(285 Ill. 188, 120 N. E. 631.) courts of another state or of the United States of the matter adjudged, they do not affect the jurisdiction either of the court in which the judgment is rendered or of the court in which it is offered in evidence. Judgments recovered in one state of the Union, when proved in the courts of another government, whether state or national, within the United States, differ from judgments recovered in a foreign country in no other respect than in not being re-examinable on their merits, nor impeachable for fraud in obtaining them, if rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 535, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242. The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment upon it, and the technical rules which regard the original claim as merged in the judgment and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay it do not preclude a court to which a judgment is presented for affirmative action (while it cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim) from ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to enforce it." The holding in that case was followed and approved in AngloAmerican Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. supra; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 52 L. ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641; Oklahoma ex rel. West v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 220 U. S. 290, 55 L. ed. 469, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 524; Carpenter v. Beal-McDonnell (D. C.) 222 Fed. 453; Beal v. Carpenter, 148 C. C. A. 633, 235 Fed. 273. These cases clearly distinguish be Constitutional and credit- inal action. tween a defense which is directed to the jurisdiction of the court in which suit is brought on a judgment and a defense which goes to the merits of the original action. While it could not be questioned that in a suit on a judgment a defense which is directed to the merits law-full faith of the original action would be in merits of orig violation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, it is equally clear that an inquiry for the purpose of merely determining the jurisdiction of the court in an action on the judgment makes no attack upon the judgment itself and does not question its binding force. Such an inquiry does not constitute a collateral attack upon the judgment. Plaintiffs rely upon Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 52 L. ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, and Beal their contention that a judgment rev. Carpenter, supra, in support of covered in a court of another state is enforceable, even though the cause of action upon which it is based would have been unenforceable in a court of this state. A careful analysis of those cases discloses that they have followed the holding in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., supra, and that they do not support the contention of plaintiffs. The legislature has seen fit to forbid recovery in this state for a death by wrongful act occurring without the state, and has deprived our courts of jurisdiction to entertain such a cause of action. Under jurisdiction. the holdings in the Judgment- firmed. Petition for rehearing denied. ANNOTATION. Refusal to entertain an action upon a judgment rendered in another state upon a cause of action which it would have been contrary to statute or public policy of the forum to have entertained. Generallly. The question involved in the reported case, whether a court of one state may, notwithstanding the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution, refuse to recognize or enforce a judgment rendered in another, because it is founded upon a claim or cause of action the enforcement of which in the first instance would have been contrary to the public policy embodied in an express statute or in a rule established by a series of uniform judicial precedents of the former state,-is one which presents considerable doubt and difficulty. The reported case (KENNEY V. SUPREME LODGE, L. O. M. ante, 964), in support of its decision that a court of a state which has enacted a statute that no action shall be brought or prosecuted in the state to recover damages for a death occurring outside the state is not bound to enforce a judgment rendered in another state upon such a cause of action, invokes the distinction between defenses which go to the jurisdiction and those which go to the merits. That distinction is made and applied in Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. (1903) 191 U. S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92, infra (see also Rose's Notes for this case), with the result that the statute in question was held to go to the jurisdiction, and in Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 52 L. ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641 (see also Rose's Notes for this case), with the result that the statute there in question was held to go to the merits, and not to the jurisdiction. In Fauntleroy v. Lum (U. S.) supra, a majority of the United States Supreme Court (reversing the decision of the Mississippi supreme court (1902) 80 Miss. 757, 92 Am. St. Rep. 620, 32 So. 290) held that, under the full faith and credit clause, the Mississippi court could not refuse to entertain an action on a judgment of a Missouri court, based upon an award in arbitration proceedings in Mississippi, because the original controversy grew out of a gambling transaction in futures in Mississippi, which the Mississippi statute declared a misdemeanor, the statute further providing that contracts arising out of such transactions should not be enforced in any court. Mr. Justice Holmes, who wrote the prevailing opinion, distinguished the case from Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. (U. S.) supra, upon the ground that in that case, the New York statutes refused to provide a court into which a foreign corporation could come except upon causes of action arising within the state, and that the decision in that case that a court of New York was not bound to enforce a judgment rendered in Illinois between Illinois corporations, upon a cause of action not arising in New York, was upon the ground that the state of New York was under no constitutional obligation to give jurisdiction to its supreme court against its will, whereas the Mississippi statute in the case at bar did not go to the jurisdiction of the court, but to the merits of the cause of action. This opinion characterizes as a dictum the passage in the opinion in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370 (see also Rose's Notes for this case), which has been treated as meaning that a court of one state, when asked to entertain an action on a judgment of another, may go behind the judgment and look to the cause of action upon which it was based; and calls attention to the fact that the suit in that case was not brought in one state upon a judgment of another, but was brought originally in the United States Supreme Court by the state of Wisconsin upon a Wisconsin judgment against a foreign corporation. An emphatic dissent from the decision in the Fauntleroy Case is registered by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, with whom concurred Harlan, McKenna, and Day, JJ. That opinion reaffirms Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (U. S.) supra, as authority for the principle that the full faith and credit provision does not deprive the court of the right to go behind the face of a money judgment and ascertain the cause of action upon which it has been rendered. In this connection the court quoted as follows from the opinion in the Pelican Case, employing brackets at the place indicated: "The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment upon it; and the technical rules which regard the original claim as merged in the judgment, and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay it, do not preclude a court to which a judgment is presented for affirmative action [while it cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim] from ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to enforce it." After quoting this language from the Pelican Case, the dissenting opinion in the Fauntleroy Case alludes to the argument of the prevailing opinion in that case to the effect that the ruling in the Pelican Case was qualified by the bracketed sentence in the passage; and in answer to that argument said that the words "validity of the claim," used in that sentence, merely pointed out the absence of power, when a judgment is one which is entitled to be enforced, to relitigate the mere question of liability; and that the language following the bracketed sentence, which declares that the court is empowered "to ascertain whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is entitled to enforce it," left no room for the implication that the bracketed sentence was intended to destroy the very doctrine upon which the decision in the Pelican Case was necessarily based, and without which the decision must have been otherwise. Continuing, Justice White said that the decision in the Pelican Case had never been overruled or qualified, but, on the contrary, that decision has been affirmed and approv ingly cited in many cases, mentioning specifically Cole V. Cunningham (1890) 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269 (see also Rose's Notes for this case); Andrews v. Andrews (1903) 188 U. S. 14, 47 L. ed. 366, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237 (see also Rose's Notes for this case), neither of which is within the scope of this note; and Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. which has already been referred to. The case of Irose v. Balla (1914) 181 Ind. 491, 104 N. E. 851, is not within the scope of the note, but is cited here for the statement by the court that it is not to be doubted that cases involving the peculiar public policy of a state with respect to matters of purely domestic character, such as marriage and divorce, do not present the same questions under the full faith and credit clause which arise in cases where common-law rights are involved, or causes of action created by statute, not inconsistent with local policy; in such cases, where the action is brought to enforce a foreign judgment, or rights under it, the court in which such action is brought may inquire into the original cause of action itself, as to whether it amounts to an invasion of the laws of that state, or is in contravention of its public policy. See also, in this connection, Interstate Sav. & T. Co. v. Wyatt (1915) 27 Colo. App. 217, 147 Pac. 444, infra. In Beal v. Carpenter (1916) 148 C. C. A. 633, 235 Fed. 273, however, the court, upon the authority of Christmas v. Russell (1866) 5 Wall. (U. S.) 290, 18 L. ed. 475, and Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 52 L. ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, declared that, in a suit upon a judgment or decree of a court of another state, the same credit and effect must be given to it by the court in which the suit on the judgment or decree is brought as would be given to it in the foreign state, although the judgment or decree is founded upon a contract or transaction, or an action, good in the foreign state, but contrary to the public policy of, and forbidden under penalties of, the state in which the suit upon the judgment or decree is brought. This was an action in the Federal court in Arkansas upon a judgment rendered in New York upon certain stock transactions which were valid by the law of New York, where the contracts were made and performable, but which were contrary to the public policy of Arkansas. So, in Westwater v. Murray (1917) 157 C. C. A. 589, 245 Fed. 427, the court said, upon the authority of Fauntleroy v. Lum and Beal v. Carpenter, that, under the full faith and credit clause, the courts of Ohio would be bound to enforce a judgment rendered in another state upon a cognovit note, including a provision for attorneys' fees, meaning apparently that that would be true even if it were contrary to the public policy of Ohio to enforce a provision for attorneys' fees in a note made and payable in another state. The court, however, seems to have been of the opinion that while such provision in a note made and payable in Ohio would be contrary to the public policy of that state, and void, it would not be contrary to the public policy of Ohio to enforce such a provision in a note governed by the law of another state. Upon that hypothesis, of course, course, there would be no ground for refusing to entertain the action on the judgment of the other state. In Phillips v. Godfrey (1860) 7 Bosw. (N. Y.) 151, the court disposed, as scarcely worthy of notice, of the objection that the cause of action upon which the judgment recovered in the other state was obtained was such as could not have been sued upon in the courts of New York; but the report does not show that the objection to the action upon the original cause of action, if brought in New York, would have been upon the ground that it was contrary to the public policy of New York to entertain the action. It is obvious, of course, that