or of any person pecuniarily inter Injunctionagainst raising rates-remedy at law. ested in the utility, for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the order or revision determined. Hence, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff below had by reason of the Public Utility Act a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law for the determination of its grievance. It will be noted that the town, now city, of Englewood, is a municipality deriving its municipal powers from legislative grant. Whether or not the rule here announced may be applied in the case of an ordinance by a municipality operating under article 20 of the Constitution, and conducting its municipal affairs under constitutional powers and limitations, without the intervention of legislative acts, is a different and more difficult question, which we do not determine. The judgment is reversed, with instructions to dismiss the proceeding. Gabbert, Ch. J., dissenting: The majority opinion is based upon three propositions: First, that by the Public Utilities Act power is conferred upon the Public Utilities Commission to change the rates for carrying passengers fixed by contract; second, that the railway company having filed with the Commission its schedule of rates, which were not suspended by the Commission upon its own motion or upon the complaint of others for thirty days, the same became effective; and, third, that by the act in question the city has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law by a proceeding before the Commission. From each of these I dissent. 1. It is said specific power is not conferred upon the city of Englewood to enact a rate-making ordinance, and therefore rates fixed by the ordinance granting the railway company a license to construct and maintain a street railway upon its streets may be changed by the Utilities Commission. In the first place the question of rates for transportation over the line of the railway company is not involved, and in the second place express power is conferred upon the city to fix rates which may be charged by a street railway company to which a franchise is granted. The provision of the ordinance which the railway company seeks to be relieved from does not relate to rates which it may charge for transportation over its own line, but to the provision whereby it was required to sell coupon tickets which would entitle persons taking a car going north from a specified point to passage on the line of the Denver City Tramway Company into the city of Denver, and also entitle persons going south on the cars of the tramway company to be transported over the line of the railway company to a street designated in the city of Englewood. This is in no sense a charge for transportation over the line of the railway company. The fare over its line has always been 5 cents, and its effort is not to increase or change rates, but to be relieved from its contract whereby it was required to furnish transportation over the line of the tramway company in the instances named. But conceding, for the sake of the argument, that rates are involved, the cases cited in support of the proposition that authority is not conferred upon the city of Englewood to fix rates are not in point. statutes and the Constitution confer upon the city the power to fix rates as a condition upon which a franchise to operate a street railway over its streets is granted. Section 6676, Revised Statutes 1908, quoted in the majority opinion, must be read in connection with the section following, whereby it is provided that a corporation desiring to secure a franchise from a city or incorporated town must publish a notice. of its intention to apply to the corporate authorities for the passage of an ordinance granting such franchise, which notice must specify the terms upon which such franchise is Our (62 Colo. 229, P.U.R.1916E, 134, 161 Pac. 151.) desired. This means that the franchise can only be granted upon terms, and necessarily confers upon the municipal authorities the express power to contract with the corporation seeking the franchise by specifying the terms upon which it is granted. So that, when a corporation accepts a franchise imposing terms, it thereby enters into a contract the municipal authorities are authorized to make, which cannot be abrogated by any act of the legislature that would impair the obligation of such contract. In addition, we have a constitutional provision (§ 11, art. 15) which provides: "No street railroad shall be constructed within any city, town or incorporated village, without the consent of the local authorities having control of the street or highway proposed to be occupied by such street railroad." From this provision it follows that, when a street railway cannot be constructed over the streets of a city without the consent of the municipal authorities, the latter have the express power to specify the terms and conditions upon which it may be constructed and maintained. A 2. Conceding that power is vested in the Utilities Commission to change a rate fixed by contract, this cannot be accomplished in the manner attempted by the railway company; i. e., by posting notice of such change with the Commission. change in a contract rate can only be made by a utility corporation making application to the Commission for such change, on notice to the parties interested, after a hearing whereby all parties are afforded an opportunity to be heard, and a change allowed by an express order of the Commission to that effect. 