Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

Yet we have had hardly a responsible report on this crucial topic in the American press or news media.

The second constitutional issue—and I think it is important to know this—that is being circumvented here is that all appropriations bills have to originate in the House of Representatives. It is specifically mandated by the Constitution. A treaty cannot appropriate funds. The Senate itself, as evidenced by our last session, just prior to the ending thereof, acknowledged that with great pomp and circumstance on the Senate floor.

Here we are entering into a treaty that is going to place a monumental burden upon the taxpayers of America. It has been suggested by the proponents of the treaties that the tolls will take care of everything. There is the misrepresentation that the tolls can cover all the payments to Panama under these treaties—about $70 million a year. Last year we operated at a $7.2 million deficit. How are the tolls going to pay for these increases unless Panama escalates them to such a degree that every country in Latin America is going to be seriously injured?

Every country that uses the canal, including our own and excepting Panama, which always has gotten to use the canal free, is going to be injured. I think it is important to note that we are going to be paying these moneys permitted by a State Department approach here without ever going to the House of Representatives, not only for the permission to transfer $7 to $12 billion—and that is what we have had in testimony before this subcommittee—of American property. The House of Representatives is not even being asked whether they have any interest in the matter. The administration intends to bypass the House and deal only with the Senate.

In addition, we are going to give a total of about $2.25 billion more in cash payments up to the end of this century. Payments will include $350 million in loans, military aid, and other payments almost immediately. Then we will also guarantee $70 million a year to the Panamanians to be taken from canal revenue. The only way those moneys could be raised in addition to assimilating the Panamanians into the operation of the canal—which should be done—is either to drastically increase the tolls or to underwrite the whole giveaway with American taxpayer dollars.

These constitutional issues indicate another overreaching, overextension beyond the separation-of-powers doctrine provided in the Constitution by the executive branch of Government, through the State Department, to the detriment of the Congress and the Constitution.

I think this matter is so crucial that everybody in America ought to know about it. I think that ultimately the Supreme Court will be called upon to support the Congress in this constitutional struggle.

I might also mention that I think that most of the problems we have in this world today are caused by an elitist foreign policy philosophy that has dominated American for too long. It is an elitist philosophy that has made us appear to the world as imperialist colonializers, when the Soviet Union, the greatest imperialist colonializer in the history of the world, controls and dominates colonies all over the world. If the Soviet Union receives any criticism at all from the world, you would never know it from reading the newspapers or viewing television newscasts.

Now we are in the posture of being imperialist colonializers who give up everything—this time the Panama Canal.

Another major foreign policy development that concerns me, is this Presidential release memorandum No. 10, which has indicated that we will use the force of world opinion rather than military aid and assistance to stop world aggression to protect not only Europe but also Korea.

This is the type of State Department foreign policy to which this country is subjected.

The fact of the matter is, as a result of the diplomatic blunders involved in this treaty, we are going to have trouble no matter what we do. If we fail to ratify the treaty and the President does not act firmly and responsibly and expeditiously, we know there will be incidents and difficulties down there. We were also told in Panama that, if we do ratify it, within a short period of time we will probably be shut off from the use of the canal.

We appreciate the witnesses that have come before us in the past. We certainly appreciate those that are here today. I shall be very interested in listening to everything that is said here today.

Senator ALLEN. Senator Scott ?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings and for the caliber of witness that we have appearing before us today and in the past.

I do not have a prepared statement. I would like to say that the proponents of the treaty speak of fairness. I believe this is a good word. I think it is a word that we should remember as we examine this treaty.

In the basic laws of contracts, we learn about consideration. We learn about mutuality. There should be benefits flowing in both directions. I do not find this to be true in an examination of the treaty. It seems to be going one way-away from the United States and to Panama.

