ter is not supported by his finding of facts. It is true that the remedy was advertised by appellant as a cure for more diseases, perhaps, than any remedy could possibly cure. But this, in itself, is not unclean hands. Proprietary medicines, generally, promise more than they do; and for that matter licensed physicians often do the same. And with proprietary medicines, as with physicians, the object often is to give mere temporary help, under the belief of the patient that he is obtaining a cure. But whether this be an improper use of the public's confidence, or constitutes a practice against public policy, is a question to be decided by the state through its legislature, and not by the courts under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands; for, so far as this case discloses, proprietary medicines are lawful commerce, and are to be given the freedom of mere trade boasting that ordinary commerce is allowed to enjoy."

In C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co. (1893) 93 Tenn. 84, 23 S. W. 165, a statement made in good faith, that "this is the original and only genuine Simmons liver medicine," was held not to debar the proprietor from relief against unfair competition, though there were in fact other remedies on the market, made from the same formula.

c. As to identity of manufacturer of article.

Where a trademark or trademarked label contains misrepresentations as to the identity of the manufacturer of the labeled article, the principle of the maxim should be applied, and the aid of the court in protecting the exclusive rights of the owner in the trademark denied. Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Co. (1865) 11 H. L. Cas. 523, 11 Eng. Reprint, 1435, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 53, 11 Jur. N. S. 513, 12 L. T. N. S. 742, 13 Week. Rep. 873, affirming (1863) 4 De G. J. & S. 137, 46 Eng. Reprint, 868, 2 New Reports, 481, 3 New Reports, 264, 33 L. J. Ch. N. S. 199, 10 Jur. N. S. 81, 9 L. T. N. S. 588, 12 Week Rep. 289; Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood (1883) 108 U. S.

218, 27 L. ed. 706, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Castroville Co-op. Creamery Co. v. Col. (1907) 6 Cal. App. 533, 92 Pac. 648; Coleman, B. & W. Co. v. Dannenberg Co. (1898) 103 Ga. 784, 41 L.R.A. 470, 68 Am. St. Rep. 143, 30 S. E. 639; Prince Mfg. Co. v. Prince's Metallic Paint Co. (1892) 135 N. Y. 38, 17 L.R.A. 129, 31 N. E. 990. See also Nelson v. Winchell & Co. (1909) 203 Mass. 83, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1150, 89 Ν. E. 180.

Thus, in Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Co. (1863) 4 De G. J. & S. 137, 46 Eng. Reprint, 868, the suit was in equity to enjoin the alleged infringement of the right to the exclusive use of a trademark. The plaintiff had purchased the English business of an American manufacturing corporation carrying on business in England and in the United States, its English patents, etc., and continued to stamp the goods, which it thereupon proceeded itself to manufacture, and most of which were untanned, with the label of the said American concern. This label contained statements which, when applied to the manufactured product of the plaintiff, were false. These statements were as follows: That the articles so labeled were the goods of the original manufacturer; that they were manufactured by the American concern; that they were tanned leather cloth; that the articles were patented under a patent issued on a certain date, which covered the process of tanning, and that the labeled goods were manufactured either in the United States, or at a designated place in England. The injunction was refused, and in this connection the court said: "There is a homely phrase, long current in this court, that a plaintiff must come into equity with clean hands. That is not the case with the present plaintiffs, whose case is condemned by the principles to which they appeal, and I must therefore reverse the decree of the vice chancellor, and dismiss their bill; but, as I do not approve of the conduct of the defendants, I dismiss it without costs." This decision was affirmed by the House of Lords in (1865) 11 H. L. Cas. 523, 11 Eng. Reprint, 1435, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 53, 11 Jur. N. S. 513, 12 L. T. N. S. 742, 13 Week. Rep. 873, on the ground that there had been no infringement by defendant, in the opinions in which there is some incidental discussion of the right of plaintiff to use the name of the original manufacturer.

In Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood (1883) 108 U. S. 218, 27 L. ed. 706, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, a bill in equity was filed to restrain the use of an alleged trademark of the complainant, on medicines prepared by the defendants, for an accounting of profits realized from the use of the trademark, and for damages resulting from the infringement. The complainant was the assignee of the property in the trademark and the medicine which the trademark designated, and not the original owner and manufacturer, respectively, thereof. Nevertheless it continued the use of the trademark on the medicine, of which it continued the manufacture and sale, the trademark stating the name of the original manufacturer of the medicine, and the place where the article was made by him. The court found that these representations in the trademark, under the circumstances, were false, and on the principle that the complainant was not in court with "clean hands," because of such misrepresentations, refused the prayer for an injunction, saying: "These statements were deemed important in promoting the use of the article and its sale, or they would not have been continued by the assignees of the original inventor. And yet they could not be used with any honest purpose, when both statements had ceased to be true. It is not honest to state that a medicine is manufactured by Moses Atwood, of Georgetown, Massachusetts, when it is manufactured by the Manhattan Medicine Company in the city of New York."

In Castroville Co-op. Creamery Co. v. Col (1907) 6 Cal. App. 533, 92 Pac. 648, wherein the principle of this maxim was applied, a manufacturer of butter had permitted another to wrap butter of the latter in the former's trademarked wrappers.

However, in Nelson v. Winchell & Co. (1909) 203 Mass. 75, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1150, 89 N. E. 180, it was held that a jobber in shoes, who in his trademarks and letterheads represented himself to be the manufacturer of the shoes labeled, was not guilty of such a misrepresentation as to require the application of the principle of "unclean hands" to his suit for an injunction restraining the use of his trademark, the shoes referred to having been manufactured by another, according to his directions.

In Regent Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Haaker (1905) 75 Neb. 426, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 447, 106 N. W. 595, it was held that the misrepresentation in advertisements, that the goods advertised were manufactured by the advertiser, whereas they were in fact manufactured by another under the "special order and direction" of the advertiser, was not such as to deprive the latter of his relief in a court of equity, on the ground that he was in court with "unclean hands."

In Gruber Almanack Co. v. Swingley (1906) 103 Md. 362, 63 Atl. 684, it was held that the use by his descendants, in the annual editions of an almanac, of the name of the original publisher as the present publisher thereof, was not a deception of the public which would justify a court of equity, under the principle of this maxim, in refusing such descendants an injunction, restraining the publication by another of an almanac in colorable imitation thereof.

Circular letters, which were placed in boxes of cigars by the administrator and successor in the business of the deceased manufacturer, containing a facsimile signature of the latter, and dated as before his death, have been held to be misrepresentations as to the continuance in life of the manufacturer, and, in the application of the principle of the maxim, sufficient to justify the denial of relief to his successor, in a suit to restrain the infringement of his trademark, and unfair competition in his business. Hazlett v. Pollack Stogie Co. (1912) 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 632, 115 C. C. A. 30, 195 Fed. 28, affirming (1911) 188 Fed. 494.

In James Van Dyk Co. v. F. V. Reilly Co. (1911) 73 Misc. 87, 130 N. Y. Supp. 755, one who was a skilled mixer of teas and coffees, and whose skill in this respect produced a high standard of goods, the credit of which accrued to his employer, so that the latter's name on labels signified that the goods so labeled were of the high standard referred to, left the service of his employer, and the latter and its assignee continued to sell its teas and coffees under the same label. It was held that this was not such a misrepresentation of quality as to require the application of the principle of "unclean hands" to the case of the assignee of such employer, which was seeking to enjoin the former employee of its assignor, who had formed a competing company, from using the said label.

d. As to place of manufacture of article.

It has been held that false representations in a trademark or trademarked label as to the place of manufacture of the article labeled therewith, if directly connected with the matter in controversy, are sufficient to justify the denial of the aid of a court of equity to a litigant, in the protection of his rights acquired therein, in the application of the principle of this maxim. Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Co. (1865) 11 H. L. Cas. 523, 11 Eng. Reprint, 1435, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 53, 11 Jur. N. S. 513, 12 L. T. N. S. 742, 13 Week. Rep. 873, affirming (1863) 4 De G. J. & S. 137, 46 Eng. Reprint, 868, 2 New Reports, 481, 3 New Reports, 264, 33 L. J. Ch. N. S. 199, 10 Jur. N. S. 81, 9 L. T. N. S. 588, 12 Week. Rep. 289; Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood (1883) 108 U. S. 218, 27 L. ed. 706, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Coleman, B. & W. Co. v. Dannenberg Co. (1898) 103 Ga. 784, 41 L.R.A. 470, 68 Am. St. Rep. 143, 30 S. E. 639; Prince Mfg. Co. v. Prince's Metallic Paint Co. (1892) 135 N. Y. 38, 17 L.R.A. 129, 31 N. E. 990; Palmer v. Harris (1869) 60 Pa. 156, 100 Am. Dec. 557.