3. The act does not require the city to apply to the Commission to have its contract with the railway company enforced. It has never been modified. It is in full force and effect, and the only remedy open to the city is by an action in the district court to compel the railway company to comply with the terms of its contract. The result of the conclusion announced by the majority opinion is sufficient to demonstrate without further argument that it is wrong. The railway company was granted the privilege the privilege of occupying the streets of the city upon terms with which it now refuses to comply, and yet continues to occupy the streets. One of the considerations which moved the municipal authorities to grant a franchise to the railway company has been taken away, and it is permitted to exercise a privilege which it must be conclusively presumed would never have been granted except for such consideration. The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. Teller, J., concurs. Petition for rehearing denied December 4, 1916. Petition for a writ of error dismissed by the Supreme Court of the United States, January 7, 1919 (248 U. S. 294, 63 L. ed. 253, P.U.R. 1919B, 638, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100). NOTE. It will be observed that the decision in the reported case (DENVER & S. P. R. Co. v. ENGLEWOOD, ante, 956) upholding what in effect amounted to an increase of rates with the approval of the Public Service Commission, over those named by the ordinance which granted the franchise, was upon the ground that the power conferred upon the municipality to grant street railway franchises did not imply power to fix rates which could not be subsequently increased. Other cases sustaining the principle that the granting to a municipality of the power to make an inviolable contract as to public utility rates must be made in clear and unequivocal terms, and that the power will not be implied, are cited at page 732 of the annotation in 3 A.L.R. 730, on the general subject of the "Power of public service commission to increase franchise rates." The power of public service commission with respect to the regulation of street railways generally is the subject of annotation in 5 A.L.R. THOMAS P. KENNEY, Admr., etc., of Donald A. Kenney, Deceased, Appt., V. SUPREME LODGE OF THE WORLD, LOYAL ORDER OF MOOSE. JOHN C. GUSTIN, Admr., etc., of Christopher Gustin, Appt., (285 Ill. 188, 120 N. E. 631.) Judgment -foreign cause not within jurisdiction. 1. A state need not, under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, enforce a judgment obtained in another state for death from wrongful injuries, if its courts would not have had jurisdiction of the original cause of action for the injuries there inflicted. [See note on this question beginning on page 968.] APPEALS by plaintiffs from judgments of the Circuit Court for Kane County (Slusser, J.) in favor of defendant in consolidated actions brought to enforce judgments obtained in another state for death from wrongful injuries. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Blum, Wolfsohn, & Blum and Raymond & Newhall for appellants. Messrs. E. J. Henning and Alschuler, Putnam, & Flannigen, for appellee: A state court is free to determine its own jurisdiction absolutely, without reference to the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. Anglo-American Provision Co. V. Davis Provision Co. 191 U. S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, L.R.A.1918E, 914, 115 N. E. 2, 16 N. C. C. A. 191; Dough erty v. American-McKenna Process Co. 255 Ill. 369, L.R.A.1915F, 955, 99 N. E. 619, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 568; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U..S. 230, 52 L. ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641; Carpenter v. Beal-McDonnell, 222 Fed. 453. Where an action is brought upon a judgment of a sister state, the court may always examine the nature of the cause of action upon which the judgment is founded for the purpose of determining if it would have jurisdiction (285 Ill. 188, 120 N. E. 631.) of the real subject-matter of the action, and if it appears that the court would not have jurisdiction of the original action, it will not have jurisdiction of an action on the judgment. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 52 L. ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641; Carpenter v. Beal-McDonnell, and Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. supra; Oklahoma ex rel. West v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 220 U. S. 290, 55 L. ed. 469, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 524; St. Louis Expanded Metal Fire Proofing Co. v. Beilharz, Tex. Civ. App. -- 88 S. W. 512; Beal v. Carpenter, 148 C. C. A. 633, 235 Fed. 273; Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 3 L.R.A. 554, 37 Fed. 497; Dey v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 45 Fed. 82; United States v. Shapleigh, 4 C. C. A. 237, 12 U. S. App. 26, 54 Fed. 126. The provision of the statute that no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to recover damages for a death occurring outside of the state is constitutional, and does not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, or the clause entitling the citizens of each state to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states. Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, L.R.A. 1918E, 914, 115 N. E. 2, 16 N. C. C. A. 191; Dougherty v. American-McKenna Process Co. 255 Ill. 369, L.R.A.1915F, 955, 99 N. E. 619, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 568; Chambers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34. Cooke, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Thomas P. Kenney, administrator of the estate of Donald A. Kenney, brought his action of debt in the circuit court of Kane county on a judgment obtained in the state of Alabama against the Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose. At the same time John C. Gustin, administrator of the estate of Christopher Gustin, brought a like suit in the same court against the same defendant. From the declarations it appears that suits were commenced in the city court of Birmingham, Alabama, a court of general jurisdiction, and judgments were recovered, respectively, in the sum of $18,000 in the Kenney Case and $15,000 in the Gustin Case. plea was filed in each case to the jurisdiction of the court, alleging the deceased came to his death by injuries inflicted upon his person in the state of Alabama, and that the death occurred within the state of Alabama, and that the judgment upon which suit was brought herein was for damages assessed for the negligent causing of the death. To this plea plaintiff demurred, and, the demurrer being overruled, plaintiff in each instance elected to stand by his demurrer, and judgment was rendered by the court. From this judgment plaintiff in each case appealed. The questions involved in both appeals are the same, and the causes have been consolidated. In Section 2 of our Injuries Act (Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1917, chap. 70) provides that no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to recover damages for a death occurring outside of this state. In Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, L.R.A.1918E, 914, 115 N. E. 2, 16 N. C. C. A. 191, we held that the courts of this state had no jurisdiction of an action for damages occasioned by death occurring in another state in consequence of wrongful act, neglect, or default. Dougherty v. American-McKenna Process Co. 255 Ill. 369, L.R.A. 1915F, 955, 99 N. E 619, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 568, we also held that the courts of this state were without jurisdiction to entertain such a cause of action, and that the jurisdictional provisions contained in the statute did not contravene the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (article 4, S 1), or the provision of the Federal Constitution entitling the citizens of each state to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. The original action on which the judgments were obtained not being maintainable in Illinois, the question arises whether, under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, the circuit court was concluded by the judgments of the Alabama court, or whether it could look behind the judgments to determine the nature of the causes of action upon which the judgments were based. The full faith and credit clause of Constitutional law-full faith the Federal Consti- and credit-duty pel a state to give its to enforce foreign judgment. courts jurisdiction against its will. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. 191 U. S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92. In that case one Illinois corporation sued another Illinois corporation in the New York supreme court upon an Illinois judgment. The New York Code provided that "an action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by another foreign corporation, or by a nonresident, in one of the following cases only: (3) Where the cause of action arose within the state." Code Civ. Proc. § 1780. It was argued there that the state could not exclude a foreign corporation from suing upon judgments obtained in another state, because to do so was to deny full faith and credit to those judgments. In passing upon the question the court said: "The Constitution does not require the state of New York to give jurisdiction to the supreme court against its will. If the plaintiff can find a court into which it has a right to come, then the effect of the judgment is fixed by the Constitution and the act in pursuance of it which Congress has passed. Rev. Stat. § 905; Comp. Stat. § 1519, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 212. But the Constitution does not require the state to provide such a court. See Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 30, 25 L. ed. 989, 992. If the state does provide a court to which its own citizens may resort in a certain class of cases, it may be that citizens of other states of the Union also would have a right to resort to it in cases of the same class." so long as a state does not discriminate between its own citizens and the citizens of other states, it may limit the jurisdiction of its courts upon actions on judgments, the same as it may do with relation to any other kind of action. It follows from this holding that, Courts determine. It now remains to be seen how far a court may go in determining whether or not it has jurisdiction in an action brought on a judgment. Where an action is brought upon a judgment rendered in another state, the court may examine into the na- jurisdictionture of the cause of power to action upon which the judgment is founded, for the purpose of determining whether it would have had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and if it appears that the court would not have had jurisdiction of the original action, it will not have jurisdiction of the action on the judgment. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370. In that case, which is the leading case in the United States on this question, an action was commenced in the United States Supreme Court upon a judgment obtained by the state of Wisconsin in a court of that state for a penalty for violation of the statutes of that state. The ground upon which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States was invoked was that the plaintiff was one of the states of the Union and the defendant a corporation of another state. In deter mining that it was without jurisdiction the Supreme Court held that the provision of the Constitution and the act of Congress by which the judgments of the courts of any state are to have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the state in which they were rendered establish a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction, and said: "While they make the record of a judgment rendered, after due notice, in one state, conclusive evidence in the |