Article 12 of the canal treaty, for example, forbids us from building a new canal anywhere in the isthmus without the consent of Panama, well outside of their territorial limits. I see no benefit to the United States, no quid pro quo there. It just seems to me that, in the interest of fairness to our own Government as well as to Panama, we should look very carefully at every provision of this treaty.

Again, I comment the chairman for what he is doing. Senator ALLEN. Thank you very much, Senator Scott and Senator Hatch.

Our first witness is a man who was one of the first to alert the country to the dangers of the proposed Panama Canal Treaty. He has articulated in a most eloquent fashion throughout the Nation the dangers underlying the treaty. We are very pleased that he is here today with his lovely wife Nancy.

He is to be presented to the committee and to those present by Senator Hayakawa, the distinguished Senator from California.

TESTIMONY OF HON. S. I. HAYAKAWA, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Chairman, it certainly is a great pleasure to be here to introduce Ronald Reagan, former Governor of California.

He and I have been associated for a long time. I guess we both got acquainted with each other best of all during the days of the student uproar in 1967–68 and so on. From the point of view of the radical students, he was one of their most unfavorite people. I think he was, from their point of view, Fascist pig No. 1 in California. (Laughter.]

Thereafter, through a whole chain of circumstances, I was appointed, with his assistance, acting president of San Francisco State College. At that time I became not only Governor Reagan's puppet, but Fascist pig No. 2. (Laughter.]

So, we have had a kind of paternal relationship over the years. I want to say right here that we did succeed in producing some kind of order at San Francisco State College which spread to other colleges. In all of that, I owe Governor Reagan a great debt of gratitude.

As you have said, Mr. Chairman, he has been in the forefront of explaining the Panama Canal treaties and the dangers involved therein in eloquent and impassioned terms. He brought the issue home to an awful lot of people. This results in one terrific stack of mail on my desk; I owe that to him, too.

So, it is with great pride and pleasure that I introduce my good friend Ronald Reagan.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you very much, Senator Hayakawa. I would urge you to stay and listen to the Governor. I think possibly your thinking in this matter might be assisted by the Governor's remarks. [Laughter.]

We are delighted to have you, Governor Reagan.

Senator Scott. Mr. Chairman, might I say that we are also glad that the Governor's wife can be with him.

TESTIMONY OF HON. RONALD REAGAN, FORMER GOVERNOR OF

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Governor REAGAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee and Senator Hayakawa, let me express my gratitude for Senator Hayakawa so graciously coming and introducing me here. It is true that we shared some battles together.

I could also say in his behalf that he followed a succession of acting presidents of San Francisco State in those hectic days, all of whom suffered combat fatigue until he arrived. At that time, the fatigue was transferred to the rioters and disturbers; and the people of California are very grateful to him for what he did; so am I.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you this morning to testify. You are concerned, as I am, with constitutional and other issues arising out of the proposed Panama Canal treaties, and I appreciate this opportunity to share my views with you.

It is necessary first to comment on the constitutional issue. Even though I am not a lawyer myself, I can appreciate the hours of research lawyers put into these matters. In reading about the Panama Canal, its history and its operation, as well as its national and international significance, I found myself spending more and more of my time studying the legal cases and opinions whici bear on the canal and our relations with Panama. There is a plentiful supply of logic and common sense in those cases and opinions.

The executive branch argues that the President's treaty-making powers under the Constitution are enough to dispose of U.S. territory and property without any implementing legislation by the Congress, and that transfers of property as specified in a treaty become selfexecuting once the Senate ratifies the treaty. Historically, Congress has held

to a different view, though there have been enough ambiguities over the years to revive the argument with each new case.

At a glance, the U.S. Constitution does seem to be ambiguous about the matter: article II, section 2, clause 2 gives the President authority to negotiate and enter into treaties.

Article VI, section 2 declares that treaties are the supreme law of the land.

But, the Constitution also places a congressional act and a treaty on the same footing.

Article IV, section 3, clause 2 grants "The Congress," meaning both houses, the power to dispose of territory and other federal property.

