In written by its superintendent to the local agent with whom the plaintiff negotiated expresses its purpose and its construction of the contract in the following terms: "I note the interlineations in the loan agreement, but regret to say that the society cannot accept any loan agreements with changes made therein. It is the form of loan agreement carefully prepared by counsel, and it is necessary that it be executed without change in every case. the matter of a renewal of the loan, the society would be very glad to furnish the beneficiary on this contract with an additional document in the shape of a letter agreeing to continue the loan in accordance with the terms of the contract, although this is not necessary, as the contract itself brings it out. The matter of the notice is one the society cannot consider any more than a bank will consider requirements to give notice in its loan forms. As a matter of practice the society does send out notices in regard to renewal of loans through the payment of interest prior to their maturity, but we cannot and will not put ourselves in position of perhaps complicating either the policy or the loan through any claimed failure to do so. We would be glad to state what our practice in this matter is in a separate communication, but will not bind ourselves to send any notice." A fair and reasonable construction of the policy, considered as a whole, leaves no doubt as to the purpose of the loan provision. It is a part of the policy, and must be interpreted in the light of the general purpose of the contract in which it is found. It cannot be assumed that the defendant intended to bind itself to make renewable loans at a fixed rate of interest below that usually paid to any persons other than the holders of live policies. There was presumptively a consideration for such an agreement. After the lapse of a policy for any reason, there would be no real justification for the favor or indulgence stipulated for in the loan provision. It was a means of encouragement of sales of policies and payments of premiums keeping them in force. There is an express forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums and settlement on a basis which includes deduction of any indebtedness to the defendant under the contract. This necessarily involves by the very terms of the agreement extinguishment of the loan in consequence of nonpayment of any premium. Assignment of the policy as collateral security for the money loaned and the interest necessarily carried right of cancelation for nonpayment of the loan or the interest. A stipulation in the loan agreement for renewal on payment of interest in advance, provided the premium should have been, or should be contemporaneously, paid for the period of the renewal, so as to keep the policy in force for such period, would have been in exact accord with the reciprocal rights of the parties under a proper construction of the policy. The agreement submitted and rejected by the plaintiff was a manifest departure from it, since it would have made the debt absolutely due and payable on the date specified. It made no provision for the borrower's clear right of renewal, and by necessary impli cation denied it. But the tender of a separate instrument giving the separate right, though in- paper. The two papers, if exchanged, formal, was a sufficient compliance. would have been read and considered together and so harmonized as to carry into effect the intention clearly expressed. Pardee v. C. Crane & Co. 74 W. Va. 359, 82 S. E. 340. A deed absolute on its face may be held to have effected only a conditional grant upon disclosure of a defeasance in a separate paper executed by the grantee. Hoffman v. Ryan, 21 W. Va. 415; Kyger v. Depue, 6 W. Va. 288. -contract in The provision in the proposed agreement for cancelation of the (81 W. Va. 663, 95 S. E. 811.) policy without notice in case of default in payment of -intention to the loan was also inconsistent with cancel-notice. the policy contract. It does not call for a loan agreement of that kind. It binds the insured to make a due assignment of the policy as collateral security, but it does not say the assignment shall carry right to the assignee to cancel it without notice and an opportunity to show lack of default or to pay the loan and save the policy after a default. As the days of grace allowed in the third clause of the division, entitled "Privileges and Conditions," do not apply to defaults in the payment of loans, the right to pay after default is not expressly provided for in the policy. As to it, the policy is open to construction, and the agreement proposed would have amounted to a practical construction by the parties, binding upon them. The assignment stipulated for as a condition of the loan was not defined otherwise than by the use of the word "due," and the phrase "as collateral security," but it is contended such an assignment as banks customarily take in making loans on collateral was contemplated. The difference between the relations of these parties and those obtaining between a bank and a borrower is very marked. This is a contract to make a loan on certain conditions indicated in general terms. In the other case there is no contract and no obligation to make the loan. Nothing has been previously settled between the parties. Here there is a contract to make a loan, and it is silent as to right of cancelation without notice for default. Such right is deemed not to exist in the absence of a waiver expressed or reasonably and fairly implied. Jones, Collateral Securities, §§ 730 to 732. Moreover, the subject-matter of the assignment stipulated for is wholly unlike commercial paper. It is an executory contract based upon conditions that have changed and cannot be restored, wherefore its loss may be far more detrimental than the loss of a merely pecuniary demand. The rates of premium