In Bear Lithia Springs Co. v. Great Bear Spring Co. (1906) 71 N. J. Eq. 595, 71 Atl. 383, a false statement

that certain medicinal waters were "bottled at the spring" was held to preclude the proprietor from equitable relief against infringement.

But however deceptive such a statement in a trademark or label may appear to be, if the statement is, in fact, true, the case is not one for the application of the principle of the maxim, and the aid prayed of a court of equity should not for that reason be denied. Therefore, in Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson (1917) 159 С. С. А. 560, 247 Fed. 658, a suit to enjoin the infringement of a trademark, it was held that the defendant could not defeat the right of the plaintiff to an injunction, on the theory that the latter was in court with "unclean hands," by showing that on some of the labels which the plaintiff placed on its goods, and which displayed its trademark, the fact was stated "in large and prominent characters" that the goods were manufactured in a city of the United States, while on others of its labels the fact that the goods were made in a Canadian city was less prominently displayed, and was, therefore, deceptive; as both statements were true.

VII. Fraudulent assignment of property.

a. In general.

A court of equity in the application of the principle of the maxim, "Не who comes into equity must come with clean hands," will refuse to aid a party to a fraudulent transfer of property against an innocent third person. Thus, in Swan v. Castleman (1847) 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 257, wherein the plaintiff, by fraud, coercion, and undue influence, as alleged, procured his wife to join with him in a conveyance of her real estate to a third person, who then reconveyed it to the plaintiff and his wife jointly, it was held that, because of such conduct of the plaintiff, he was in court with "unclean hands," in a suit instituted against an innocent third person for the rents of the property; such third person having acquired possession of the property under a lease, and continuing to remain in possession after the expiration of the term under a color of title. On the principle involved in this maxim, a court of equity will refuse to compel a retransfer of property to a party to a suit, who has transferred it to an opponent in the litigation before the court, or to grant other relief in connection therewith, where the transfer was for a fraudulent purpose. Thus, in Reynolds v. Boland (1902) 202 Pa. 642, 52 Atl. 19, quoting from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, the court said, in part: "Whenever one party, in pursuance of a prior arrangement, has fraudulently obtained property for the benefit of another, equity will not aid the fraudulent beneficiary by compelling a conveyance or transfer to him; and, generally, where two or more have entered into a fraudulent scheme for the purpose of obtaining property in which all are to share, and the scheme has been carried out so that all the results of the fraud are in the hands of one of the parties, a court of equity will not interfere on behalf of the others to aid them in obtaining their share, but will leave the parties in the position where they have placed themselves."

In Stillwell v. Bell (1913) 248 Mo. 61, 154 S. W. 85, the suit was to cancel a deed to real estate, conveyed to the defendant in the suit with the understanding that the latter would reconvey the property to the complainant, after the complainant had procured a divorce from his wife, which he then had in contemplation. The signature of the wife to the deed had been obtained after the complainant had resumed his marital relations with her, following her disclosure to him of her conduct, on which he intended to base his cause of action. The court held that the complainant was not in court with "clean hands" in seeking the reconveyance, and denied the relief prayed.

In Derry v. Fielder (1909) 216 Mo. 176, 115 S. W. 412, it appeared that a purchaser of real estate, who procured the deed to the property to be executed in blank, and filled in the blank with the names of his daughter and her children, for the purpose, as he alleged, of selling the property more easily, his wife (a second wife) having on a previous occasion asserted

her decision never again to join with him in a conveyance of any of his property, was held to be in court with "unclean hands" in seeking to establish a resulting trust in the property, if his purpose in naming his daughter and his grandchildren as grantees in the deed referred to was really to defeat his wife's inchoate right of dower.

In Palmer v. Palmer (1917) 100 Neb. 741, 161 N. W. 277, a conveyance of real estate by the plaintiff to the defendant, to defeat alimony which plaintiff anticipated would be awarded to his wife in a suit for divorce which he contemplated instituting, was successfully pleaded by the defendant in a suit to set aside the conveyance.

Where the relations of two of three persons engaged in a common enterprise, to wit, the formation of a company for the operation of certain coal leases, became strained, and one of them demanded of the other the severance of his connection with the enterprise, it was held that the latter, who, in order to deceive the former, assigned all of his interest in the association to the third associate, with the understanding that the latter would reassign such interest to him on the completion of the organization of the company, was in court with "unclean hands," in seeking against his assignee the enforcement of such reassignment. Reynolds v. Boland (Pa.) supra.