Treaties, of course, must not be in violation of the Constitution which grants various powers to the President, the Congress, and the States. All of these, at face value, are limited, but in reality they are subject to the limitations imposed by other sections of the Constitution, in the form of specific prohibitions, or by the fact that the Constitution vests concurrent or exclusive power in certain units of the Government.

Whether the proposed Panama Canal treaty needs implementing legislation in order to dispose of U.S. property lies in this question of “concurrent” versus “exclusive” power.

In his recent paper titled "The Treaty Power and Congressional Power in Conflict: Cession of U.S. Property in the Canal Zone to Panama,” Kenneth Merin, Legislative Attorney of the American Law Division of the Library of Congress, makes the point that, “The Constitutional issue is not, or should not be, involvement of the House of Representatives in treaty negotiations," but "whether, by virtue of article IV, Congress exercises exclusive or concurrent power over the disposal of territory and property."

Presumably, if it could be proved that Congress' power is concurrent, the proposed Panama Canal treaties would be complete and self-executing if ratified by the Senate. If, on the other hand, the weight of the evidence is for the other view—that the Congress holds exclusive power over the disposal of territory and property—then Senate ratification is not enough. Implementing legislation by the House of Representatives would be required. I believe that careful examination of legal cases as well as historical precedent leads one to the inevitable conclusion that Congress does hold exclusive power and that implementing legislation will be needed in the case of the Panama Canal treaties.

Now, the executive branch may cite as evidence to support its position the treaties we entered into in the last century with a number of Indian tribes. In these treaties we appeared to be ceding land to the tribes without requiring implementing legislation. The practice was stopped altogether more than a century ago with the passage of the Indian Appropriations Act of 1872, but a closer look at the Indian land treaties shows they were very different from this proposal to turn over U.S. property in the Canal Zone to a foreign government.

The American Indian tribes have always had a unique relationship with the Federal Government and have not been considered foreign nations. When lands were turned over, the tribes were usually given "right of occupancy," with ultimate authority over the lands still to be held by the Federal Government. Even in cases where the treaties gave the tribes the land in fee simple, the Government reserved the right of eminent domain and sometimes the right to hold veto power over transfer of the land to third parties. Neither of these reservations would apply, of course, when turning property over to a foreign nation, such as Panama.

Other arguments will be put forward to support the contention that implementing legislation is not needed in order to dispose of our property in the Canal Zone. One may have to do with treaties which involved boundary claims. The United States has entered into boundary settlement treaties several times in its history, swapping pieces of land here and there without any implementing legislation from Congress. Again, on closer examination, each settlement of a boundary dispute turns out to have been a matter of recognition of the rightness of the claim of our Nation or the other one involved, and not a matter of outright cession of territory.

RYUKYU ISLANDS

The case of the Ryukyu Islands might be cited, too. We turned these islands back to Japan in 1972, following ratification of a treaty without implementing legislation. In the 1951 peace treaty with Japan, however, the Japanese did not renounce their right or title to the Ryukyus, as they did to certain other pieces of territory; so that when the time came to discuss the matter further there was no serious question of ownership.

So much for the flaws in the arguments that are put forth to support the idea that the new Panama Canal treaties can be used to turn over U.S. property without special implementing legislation. The strongest evidence to support the opposite assertion is the past record of disposal of U.S. property in the Canal Zone itself.

I have read thousands of words of newspaper and magazine copy and heard many television and radio broadcasts about the Panama Canal treaty issue, but have seen or heard nothing about these cases in the news media. Yet, their significance cannot be underestimated in establishing that legislation will be required of Congress because of its exclusive power to dispose of territory and property.

Back in 1932, our government wanted to build a new legation building on land inside the Canal Zone. It is not proper, of course, to build a legation on one's own territory. So, a bill was passed by Congress to authorize the Secretary of State to adjust the boundary between the

« PředchozíPokračovat »