advance with age, and physical infirmities liable to occur at any time may have rendered it impossible for the insured in any case to obtain new insurance at even higher rates. The principle of analogy fails for total dissimilarity in situation and circumstances. Lack of proof of plaintiff's readiness, willingness, and desire to take the loan upon proper conditions, and deviation of the form as altered by him from the true interpretation of the contract, in that it fails to provide for continuance of the policy in force by payment of premiums, are urged against the verdict. His application for the loan and expression of willingness to execute his obligation for it and assign the policy warranted the jury in finding his willingness and desire to take it. Nothing in his conduct indi- -refusalcated unwillingness effect. to sign an agreement making the maintenance of the policy a condition of continuance of the loan. At the very inception of the negotiations, he was met with flat refusal to provide for notice of default as a step preliminary to cancelation. That excused further negotiation on his part, and he was under no duty to suggest conditions favorable to the defendant. It seems to have been amply able to take care of its own interests. An exception was taken to the overruling of a general objection to the introduction of a letter from Thomas B. Sweeney, the local agent of the defendant, through whom the plaintiff negotiated for the loan, directed to the defendant's superintendent, and urging compliance with the conditions suggested by the plaintiff. Some of the matter contained in it may have been inadmissible, but it was clearly admissible for proof of the plaintiff's efforts to obtain the loan referred to in it. objectionUnder such circumstances a general objection is un Evidence general. availing. It must be special and limited to the inadmissible part of the evidence or the purpose for which it cannot be considered. State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 448, 129 Am. St. Rep. 964, 59 S. E. 971; State v. Calhoun, 67 W. Va. 666, 69 S. E. 1098; Billups v. Woolridge, 80 W. Va. 13, 91 S. E. 1082. The policy under which the first loan was applied for was issued in 1901. A provision of a form of policy used by the defendant in 1911, relating to loans, and allowing the borrower all the conditions claimed by the plaintiff, and even more, was admitted over an objection. As this tended to prove reasonableness of the plaintiff's construction of the contract in the estimation of the defendant, as dis -subsequent contracts. closed by its subsequent conduct relating to the subject-matter, it was relevant and material, wherefore the objection was properly overruled. State ex rel. Mt. Hope Coal Co. v. White Witnessinsurance agent. damages. collateral for the purpose, the testi- tion was admissible. He said the provision was a standard one known in all policies issued since some time in the year 1907. Inasmuch as the plaintiff borrowed the money from banks on collateral other than the policies owned by him, and did not hire or borrow The plaintiff cross assigns error in the refusal of his proposed instruction No. 4, which would have told the jury he had right to recover for the use of his collateral securities. The disposition of the assignment of error relating to the evidence adduced to prove this item sustains the refusal of the instruction. His instruction No. 3 is founded upon the theory of right of recovery for his time and labor devoted to procurement of the loans from banks, and he proved by a witness that brokers charged of 1 per cent for procuring loans in the community in which he resided, but not that he had paid that rate. He procured the loans himself. The argument submitted in support of the assignment of error, based on the giving of the instruction, does not seem to question right to compensation for such services, but it denies sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the instruction. The evidence does not detail the days or hours of service, and it proves the loans in question were only parts of larger ones (81 W. Va. 663, 95 S. E. 811.) obtained. Notwithstanding these circumstances, it justified the giving of the instruction. As a general rule, such services are services are not compensated for on the basis of rates by the day or hour. Such compensation is made ordinarily on a percentage basis. Susceptibility of apportionment of the value of the service required in procuring the larger loans of which those in question were parts is obvious. All of the instructions requested by the defendant were contrary to the conclusion here expressed as to the interpretation of the contract and the rights of the parties thereunder, wherefore they were properly refused. In substance and effect they would have been directions to find for the defendant. The court properly told the jury, in an oral charge, they should find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at not less than $562, the amount of the interest he had had to pay in excess of that stipulated for. Exclusion here of the item for compensation for the use of collateral securities, which the jury necessarily included in their verdict, makes it excessive. It is so for another reason. The proof of value of services in procuring loans does not warrant recovery of $500 on that account. The usual compensation to brokers for obtaining loans in the plaintiff's community is, according to the evidence, of 1 per cent and nothing for renewals. He says he handled the $17,680 on about thirty loans, but this is qualified by an admission that some of them were renewals. Just how many were actual loans and how many renewals he does not say. His evidence is too uncertain on this point to justify recovery of the amount claimed and allowed for services. The letter of Thomas B. Sweeney, agent, to the superintendent, transmitting