail himself of a bounty from his late ward, or other person holding the relation, unless there is clear and distinct evidence that the influence has determined, and that the donor acted in a manner perfectly free, independent, and unbiased. And the beneficiary must in all instances. furnish this evidence. That is not easily attainable, I am aware, and therefore learned judges have said that it is almost impossible to make this proof." In Williams v. Davison, 133 Mich. 344, 94 N. W. 1048, it is said: "The rule is elementary that, even after the ward attains majority and the guardian's accounts have been settled, while the disability of infancy has been removed, that arising from the trust relation is but slightly diminished, and contracts between the guardian and ward are scrutinized with the utmost care and caution; and, if the guardian derives a benefit or the ward suffers a loss by the transaction, it will not be sustained if the court is convinced that there is lacking the element of the utmost fairness and good faith." A number of English authorities are reviewed in Berkmeyer v. Kellerman, 32 Ohio St. 239, 30 Am. Rep. 577, where it was held that a conveyance by a minor, on the date he came of age, of all his real estate to a person occupying the relations of parent and guardian of such minor, in execution of a settlement made for such minor by others not authorized to bind him, and while he was still under his influence and control, and not advised of his rights, was not binding, and could only be upheld in a court of equity by clear proof that, under all the circumstances, it was just and equitable, and that the burden was on the claimant to show the utmost good faith. Section 2034 of the Kentucky Statutes of 1903 provides that no disbursements should be allowed the guardian for the maintenance and education of the ward beyond the income of the estate, except in the following cases, unless authorized by the deed or will under which the estate is derived: (1) When |