Where, however, an assignment of a fund to a party to a fraudulent scheme was fraudulent only as to a part of the fund, of which an accounting was sought, the principle of this maxim was held not to be applicable to the case of the complainant, as concerning the part thereof which was not tainted with the fraud. Dempster v. Baxmyer (1911) 231 Pa. 28, 79 Atl. 805.

b. To defraud creditors.
1. General rule.

A court of equity, in applying the principle of this maxim, will refuse, as against creditors of the assignor, to protect a party to litigation before it, to whom property has been assigned as part of a fraudulent scheme to defeat the creditors of such assignor. Com. v. Filiatreau (1914) 161 Ky. 434, 170 S. W. 1182 (fraudulent conveyance of live stock to defeat judgment creditor in bastardy proceedings); Bleakley's Appeal, 66 Pa. 187 (fraudulent antedating and assignment of contract for purchase of real estate, to defeat judgment creditor, pleaded in suit by such creditor to cancel assignment); Raasch v. Raasch (1898) 100 Wis. 400, 76 N. W. 591 (conveyance of personalty to plaintiffs by husband of defendant, to defeat anticipated decree in favor of defendant, in divorce proceedings instituted by her).

However, in Huntzicker v. Grocker (1908) 135 Wis. 38, 115 N. W. 340, 15 Ann. Cas. 444, it was held that a woman who had joined in a conveyance of real estate by her husband, to defraud his creditors, was not in court with "unclean hands" in a suit against the assignee in bankruptcy of her husband, to have her inchoate right of dower in the property established, after the said conveyance had been judicially declared to be void at the suit of the said assignee in bankruptcy.

It has been held that whether the intent to perpetrate a fraud on the creditors of the grantor, in a conveyance to defraud such creditors, arose at the time of the conveyance or thereafter, it is equally united with the subjectmatter of the suit. Conlon v. Hosier (1917) 165 Ν. Y. Supp. 746.

A court of equity will not lend its aid to a litigant seeking a retransfer or other relief against a transfer of property by such litigant to, or for the supposed benefit of, his opponent in the suit, executed for the purpose of defrauding the former's creditors; but will leave the parties concerned in the position in which it finds them.

Georgia. Peacock v. Terry (1850) 9 Ga. 137; Bagwell v. Johnson (1902) 116 Ga. 464, 42 S. E. 732.

Illinois. Kassing v. Durand (1891) 41 Ill. App. 93.

Kentucky.-American Asso. v. Innis (1901) 109 Ky. 595, 60 S. W. 388. Michigan. Massi v. Lavine (1905) 139 Mich. 140, 102 N. W. 665.

Missouri.-Creamer v. Bivert (1908) 214 Mo. 473, 113 S. W. 1118; Seibel v. Higham (1909) 216 Mo. 121, 129 Am.

Pennsylvania. - Hershey v. Weiting (1865) 65 Pa. 244; Simcox's Estate (1894) 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 387.

Tennessee.-Harton v. Lyons (1896) 97 Tenn. 180, 36 S. W. 851.

Virginia. Helsley v. Fultz (1882) 76 Va. 675.

Washington. - LANGLEY V. DEVLIN (reported herewith) ante, 32.

Thus, in Kassing v. Durand (1891) 41 III. App. 93, the court said: "One of the most common occasions for the enforcement of the rule that he who comes into equity must do so with clean hands arises in cases where a debtor has, in any manner, transferred his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, and afterwards seeks, as against the transferee, to recover back the property. The door of a court of equity is always shut against such a claimant."

In Wertheimer-Swartz Shoe Co. v. Wyble (1914) 261 Mo. 687, 170 S. W. 1128, after stating this maxim, the court said: "When one attempts to hide the title to his property from his creditors under the mantle of another, equity will not, when the trick has served its purpose, search it out from its hiding place, and return it to him as on a silver platter, in the form of a judicial declaration of the trust in his favor. It will rather, like a famous judge of old, take water and wash its hands in the presence of the multitude, in token of its innocence of the terrible thing about to happen."

In Baird v. Howison (1908) 154 Ala. 359, 45 So. 668, a court of equity refused, in a suit instituted by an insolvent lessee of real estate against his assignee, to lend its aid to enforce a trust in favor of the former in the leased property, where it was shown that the assignment was made to de