the form of agreement with interlineations made by the plaintiff, and dated March 30, 1911, was admissible to prove Evidencetransmission of the correspondence. altered form. In view of other evidence of the fact, it may not have been important, but it was relevant and material. The court should have admitted it. For reasons stated in the disposi-. tion of the assignment of error predicated on on the admission of Sweeney's testimony, the loan clause used in the policy of 1915, issued by the defendant, should have been admitted. No evidence offered to prove purpose on the part of the defendant to discourage policy loans is pointed out in the cross assignment of error pertaining to it or elsewhere. The court will not search the record for it. The judgment will have to be reversed, the verdict set aside, and a new trial allowed. Petition for rehearing denied, May 9, 1918. ANNOTATION. Breaches of loan agreements in insurance policies. As indicated by the title, this note deals with the question of breaches of loan agreements by the insurer as constituting a ground for an action for damages, or as justifying a rescission of the policy by the insured. Provisions giving the insured a right to borrow on the policy after a certain number of premiums have been paid are now commonly found in life insurance policies. This right in many instances is a potent factor in inducing the taking of a policy. It is a part of the contract, and the insured is entitled to loans in accord with the conditions stated in such provisions, and clearly has the right to maintain an action for damages in case the insurer refuses to make a loan according to its contract. It will be noted that in the reported case (HUBBARD V. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. ante, 886) the policy proIvided that after it had been in force a certain time, the insurer would make loans at stated interest, of amounts named in a table, upon assignment of the policy as collateral, and that it was decided that this agreement contemplated a continuance of the loans at the option of the borrower upon payment of premiums and interest in advance until the maturity of the policy, and the insured was therefore held entitled to a provision in the loan agreement giving him a right of renewal upon payment of interest for such time as he kept the policy alive up to the time of maturity; but it was held that a provision in a separate paper was sufficient to give him this right, and that he could not refuse the loan because it was not incorporated in the loan agreement proper. It was further decided that the insured was entitled to a reasonable notice of the insurer's intention to cancel the policy for default in payment of the loan, and that the insurer's refusal to make the loan without a provision in the loan agreement giving it the right to cancel the policy without notice was a breach of the loan provision of the policy. him in rescinding the contract and maintaining an action for a return of the premiums. In Lewis v. New York L. Ins. Co. (1910) 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1202, 84 C. C. A. 181, 181 Fed. 433, so holding, the court observed that the undertaking was merely subsidiary to the main purpose of the contract, which was to insure. It was further held in this case that, assuming that the insured was entitled to rescind for a refusal to make a loan, no case for rescission was made, where the insured had not allowed time between the making of his demand for a loan and the bringing of suit, for the application to reach the home office and a reply to be returned, and had not executed a loan agreement which the policy made a condition precedent to the granting of a loan. A similar situation arose in Bozeman v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1908) 130 Ky. 572, 113 S. W. 836, where a policy provided the conditions on which loans should be made, but did not include a provision that if the loan, with the accumulated interest, should become equal to the reserve value of the policy, the company might demand immediate payment of the loan, or any part thereof, and that, if not paid, the policy should become void, and it was held that such a provision, which the insurer incorporated in a loan agreement, was not binding on the insured, as it was without any consideration to support it. It was further held, however, that if it were regarded as valid, the evidence in the case failed to show that the amount of the loan and interest equaled the legal reserve. While a breach of the insurer's contract to make loans gives the insured a right to maintain an action for damages, it has been held not to justify And under the pleadings in this case, which set forth an action praying damages for a failure to make a loan on the policy according to its terms, it was held that there could be no recovery of premiums, and that it was immaterial that the complaint contained language indicating an intention on the plaintiff's part to repudiate the contract, where it also showed that the insurer had no such intention. In New York L. Ins. Co. v. Pope (1902) 139 Ky. 567, 68 S. W. 851, where the original policy provided for loans to the insured, one of the conditions being an assignment of the policy to the insurer as collateral, a recovery of damages for a breach of the agreement was allowed, it appearing that the original policy had been burned and that a copy had been delivered to the insured, and that he had applied for a loan, but had been refused, because the original policy was not delivered as collateral. A rescission and recovery of the premiums paid, however, was denied. And in Harn v. Missouri State L Ins. Co. (1918) Okla. 173 Pac. 214, where an endowment policy contained a provision giving the insured the right to borrow money from the insurer on the security of the policy in progressive sums as the policy |