an objection which did not rise above the point that the original cause of action was lacking in merit, tested by the law of New York, would afford no ground whatever for refusing to entertain the action based upon the judgment in the other state. In Minkus v. Armstrong (1907) 90 Miss. 751, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 873, 44 So. 32, it was held that a court of Mississippi would not entertain an actioncommenced before the recognition by the laws of that state of the right of the wife and children of a party paying money on a future transaction, or the party himself, to sue for and recover such money-to enforce a judgment recovered in Tennessee under such a statute. The court, however, observed that it did not decide at that time anything as to the right of the widow to maintain the action if commenced after the adoption of the Mississippi statute; and in a subsequent action upon the same judgment, commenced after the Mississippi statute had been put in force, it was held that the action would lie ((1908) 93 Miss. 621, 47 So. 467). The court pointed out in the last case that the previous decision was simply redeclaring the law as held by the Mississippi supreme court in the case of Lum v. Fauntleroy (1902) 80 Miss. 757, 92 Am. St. Rep. 620, 32 So. 290, and that the latter case had been in the meantime reversed by the United States Supreme Court (Fauntleroy v. Lum (U. S.) supra); and the opinion concludes that, in the light of that decision, the plaintiff in the case at bar had the right to maintain the suit on the Tennessee judgment, whatever it may have been founded upon there, and that she also now had the right under the Mississippi statute. The West Virginia supreme court in Roller v. Murray (1912) 71 W. Va. 161, L.R.A.1915F, 984, 76 S. E. 172, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, held that a decree of a court of Virginia declaring a contract void and unenforceable because champertous under the law of that state was entitled to full faith and credit in another state in which the contract, unaffected by that decision, would be valid. The court said: it were an affirmative judgment of the Virginia court against the plaintiff here, based upon a statute, instead of the common law as understood in Virginia, it would be entitled to respect and full faith and credit, however different our law might be, and even "If though it were contrary to the public policy of this state." A writ of error in this case was dismissed by the United States Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction ((1914) 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 902), upon the ground that no substantial Federal question was involved in the contention that the decision of the West Virginia court, giving conclusive effect to the Virginia judgment, denied due process of law, for, even supposing that the court erred in that regard, it was no more than an error of law, committed in the exercise of jurisdiction. In Mottu v. Davis (1909) 151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969, it was held that an action upon a judgment rendered in another state could not be defended on the ground that the judgment was based on a gambling transaction, that question having been raised and determined adversely to the defendant in the state in which the judgment was rendered, and the judgment, therefore, not being open to attack upon that ground in that state. The defendant invoked the provision of the North Carolina statute: "Nor shall the courts of this state have any jurisdiction to entertain any suit or action brought upon a judgment based on any such contract [gambling contract]." The statute, however, was held to be inapplicable for the reason that the very question whether the plaintiff's original judgment arose out of a gambling transaction had been decided adversely to the defendant in the other state. If, as is apparently true, the decision in the other state went to the point that the contract was not a gambling transaction at all, there was no ground upon which a court of the latter state could refuse to entertain the action, since that decision was of course conclusive as to the merits. The case was therefore quite different from one in which the judgment in the other state is rendered upon the footing of a transaction which, though not contrary to the law or public policy of that state, is contrary to the public policy of the state in which the action is brought to enforce the judgment. In this con nection, the North Carolina court observed that there is no recognizable principle that would prevent a state legislature from withdrawing the jurisdiction of its courts from an action to enforce judgments, when it was admitted or clearly appeared that recovery had been awarded on a transaction forbidden by its public policy or statute law, and the matter had not been raised, considered, or determined in the courts "of the original forum; adding that the question is expressly reserved in Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. (1903) 191 U. S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92, and is not necessarily determined in Fauntleroy v. Lum, as that decision is chiefly made on the fact that the legislation there presented was addressed to the rights of the parties, and the duty of the domestic courts concerning them, and not to their jurisdiction and power, though the opinion arguendo gives decided intimation against the validity of such legislation except to the extent that like defense and inquiry would be open to defendant in the courts of the sister state where the judgment was obtained." Caruthers v. Corbin (1868) 38 Ga. 75, declares generally that while the court will not enforce the laws of another state which contravene the public policy of the forum, yet it will respect a judgment of another state giving effect to a will which, according to the law of Georgia, would be illegal because of provisions for the manumission of slaves. The court said, however, that it was not called upon to enforce any illegal provisions of the will, and that the question of emancipation was not in any way before it. Judgment under penal statute. It is a well-settled principle that no state will enforce penalties imposed by the laws of another; and the case of Wisconsin V. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 290, 32 L. ed. 243, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370, was, formerly at least, supposed to have established the principle that the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution does not require a court of one state |